Sort of wondering what the missions are going to be, it is coming across as a type that would enable a 1944 replacement of Bomber Command Mosquito with A-20 and B-26, or the other way, as the design would do every mission. For long range beyond fighter cover supercharging becomes important, for within fighter cover then performance at 10 to 15,000 feet is more important, though this assumes the targets are not the big ones that will have lots of flak cover. A big internal bomb bay is what you need to carry a variety of ordnance but that makes for a bigger therefore more drag airframe. Similar for longer range. The speed bomber would enable escorts to be at their fast cruise (P-51 escorting Mosquito ideas) without having to weave very much. Next is what bomber top speed, 100% of fighter? 90%? In "mass production" terms in 1938 fighters were around the 320 to 330 mph mark, in 1939 it became 350 to 360 mph but also better altitude performance, enabling a better height for speed trade off. The fighter top speed stayed the same to the end of 1940, was around 370 to 380 mph with better again altitude performance in mid 1941, to pushing 400 mph by the end of the year. So any good enough speed bomber in 1940 is going to need a rapid update or be phased out or take a reputational hit during 1941.
No one uses all the fuel loaded onto a plane unless something has gone wrong. RAF Aircraft performance charts note, In these tables the ranges of all aircraft except fighter types are calculated after deducting fuel used in 50 minutes at maximum economic power a) 20 minutes at maximum economic cruising power, to allow for warming of engines, taxying, taking off and the climb to operational height b) 30 minutes at maximum economic cruising power, to allow for time over target, navigational errors and other emergencies. The above makes no allowance for - (i) The effect of wind, (ii), The effect of formation flying, (iii) The use of full throttle over enemy territory. The effect of these factors must be allowed for when flights are being planned.
Blenheim IV, top speed 266 mph at 11,800 feet, range with 1,000 pounds of bombs 1,160 miles at 225 mph at 15,000 feet (2.9 ampg), 1,457 miles at 170 mph at 15,000 feet (3.6 ampg)
Boston II, top speed 311 mph at 15,000 feet, range with 1,500 pounds of bombs 690 miles at 243 mph at 15,000 feet (3.3 ampg), 840 miles at 165-175 mph at 15,000 feet (4 ampg)
Maryland 167F3, top speed 292 mph at 13,000 feet, range with 2,000 pounds of bombs 1,250 miles at 242 mph at 15,000 feet (3.35 ampg), 1,450 miles at 160-170 mph at 15,000 feet (3.9 ampg).
The Halifax I with 9,250 pounds of bombs on board 1.03 ampg at 210 mph, 1.27 ampg at 190 mph. Is obviously the most efficient in terms of fuel and crew per ton of bombs despatched.
A-20 and B-25 in 9th Air Force, A-20 average bomb load 2,357 pounds, (bombs dropped on target divided by effective sorties), B-26 average bomb load 3,621 pounds, mission times A-20 3.31 hours (Operational hours divided by credit sorties), B-26 3.44 hours, given the two types were cruising at similar speeds unless one set of bases was further from the front than the other they were over enemy territory for about the same time. Losses on combat operations, rate is per 1,000 NOT 100 sorties.
| A/C Type | Category | A-20 | B-26 |
| Flak | Lost | 56 | 204 |
| Flak | CAT E | 36 | 116 |
| Flak | Total | 92 | 320 |
| Flak | Rate | 4.4 | 4.1 |
| Enemy Aircraft | Lost | 0 | 47 |
| Enemy Aircraft | CAT E | 0 | 13 |
| Enemy Aircraft | Total | 0 | 60 |
| Enemy Aircraft | Rate | 0.0 | 0.8 |
| Other | Lost | 34 | 69 |
| Other | CAT E | 43 | 124 |
| Other | Total | 77 | 193 |
| Other | Rate | 3.8 | 2.5 |
| Totals | Lost | 90 | 320 |
| Totals | CAT E | 79 | 253 |
| Totals | Total | 169 | 573 |
| Totals | Rate | 8.2 | 7.4 |
Another 2,774 A-20 and 9,425 B-26 recorded damage on operations. A-20 22,999 sorties airborne, 20,522 credit, 15,855 effective, B-26 85,706 sorties airborne, 77,785 credit, 62,686 effective. A-20 68.9% airborne sorties effective, B-26 73.1%.
The bombs dropped,
| Bomb | Type | Class | B-26 | B-26 | A-20 | A-20 |
| Weight | Type | Class | On Target | Jettison/lost | On Target | Jettison/lost |
| Pounds | Type | Class | Number | Number | Number | Number |
2000 | GP | HE | 21,874 | 875 | | |
1600 | GP | HE | 98 | | | |
1100 | GP | HE | 359 | 34 | | |
1100 | Demo | HE | 72 | | | |
1000 | GP | HE | 61,160 | 1,338 | | |
1000 | Comp B | HE | 40 | 4 | | |
1000 | SAP | HE | 1,145 | 9 | | |
600 | GP | HE | 1,341 | 33 | | |
500 | GP | HE | 106,213 | 3,331 | 72,767 | 1,978 |
500 | Comp B | HE | 3,872 | 32 | | |
500 | SAP | HE | 0 | 0 | 528 | 10 |
300 | GP | HE | 4,523 | 184 | 17 | |
250 | GP | HE | 148,778 | 3,954 | 724 | 52 |
250 | Demo | HE | 422 | | | |
150 | GP | HE | 9,084 | 142 | 24 | |
100 | GP | HE | 94,668 | 3,793 | | |
100 | Demo | HE | 686 | | | |
100 | D/A | HE | 56 | 5 | | |
500 | | Frag | 24 | 0 | 520 | |
500 | CL | Frag | 0 | 0 | 395 | 4 |
260 | | Frag | 33,032 | 980 | 61 | 4 |
120 | | Frag | 3,629 | 263 | | |
| 6 x 20 | | Frag | 1,900 | 86 | | |
100 | | Frag | 3,417 | 203 | | |
500 | IC | Incen | 4,844 | 68 | | |
500 | IB | Incen | 4,959 | 109 | 118 | 4 |
250 | TI | Incen | 179 | | | |
100 | WP | Incen | 24 | | | |
100 | IB | Incen | 6,568 | 182 | | |
| Totals | All | All | 512,967 | 15,625 | 75,154 | 2,052 |
According to the War Production Board Report, July 1940 to August 1945 inclusive the US made 45,030x4000 pound, 213,000x2000 pound, 1,745,000x1000 pound, 7,397,000x500 pound, 355,000x300 pound, 2,455,000x250 pound, 450,000 150 pound TI, 4,132,000x100 pound HE/Demolition bombs. The 300 pound bomb program ended in September 1942.
DB-7 October 1939 to December 1940, DB-7A November 1940 to May 1941 (Santa Monica), August 1941 to January 1942 (Boeing), DB-7C May and June 1942, A-20A December 1940 to August 1941, A-20B and C from December 1941. A-20G starting February 1943.
B-26 starting February 1941, to B-26A in October, to B-26B in March 1942, to B-26F in August 1943, Omaha started B-26C production in AUgust 1942.
A-22/Maryland, first French order from September 1939, to second order in December, third order April to July 1940, British order from December 1940.
The US started exporting DB-7 and Maryland in 1939, all 100 from the first French DB-7 order to France, second order split 32 France 138 Britain, Britain took over the French DB-7A and 7B orders, which were ultimately split between Britain, Russia, US and Netherlands, while all but 1 DB-7C ordered by the Netherlands went to Russia. All 215 Maryland from the first two orders were exported for France, third order was 68 France, 62 Britain
The US kept all the A-20A for itself.
In the early difficult days in the Western Desert as the British called it, Axis fighters and (especially German) AAA was extremely lethal. Allied bomber life span was pretty low. The Blenheims got wrecked, Wellingtons were quickly relegated to commerce raiding, as was the (I think one squadron of) Marauders, though both did well in this important role, it's worth noting. Initial bomber units were mainly the Boston III's and the Marylands, and almost always flying with fighter escorts, mainly Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks, sometimes Hurricanes too for shorter trips. Both carried light loads but had a relatively good survival rate. I don't know what it was exactly but you are talking one or two lost on a bad raid, vs five or six of the Blenheims.
The Desert War started in June 1940, but presumably "early difficult" dates to some time in 1941 but could be well into 1942 given the aircraft types mentioned. Wellingtons did anti shipping operations and remained the primary strategic bomber in Egypt, supplemented by Halifax and then the USAAF B-24 units started to take over.
When it comes to bomber losses there is Bomber Losses in the Middle East and Mediterranean Volume 1 1939 to 1942, by David Gunby and Pelham Temple. Meant to include aircraft lost on ferry flights to the theatre as well as all causes losses, pages 17 to 36 the 1940 war losses, pages 37 to 114 for 1941, pages 116 to 211 for 1942. The most common way for a formation to take multiple losses was an anti shipping strike.
A quick leaf through for multiple losses on the one raid, 1941, Western Desert unless mentioned otherwise, 4 or more
13 April, 6 out of 6 Blenheim, Greece, fighters
23 May, 5 out of unknown number Blenheim, fighters
27 May, 6 out of unknown number, Blenheim, Crete, none to enemy action
9 July, 4 out of 7 Blenheim, causes not given
12 September, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim anti shipping, flak
1/2 November, 5 out of unknown number Wellington, fog.
20 November, 5 out of 9 Maryland, army co-operation, fighters
22 November, 4 out of 6 Blenheim, fighters
10 December, 5 out of 6 Boston, fighters
12 December, 5 out of unknown number Maryland, fighters
20 December, 4 out of 12 Blenheim, fighters
In 1942,
4 February, 4 out of unknown number Blenheim, low cloud
16/17 August 4 out of unknown number Wellington, none enemy action
13/14 September 4 out of unknown number Wellington, probably none enemy action
4 December 9 out of unknown number Blenheim (NW Africa), fighters
Interesting that from pre Gazala battle daylight bomber losses to enemy action drop away.
The heavy bomb load of the B-24s was ultimately telling in the destruction of Axis airfields in early 1943, by which time the Allies had tons of fighters including Spitfire Mk IXs and some mk VIII (I think). But they (B-24s) took fairly heavy losses. The B-25s did fairly well but were in trouble if their escorts got away from them.
To end May 1943, 9th Air Force, B-24 3,118 sorties airborne 30 lost, no more than 5 in a month, B-25 1,801 sorties, 20 losses, P-40 10,820 sorties, 70 losses. Over at the 12th Air Force mostly B-17 units, November 1942 to end May 1943, 3,497 sorties attacking (NOT airborne), 139 losses, monthly loss rates as a percentage of attacking 2.4, 6.9, 6.8, 4.6, 5.1, 3.9, 2.5, overall 4.0. No data for 12th AF light and medium bombers.