SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
That Barnes-Wallis came up with some crazy stuff.If they pointed the end of them it would have helped reducing the drag. View attachment 677606
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That Barnes-Wallis came up with some crazy stuff.If they pointed the end of them it would have helped reducing the drag. View attachment 677606
I believe it was also Galland who said that the only good thing about the Spitfire MkXIV was that there werent many of them.That's the funniest thing I've heard for a while.
Its easy to forget or overlook the huge difference between The LW against the RAF in 1940 and the USAAF against the LW in early 1944. In 1940 BoB LW fighters outnumbered the RAF by around 2 to 1 in total numbers, but the RAF had to spread its resources to cover the whole coast. Locally in the Pas de Calais the RAF could call upon around 300 fighters while the LW had around 1000. Goering instructed all of them to stick to the bomber formation, which meant many turned back being short of fuel escorting bombers that were not in any danger over the Channel itself without actually seeing the RAF, while others had to turn back over London having burned their fuel off staying with a formation labouring into headwinds.
That would be an over simplification. Fighter pilots and fighter leaders were a spectrum of leadership and skills modifying 'doctrine' tactics as well as 'working within' an awkward doctrine. Most if not all the new guys probably chose the tactics you noted, or followed leaders initiating the attack. Experienced fighter pilots tended to do what worked for them. Unfortunately for those used to split Ess/dive issues of Spitfire or slow divers in Ost front, they were shcked many times (fatally) by high dive speeds of P-40 and P-38 in MTO - and really were educated by the P-47. Opinion - high percentage of experten killed vs P-47s atempted to dive to evade.
Egon Meyer for example, pioneered and led the dreaded Company front tactics against B-17s in fall/winter 1942. It started with assembling several miles in front of bomber stream, attacking with four to 8 Fw190s in shallow dive (i.e. 12 O'clock high), hit and split Ess. Galland modified to continue in shallow dive to gain speed and pull up without muchaltitude loss, and turn to ge out in front again. The point is that the LW pilots feared the B-17 formation firepowr and adapted.
The forthcoming orders were to avoid fighter and go after the bombers led to attack, split Ess and get out of town, but the able leaders understood the escort weaknesses and patiently awaited time to attack fighters to exploit them.
In the limited spectrum of my father's scores vs109s, three were combat in horizontal with no attempt to dive, two were chasing diving 109s, one was chase and manuever on the deck. The D-Day Ju 87 was potting it in frantic low level evasion attempt in near dark.
The things one learns here.You can fit a lot of fuel in those logs though, I gather they made 240l slipper tanks inside of them which increased Spitfire range by 140,000 km. Then Barnes Wallis sussed out how to put a radar in one, enabling night log missions. Logs would be dropped in the English channel right in front of E boats... needless to say they were geodesic logs too which makes them 100 times stronger and lighter.
the question is how much does one have to unlearnThe things one learns here.
I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive.
If you want to know more about Bill's dad;So your dad was an ace? That's pretty cool!
I can't say about 8th AF etc. but in the Med I think the Germans had learned that dives wouldn't work against P-40s very early on, as in late 1941. By the time P-47s arrived in Italy (I think mid to late 1943?) I am sure they knew the risks.
The standard German fighter tactic in the Med, where possible (as in they had enough E) was to dive down, attack, then climb away often in a climbing turn. If followed, their wingman would get the chaser(s).
I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive. P-51 and P-47 were I'm sure, probably Typhoon in the channel. P-40s could, usually. Maybe P-39?
So your dad was an ace? That's pretty cool!
I can't say about 8th AF etc. but in the Med I think the Germans had learned that dives wouldn't work against P-40s very early on, as in late 1941. By the time P-47s arrived in Italy (I think mid to late 1943?) I am sure they knew the risks.
The standard German fighter tactic in the Med, where possible (as in they had enough E) was to dive down, attack, then climb away often in a climbing turn. If followed, their wingman would get the chaser(s).
I am not sure a P-38 was good at catching a Bf 109 or Fw 190 in a dive. P-51 and P-47 were I'm sure, probably Typhoon in the channel. P-40s could, usually. Maybe P-39?
Bill has written a few things here and there...I gather you are an aviation writer too
Nice finds Joe. Two things about the Olds excerpts.If you want to know more about Bill's dad;
Bert W Marshal | American Air Museum
www.americanairmuseum.com
Bert Marshall
Growing up in Texas, Bert Marshall has been hailed as one of greatest quarterbacks in Texas High School history, and was the only 3 time All State Quarterback in Texas High School history and an Honorable Mention All America tailback at Vanderbilt University. During World War II, he became a...valor.militarytimes.com
A little simplistic - the biggest factor is "who sees who" first.
As we know, the P-38 did not do great in the ETO, a bit better in the Med. Consider tactics, training and many times a little luck.
Lightning Ace! P-38 legend Robin Olds - Flight Journal
Aviation History | History of Flight | Aviation History Articles, Warbirds, Bombers, Trainers, Pilots | Lightning Ace! P-38 legend Robin Oldswww.flightjournal.com
Early War German doctrine was to try and avoid tank duels, the US army did the same, the trouble for the allies was the Germans were changing, the Panther was primarily an anti tank weapon. The mark IV gun upgrades.Logistics on D Day were critical, and you wanted gun tanks to support the infantry breaking out off the beaches - and the 75mm gun was a much better support gun.
Tanks didn't often fight tanks contrary to popular belief.
Then there is the ammunition, a quote,They also didn't issue the HVAP (improved AP) ammunition as much to the Tank battalions whereas the TDs got a bit more of it (though not as much as they could have had).
If you look for example at Alfred Price's Battle of Britain Day the German bomber formations had "free hunt" Bf109 units sweeping ahead. In addition the way RAF fighter pilots would ignore orders and pursue over the channel, plus the raids the RAF ran on German airfields meant the Luftwaffe kept some fighters for withdrawal cover and local protection. It is also interesting one plot of 15 September RAF fighter courses has many of them ending up behind the bombers before attacking, staying clear of the "free hunt" fighters. Goering's order increased the number of close escorts, it did not force all the Luftwaffe fighters to use the tactic.In 1940 BoB LW fighters outnumbered the RAF by around 2 to 1 in total numbers, but the RAF had to spread its resources to cover the whole coast. Locally in the Pas de Calais the RAF could call upon around 300 fighters while the LW had around 1000. Goering instructed all of them to stick to the bomber formation,
The bombers were the RAF's primary target and Parks primary tactic was to engage the 109's ''peeling away'' the escort leaving them venerable, the Luftwaffe commanders blamed the pilots, the pilots blamed the commanders instead of working out a feasible solution.One unpleasant result for the Luftwaffe on 15 September 1940 was the large number of bombers shot down, despite having several fighters per bomber. The close escort order handicapped the Jagdwaffe but the force was not able to keep bomber losses to an acceptable level even before the order and that continued. Easy to blame Goering instead of a general failure to devise suitable tactics.
I always wondered why only 20,000 were made thanks for the info.
In fact the Spitfire was a peacetime design, if war hadnt been declared it would have been produced in numbers like the Gloster Gladiator 747 and replaced by the Typhoon and Tornado, that was the plan anyway.
discussed here The man-hour battle: the cost of production, Spitfire, bf-109 and ???Look at the insanely complex wing spar of a Spitfire - an engineering delight, a manufacturing nightmare.
View attachment 678409View attachment 678410View attachment 678411
Manufacturing times:
Spitfire: 13,000 man hours
Hurricane: 5,200 man hours
Bf 109: 4,000 man hours