SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I know there was more to the story than a glib "telling off the boss".
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I know there was more to the story than a glib "telling off the boss".As I understand it that wasnt a ringing endorsement of the Spitfire by Galland, but a fair appraisal of the differences between the Spitfire/ Hurricane and Bf 109. The Bf 109 could break contact by going into a dive, but that isnt what you can or should do if required to close escort a bomber formation, which is what Goering was telling Galland and others to do.
There were similar goings on in the RAF "Those of high rank are never seen at high altitude" sort of sums it up. Goering was a WW1 ace, the highest scorer to survive but the fat old git couldnt even fit in a Bf 109, the 109 was not the tool to do what Goering was ordering Galland to do.I know there was more to the story than a glib "telling off the boss".
Galland wanted to do what the US escorts eventually did, seek out the RAF and attack it before they got to the bomber formation.I think he's just trying to explain what the Bf 109 was good at vs. not good at. Luftwaffe pilots were still voicing similar complaints about flying escort missions in 1942 and 1943. Bf 109 was good at hit and run, but not close in sustained fighting in a constrained area.
Galland wanted to do what the US escorts eventually did, seek out the RAF and attack it before they got to the bomber formation.
My understanding though is that the applique armor was already being used during Cobra, so not after the BoB.
I would imagine that might increase drag and cause some C.O.G. issues.So the stories I heard about Spitfires with logs tied to them aren't necessarily accurate?
Because logs are really good against rifle-caliber MG fire, I've heard.
I just peed myself a little.So the stories I heard about Spitfires with logs tied to them aren't necessarily accurate?
Because logs are really good against rifle-caliber MG fire, I've heard.
I would imagine that might increase drag and cause some C.O.G. issues.
I think there are some cases of up-armoring fighters in the field though, including possibly Spitfires. I know in some units in the Med individual spitfires might have the BP windscreen and some might not, and I think some pilots had an extra plate bolted on to the headrest on some aircraft. Not sure if spits though.
So you are saying the logs were streamlined?
That would be an over simplification. Fighter pilots and fighter leaders were a spectrum of leadership and skills modifying 'doctrine' tactics as well as 'working within' an awkward doctrine. Most if not all the new guys probably chose the tactics you noted, or followed leaders initiating the attack. Experienced fighter pilots tended to do what worked for them. Unfortunately for those used to split Ess/dive issues of Spitfire or slow divers in Ost front, they were shcked many times (fatally) by high dive speeds of P-40 and P-38 in MTO - and really were educated by the P-47. Opinion - high percentage of experten killed vs P-47s atempted to dive to evade.Right, and in the Med it was an ongoing debate between the Luftwaffe and the ground forces, and between the bomber pilots and the fighter pilots (notably JG 27). The bomber pilots wanted closer escort, and distrust between fighter and for example stuka units led to the latter being very quick to jettison bombs and emit smoke and go into various escape maneuvers as soon as they saw Allied fighters, much to the dismay of ground forces (who sometimes had 'friendly' bombs dropped on them). There were heated debates in the Luftwaffe about this.
Fighter pilots liked to attack the Allied fighters in the safest possible way, picking them off from above (preferably when they weren't paying attention) and quickly disengaging / evading. This worked very well to quickly accumulate very high scores for a handful of experten. But when it came down to either attacking of protecting bombers, including breaking up attacks against their own airfields, these tactics didn't succeed so well.
This was a major factor after the reorganization of Allied Air forces in mid 1942 and notably, at El Alamein. It is in part what lead to the destruction of J.G. 27 and their replacement by J.G. 77 in fall 1942.
Its easy to forget or overlook the huge difference between The LW against the RAF in 1940 and the USAAF against the LW in early 1944. In 1940 BoB LW fighters outnumbered the RAF by around 2 to 1 in total numbers, but the RAF had to spread its resources to cover the whole coast. Locally in the Pas de Calais the RAF could call upon around 300 fighters while the LW had around 1000. Goering instructed all of them to stick to the bomber formation, which meant many turned back being short of fuel escorting bombers that were not in any danger over the Channel itself without actually seeing the RAF, while others had to turn back over London having burned their fuel off staying with a formation labouring into headwinds.Right, and in the Med it was an ongoing debate between the Luftwaffe and the ground forces, and between the bomber pilots and the fighter pilots (notably JG 27). The bomber pilots wanted closer escort, and distrust between fighter and for example stuka units led to the latter being very quick to jettison bombs and emit smoke and go into various escape maneuvers as soon as they saw Allied fighters, much to the dismay of ground forces (who sometimes had 'friendly' bombs dropped on them). There were heated debates in the Luftwaffe about this.
Fighter pilots liked to attack the Allied fighters in the safest possible way, picking them off from above (preferably when they weren't paying attention) and quickly disengaging / evading. This worked very well to quickly accumulate very high scores for a handful of experten. But when it came down to either attacking of protecting bombers, including breaking up attacks against their own airfields, these tactics didn't succeed so well.
This was a major factor after the reorganization of Allied Air forces in mid 1942 and notably, at El Alamein. It is in part what lead to the destruction of J.G. 27 and their replacement by J.G. 77 in fall 1942.
That's the funniest thing I've heard for a while.'The Spitfire was a pilots plane, but it wasn't a warplane'
So you are saying the logs were streamlined?
That's the funniest thing I've heard for a while.
It played no part in any war, it was only produced to take part in post war air displays, modern crowds like the noise and the curvy wings.That's the funniest thing I've heard for a while.
If they pointed the end of them it would have helped reducing the drag.I would imagine that might increase drag and cause some C.O.G. issues.