FAA Seafire vs Corsair

[SaparotRob]

If they pointed the end of them it would have helped reducing the drag. View attachment 677606

That Barnes-Wallis came up with some crazy stuff.

 

[PAT303]

I'm imagining a BBQ and a few ale's with you blokes, the nieghbours would complain.

 

[pbehn]

That's the funniest thing I've heard for a while.

I believe it was also Galland who said that the only good thing about the Spitfire MkXIV was that there werent many of them.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

You can fit a lot of fuel in those logs though, I gather they made 240l slipper tanks inside of them which increased Spitfire range by 140,000 km. Then Barnes Wallis sussed out how to put a radar in one, enabling night log missions. Logs would be dropped in the English channel right in front of E boats... needless to say they were geodesic logs too which makes them 100 times stronger and lighter.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Its easy to forget or overlook the huge difference between The LW against the RAF in 1940 and the USAAF against the LW in early 1944. In 1940 BoB LW fighters outnumbered the RAF by around 2 to 1 in total numbers, but the RAF had to spread its resources to cover the whole coast. Locally in the Pas de Calais the RAF could call upon around 300 fighters while the LW had around 1000. Goering instructed all of them to stick to the bomber formation, which meant many turned back being short of fuel escorting bombers that were not in any danger over the Channel itself without actually seeing the RAF, while others had to turn back over London having burned their fuel off staying with a formation labouring into headwinds.

well just to be clear, i was talking about British / Commonwealth and later British / Commonwealth / American units in 1942-43, in the Med, not US units in 1944-45 in Northwest Europe

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

That would be an over simplification. Fighter pilots and fighter leaders were a spectrum of leadership and skills modifying 'doctrine' tactics as well as 'working within' an awkward doctrine. Most if not all the new guys probably chose the tactics you noted, or followed leaders initiating the attack. Experienced fighter pilots tended to do what worked for them. Unfortunately for those used to split Ess/dive issues of Spitfire or slow divers in Ost front, they were shcked many times (fatally) by high dive speeds of P-40 and P-38 in MTO - and really were educated by the P-47. Opinion - high percentage of experten killed vs P-47s atempted to dive to evade.

Egon Meyer for example, pioneered and led the dreaded Company front tactics against B-17s in fall/winter 1942. It started with assembling several miles in front of bomber stream, attacking with four to 8 Fw190s in shallow dive (i.e. 12 O'clock high), hit and split Ess. Galland modified to continue in shallow dive to gain speed and pull up without muchaltitude loss, and turn to ge out in front again. The point is that the LW pilots feared the B-17 formation firepowr and adapted.

The forthcoming orders were to avoid fighter and go after the bombers led to attack, split Ess and get out of town, but the able leaders understood the escort weaknesses and patiently awaited time to attack fighters to exploit them.

In the limited spectrum of my father's scores vs109s, three were combat in horizontal with no attempt to dive, two were chasing diving 109s, one was chase and manuever on the deck. The D-Day Ju 87 was potting it in frantic low level evasion attempt in near dark.

So your dad was an ace? That's pretty cool!

I can't say about 8th AF etc. but in the Med I think the Germans had learned that dives wouldn't work against P-40s very early on, as in late 1941. By the time P-47s arrived in Italy (I think mid to late 1943?) I am sure they knew the risks.

The standard German fighter tactic in the Med, where possible (as in they had enough E) was to dive down, attack, then climb away often in a climbing turn. If followed, their wingman would get the chaser(s).

I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive. P-51 and P-47 were I'm sure, probably Typhoon in the channel. P-40s could, usually. Maybe P-39?

 

[SaparotRob]

You can fit a lot of fuel in those logs though, I gather they made 240l slipper tanks inside of them which increased Spitfire range by 140,000 km. Then Barnes Wallis sussed out how to put a radar in one, enabling night log missions. Logs would be dropped in the English channel right in front of E boats... needless to say they were geodesic logs too which makes them 100 times stronger and lighter.

The things one learns here.

 

[Shortround6]

The things one learns here.

the question is how much does one have to unlearn

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

You've just got to make yourself geodesic, that way you can become stronger and lighter... and more flexible! That way the extra load doesn't weigh you down so much...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive.

Oh, a P-38 could catch either in a dive. It could also win the race all the way to the ground.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

So your dad was an ace? That's pretty cool!

I can't say about 8th AF etc. but in the Med I think the Germans had learned that dives wouldn't work against P-40s very early on, as in late 1941. By the time P-47s arrived in Italy (I think mid to late 1943?) I am sure they knew the risks.

The standard German fighter tactic in the Med, where possible (as in they had enough E) was to dive down, attack, then climb away often in a climbing turn. If followed, their wingman would get the chaser(s).

I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive. P-51 and P-47 were I'm sure, probably Typhoon in the channel. P-40s could, usually. Maybe P-39?

If you want to know more about Bill's dad;

Bert W Marshal | American Air Museum

www.americanairmuseum.com

Bert Marshall - Recipient -

Growing up in Texas, Bert Marshall has been hailed as one of greatest quarterbacks in Texas High School history, and was the only 3 time All State Qua...

valor.militarytimes.com

A little simplistic - the biggest factor is "who sees who" first.

As we know, the P-38 did not do great in the ETO, a bit better in the Med. Consider tactics, training and many times a little luck.

Lightning Ace! P-38 legend Robin Olds - Flight Journal

Aviation History | History of Flight | Aviation History Articles, Warbirds, Bombers, Trainers, Pilots | Lightning Ace! P-38 legend Robin Olds

www.flightjournal.com

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

So your dad was an ace? That's pretty cool!

I can't say about 8th AF etc. but in the Med I think the Germans had learned that dives wouldn't work against P-40s very early on, as in late 1941. By the time P-47s arrived in Italy (I think mid to late 1943?) I am sure they knew the risks.

The standard German fighter tactic in the Med, where possible (as in they had enough E) was to dive down, attack, then climb away often in a climbing turn. If followed, their wingman would get the chaser(s).

I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive. P-51 and P-47 were I'm sure, probably Typhoon in the channel. P-40s could, usually. Maybe P-39?

Hey @dragondog somebody filled me in on who your dad was, I certainly meant no disrespect, that was actually my honest reaction up above. I gather you are an aviation writer too so obviously take my opinions on German tactics, P-38 diving abilities with a grain of salt.

Just read about one of your father's exploits he sounds like quite a guy.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I gather you are an aviation writer too

Bill has written a few things here and there...

 

[NevadaK]

A slightly longer biography:

http://www.p51pilots.com/P51-Pilots.cfm?c=incp51BiographyHome.cfm&viewmode=BIO&pilotid=558&p=P-51%20Mustang%20Pilot%20Bert%20Wilder%20Marshall,%20Jr

 

[ThomasP]

re roll rate of the Spitfire IX/XIV vs Tempest II/V

Clayton Magnet is correct in his post#315. The Spitfire rolls better than the Tempest at <300 mph IAS according to the chart.

Sorry, I misread the chart - the copy I have is very faint and grainy.

I have edited my post#300 to correct the information.

 

[drgondog]

If you want to know more about Bill's dad;

Bert W Marshal | American Air Museum

www.americanairmuseum.com

Bert Marshall - Recipient -

Growing up in Texas, Bert Marshall has been hailed as one of greatest quarterbacks in Texas High School history, and was the only 3 time All State Qua...

valor.militarytimes.com

A little simplistic - the biggest factor is "who sees who" first.

As we know, the P-38 did not do great in the ETO, a bit better in the Med. Consider tactics, training and many times a little luck.

Lightning Ace! P-38 legend Robin Olds - Flight Journal

Aviation History | History of Flight | Aviation History Articles, Warbirds, Bombers, Trainers, Pilots | Lightning Ace! P-38 legend Robin Olds

www.flightjournal.com

Nice finds Joe. Two things about the Olds excerpts.

Dad graduated 41-A and was immediately assigned as IP, then soon after took more and more responsibility in Training Command. He had the same degree of hatred of Training Command as Olds and successively volunteered for assignment to AVG, then any combat assignment with fighters, Finally he volunteered and was accepted to a squadron of B-26s training for ETO in mid 1943. He loved the airplane but fighters was his goal. Allegedly he got out of 26s by claiming he was too short to get traction on the rudder pedals. The CO had mercy on him - and he was assigned to Advanced Fighter School and then to ETO.

The second thing is that dad was leading 354FS on the 14th of August and he spotted the P-38 shootdown near Montmiral - a loner, but he recognized 479th. He called Zemke after return and verbally confirmed the score. Not in that excerpt was that he was having butt chewed by Zemke for being 'off chasing' alone. That is how dad and Robin ultimately 'met' after Korea when both were 'stuck' at Pentagon and swappng lies.

Notably the 479th had the best air to air record of any of the P-38FG in ETO/MTO, and most of the other 8th AF FG's, in context of ratio of VCs to losses in air combat. IMO the difference was a.) immediate assignment of P-38J-15 with all of serious high altitude bugs worked out, and b.) Zemke.

Robin Olds was the most impressive pilot I ever met - not just because of his flying and combat skills, but simply his command presence and demeanor - when he walked into a room, every eyeball swiveled over to observe the entrance. There was just something I couldn't describe - but he was awesome.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Logistics on D Day were critical, and you wanted gun tanks to support the infantry breaking out off the beaches - and the 75mm gun was a much better support gun.
Tanks didn't often fight tanks contrary to popular belief.

Early War German doctrine was to try and avoid tank duels, the US army did the same, the trouble for the allies was the Germans were changing, the Panther was primarily an anti tank weapon. The mark IV gun upgrades.

As Ewen has pointed out the decision to delay the deployment of 76mm and 105mm Shermans was an unwillingness to disrupt the assault and follow up unit preparations, including their internal supply system. The US had independent tank battalions to do the support function, as far as I know few to no 76mm Shermans served in them, 19 battalions in Britain along with 5 armoured divisions end May 1944. 2nd Armoured went to France on 9 June, 3rd on 22 June, 4th on 13 July, 6th on 19 July and 5th on 25 July. The 2nd and 3rd were the ones needing replacement tanks June/July. On 15th of August there were no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later were issued.

It means apart from disruption to assault units there was the US armoured warfare doctrine against the 76mm Shermans.

Changing US Army ETO ideas on tanks
Pre invasion told of the 105mm gun Sherman and the new 90mm gun Pershing the theatre requested 4 105mm to 1 90mm gun tanks.
On 11th October the theatre alters its request to a 2 to 1 ratio in favour of the Sherman.
In early January 1945 the theatre alters its request to a 4 to 1 ratio in favour of the Pershing.

Initial Firefly issue was 1 per troop of 5, but by December the 21st Army Group had 1,168 Sherman 75mm gun tanks and 605 Sherman 17-pdr gun tanks.

The average ETO tank engagement range was around 800 yards which helped reduce the German AP performance superiority.

They also didn't issue the HVAP (improved AP) ammunition as much to the Tank battalions whereas the TDs got a bit more of it (though not as much as they could have had).

Then there is the ammunition, a quote,

"In AT use the initial design of the M1 76mm cartridge and projectile were found to have many defects. The propellent of the cartridge failed to burn cleanly or completely, resulting in excessive flash. The standard hardness accepted for the M68 APC round was actually grossly inferior to what was required, which resulted in projectiles shattering on impact or being deformed and glancing off (a common problem at the time). By 1945 most of these problems had been corrected

The US 76mm APCR/HVAP lost energy much quicker than the British Sabot design, but it was noted in testing as being the "most accurate" tank gun round fired. Unfortunately it was available in very small lots, serial production not beginning until July and August 1944 (3" and 76mm T4E17 respectively) with just 33,000 3" and 63,000 76mm round being produced. Few US tank units got any significant number of HVAP and most never saw a single round until spring 1945. That tested near Isigny in August 1944 on three Panthers was flown directly from the US for the test. In contrast, 6-pdr APDS was available by June 1944 and 17-pdr (albeit with faults) by August."

First versus third army M4 losses, showing some differences, even allowing for the losses in the Ardennes.

First army, for the campaign the average 75mm M4 strength was 651, losses were 1,353, or about 208% of average strength. For the period from 20 July onwards the average 75mm M4 strength is 630, with 1,070 losses, or 170% of average strength. This can be compared to the 76mm M4, for July 20 onwards, average strength of 275, with 307 losses or 112% of average strength. Meaning the 75mm version is suffering a loss rate of around 150% of the 76mm gun version.

Third army, from 1 August 1944, for the campaign the average 75mm M4 strength was 569, losses were 630, or about 111% of average strength. For the period from 19 August onwards the average strength was 574, with 494 losses, or 86% of average strength. This can be compared to the 76mm M4, for August 19 onwards, average strength of 209, with 431 losses or 206% of average strength. Meaning the 75mm version is suffering a loss rate of around 42% of the 76mm gun version.

In 1940 BoB LW fighters outnumbered the RAF by around 2 to 1 in total numbers, but the RAF had to spread its resources to cover the whole coast. Locally in the Pas de Calais the RAF could call upon around 300 fighters while the LW had around 1000. Goering instructed all of them to stick to the bomber formation,

If you look for example at Alfred Price's Battle of Britain Day the German bomber formations had "free hunt" Bf109 units sweeping ahead. In addition the way RAF fighter pilots would ignore orders and pursue over the channel, plus the raids the RAF ran on German airfields meant the Luftwaffe kept some fighters for withdrawal cover and local protection. It is also interesting one plot of 15 September RAF fighter courses has many of them ending up behind the bombers before attacking, staying clear of the "free hunt" fighters. Goering's order increased the number of close escorts, it did not force all the Luftwaffe fighters to use the tactic.

One unpleasant result for the Luftwaffe on 15 September 1940 was the large number of bombers shot down, despite having several fighters per bomber. The close escort order handicapped the Jagdwaffe but the force was not able to keep bomber losses to an acceptable level even before the order and that continued. Easy to blame Goering instead of a general failure to devise suitable tactics.

 

[PAT303]

One unpleasant result for the Luftwaffe on 15 September 1940 was the large number of bombers shot down, despite having several fighters per bomber. The close escort order handicapped the Jagdwaffe but the force was not able to keep bomber losses to an acceptable level even before the order and that continued. Easy to blame Goering instead of a general failure to devise suitable tactics.

The bombers were the RAF's primary target and Parks primary tactic was to engage the 109's ''peeling away'' the escort leaving them venerable, the Luftwaffe commanders blamed the pilots, the pilots blamed the commanders instead of working out a feasible solution.

 

[Macandy]

I always wondered why only 20,000 were made thanks for the info.

In fact the Spitfire was a peacetime design, if war hadnt been declared it would have been produced in numbers like the Gloster Gladiator 747 and replaced by the Typhoon and Tornado, that was the plan anyway.

Look at the insanely complex wing spar of a Spitfire - an engineering delight, a manufacturing nightmare.

Manufacturing times:

Spitfire: 13,000 man hours
Hurricane: 5,200 man hours
Bf 109: 4,000 man hours

 

[pbehn]

Look at the insanely complex wing spar of a Spitfire - an engineering delight, a manufacturing nightmare.

View attachment 678409View attachment 678410View attachment 678411

Manufacturing times:

Spitfire: 13,000 man hours
Hurricane: 5,200 man hours
Bf 109: 4,000 man hours

discussed here The man-hour battle: the cost of production, Spitfire, bf-109 and ???