Effectiveness of the P-38 (4 Viewers)

[Steamed_Banana]

So no specific numbers, then. Carry on.

I was actually asking if anyone else had numbers.

But I can post operational history from North Africa and from New Guinea as examples to back up the provisional / limited estimates that I did make so far

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I was actually asking if anyone else had numbers.

But I can post operational history from North Africa and from New Guinea as examples to back up the provisional / limited estimates that I did make so far

I asked you for numbers to support your expressed opinions. We all have opinions, and good on you for expressing your own. But bereft of facts, that is all they are, nothing more.

It's obvious that the shorter-ranged planes won't be as successful in the PTO. Don't need numbers for that. But to claim that two rifle-caliber machine guns, or one LMG + one HMG, are as efficacious at downing heavies as cannon, well, that really needs factual support. Quoth Carl Sagan, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof."

Note: I'm not asking for operational histories. I'm asking for statistical support.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

The argument is not if the Ki-43 could still shoot down planes as the war went on. It could.
The argument is how effective they were. Late 1930s Italian fighter armament against 1943-44 4 engine bombers (or even B-25s) is not a recipe for overall success. That is to say shooting down the bombers (and escorting fighters) in enough numbers to stop or restrict allied offences.
And if the Japanese should have done something different later in the war with their resources.

A big problem I have with the Ki-43 is that out of 5750-5900 Ki-43s built 2750 were built in 1944 and another 748 built in 1945.
The Japanese were still going to lose, but a more effective fighter might have added a few weeks to the war.

The Ki-43 was not a recipe for success. Useful is one thing but given equal pilots the Ki-43's attributes did not make up for it's short comings.
Bombers don't care about the size of the turning circle of the attacking fighters.
Fast climb helps the interceptor get into firing position but that is relative. The bombers rarely climb to evade interceptors so once the interceptors are at intercept altitude fast climb is less important although very important for fighting escorts.
Very few fighters were good at everything. But low level speed, low diving speed, poor fire power are not made up for tight turning circle.

I do have to ask or maybe suppose that's what Japan's industry largely had to bear?

Japan had as far back as 1938 (admittedly at least a couple of years behind most major western powers) knew that things were changing, but being a bit late to the table and maybe not realizing how fast things were changing caught them off guard. Hence they were flying what to the British and Germans (and to a degree the US) were 1940 fighters in 1942. Also, a lot of their programs to replace the Zero or Ki-43 either came to naught (A7M) or ran into delays and technical and industrial issues (Ki-61, Ki-84).

Compared to most western powers, Japan in the 1930s and 40s was still a relatively new industrial power. They were also still relatively isolated and had finite resources. Which was one of the very reasons Japan went to war against China and later the US and British/Commonwealth and other western nations. They needed raw materials and resources to feed the imperial machine--materials and resources they didn't have readily at hand at home.

This is of course much the same reason why Germany went to war, as did ultimately Italy. They needed materials and resources to build their empires--stuff that they often were chronically short of. One can argue overall for the Axis that this was a self-defeating expedition. You already lack things, so you got to war to get more resources only to burn though a lot of what you already had. Not to mention that the biggest problem that both Germany and Japan had in 1942 was huge swaths of territory that they had to occupy, and relatively few people and material to occupy it beyond the front lines. Which, of course, complicated matters further.

Germany and Japan depended on quick, crushing victories and rapid surrenders of their enemies to meet their goals. When that didn't happen, it can be said that their fates were sealed, sooner or later.

But back to the main subject. Because of issues with their next generation aircraft that have been pointed out, one can say that keeping Zeros and Ki-43s in production, no matter how obsolescent, was better than no new fighters at all. Of course, Zeros and Ki-43s were still formidable in the hands of capable pilots, especially when they were able to exploit inexperienced or even overly cocky or over-brave Allied pilots. As Allied tactics and aircraft improved, Japanese losses began to mount. Not every fight in the air went the Allies way, but it did, more often than not, and being "stuck" with increasingly obsolescent aircraft and perhaps even worse a lack of pilots who could get the best out of them, meant that by 1945 the IJA and IJN were struggling to maintain any semblance of air superiority, even over the home islands. In fact, it can be argued that they had lost the plot totally by then.

Again, this is not dismissing the IJA or IJN, but the fact was be it intercepting bombers, or dealing with Allied fighters and inflicting losses that were unsustainable, Japan was after 1942 in a very unfavorable position. Things were similarly bleak for Germany in the air war in the vest by the Normandy Invasion, if not before, and Italy, well, they were basically up a creek without a paddle when Benito Mussolini idiotically threw Italy into a war it was unprepared for (and relatively few Italians actually wanted) in June of 1940.

Granted, the discussion of "how things got there" is just as important as the "got there" part.

 

[Shortround6]

As for rates of shoot-downs by one aircraft type or another, I do not have any statistics handy, but I know the operational history of the A6M vs B-17s and B-24s in New Guinea and Solomons area from the same kind of data I posted above, and the results are similar but I would say the A6Ms did a bit worse. This may be because they were fighting B-17s more often than B-24s, (I think B-17s were a little tougher) and it may be due to the wild weather in the South Pacific which often allowed aircraft to escape - a lot of recon B-17s ended up ducking into storm clouds. B-17s seemed to operate with some degree of relative impunity over the Solomons as recon, (long shot) anti-shipping strikes, and occasional low level raids on ports and airfields. I don't think you could say the losses were hugely different, but I suspect the Army did a little better against the US Heavy bombers- both in the Solomons and in Burma.

As for Bf 109s vs US Heavy bombers, i.e. without a lot of heavy fighters and special weapons, gun packs etc., I don't know about NW Europe 8th AF etc., but I do know the operational history in North Africa fairly well, and I can tell you that B-17s and B-24s did not get slaughtered there, though they were almost always escorted. Loss rates weren't much higher than they were in Burma, I'd guess (just a guess I haven't done a statistical sample).

when comparing different theaters we have to figure, as noted, different weather, different altitudes and different force ratios. 20 interceptors vs 10 bombers is different than 15 interceptors to 6 bombers.
B-17s and B-24s were not completely interchangeable. B-17s are generally acknowledged as being tougher (taking more damage before not flying anymore), they also tended to fly a bit higher, but that depends on the exact operations. Advantage changed with models of the bombers and the attacking aircraft. B-17E and Fs flew a bit faster and higher than the Gs.
A B-17 with bombs gone and part fuel was pretty fast. Escorting can a make big difference but escorting only goes so far. A lot depends the force ratios.

This was clearly the approach the Germans took, I'm just pointing out there appeared to be more than one way to skin that proverbial cat, at least to a point.

The problem is the "appears" part. Germans could not with the 109 use enough guns to shoot down bombers without comprising ability to deal with escorts.
Germans were having trouble building enough fighters and training enough pilots. Needed to use different interceptor for the escorts and the bombers that were not interchangeable was not really cost effective. Using 109s to deal with escorts while using 190s for bomber busting was also not ideal.

All things being equal, having more and heavier guns is better. But we do certainly know that many aircraft suffered from the extra weight of heavier guns - notably the Bf 109G series, especially those with the gun pods, were less agile and more vulnerable to Allied fighters, right?

See above. Problem for the Japanese was that JAAF they had no heavily armed fighters of any type until 1944 (?). The Ki-45 was not a firepower highpoint.

My point here is that aircraft design is to some extent a trade off along the lines of paper / scissors / rock. You want good handling, fast roll rate, turn rate, speed, acceleration, climb, dive, armor, self sealing tanks, heavy guns, more and heavier guns, long range (large fuel capacity and / or great fuel efficiency), altitude performance (high ceiling). You may not be able to have all of these things in the same aircraft.

The more powerful the engine and the larger the aircraft the easier it was to combine performance and firepower/protection. If you are using 1100-1300hp engines you have limited options. Power at altitude was important and here the US had problems with the Allison. P-39 had short range and poor altitude performance. In part due to weight. P-39s would have made lousy interceptors against B-17s or B-24s if the bombers stayed above 20,000ft. If the bombers flew at 12,000ft they would have been in a lot more trouble.

We know that the early Spitfires (up to the VIII) did not do so well in the Pacific or CBI Theaters. I don't think that the Bf 109, MC 202, Yak 1, or La 5 would have either. FW 190 maybe to a point, but it was also limited by short range.

Some of this was tactics and experience. Bombers were not being intercepted hundreds of miles from the bomber bases. Ki-43s were very useful in the 1941/42 advances. Long range was also useful for moving from place to place. If the bombers were attacking Rangoon docks or other fixed locations (airfields) long range was less important. Once the Japanese moved to more defensive operations range became less important.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I asked you for numbers to support your expressed opinions. We all have opinions, and good on you for expressing your own. But bereft of facts, that is all they are, nothing more.

I was pretty clear what I had to offer in terms of data. The issue is that a lot of these operational histories are relatively new, having been published in the last 10-15 years, up to as recently as a few months ago in terms of the South Pacific. So we don't actually have statistics compiled from them, at least that I know of. But you can read the operational histories and see clear patterns. We (SR6 and I) have actually already presented most of the JAAF vs US heavy bomber actions in the CBI from 1943, for example.

It's obvious that the shorter-ranged planes won't be as successful in the PTO. Don't need numbers for that. But to claim that two rifle-caliber machine guns, or one LMG + one HMG, are as efficacious at downing heavies as cannon, well, that really needs factual support. Quoth Carl Sagan, "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof."

Like I said, I can post operational history of the (20mm cannon armed) A6M vs US heavy bombers, albeit with some effort so if people are just going to tune it out then why bother? And I could also post some examples from the Med as well, but ... same issue.

Note: I'm not asking for operational histories. I'm asking for statistical support.

Statistics at a high level are not available yet, and even if they were, if anyone posted them here some would debate them endlessly and we would ultimately end up ... back in the operational histories. Which some people also will claim aren't real.

However, if you know anything about statistics, like if you took it in university, you can extrapolate statistical trends from a relatively smaller sample of a whole.

And on that basis, I would argue (yes, this is just opinion) that the A6M did not have particularly better luck against B-17s and B-24s than the Ki-43 did. Which could be in part due to a variety of factors as I also previously noted, but some of these encounters took place in the same area (i.e. over or near New Guinea).

Anyway, i haven't seen a case yet where Ki-43s proved incapable of shooting down Allied heavy bombers, in spite of their light armament. Sometimes they took heavy losses, sometimes they did not, but the bombers always paid a price and it was enough to influence decisions on where to strike.

And in spite of the numerous heavy bomber raids in North Africa in 1943, I don't know of any cases where major slaughters took place at the hands of cannon-armed Axis fighters eg Bf 109s and Fw 190s. If anyone has one to bring up, please post it.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

But back to the main subject. Because of issues with their next generation aircraft that have been pointed out, one can say that keeping Zeros and Ki-43s in production, no matter how obsolescent, was better than no new fighters at all. Of course, Zeros and Ki-43s were still formidable in the hands of capable pilots, especially when they were able to exploit inexperienced or even overly cocky or over-brave Allied pilots. As Allied tactics and aircraft improved, Japanese losses began to mount. Not every fight in the air went the Allies way, but it did, more often than not, and being "stuck" with increasingly obsolescent aircraft and perhaps even worse a lack of pilots who could get the best out of them, meant that by 1945 the IJA and IJN were struggling to maintain any semblance of air superiority, even over the home islands. In fact, it can be argued that they had lost the plot totally by then.

Without a doubt they had. This both due to quantity (!!) and quality of the enemy aircraft, as well as lack of trained pilots, fuel, spare parts, ships, ammunition, everything they needed to fight. By later 1944 they were absolutely cooked, as were the Germans.

What's interesting to me though is that part of the war we tend to fast-forward through, especially the pivotal year of 1943 when it was definitely still very much a fight. Momentum was slightly on the Allied side, but not along the lines of 11-1 kill ratios like we'd been told when we were all younger. This long tipping point - We could say second half of 1942 (when the Allies kind of caught up after being heavily on their back foot for the first six months and before back to the late 1930s, depending on which Theater you are talking about) through the first few months of 1944, when both the quality and (especially) quantity of the Allied war-machines utterly outstripped what Japan could produce.

Again, this is not dismissing the IJA or IJN, but the fact was be it intercepting bombers, or dealing with Allied fighters and inflicting losses that were unsustainable, Japan was after 1942 in a very unfavorable position. Things were similarly bleak for Germany in the air war in the vest by the Normandy Invasion, if not before, and Italy, well, they were basically up a creek without a paddle when Benito Mussolini idiotically threw Italy into a war it was unprepared for (and relatively few Italians actually wanted) in June of 1940.

Granted, the discussion of "how things got there" is just as important as the "got there" part.

The tipping point of the war, in the period I discussed, was still touch and go. Outcome of the war was probably inevitable (arguably) but how long it would have taken could have varied quite a bit, I suspect.

To your point about industrial capacity, and SR6 can probably wax more eloquent than I about this, the Japanese were limited in their ability to produce engines. The 14 cylinder Nakajima Sakae engine was something of a miracle in terms of fuel efficiency and reliability, but it made less than 1,000 hp, and this was only ever later increased to about 1,200 using water-injection for WEP. This limited the size and weight of the type of aircraft which used it. Arrival of much more powerful engines like the 18 cylinder Nakajima Homare 21, which did eventually come, took far too long (and too long to reach reliability levels). But it did reach 2,000+ hp. Engine technology was arguably the most difficult engineering problem of WW2 aircraft design, and Japan was pretty good at it on the world stage, but probably behind the UK, Germany, and the US.

However, they did have strong capabilities, and it's debatable whether Japan could have produced more powerful engines sooner. The relatively small engines like the Sakae were ideal for their circumstances - i.e. long distances, relatively little fuel available (certainly compared to the US). So did the industrial situation define the design or vice versa? Hard to say, maybe it's a little of both.

 

[GregP]

It's also proven to be the case that the 6-1 and 10-1 kill ratios much vaunted and much lauded in the history of our air wars, notably by the US in the Pacific, turn out not to be real. Which is really my point here. During 1943 the ratio was closer to 1-1 between US / Allied vs Japanese fighters, in spite of the alleged obsolescence of the IJN and JAAF aircraft.



I mean, that's true, but I don't think it fully accounts for the data.

Let's say we agree to disagree. There is no other country that fought in WWII with a better-vetted victory list than the U.S.A. . We are the only country who spent money to produce a vetted list, at least for the USAAF (Report 85). Everone else just wanted the war expense to be over and left the aerial victories where they were when the war ended. The US Navy document "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics of World War Two" lays out the logic and data used to produce the reports quite well. I have never seen a similar document for the UK, USSR, Japan, or any other WWII combatant. So, they stand as the best documents available, at least for US aerial combat. I've never seen a single document for the UK for the RAF or RN. There are reports of the Battle of Britain and for other time periods and coammands, but I have not seen a summary document for the war.

The Japanese didn't save individual data. They saved it for com,bat units. The scores were largely complied from indivudual war diaries of former Japanese aviators after the war. There is no way to get better data, but it is far from definitive.

There are German claims files for 1939 - 1945, but they are incomplete as some data have been lost. But, we DO have a lot of claims data. Verification is another story.

That being the case, it is very difficult to see how you can credibly claim the data are not real. All we HAVE are claims data for most of the world.

The USA data is as good as can be had, and the loss data world-wide are VERY far from 100% accurate. As much loss data as victory data was likely lost to battle damage, and some nation's data are suspect to start with. Some awarded points instead of victories! I have spoken with Russians who said Soviet data from that time were produced from political entities, not from real reports. The USA loss data are pretty decent since we didn't have anyone bombing our archives in the USA, and almost all the loss data was transmitted from the front to back home, but I'm not really sure we know everything down to the aircraft, either. Are you?

Just thinking out loud here. People today tend to think we have data about everything, but that is NOT the case. We DO have a lots of claims made by people, but a large majority of them cannot cite a source that makes sense.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

That being the case, it is very difficult to see how you can credibly claim the data are not real. All we HAVE are claims data for most of the world.

That is just not true Greg. We do have loss data for most of WW2, and it's again, just basic reality that it's easier to count your own lost aircraft than how many you THINK we shot down of the enemy aircraft. we do have loss records for the Japanese, for the Germans, for the Italians, for all the Western Allies, for the Finns, for the minor Axis nations, and even for the Soviets.

10-1 or 11- 1 isn't real, and we know that for a fact now.

The USA data is as good as can be had, and the loss data world-wide are VERY far from 100% accurate.

Again, your own units loss data is much more accurate than their guess of enemy losses

As much loss data as victory data was likely lost to battle damage, and some nation's data are suspect to start with. Some awarded points instead of victories! I have spoken with Russians who said Soviet data from that time were produced from political entities, not from real reports. The USA loss data are pretty decent since we didn't have anyone bombing our archives in the USA, and almost all the loss data was transmitted from the front to back home, but I'm not really sure we know everything down to the aircraft, either. Are you?

Achieving 100% certainty in history, including relatively recent history, is never possible. But I don't think you are making a good case for why claims records are more accurate than loss records.

Just thinking out loud here. People today tend to think we have data about everything, but that is NOT the case. We DO have a lots of claims made by people, but a large majority of them cannot cite source that make sense.

Some things will never make sense if you really don't want them to.

 

[Shortround6]

I do have to ask or maybe suppose that's what Japan's industry largely had to bear?

Japan had as far back as 1938 (admittedly at least a couple of years behind most major western powers) knew that things were changing, but being a bit late to the table and maybe not realizing how fast things were changing caught them off guard. Hence they were flying what to the British and Germans (and to a degree the US) were 1940 fighters in 1942. Also, a lot of their programs to replace the Zero or Ki-43 either came to naught (A7M) or ran into delays and technical and industrial issues (Ki-61, Ki-84).

Compared to most western powers, Japan in the 1930s and 40s was still a relatively new industrial power. They were also still relatively isolated and had finite resources. Which was one of the very reasons Japan went to war against China and later the US and British/Commonwealth and other western nations. They needed raw materials and resources to feed the imperial machine--materials and resources they didn't have readily at hand at home.

This is of course much the same reason why Germany went to war, as did ultimately Italy. They needed materials and resources to build their empires--stuff that they often were chronically short of. One can argue overall for the Axis that this was a self-defeating expedition. You already lack things, so you got to war to get more resources only to burn though a lot of what you already had. Not to mention that the biggest problem that both Germany and Japan had in 1942 was huge swaths of territory that they had to occupy, and relatively few people and material to occupy it beyond the front lines. Which, of course, complicated matters further.

Germany and Japan depended on quick, crushing victories and rapid surrenders of their enemies to meet their goals. When that didn't happen, it can be said that their fates were sealed, sooner or later.

But back to the main subject. Because of issues with their next generation aircraft that have been pointed out, one can say that keeping Zeros and Ki-43s in production, no matter how obsolescent, was better than no new fighters at all. Of course, Zeros and Ki-43s were still formidable in the hands of capable pilots, especially when they were able to exploit inexperienced or even overly cocky or over-brave Allied pilots. As Allied tactics and aircraft improved, Japanese losses began to mount. Not every fight in the air went the Allies way, but it did, more often than not, and being "stuck" with increasingly obsolescent aircraft and perhaps even worse a lack of pilots who could get the best out of them, meant that by 1945 the IJA and IJN were struggling to maintain any semblance of air superiority, even over the home islands. In fact, it can be argued that they had lost the plot totally by then.

Again, this is not dismissing the IJA or IJN, but the fact was be it intercepting bombers, or dealing with Allied fighters and inflicting losses that were unsustainable, Japan was after 1942 in a very unfavorable position. Things were similarly bleak for Germany in the air war in the vest by the Normandy Invasion, if not before, and Italy, well, they were basically up a creek without a paddle when Benito Mussolini idiotically threw Italy into a war it was unprepared for (and relatively few Italians actually wanted) in June of 1940.

Granted, the discussion of "how things got there" is just as important as the "got there" part.

That is good reasoning and there are many good points.
The A7M came to nothing impart because they changed the requirements at least once. So did some other people.
The A6M seemed to be somewhat adaptable or perhaps the design team spent more time adapting it rather than jumping around trying new things.
Japanese don't seem to get the credit they deserve for some of their 2 speed superchargers.
JAAF was little bit late getting on the two speed wagon. Ki-43s were around 5-6 months late vs the A6M3.
The engineers at Mitsubishi wanted to use own Kinsei engine rather than the Sakae 21 engine but were overruled.
A6M3 went for 100rpg on the 20mm cannon in the summer of 1942. And soon after went to a more powerful round in the 20mm cannon.
JAAF stayed wedded to the pair of 12.7mm machine guns. Their "upgrade" in the Ki-44 and Ki-61 was adding a pair of 7.7mm machine guns in the early versions.
JAAF was splitting their own effort, forget about teaming up with the Navy. The 2nd production line for the Ki-43 was not producing until May of 1943 and didn't hit triple digits until Feb 1944. 3rd production came in later than expected in Oct 1943 but lack of trained workers kept production well below expected levels. Question is why were the Japanese building extra production lines for Ki-43s in 1943? Even getting the Army version of the Sakae 21 engine was not enough to get the needed performance or firepower advantages required.
JAAF were seduced by the "specialty" fighter theory. A "standard" fighter with high maneuverability and poor fire power and a "heavy" fighter with more firepower and higher speed (Ki-44 and Ki-61) Turns out the V-12 engine had problems and they waited way too long to try another engine in the K-61 and they stuck with the small wing on the Ki-44 for the small gain in speed instead of build a four gun fighter with better handling.
JAAF building 3 different single engine, single seat fighters at the same time before the KI-84 even showed up was kind of a waste.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The more powerful the engine and the larger the aircraft the easier it was to combine performance and firepower/protection. If you are using 1100-1300hp engines you have limited options. Power at altitude was important and here the US had problems with the Allison. P-39 had short range and poor altitude performance. In part due to weight. P-39s would have made lousy interceptors against B-17s or B-24s if the bombers stayed above 20,000ft. If the bombers flew at 12,000ft they would have been in a lot more trouble.

This is the crux of where we disagree. If we categorize fighter aircraft as "Very Light", "Light", "Semi-heavy", and "heavy", according to the following rough criteria:

2,000-5,000 lbs gross weight - light
5,000-7,000 lbs gross weight - semi-light
7,000-10,000 lbs gross weight - semi-heavy
10,000+ gross weight - heavy (with or without twin engines)

We can break it down as follows:
(I put the most significant aircraft for the war between 1940-45 in blue and blold)

Ki-27, A5M, Ki-43-I, CR 32, CR 42, Gladiator, I-153, I-16, MC. 200 - Very Light
A6M, Ki-43-II - III, Ki-44, Fiat G.50, MC. 202, early Bf 109D, E, F, Hawker Hurricane Mk 1, Spitfire Mk 1 - Mk V, Yak 1 - 7 - 9, Yak 3, LaGG-3, P-36 - Light
MiG-3, La 5FN, MC. 205, Ki-61, J2M Raiden, Ki-84, Bf 109G, Fw 190A, P-39, P-40, P-51A, P-51B, F4F Wildcat, Hurricane II, Spitfire Mk VIII and IX (and later), Semi-Heavy
Ki-45, Westland Whirlwind, DH Mosquito, Hawker Typhoon, Hawker Tempest, Fairey Fulmar, P-38, P-47, F6F Hellcat, F4U Corsair, P-51D, Fw 190F and D, Bf 110, Bf 210/ 410- Heavy

Feel free to add in any I forgot.

We can dismiss the 'Very Light' as being mostly pre-war designs that fought only in the earliest years of the war. The single exception being the Ki-43-I, in my opinion.

I'd say of the most important fighters of the war, arguably 8 or 9 (depending on how you count variants) were "Light", 9 were "Semi-Heavy", and 10 were "Heavy".

The light fighters, including some which were successful right to the end of the war (like Yak 3) had light to very light armament. The Bf 109F which was one of the most successful variants of that very successful aircraft, only had 3 guns, one cannon (originally a 15mm) and two light machine guns.

We in the Anglophone world tend to credit the "Medium Heavy' and "Heavy" types almost exclusively, but I don't think that is necessarily correct.

Some of this was tactics and experience. Bombers were not being intercepted hundreds of miles from the bomber bases. Ki-43s were very useful in the 1941/42 advances. Long range was also useful for moving from place to place. If the bombers were attacking Rangoon docks or other fixed locations (airfields) long range was less important. Once the Japanese moved to more defensive operations range became less important.

The thing is, targets like Rangoon docks were more the exception than the rule. This is why aircraft like the Ki-44, despite relatively good performance, had little impact. Most targets are going to be far more remote airfields, docks, ship landing or mooring sites, ships at sea, armies in the field, etc. etc. It helped enormously to be able to reach out.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Two other comments -

On counting enemy losses
This is not just an issue for aviation enthusiasts. It was a very real and chronic problem for the US long after WW2, for example perhaps most tragically in Vietnam. We tend to make delusional estimates of destruction of the enemy, or even worse, require proof (like body counts, which may count people but not necessarily enemy combatants) and thus convince ourselves we are winning when we actually aren't. We saw some of this in Afghanistan as well. The US is by no means the only nation with this problem but it has been a chronice problem in US armed services.

On the P-38 specifically and the middle of the war
I like to make model kits, and reading this thread made me realize how much more important the P-38F, G, and H were than the improved J and L versions. So I wanted to get a kit or two of these earlier variants. But if you look for model kits of the P-38, at least in the 'gentleman's scale' (1/72) it's relatively hard to find the early ones. Airfix made a P-38F and a P-38H but both are quite old now, RS (a short run company - kits are good but quite expensive) makes F, G, H and I think Tamiya or Hasegawa has an old P-38 kit that can be made as an F or a J/L. But it's amazing how ubiquitous the J and L kits are in comparison.

It's almost like we just fast forwarded past the difficult (but also arguably more interesting) parts of the history strait over to the hoorah kick-ass we won part.

I'm a lot more curious than I used to be about how P-38F, G and H pilots managed to hold their own in combat, which they clearly eventually did, given all the challenges.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

Let's say we agree to disagree. There is no other country that fought in WWII with a better-vetted victory list than the U.S.A. . We are the only country who spent money to produce a vetted list, at least for the USAAF (Reprot 85). Everone else just wanted the war expense to be over and left the aerial victories where they were when the war ended. The US Navy document "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics of World War Two" lays out the logic and data used to produce the repoprts quite well. I have never seen a similar document for the UK, USSR, Japan, or any other WWII combatant. So, they stand as the best documents available, at least for US aerial combat. I've never seen a single document for the UK for the RAF or RN.

The Japanese didn't save individual data. They saved it for com,bat units. The scores were largely complied from indivudual war diaries of former Japanese aviators after the war. There is no way to get better data, but it is far from definitive.

There are German claims files for 1939 - 1945, but they are incomplete as some data have been lost. But, we DO have a lot of claims data. Verification is another story.

That being the case, it is very difficult to see how you can credibly claim the data are not real. All we HAVE are claims data for most of the world.

The USA data is as good as can be had, and the loss data world-wide are VERY far from 100% accurate. As much loss data as victory data was likely lost to battle damage, and some nation's data are suspect to start with. Some awarded points instead of victories! I have spoken with Russians who said Soviet data from that time were produced from political entities, not from real reports. The USA loss data are pretty decent since we didn't have anyone bombing our archives in the USA, and almost all the loss data was transmitted from the front to back home, but I'm not really sure we know everything down to the aircraft, either. Are you?

Just thinking out loud here. People today tend to think we have data about everything, but that is NOT the case. We DO have a lots of claims made by people, but a large majority of them cannot cite source that make sense.

Not to mention when you read lists, from no matter whom, I'd add one or two caveats. For instance, the P-51 Mustang has a 11:1 kill/loss ratio, but that's exclusively counting the European Theater. The F6F Hellcat had a 19:1 kill/loss ration, but that's exclusively USN. Also remember that these are averages I'd think. I did try and look up a list for these things, but the best I could quickly do was Google AI, so make of that what you will (I have my suspicions about those claims that I wasn't able to vet, like the P-51 and Hellcat claims) Namely about one claim that the Ki-43 by War's end had a 1:4 kill loss ratio.

Granted, there's outliers like the Fiat G50 in Finnish service having a 29:1 kill/loss ratio, and the Brewster F2A Buffalo having a 32:1 k/l in Finnish service.

Which is another big caveat that I have that goes back to point #1--context and where/when does matter.

 

[tomo pauk]

To your point about industrial capacity, and SR6 can probably wax more eloquent than I about this, the Japanese were limited in their ability to produce engines. The 14 cylinder Nakajima Sakae engine was something of a miracle in terms of fuel efficiency and reliability, but it made less than 1,000 hp, and this was only ever later increased to about 1,200 using water-injection for WEP. This limited the size and weight of the type of aircraft which used it.

If I may.
Japanese have had the engines of greater power in series production, before Homare materialized. Nakajima was making the Ha 41 and the Ha 109 in quick succession. These engines were doing 30-40% better power than the Sakae of the day (the Ha 109 was very close to what the BMW 801 was doing), and were pretty light and compact. Price of these engines was a bit greater than of the Sakae family (25000 yen vs. 20000, by some time of 1942), but the 'no free lunch' rule applies as ever. That IJA had not put the ever greater emphasis on these engines is just the IJA's mistake, nobody else's.
IJA also made a mistake when they approved the Ki-45 - aircraft that used two 14 cyl engines to bring one cannon to the fight, in the time the Zero was bringing two cannons to the fight with just one engine. There was no extra/super performance or firepower offered by the Ki 45 in order to be worth it, while it required twice the engines and fuel when compared to Zero.
Japanese resources would've been better spent with a Ha-41/-109 powered fighter (it does not need to be Ki 44). Install the alcohol-water add-on to the 109, as well as the better exhausts and were in the spitting distance vs. the Homare operating under restricted settings. The resulting fighter would've cost them less to own and operate than the Ki-45, while being a better fighter overall.

There is also the Kinsei, the engine similar to the Ha-41/-109 family, that again it took forever (until 1945) to be installed on a fighter. A mistake by both IJA and IJN.

IJN also made a mistake by not speccing the J2M to be 1st and foremost the carrier-borne design, and with the 'normal' Kasei. The Gekko, Saiun and the fancy floatplanes were a fancy luxury.

Mitsubishi in 1944 made more than 2000 of the Ha 42 engines (and 700+ in 1945), that were making around 2000 HP and were not picky about the fuel, yet these were not powering a no-nonsense fighter the Japanese needed badly.

tl;dr - while Japanese were sometimes behind the 'West', a lot of the problems (= no having the more modern fighters by mid-war) was of their own making.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

To your point about industrial capacity, and SR6 can probably wax more eloquent than I about this, the Japanese were limited in their ability to produce engines. The 14 cylinder Nakajima Sakae engine was something of a miracle in terms of fuel efficiency and reliability, but it made less than 1,000 hp, and this was only ever later increased to about 1,200 using water-injection for WEP. This limited the size and weight of the type of aircraft which used it. Arrival of much more powerful engines like the 18 cylinder Nakajima Homare 21, which did eventually come, took far too long (and too long to reach reliability levels). But it did reach 2,000+ hp. Engine technology was arguably the most difficult engineering problem of WW2 aircraft design, and Japan was pretty good at it on the world stage, but probably behind the UK, Germany, and the US.

This is an area, as SR6 will agree, was critical towards the aviation ascendance of the Western Allies and also the downfall of the Axis. The perhaps biggest single critical factor that can be singled out is fuel. The US and Britain used 100 octane fuel minimum for most of the war. By some point in 1944, they had 150 octane fuel available, and significant amounts of it. That was a major ingredient (among several) in taking the Rolls-Royce Merlin from being a just over 1000 hp engine at the start of World War II to being capable of making over 2000 hp by war's end, for a very vivid example. Two stage supercharged Merlins were even making 2000+ hp on engine dynos/test benches as early as 1942, but note, this was on test benches and dynos, and not yet a production reality (1944-45).

Also notable was the power that the RAF got out of the Allison V-1710s they modified for their Tac Recon Mustangs, that allowed them to do approx 400 mph on the deck and gave those Mustangs 4000+ fpm initial climb rates (per a document that Colin Ford sent me recently). Those engines were pushing out almost the same power as late war Merlins on 80 in/HG/25 PSI supercharger boost in 1942, which shows how good a design the Allison indeed was (aside from the crap supercharger).

Back to the Axis, Japan (depending on Army or Navy) had 91/92 octane fuel. Not the best for making a ton of power from small capacities (relatively speaking) or especially high supercharger boost numbers. Granted, Germany and Italy were even worse off, having to make due with chiefly 87 octane fuel (though Germany was able to make relatively limited amounts of 100 octane B4 spec fuel, but this wasn't exactly common). But the Japanese were "stuck" like the Germans having to run big displacement, or high revs, or ADI, or some combination to make the power that the Western Allies were making just by cranking up supercharger boost, let alone when we started tinkering with ADI.

Not to mention that as SR6 will point out, high octane fuel is just one factor (though an important one) that allowed for different things to be engineered and exploited, among several others.

It wasn't until very late in the War that the Axis powers were able to get their hands on 2000+hp engines that were designed with that power in mind from the outset, and it also took them longer to engineer existing engine designs to achieve that. This caused issues for Germany with the He-177 (not the only thing, but a huge factor), and also hurt both Germany and Japan quite badly when it came to high powered interceptor fighters (not counting jet fighters).

It does come down to technical and industrial infrastructure to a large degree.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I was pretty clear what I had to offer in terms of data. The issue is that a lot of these operational histories are relatively new, having been published in the last 10-15 years, up to as recently as a few months ago in terms of the South Pacific. So we don't actually have statistics compiled from them, at least that I know of. But you can read the operational histories and see clear patterns. We (SR6 and I) have actually already presented most of the JAAF vs US heavy bomber actions in the CBI from 1943, for example.

Yes, I know. I was asking if that had actually been done. The answer is evidently "no." I've read plenty of accounts of individual actions, but without collating and organizing them, and compiling comparative tables for other possible causes, "seeing clear patterns" is an invitation to subjectivity that undermines the point of basing opinions on facts.

The other thing is that attributing this success or that failure to the qualities of the fighter courts the post-hoc fallacy, as those results may be due to many other factors, and are likely a combination of factors anyway.

It's great that you have an opinion. but I want to see evidence that a machine-gun armament is as efficacious as a cannon-armament. It's okay if you don't have it, so long as you don't mind coming to terms with Hitchens's Razor.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

This is an area, as SR6 will agree, was critical towards the aviation ascendance of the Western Allies and also the downfall of the Axis. The perhaps biggest single critical factor that can be singled out is fuel. The US and Britain used 100 octane fuel minimum for most of the war. By some point in 1944, they had 150 octane fuel available, and significant amounts of it. That was a major ingredient (among several) in taking the Rolls-Royce Merlin from being a just over 1000 hp engine at the start of World War II to being capable of making over 2000 hp by war's end, for a very vivid example. Two stage supercharged Merlins were even making 2000+ hp on engine dynos/test benches as early as 1942, but note, this was on test benches and dynos, and not yet a production reality (1944-45).

Also notable was the power that the RAF got out of the Allison V-1710s they modified for their Tac Recon Mustangs, that allowed them to do approx 400 mph on the deck and gave those Mustangs 4000+ fpm initial climb rates (per a document that Colin Ford sent me recently). Those engines were pushing out almost the same power as late war Merlins on 80 in/HG/25 PSI supercharger boost in 1942, which shows how good a design the Allison indeed was (aside from the crap supercharger).

Back to the Axis, Japan (depending on Army or Navy) had 91/92 octane fuel. Not the best for making a ton of power from small capacities (relatively speaking) or especially high supercharger boost numbers. Granted, Germany and Italy were even worse off, having to make due with chiefly 87 octane fuel (though Germany was able to make relatively limited amounts of 100 octane B4 spec fuel, but this wasn't exactly common). But the Japanese were "stuck" like the Germans having to run big displacement, or high revs, or ADI, or some combination to make the power that the Western Allies were making just by cranking up supercharger boost, let alone when we started tinkering with ADI.

Not to mention that as SR6 will point out, high octane fuel is just one factor (though an important one) that allowed for different things to be engineered and exploited, among several others.

It wasn't until very late in the War that the Axis powers were able to get their hands on 2000+hp engines that were designed with that power in mind from the outset, and it also took them longer to engineer existing engine designs to achieve that. This caused issues for Germany with the He-177 (not the only thing, but a huge factor), and also hurt both Germany and Japan quite badly when it came to high powered interceptor fighters (not counting jet fighters).

It does come down to technical and industrial infrastructure to a large degree.

This is all true, but I would say the fuel issue was much more basic (and even more dire) than you outline here. I.e. there was a major lack of fuel period, of any kind, at any octane. The Japanese stored up a lot of fuel before the start of the war, and the Germans did too, but both were very limited in ongoing sources. The Germans had the Romanian oil fields and their synthetic oil from coal, and some oil from Hungary and Poland; the Japanese captured Java and Borneo and got some fuel from there, but for various reasons (including local industrial capacity and processing and shipping facilities on these remote, tropical islands) this was very limited in terms of production of usable military grade fuel like aviation fuel. And it became increasingly difficult to get it to Japan as the Allies started interdicting Japanese merchant shipping. Neither Japan or Germany succeeded in their 'stretch goal' of capturing Soviet oil fields.

Italy was even worse off, and had so little oil / fuel available that it basically kept their (theoretically quite powerful) fleets in port and grounded their (again, very capable in terms of fighters) air forces grounded half the time.

For Japan and Germany, many major decisions - including movement of individual ships and fleets, timing of offensives and counter-offensives (especially for the vehicle-heavy ground armies of Germany) were made due to the lack of oil. I believe we tend to underestimate the significance of oil to the overall outcomes in WW2 quite a bit.

And this in turn does help explain why an engine like a Sakae 12 or 21 could be considered strategically more useful for Japan than something like an R-2800, even if they had the capacity to make it and the specialized fuel to run it at full power. When you multiply fuel use by thousands of aircraft, many on remote fields which require precarious shipping lanes to refuel and resupply, simple reliable engines and low fuel usage stand out as quite important.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yes, I know. I was asking if that had actually been done. The answer is evidently "no." I've read plenty of accounts of individual actions, but without collating and organizing them, and compiling comparative tables for other possible causes, "seeing clear patterns" is an invitation to subjectivity that undermines the point of basing opinions on facts.

If there were already such tables, it's a safe bet that everyone here would know about it

But while I know some people (to me very mysteriously) discount or down-rate operational history as facts, this is ultimately where the statistics come from, and I think they do 'rate' as useful and valid sources, even if they are incomplete or we can't be 100% certain about them (as we ever can for any historical records). I'm sure someone will count up losses and claims in the Mediterranean soon, and likely CBI as well. Pacific war operational history is still being compiled but that will come too.

Once these come out, as I already noted, needless to say people will contest them (sometimes for good and valid reasons, and quite often for crazy / delusional / emotional ones) and we'll be back in the weeds in the operational history anyway.

Until all this happens, we can just ignore operational history and believe that P-38s and F4Us and P-51As shot down 11-1 or 25-1 or whatever ridiculous the propaganda claim says, or we can start to look at it and draw provisional conclusions or at least make observations. You can shout me down all you want, but I'm not the only one doing so. Real aviation historians are already publishing books and articles about this, in fact. It's not going away.

The other thing is that attributing this success or that failure to the qualities of the fighter courts the post-hoc fallacy, as those results may be due to many other factors, and are likely a combination of factors anyway.

Potentially that is true, as I've already pointed out, but we also have cases where for example both Ki-43s and A6Ms were operating against the same targets in the same area in the same conditions. You'll never be able to definitively prove anything but you can reach a more informed perception of the realities than was possible 30-40 years ago.

It's great that you have an opinion. but I want to see evidence that a machine-gun armament is as efficacious as a cannon-armament. It's okay if you don't have it, so long as you don't mind coming to terms with Hitchens's Razor.

Thank you so much, I'm delighted to have permission. My opinion wasn't, by the way, necessarily that machine guns are as good as cannon, all things being equal. It's the all-things being equal part. All things aren't equal and that's precisely the difficulty.

Let me pose to you a few questions to you then.

Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC with four 20mm cannon. Top speed 330 mph.
P-39Q one 37mm cannon, four .50 caliber machine guns. Top speed 380 mph.
P-51A with 6 .50 caliber machine guns. Top speed 390 mph.

Are any of these better fighters than a Ki-43-I (two machine guns, top speed 308 mph)? I believe the operational history clearly tells us "no".

Hawker Typhoon four 20mm cannon, top speed 412 mph vs Bf 109F2 with one 15mm and two 7.92 mm machine guns top speed 382 mph. Which one was better?
Spitfire Mk VB two 20mm cannon and four 7.7mm machine guns vs Bf 109F2 with one 15mm and two 7.92mm machine guns. Which was better?
Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC with four 20mm cannon, vs MC 202 with two 12.7mm and (maybe) two 7.7mm machine guns. Which was better?
Bf 110 two 20mm cannon and four 7.92 mm machine guns, 360 mph vs Yak 1B with one 12.7mm and one 20mm cannon, top speed 367 mph. Which came out on top?


Finally let me just say, Hitchen's razor? Christopher Hitchens was one of the most intellectually dishonest, devious, 'artful' debaters in our public sphere. He was one of the people who rationalized the Iraq War. I don't rate his theories, and I'm not setting out to 'prove' anything so it's a false premise.

 

[GregP]

That is just not true Greg. We do have loss data for most of WW2, and it's again, just basic reality that it's easier to count your own lost aircraft than how many you THINK we shot down of the enemy aircraft. we do have loss records for the Japanese, for the Germans, for the Italians, for all the Western Allies, for the Finns, for the minor Axis nations, and even for the Soviets.

10-1 or 11- 1 isn't real, and we know that for a fact now.



Again, your own units loss data is much more accurate than their guess of enemy losses



Achieving 100% certainty in history, including relatively recent history, is never possible. But I don't think you are making a good case for why claims records are more accurate than loss records.



Some things will never make sense if you really don't want them to.

As I said above. we can agree to disagree. Loss data are NOT 100% accurate, and numbers are easily fudged to lolok better.

If a plane gets damaged in combat but remains flyable, and then develops trouble and goes down on the flight home, it can easily, and largely WAS classified as an "operational loss," when the real damage that became fatal was combat-induced. That happed a LOT, from first-hand accounts by former combat pilots.

Any set of numbers classified into categories can be true or false, depending on how the person making the classification decides it should be accounted for.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

As I said above. we can agree to disagree. Loss data are NOT 100% accurate, and numbers are easily fudged to lolok better.

Not as easy to fudge as the guesses as to how many enemy aircraft were shot down!

If a plane gets damaged ion com,bat but remains flyable, and then develops trounble and goes down on the flight home, it can easily, and largely WAS classified as an "operational loss," when the real damage that became fatal was combat-induced. That happed a LOT, from first-hand accounts by former combat pilots.

Yes but the 'operational losses' are still recorded, and the authors who publish the operational histories have been recording these right alongside those reported as MiA / failed to return, or shot down, or crash landed already for years. The reader can decide how to interpret data like "1 shot down, 2 MiA, 2 crash-landed, 2 engine failure and lost on the way home"

Deciding precisely how to total all this up is always tricky, but you can easily end up with a range based on different types, and that can tell you that even in the above case, they clearly didn't lose 25 aircraft. So we know the claims were inflated... it's just a matter of whether you count the above as 3 real losses, 5, or 7. You can present the outcome as a range if you want to total it up (i.e. in this theoretical example, between 3-7 lost, vs 25 claimed.)

Any set of numbers classified into categories can be true or false, depending on how the person making the classification decides it should be accounted for.

See above. You could use this argument to negate the claims totals too, or any data set.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

By the way, I think this is amusing considering the extreme push-back I get from mentioning the operational histories (including accusations that i was 'library bragging' etc.) when I learned about most of these books and book series like Bloody Shambles, and Mediterranean Air War, and First Team and Black Cross / Red Star from this very forum. Data from these sources were brought up to me to disprove various claims I was making, so I eventually tracked them down and came to the conclusion that they were very useful sources, and same goes for some newer ones like Claringbould's work on the South Pacific.

Now all the sudden it seems like nobody ever heard of these and feels like a general contempt for the very idea of using operational history as a means of understanding anything about the war...