At a certain point a hydraulic drive becomes attractive perhaps due to the 'gentleness' of the stress on the gears and shaft from the lack of sudden shifts as we saw on the Allison V1710 and DB series. The DB603N had the usual DB variable hydraulic drive but actually two mechanical speeds on top that could be selected as too mission type.
This again make me think about RPM limiting to regulate supercharger speed. Matching (close to) optimum RPM and boost for given altitude/atmospheric pressure within alloted power/RPM limits on a given engine design would seem to have at least some of the same advantages of the hydraulic system (including on single-speed superchargers -the early DB-601s just have one smoothed power curve with a peak, so single gear vs 2 on the 601E and 605).
Now, you'd either have to have pilots manually regulate all that, or have an automatic rev-limiting system on top of automatic boost control (or one or the other, leaving the pilot to make up the difference). Could linking prop pitch control to an altitude (or altitude+throttle setting) defined rev limiter be practical for the time?
Early Allison drive system couldn't handle the load of 9.60 gears and the Merlin needed a beefed up (larger diameter ?) driveshaft to the supercharger gears to reliable go above 15/16lbs boost.
On the note of the V-1710's supercharger gear/teeth load issues, would putting RPM limits on an earlier 9.6:1 engine (say in the -39 or even -33 vintage time period) below critical altitude avoid the strain on the drive gears? (and, like the DB 601, allow overrev -ie full 3000 RPM in this case- at some point above critical altitude at the lower speed -say 2750 or 2800 RPM, the former literally running the supercharger at the same speed as 8.8:1 would at 3000 RPM) Or would the lower tooth count on the gear still end up causing it to be too weak in spite of less power actually being transmitted?
The early V-1710s seem to have left quite a bit of headroom for boost increase without risking detonation (even on 100/100 octane fuel -let alone 100/130), so dropping RPM and increasing boost limits while staying within structural tolerances seems feasible.
Those pilots were wrong, just like the Japanese were wrong until too late to emphasize maneuverability above other qualities of a fighter.
I'm not really sure that's relevant to the P-36 or F2A, at least given the contemporary competition. (P-40 and F4F-3) Brewster's manufacturing and management woes aside, was the F2A-3 actually worse on the whole than the F4F-3? (or F4F-4 -let alone the jumble of single-stage R-1830 and R-1820 powered versions) British test pilots complemented the Buffalo Mk.I's handling characteristics in spite of it being weighed down with protection roughly equivalent to late BoB Spitfires/Hurricanes and P-40Bs. (metal tanks covered in self-sealing material, armor plate, armor glass windscreen)
Is there any actual USN/USMC combat where both F2A-3s and F4Fs were present?
And while the P-36 wouldn't beat the P-40 in speed, had it kept getting similar engines to the contemporary F4F (both single and 2-stage) along with upgraded armament and protection of the P-40, it should have held up better than the F2A or F4F taking advantage of energy tactics while possibly having better altitude performance (perhaps more so climb than level flight) than the similarly configured P-40.
But as far as up-arming/armoring those fighters vs leaving them lighter, yes that's certainly preferable AND that weight is a major part of gaining superior dive performance (the lighter Export Hawk 75s dove slower than the Spitfire I due to a combination of drag and lower weight -it still shared the superior high speed control of P-40). That might be an area the F4F beats the F2A. (but it'd still probably be close -the F2A might have the lead had it been adapted to the narrower R-1830, probably more significant drag difference than the F4F saw -it's bulky enough that the wider R-1820 Cyclone doesn't make as much difference)