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Steve another IF ONLY. The Smithsonian guy ignores the following: At 14:15 GMT a faint scratchy radio message was heard and picked up and recorded by Chief Radio Operator Bellarts on the USCG Itasca. Several people heard the call but only Chief Bellarts was able to discern the words: "Cloudy and overcast."Noonan, he explained, would have plotted his position by the stars until dawn
Duly noted and factored in. Joe, I'm not a pilot an therefore some of my terminology may be weird but, I am well acquainted with vectors and taking their components. An airline pilot is concerned with keeping a schedule and therefor when facing a headwind or any component thereof increases the power to compensate for the reduced Ground Speed increasing his Air Speed and increasing fuel consumption. AE on the other hand had no schedule to keep. Howland and the CG were going nowhere therefore she did not increase power but kept to her Long Range Flight Plan of maximum fuel efficiency. This would mean that the Electra's ground speed (ocean?) would be reduced by the headwind or its component. In 1935 Lockheed had issued memo 465 giving fuel/power settings for all Electras and then in June of 1936 a specific memo 487 for Long Range Electras. This was further enhanced by Kelly Johnson (see telegrams) stating that the Electra's best economy was at a TAS of 130 knots or 150 MPH. In nil wind the two speeds are the same and the 2556 miles to Howland take 17.04 hours. A 10mph headwind reduces the G/S to 140mph and Howland is now 18.25 hours away. NOW I do understand that this increased TIME also burns fuel but at a lesser rate that upping the power to keep the G/S at 150mph since air resistance is proportional to the velocity (of the air) squared.
Forecast received at Lae on June 30th:
EARHART LAE
WEATHER LAE AND HOWLAND GENERALLY AVERAGE MOSTLY CLEAR FIRST 600 MILES WIND ESE10-15 HEAVY LOCAL RAIN SQUALLS TO WESTWARD ON ONTARIO DETOUR AROUND AS CENTER DANGEROUS CLOUDY ONTARIO TO LONG 175 EAST OCCASIONAL HEAVY SHOWERS WINDS EAST AT 10 THENCE TO HOWLAND PARTLY CLOUDY UNLIMITED VISIBILITY WIND ESE 15-20 ADVISE CONSULTING LOCAL WEATHER OFFICIALS AS NO REPORTS YOUR VICINITY AVAILABLE HERE
FLEET AIR BASE PEARL HARBOUR
Another forecast received at Lae on July 1st:
EARHART LAE
FORECAST THURSDAY LAE TO ONTARIO PARTLY CLOUDED RAIN SQUALLS 250 MILES EAST OF LAE WIND EAST SOUTH EAST TWELVE TO FIFTEEN PERIOD ONTARIO TO LONG ONE SEVEN FIVE PARTLY CLOUDY CUMULUS CLOUDS ABOUT TEN THOUSAND FEET MOSTLY UNLIMITED WIND EAST NORTH EAST EIGHTEEN THENCE TO HOWLAND PARTLY CLOUDY SCATTERED HEAVY SHOWERS WIND EAST NORTH EAST FIFTEEN PERIOD AVOID TOWERING CUMULUS AND SQUALLS BY DETOURS AS CENTRES FREQUENTLY DANGEROUS
FLEET AIR BASE PEARL HARBOUR
Altogether, the winds are not favorable for the flight to Howland Island. For the reports that did not reach Earhart and Noonan before they left, the Lae Radio Operator, Harry Balfour, continually broadcast these reports to the Electra but did not receive any acknowledgement that they had been heard.
The fuel loads that we know of, and the mileages that they were intended for:
a. Oakland to Honolulu: 947 USG for 2400 statute miles which included a 40% excess range, i.e. 960 "more miles" making the total 3360 statute miles on 947 USG. A telegram from Kelly Johnson of Lockheed to Earhart states that 900 USG is "ample" for this flight and the 40% excess range.
b. Luke Field, Honolulu to Lae: 900 USG for 1900 miles plus a reserve of 200 USG.
c. Lae to Howland Island: 1100 USG (or 1151 USG) for 2556 Statute Miles plus a further 600 miles if the Contingency Plan was invoked and a turn-back for the Gilbert Islands was made. Total would then be 3156. Note that this 3156 Statute Miles requirement is less than the range possible on 900 USG of the Johnson telegram mentioned at a., above.
On the "First Attempt" flight from Oakland to Honolulu, Earhart made notations that were later put into the book "Last Flight" by her husband George Palmer Putnam. In my copy of the book on pages 33-34, there are notations. There is a section of these notes which are for a point 6 hours and 35 minutes into the flight, she writes:
"Harry (Manning) reports we're ahead of the dead reckoning. Noonan is just figuring position. Gas so far is o.k. The ship now flies like an airplane with almost 2000lbs rt up."
The letters "rt" in "rt up" in the print font, are taken from Earhart's handwriting, and her "r" and "e" are similar. Her handwritten note could have been "et up" which means "eaten up" or perhaps in long form, "used right up,". This indicates that at the 6 hour, 35 minute "into the flight point" or at the latest, the 7 hour point, nearly 2000 lbs of fuel have been used which means "nearly" 333 USG gone. At this 6:35 hour point and according to the Lockheed Long Range Plan, the Electra should have used 413 USG. It had to be 333 because it is defined by "almost 2000 lbs" and 433 USG would weigh 2598 lbs while 333 USG would be 1998 lbs. This could mean that Earhart did not use a high power climb-out but "cruise-climbed" at a lower power setting, thereby using less fuel.
For the Electra at Sea Level, Lockheed states that VL/D. at Sea Level for a weight of 9,300 pounds is 11.85: 1 at 110 mph IAS.
For 12,900 pounds it is 11.85: 1 at 120 mph IAS
For 16,500 pounds AUW it is 11.9: 1 at 150 mph IAS.
In comparison, a Cessna 150 has a Lift Drag Ratio of 7:1, a Boeing 747 has an L/D of 17:1.
The meaning of that call was ominous and would mean that no Astro Navigation was possible.
In the tropics rain and lots of it would often make landing fields unusable. The solution was to cover the landing field with first a 6 inch thick layer of crushed rock, then use a heavy roller to pack it down, then this layer was coated with emulsified asphalt, and then covered with a second layer of fine stone also rolled down. The resulting "Landing Mat" promoted rapid drainage of rain water.keeps referring to the 'landing mat' at Luke Field? There are several references to it in the report.
As it turns out AE did make the correct decision. When they arrived at the African coast south and east of Dakar, conditions were very hazy/foggy less than half mile visability. Reaching Dakar which is located on a peninsula jutting out into the Atlantic would have meant either flying into a setting sun in fog and haze or turning back out toward the ocean and then trying to find Dakar with no radio, limited fuel, and fading light. It was safer to turn northeastward and follow the coast to St. Louis.but they at some stage made a decision to head for St Louis rather than Dakar,
Steve, yea, I am aware of that contention and there is another one of those "anecdotal" statements made a few years after the flight by an airport worker, that he had found a length of antenna wire at the end of the runway.I've been looking into the famous missing antenna.
The French authorities had given Earhart approved routes and they expected her to go where she had said she would go. All of the approved routes across Africa began in Dakar. Failing to land there, if seen as willful disregard of the approved itinerary, might result in the airplane and crew being impounded and fined. If missing Dakar was represented as a navigational mistake, however, especially one for which the female pilot took the blame for not listening to her male navigator, the French authorities might be less likely to hold it against her.
Another thread is running this.Bones discovered on a Pacific island belong to Amelia Earhart, a new forensic analysis claims
Case closed???
OR
Birth of some more conspiracy theories???