Sakai Saburo Vs Sugita Sho-ichi

[GrauGeist]

When I was learning to fly, I had former WWII pilots teaching me.

Of the four guys: two USAAF, one USMC and one Luftwaffe, the German was the most calm, practical and thorough of the bunch.

The Marine, was, well...a Marine.

All were great guys with a wealth of knowledge.

 

[Glider]

I'll have to agree on flight instructors, I had several different flight instructors during my WOC flight training .
They were all fresh from Vietnam, maybe some suffering from PTSD also, and some insisted that teaching new helicopter pilots was more hazardous than flying in combat.
Myself I reacted better to the calm approach. I did have one instructor yell " you trying to kill me Hodges?" Like he didn't seem to remember I was in it with him.

I just remember my gliding instructor shouting 'Your not F--------ing Biggles' at me whenever I did a fast tight turn.

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW

A number of years ago I ran across a Japanese air combat tactics manual from the early-war period (ie China and the opening stages of WWII). In my opinion, the Japanese tactics were as advanced as those taught/used in the West - although they were a bit different in some areas. I do not remember all the details but there were various tactics and maneuvers that come to mind. Examples:

Gain a height advantage before the engagement if possible
Make initial attacks from up-sun if possible
High and Low Yo-Yo
Near stall turns
Diving attacks - ie boom & zoom - both as an individual maneuver and as a unit tactic
Dogfighting over extended periods was to be avoided if possible

The tactics were to be adjusted by the squadron leaders based on whether they were on the offensive or defensive. IIRC the description of offensive could be defined by the mission type and/or the tactical situation - ie if you significantly outnumbered the enemy you would most likely use offensive tactics. Also position advantage (ie a useful height advantage, or when they enemy was unaware of your approach) would dictate what you would do next.

The 3-plane tactical unit (Shotai?) on the offense. When using the 3-plane formation the forward pilot was usually the most experienced and also the flight leader. The 2 other pilots were generally less experienced, and operated in a form of wandering trail - ie they tended to ~randomly weave back and forth and up and down at a significant distance behind the leader - often crossing each other's tail. The intent of the trailing aircraft was to make it harder for the enemy to sneak up on the flight, harder to get a surprise kill on the trailing aircraft, and harder to make a clean attack on the flight leader. In effect, this was a variant of the Thatch Weave being performed by the trailing pair at a tactically advantageous trailing distance, both in mutual support of each other and in support of the flight leader.

re

What I find interesting is that the Japanese Navy would sometimes allocate victories to the entire flight of aircraft rather than give individual victories. A lot of the victories were individually awarded as well of course but the fact that there were so many shared victories means that pilots would probably have official scores with decimals. So it's a bit confusing why the official scores of Japanese pilots never have decimals since they probably should do.

When on the offensive (as defined above) the 3-plane formation would tend to all attack the same enemy aircraft during the first diving or surprise attack - making firing passes one after the other over a very short interval of time. This would give a greater chance of scoring a hit and/or preventing the target aircraft from getting away, while thinning the herd (if successful) and give the attackers better odds during the continued encounter. Often this would result in multiple aircraft getting hits on the same target in very short order, making it difficult to determine who made the killing shot. In these cases - when it was not clear who made the killing shot - a full kill was often attributed to more than one pilot.

 

[CHen10]

When on the offensive (as defined above) the 3-plane formation would tend to all attack the same enemy aircraft during the first diving or surprise attack - making firing passes one after the other over a very short interval of time. This would give a greater chance of scoring a hit and/or preventing the target aircraft from getting away, while thinning the herd (if successful) and give the attackers better odds during the continued encounter. Often this would result in multiple aircraft getting hits on the same target in very short order, making it difficult to determine who made the killing shot. In these cases - when it was not clear who made the killing shot - a full kill was often attributed to more than one pilot.

Yeah I've read about this and seen it mentioned a lot. I've seen multiple pilots credited with individual aircraft not realising they attacked the same aircraft.

What about when the shot down enemy aircraft is credited to a group of pilots? For example if three pilots are credited with the same one aircraft destroyed, does that mean the Japanese Navy would assign the three pilots with 0.3 victories each? They can't credit all three with one aircraft each since it's acknowledged they all destroyed the same aircraft.

 

[wrathofatlantis]

FWIW

A number of years ago I ran across a Japanese air combat tactics manual from the early-war period (ie China and the opening stages of WWII). In my opinion, the Japanese tactics were as advanced as those taught/used in the West - although they were a bit different in some areas. I do not remember all the details but there were various tactics and maneuvers that come to mind. Examples:

Gain a height advantage before the engagement if possible
Make initial attacks from up-sun if possible
High and Low Yo-Yo
Near stall turns
Diving attacks - ie boom & zoom - both as an individual maneuver and as a unit tactic
Dogfighting over extended periods was to be avoided if possible

The tactics were to be adjusted by the squadron leaders based on whether they were on the offensive or defensive. IIRC the description of offensive could be defined by the mission type and/or the tactical situation. Ie if you significantly outnumbered the enemy you would most likely use offensive tactics. Also position advantage (ie a useful height advantage, or when they enemy was unaware of your approach) would dictate what you would do next.

The 3-plane tactical unit (Shotai?) on the offense. When using the 3-plane formation the forward pilot was usually the most experienced and also the flight leader. The 2 other pilots were generally less experienced, and operated in a form of wandering trail - ie they tended to ~randomly weave back and forth and up and down at a significant distance behind the leader - often crossing each other's tail. The intent of the trailing aircraft was to make it harder for the enemy to sneak up on the flight, harder to get a surprise kill on the trailing aircraft, and harder to make a clean attack on the flight leader. In effect, this was a variant of the Thatch Weave being performed by the trailing pair at a tactically advantageous trailing distance, both in mutual support of each other and in support of the flight leader.

re


When on the offensive (as defined above) the 3-plane formation would tend to all attack the same enemy aircraft during the first diving or surprise attack - making firing passes one after the other over a very short interval of time. This would give a greater chance of scoring a hit and/or preventing the target aircraft from getting away, while thinning the herd (if successful) and give the attackers better odds during the continued encounter. Often this would result in multiple aircraft getting hits on the same target in very short order, making it difficult to determine who made the killing shot. In these cases - when it was not clear who made the killing shot - a full kill was often attributed to more than one pilot.

I would not say these Japanese Navy tactics are "Advanced". They were the same hit and run dogma everyone bought into during the early monoplane era of the 1930s (despite requiring, in practice, an unaware target and point-blank fire to make the guns effective at overtaking speeds: Turns in reality easily broke diving attacks); a dogma which took most of the War to moderate to its proper place in the Luftwaffe's case (or never, in the Japanese Navy's case).

To their credit, the USAAF in Europe was among the most intense users of prolonged low speed circle fighting (over multiple consecutive circles), which avoided attacks and trapped targets for a prolonged period at a constant range. This all you you'll you hear the P-47s do (especially the Razorback, despite the mushy initial turn of all P-47s), and similarly all you hear from P-51 pilots is the constant use of flaps in turns. They would even ask about each other's flap settings over the radio during turning combat!

I vaguely recall that the Japanese Navy used the vic throughout the War, and that this was contrasted to the Army using the finger four at some point.

As to the Sakai dispute, having suffered head wounds in combat does not make you immune to criticism.

 

[GrauGeist]

A detailed report from the U.S. War Department publication March 1943.

This summary was from those who actually engaged the Japanese and not opinions 80 years later.

Japanese Fighter Tactics, WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 20: March 11, 1943 (Lone Sentry)

 

[CHen10]

A detailed report from the U.S. War Department publication March 1943.

This summary was from those who actually engaged the Japanese and not opinions 80 years later.

Japanese Fighter Tactics, WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 20: March 11, 1943 (Lone Sentry)

It's not "opinions 80 years later". It's facts.

 

[GrauGeist]

It's not "opinions 80 years later". It's facts.

Oops, my apologies.

I had no idea you were there.

 

[CHen10]

Oops, my apologies.

I had no idea you were there.

What I'm saying comes from official documents in the war.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

I would not say these Japanese Navy tactics are "Advanced". They were the same hit and run dogma everyone bought into during the early monoplane era of the 1930s (despite requiring, in practice, an unaware target and point-blank fire to make the guns effective at overtaking speeds: Turns in reality easily broke diving attacks); a dogma which took most of the War to moderate to its proper place in the Luftwaffe's case (or never, in the Japanese Navy's case).

To their credit, the USAAF in Europe was among the most intense users of prolonged low speed circle fighting (over multiple consecutive circles), which avoided attacks and trapped targets for a prolonged period at a constant range. This all you you'll you hear the P-47s do (especially the Razorback, despite the mushy initial turn of all P-47s), and similarly all you hear from P-51 pilots is the constant use of flaps in turns. They would even ask about each other's flap settings over the radio during turning combat!

I vaguely recall that the Japanese Navy used the vic throughout the War, and that this was contrasted to the Army using the finger four at some point.

As to the Sakai dispute, having suffered head wounds in combat does not make you immune to criticism.

My understanding is that air-combat tactics began with turn-fighting and then evolved into squadron-based, coordinated attacks. There are numerous references to energy tactics going back to World War 1. Oswald Boelcke's rules for combat were basically to:

1. Attack out of the sun.
2. Attack in pairs.
3. Get altitude advantage.
4. Do not run from the enemy.

These rules promoted turn fighting rather than energy tactics or mutual cover tactics. Energy tactics and beam tactics evolved in the pre-war period and early war period. Energy tactics oftentimes relied on maintaining energy through attacking and then climbing. This post on Reddit describes both the section tactics and the individual looping tactics used in section fighting by the Japanese Naval pilots, as described in "Sunburst". My understanding is that everyone was using energy tactics.

The defensive "lufberry" circle was used by slower aircraft, with greener pilots, against fast aircraft which were employing dive-and-zoom tactics (energy tactics). The Japanese heavily favored Lufberry tactics because their pilots had less training and they were oftentimes flying slower aircraft.

The 343rd AG used beam tactics, according to Genda's Blade, which seemed to have been necessitated by the adoption of four-plane Shotai, instead of the three-plane Shotai. The four-finger formation supposedly was designed for mutual cover (beam tactics). I also remember reading that there was supposed to be a shooter, with the second plane providing cover. Getting back to the main subject, Shoichi Sugita was known for relentlessly drilling four-finger and beam tactics into his students.

The Japanese in general moved from three-plane formations to four in 1943 1944 and 1945. According to several sources, but mostly Sakaida, the third man in a formation would normally not return from missions. I've read, but can't remember where, that US pilots typically focused attacks on the third man because he wouldn't have any cover.

Japanese pilots, such as Sadaaki Akamatsu would claim that they had the best maneuvering (or dogfighting) tactics in the world. But I think he was speaking more about how veteran Japanese fliers had training in how to best leverage aircraft which had great turning abilities.

EDIT: The IJN and IJA switched to finger-four tactical units in 1943, according to Shores, Hata, and Izawa's books. It's interesting to note though that vics continue to appear in reports from Allied pilots well past 1943.

 

[GrauGeist]

It's not "opinions 80 years later". It's facts.

Look at the post above mine...