Fw 190 vs P-51 Mustang

[drgondog]

Pbehn - I have posted the battle - a condensed version of the 10 page narrative including the werkno and serial numbers and pilots and unit on Spifireperformance.com. My book added better clarity and corrected errors.

Summary - the LW wasn't particularly skillful at organizing large formations to attack the bombers but got better in the fall of 1944. That said, the Day Fighter forces were concentrated in Staffels but not Gruppe's. The largest US engagement was flight to section of 6 to 8 P-51s (depending on aborts).

Some of the 109s were sporting external guns and escorted by high cover 109s. The FW 190s were a single Sturmstaffel 1 unit. The Me 110s were 20+ I./ZG 26 heading for an intercept from the NE toward Erding and got caught by two flights of the 357FG. Interestingly, two of the 3 Mustangs lost by 355th were shot down east of Munich by III./JG 26 Bf 109G-6/U4's. Two of the 357FG losses were due to mid air collisions with Me 110s.

Even though the Goering orders were to attack only the bombers, the German fighter leaders in the first five months of 1944 were more aggressive in engaging the P-51s when they spotted them than in later periods where nearly all would split ess and dive when they spotted US fighters in time to evade.

 

[stona]

The LW had approximately 500 s/e day fighters in LuftFlotte Reich based out of range of P-47s but positioned to put up as many as 400 in a concentrated attack. Net - an attack by LW on April 24, 1944 by 250+ day fighters from Ulm to Erding, around Munich and back to Oberpfaffenhofen could only be defensed by the 355th and 357th FG. The LW destroyed (or chased to Switzerland) 27 B-17s of 1st TF plus six P-51s - but lost 34 109Gs, 10 Me 110s and 1 FW 190A to the 355th and 357th. 250 LW vs 88 P-51s is an example of how Germany could achieve local superiority - and did so, often.

That is an over simplistic view of the escort groups involved in the series of actions 0n 24/4/44.
The total sorties flown by the escort groups was 817, which far outnumbers the 318 single engine fighters and 34 twins sent up by the Luftwaffe (247 and 26 made contact with the Americans). In total the American escort comprised three Fighter Groups of P-38s, ten of P-47s and six of P-51, a total of nineteen Fighter Groups.

Obviously not all those Groups were in position to defend against the Luftwaffe fighters when they intercepted the bombers, but 19 Groups is what Luftwaffe controllers had to worry about at various times as the raid developed.

It was difficult for the Luftwaffe controllers to concentrate their fighters because they had to fly in from far and wide. For example various elements of JG 3 came from airfields at Rotenburg, Salzwedel and Sachau which are west of Berlin, north of Hannover. Elements of JG 27 came from airfields at Graz and Wagram. ZG 76 came from Konigsberg-Neumark!

Just as the Luftwaffe fighters did not confront 817 American fighters at no time did the American escorts and bombers confront over 200 Luftwaffe fighters.

Interceptions of the incoming American formations occurred east of Paris (elements of JG 2) then south of Karlruhe ( elements of JG 1, JG 53).
In and around the target interceptions were made by elements of JG 3, JG 27, JG 5, JG 26, ZG 76, JG 301 and probably some I've missed. This is roughly the area referred to above ( a box situated east of Leipheim containing Landsberg, Erding and Oberfaffenhoffen) and nowhere near 250 Luftwaffe fighters made interceptions in this area. Nonetheless for a short time the intercepting force did out number the escorting force, but not by much. I doubt that there were ever more than 100 Luftwaffe fighters committed at any time against 2 Fighter Groups. Not much difference in overall numbers.
On the way out interceptions were made around Eschborn by elements of JG 1 making a second sortie. The final interceptions were made by elements of JG 2 near Liege.

One Luftwaffe unit, III./JG 26, claimed 17 B-17s of which ten were confirmed. The Americans wrote off 41 bombers, including the 14 which flew to Switzerland an internment, and 18 fighters, a total of 59 aircraft. The Germans lost 66 aircraft but more importantly 43 aircrew were listed as KIA.


Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

Pbehn - I have posted the battle - a condensed version of the 10 page narrative including the werkno and serial numbers and pilots and unit on Spifireperformance.com. My book added better clarity and corrected errors.

Drgondog, I was speaking in completely general terms. For the LW there were two (admittedly ridiculous) extremes.
a) Attack the escorts and ignore the bombers until such time that there were no more escorts.
b) Attack the bombers paying absolutely no regard at all to the escorts.

The actual tactics were in between the two, The the raid lost more bombers than fighters which in terms of the thread topic shows the P51/FW190 weren't actually fighting each other,. Losses of P51s were of no interest to the LW and for the US shooting down 100 fighters would be a success if 27 bombers were lost and a disaster if 270 were lost.

 

[stona]

The crucial loss to the Luftwaffe on this and other days was the aircrew, mostly pilots from the single engine fighters. The loss of properly trained pilots degraded the Luftwaffe's capabilities far more than the loss of fighter aircraft which were being produced in numbers due to various production expedients, not least producing almost nothing else.
Cheers
Steve

 

[drgondog]

Pbehn - All of the 27 B-17s lost were due to s/e fighters and flak, of which 9 went to Switzerland (where on was shot down by a Swiss 109 while the B-17 was on final approach. None of the Me 110s made an attack on the B-17s.

This mission was certainly not 'typical' as it was chacterized by excellent ground control directing the many Staffels that engaged from South, Southeast, Northeast including all of JG3, multiple Gruppes from ZG 26, JG 27 and JG 26 plus Staffels from JG 5, JG 301, JG 106.

The 355th was the first to arrive, slightly ahead of schedule and entered the battle at combat speed due to hearing calls for help from Task Force. When the 357FG arrived some 5-10 minutes later all of the 354th and 357th FS were engaged - and the 358th proceeded to its assigned escort of the leading box where it remained as sole intact escort for the entire battle.

There was a 'fight' between Sturmstaffel 1 and red flight of the 357FSin which the 355th attacked, SS1 and all 12 of SS1 dove for the deck - but that would be SOP in the zeal to avoid combat with US fighter escorts, even though the attacking force was only four P-51s.

Other than this, I generally agree your remarks.

This a widely scattered small unit battle between fighters over a very large area. The three 355th losses were all 'unseen' attacks from 109s. The Munich area had quite a bit of spring cloud formations which enabled fighters of both sides to play hide and seek.

 

[stona]

This a widely scattered small unit battle between fighters over a very large area.

Indeed, from the Munich area up into Belgium, about 350 miles as the crow flies. I disagree with the contention that

'250 LW vs 88 P-51s is an example of how Germany could achieve local superiority - and did so, often.'

In fact there were 817 American fighters involved in the escort that day (nineteen Fighter Groups) and the two Fighter Groups you mentioned engaging various Luftwaffe units in the target area (the 88 v 250) did not amount to those numbers in any way.

The Luftwaffe did not achieve any measure of local superiority on that day, neither did it do so often.

Cheers

Steve

 

[drgondog]

Steve - to your comments re: April 24
"Just as the Luftwaffe fighters did not confront 817 American fighters at no time did the American escorts and bombers confront over 200 Luftwaffe fighters."

Not true - with a caveat, There were approximately 200 S/E in the immediate area from Ulm to Erding then south, then west to defend Oberphaffenhofen and Landsberg. Unlike November LW formations there were more than 70 Bf 109s attacking at one time on one combat wing. III./JG3 united with III./JG 26 united at Ulm and started attacks about 10 minutes before 355th arrived. The other attacks were carried out primarily, but not exclusively in Staffel level units at multiple times and locations all along the route. Of the 250 s/e day fighters and 40 t/e fighters launched for the attacks (Not including the LF 3 II./JG 26 and II.&III./JG 2 which entered near Paris with nil results) - Of the ~ 290 remaining (40 of JG 11, JG 53 and JG1 units engaged in the Wrms-Stuttgart-Friedrichshafen area) most entered the fight near Ulm and beyond.

Interceptions of the incoming American formations occurred east of Paris (elements of JG 2) then south of Karlruhe ( elements of JG 1, JG 53).

True - most notably intercepted by 4th FG while en route to attack the 1st TF from NE near Worms. The 4th was on a Sweep.

In and around the target interceptions were made by elements of JG 3, JG 27, JG 5, JG 26, ZG 76, JG 301 and probably some I've missed.

This is roughly the area referred to above ( a box situated east of Leipheim containing Landsberg, Erding and Oberfaffenhoffen) and nowhere near 250 Luftwaffe fighters made interceptions in this area. Nonetheless for a short time the intercepting force did out number the escorting force, but not by much.

JG3=85, JG27=47, JG5=12, III./JG26=30, II./JG53=8, ZG76=7, ZG26=41, JG106=5, JG 301=12

ZG 26 (41), JG 106 (5), plus 8 from II./JG53 (54 total) are the ones you missed. Total attacking Munich bound 1st TF from Ulm 1215 to 1430 was about 247. Actually there were close to 350 total launched, 48 Twin/300 Single engine strung out from Paris to Munich.

I doubt that there were ever more than 100 Luftwaffe fighters committed at any time against 2 Fighter Groups. Not much difference in overall numbers. See above. I spent a lot of time with Caldwell and others organizing the LW force and times

On the way out interceptions were made around Eschborn by elements of JG 1 making a second sortie. The final interceptions were made by elements of JG 2 near Liege. Agreed - also II./JG 26 which was ineffective.

One Luftwaffe unit, III./JG 26, claimed 17 B-17s of which ten were confirmed. The Americans wrote off 41 bombers, including the 14 which flew to Switzerland an internment, and 18 fighters, a total of 59 aircraft. The Germans lost 66 aircraft but more importantly 43 aircrew were listed.

Actual losses 1st TF were 27, including 1 ditching, 3 in France, 8 to internment in Switzerland, 4 to flak and 11 to fighters. Your figures are correct based on Freeman's totals.

To get a sense for LW claims to awards to actuals, The Ulm/Munich 1st TF Victory credit awards 45 B-17s shot down, 9 P-51s by 109s and 1 P-51 by Me 110. Actual losses to GF were 11 B-17s and 6 P-51's (two of which were lost due to mid air collisions). From the MACrs six of the B-17s that landed in Switzerland were damaged by fighters so you could give the LW 17 air credits to the 45 credits actually awarded by LW

 

[stona]

Well not all our numbers agree but at least the idea that 250 Luftwaffe fighters took on 88 American fighters at any time we can agree on.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

Well not all our numbers agree but at least the idea that 250 Luftwaffe fighters took on 88 American fighters at any time we can agree on.
Cheers
Steve

That is where I disagree with the discussion, 250 german fighters were tasked with preventing a bomber raid escorted by 88 US fighters at the time in question.

 

[tomo pauk]

(1)Why did the Fw 190 sink compared to a battle to the P-51 Mustang? (2)What was that made the P-51 Mustang superior to the FW 190? (3)Was there any attempts or any versions that would have made the FW 190 more combat ready to the P-51 Mustang?

Just my 2 cents:
1 - Before late 1943, the Fw 190 was a better aircraft, whether we talk about speed, rate of roll, rate of climb, armament, visibility.

2 - Once the P-51 got the engine with 2-stage supercharger, the Packard Merlin V-1650-3, it's performance, especially at altitude (above 15000-20000 ft) vastly improved. The rate of roll and armament did not mattered anymore, the P-51B was well enough armed to kill the Fw 190.
Contrary to the major improvement that P-51 received, the speed and RoC of the Fw 190 fell since Luftwaffe/RLM wanted the Fw 190 to carry ever more firepower, fuel and protection. Plus, the engine power at altitude remained the same. A good engine with 1-stage supercharger is ill able to compete with a good engine that features 2-stage supercharger. That is why we see a 50 mph deficit for the Fw 190A-7 or A-8 vs. the P-51B/C at 25000 ft. The Fw 190A-8 was some 10 mph slower than the Fw 190 A-3 on same power, rate of climb suffered even more.
The P-51 was much more a streamlined aircraft, and carried much more fuel - major pluses.

3 - There were attempts to improve altitude performance of the Fw 190 series, even before the P-51B arrived. Some involved installation of other engines (DB 603, Jumo 213), plus turbocharging. The improvements for the 'usual' Fw 190A were installation of GM-1 system; installation of external air intakes (that was coupled with reduction of armament and protection, but managed to improve both RoC and speed considerably above 6-7 km; the variant with extended wings was supposedly also tested). Apart from ungainly turbocharged installation, other imperovements were either too late (Jumo 213A installation), or not proceeded with despite the promise (DB 603 installation, external intakes).

 

[stona]

What time in question? I assume you mean the roughly 45 minutes that the Various Bomb Groups took to pass over their various targets.There is no way that 250 Luftwaffe fighters made this contact in the target area during 'the time in question'. I don't know the movements of all nineteen US Fighter Groups, it seems that the 8th AF was using the method whereby it did not escort the bombers on the way in and mounted a relay escort on the way out, but I stand to be corrected. This would explain why there were only two Fighter Groups in the area. The range of the escort fighters was still a problem, only four of the Groups were P-51 equipped.
Luftwaffe did well to muster 150+ fighters in the target area and a substantial number of these made attacks here, but that's still not 250 v 88.
In the final analysis the Luftwaffe flew about 350 fighter sorties on the day in question, the USAAF 867.

I believe there is already posted an account of the actions that day. Let's not forget that two Wings of the 1st Bomber Division comprising the force bound for Oberfaffenhofen, over 100 B-17s, were unescorted when first attacked by III./JG 26 and III./JG 3. Now that certainly gave the Germans a local superiority, but this was as much to do with failings in the American system as successes in the German. It was this bomber force that was rescued by the 355th FG, having suffered a substantial portion of the overall losses that day. The US fighters had arrived by the time IV./JG 3 mounted its attack and was confronted by one Luftwaffe Gruppe making an attack and two Gruppen disengaging, many aircraft having expended their ammunition. Again, this is not quite the odds the raw numbers would imply.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

From discussing the merits of the P51 v the Fw190 we are now discussing not only an individual mission but a particular part of that mission. X# LW fighters are tasked with intercepting a bombing raid while Y# escorts are tasked with stopping it.

 

[drgondog]

I have repeatedly stated that the battle of Munich was comprised of many small unit engagements - the reason that mentioning 88 vs 250 is to illustrate that the P-51 escort force could "do anything, but Not everything' when the Luftwaffe skillfully positioned a large force entering the battle at different times and locations.

Later, from say April 29 and May 12 and July 7 and September 27 the LW was able to concentrate 200 fighters in a small area and overwhelm a local FG tasked to escort that group.

The point to be illustrated is the myth that the LW 'outnumbered 10:1" by US escorts is pure bovine fecal matter.

Steve - I researched in great detail this particular mission with enormous assistance from German sources, as well as Caldwell and Dr Muller, several 384th and 306th BG pilots, 355th and 357th pilots to put together the order of battle for the 1st Task Force.

To help you understand, the mission had three Task forces which branched on separate tracks NW of Frierichshafen and west of Ulm. One force, 243 3rd BD B-17s went south for Fridrichshafen. The 230 B-24s of 2nd BD branched northeast to Gablingen. The 1st Task Force with 281 1st BD B-17s proceeded east to Ulm (1315), Augsburg (1330), above Munich to Erding, then south to the IP southeast of Munich (1410), branched 41-A and 41B CW to bomb Landsberg and Oberphaffenhofen (~1420) to the southwest of Munich.. All three Task Forces re-grouped east of Sandhofen ~ 1440 to return to England. RAF Mustangs relieved the 355th and 357th at 1440.

As to your comments in last post
What time in question? I assume you mean the roughly 45 minutes that the Various Bomb Groups took to pass over their various targets.There is no way that 250 Luftwaffe fighters made this contact in the target area during 'the time in question'. I don't know the movements of all nineteen US Fighter Groups, it seems that the 8th AF was using the method whereby it did not escort the bombers on the way in and mounted a relay escort on the way out, but I stand to be corrected. This would explain why there were only two Fighter Groups in the area. The range of the escort fighters was still a problem, only four of the Groups were P-51 equipped.
Luftwaffe did well to muster 150+ fighters in the target area and a substantial number of these made attacks here, but that's still not 250 v 88.
In the final analysis the Luftwaffe flew about 350 fighter sorties on the day in question, the USAAF 867

Lets summarize facts.
1. The 1st TF and 2nd TF (to Gablingen) were unescorted from just past Worms. The Sweeping 4th FG was scattered following the fight at Worms leaving the front of 1st TF uncovered. The shorter range 20th and 55th P-38s picked up the B-24s south of Worms and took them to Freidrichshafen. The 352nd and 354th made RV with the trailing B-17s of the 3rd BD near ULM about 1335 and escorted them through Gablingen and up to the Rally point.
2. All the Penetration P-47s turned back at Stuttgart, All the Withdrawal P-47s and 364th P-38s and 363rd P-51s picked the returning bomber stream.
3. The 355th was engaged from 1320 through 1430, north, NE, east, SE, south, SW and west. All along the bomber track. The 357th arriving 15 minutes later essentially was concentrated from east of Augsburg, in trail to the 355th.
4. The bulk of the B-17 losses were from 1315 through 1345. During that period the LW made 32 claims for B-17s. From east of Ulm on a straight line to Muhldorf ne of Munich. A further 11 B-17 claims were made from Erding/Muhldorf to se Munich between 1347 to 1400. The last series of claims were from se Munich (IP) to Landsberg and S. Leipheim from 1400 to 1415.
5. The forces attacking ranged form 50+ to 30+ to 9+ all along the route.
6. Five squadrons (2 355th, 3 357th) were fully engaged. One (358FS/355FG) stayed in escort to the leading 41-A box. The 358FS were reduced to 11 effectives due to early returns but no further attacks were made on 41-A after 355th arrived.
7. The total LW force attacking Only the 1st TF as outlined above, was 200+ single engine fighters plus 47+ twin engine fighters. They were not attacking the Gablingen force, they were not attacking the Friedrichshafen force.

Caldwell and Muller have an excellent map of the units, the numbers dispatched and points of attack on the 8th BC on page 274 of "Day fighters In Defense of the Reich"

 

[stona]

We'd better leave this and get back on track. I appreciate the detailed information, so thanks very much for that.

Cheers

Steve

 

[TheArtOfFlight]

I personally would not adhere to the notion that the Fw 190A series "stunk"/"stink".
It was an excellent dogfighter and had a incredible roll rate. It was fast, heavily armed and could take a lot of battle damage.
As many here have said already there are variables.

However.....my views on the Fw 190 D series are completely different. The Dora was a terrible dogfighter and most accounts of German pilots i have read/heard have said they would try to avoid dogfighting altogether and simply try to outrun their opponent. This however did not work with planes such as the Tempest V which could easily chase down and catch a Dora. The reason for all this is simple. The D series 190s were not designed to be dogfighters but bomber destroyers. And the proof for this is in the engine choice. The Jumo 200 series inline engine (fitted to all Ju 88s) was an exceptional engine at high altitude. The added weight of this engine, stretched nose/tail and heavy armament meant the Dora suffered from severe handling problems and simply was not practical for air to air fighter combat.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Fw 190D was not designed as a bomber destroyer - the D-9 was two cannon short vs. Fw 190A of the 1942-44 era. The total firepower fell anywhere between 40 and 50%. Jumo 210 engines were not exceptional at high altitude, until the advent of the two-stage supercharged Jumo 213E, and that is 1945 in service use.
Nobody complained that Fw 190D was suffering severe handling problems, and D-9 was very practical for air-to-air combat. The weight of the D-9 and A-8 was withing several kilos of difference, the D-9 being some 20 mph faster due to the lower drag and better layout of ram air intake.

 

[stona]

However.....my views on the Fw 190 D series are completely different. The Dora was a terrible dogfighter and most accounts of German pilots i have read/heard have said they would try to avoid dogfighting altogether and simply try to outrun their opponent.

Well many would disagree.

From Hans Dortenmann's diary (III./JG 54):

"It takes quite some time before we are sufficiently familiar with our new birds. But really, even now the machine proves its superiority with every flight. Enormous climbing ability, far better acceleration in a dive, significantly higher cruising speed and definitely improved turning capability compared to a Fw 190 or 109."

Friedrich 'Fritz' Ungar (9.JG 54)

"Because of the long fuselage I thought it would not be able to turn. But this first impression was soon dispelled. I was able to fly 'White 3' three times on this day. I found it much better than the Me 109 and the big wooden propeller gave it terrific acceleration."

Karl-Heinz Ossenkop (2./JG 26 and Technical Officer for I./JG 26)

"After some familiarisation flights, the majority of pilots with JG 26 were completely satisfied with this new aircraft...During take-off this powerful new machine had no tendency to pull left or right. Overall it was a joy to fly. "

Ossenkop also drew up a comparison between the D-9 and the Allied fighters it might meet. This is just one man's opinion, but more valuable than ours.

Tempest: In horizontal flight both were about equal. The D-9 was better in climbing and turning, but the Tempest was faster in a dive.
Mustang: In normal combat maneuvers they were both about equal especially when compared to the A-8; however the D-9 had a little advantage. In a dive the Mustang was slightly faster.
Spitfire: The D-9 was better in horizontal flight, dive and climb but in turns the Spitfire was considerably better.
Thunderbolt: In horizontal flight, climbing and turning, the D-9 was better. In a dive we were badly outclassed. (Never try to out-dive a Thunderbolt, they can dive like a bullet.)

Now, I don't know which pilots' accounts you are referring to, but many I have read are extremely positive about the D-9. Ossenkop's list is a good illustration of the relative strengths and weaknesses he perceived between the various types. A good pilot will attempt to fight to his aircraft's strengths whilst exploiting his enemy's weaknesses. No Luftwaffe fighter pilot, whatever he was flying, would try to initiate a turning fight against a Spitfire or try to out-dive a P-47. As the Technical Officer of I./JG 26 Ossenkop would surely have disseminated his opinion to other pilots in the Gruppe.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Lumping the Jumo engines under the generic name of '200 series' is not doing the justice.
Eg. the Jumo 210 'branch' was a bit worse than RR Kestrel, especially at altitude; it was also a later model. The 211 series was comparable with 2-speed, 1 stage Merlins, with Merlins having the edge when it was about short term power (due to hi oct fuel available, and probably better reliability); the 211 series was without comparable 2-stage version where Merlin excelled even in 1945.
213 series was comparable with RR Griffon, with some features the Griffon lacked, like the use of water/methanol injection, ability to run well on 87 oct fuel, capacity for the prop gun from the 213C on, while packed in the neat power egg. The 213E introduced 3-speed (and 2-stage) supercharger. 213EB and 213J (4 valve head, 3700 rpm) were very promissing. Main, and a very big shortcoming was that 213 series was too late to matter, with LW/RLM droping the ball with waiting too long for installation of the Jumo 213 in the Fw 190.

 

[TheArtOfFlight]

Well many would disagree.

From Hans Dortenmann's diary (III./JG 54):

"It takes quite some time before we are sufficiently familiar with our new birds. But really, even now the machine proves its superiority with every flight. Enormous climbing ability, far better acceleration in a dive, significantly higher cruising speed and definitely improved turning capability compared to a Fw 190 or 109."

Friedrich 'Fritz' Ungar (9.JG 54)

"Because of the long fuselage I thought it would not be able to turn. But this first impression was soon dispelled. I was able to fly 'White 3' three times on this day. I found it much better than the Me 109 and the big wooden propeller gave it terrific acceleration."

Karl-Heinz Ossenkop (2./JG 26 and Technical Officer for I./JG 26)

"After some familiarisation flights, the majority of pilots with JG 26 were completely satisfied with this new aircraft...During take-off this powerful new machine had no tendency to pull left or right. Overall it was a joy to fly. "

Ossenkop also drew up a comparison between the D-9 and the Allied fighters it might meet. This is just one man's opinion, but more valuable than ours.

Tempest: In horizontal flight both were about equal. The D-9 was better in climbing and turning, but the Tempest was faster in a dive.
Mustang: In normal combat maneuvers they were both about equal especially when compared to the A-8; however the D-9 had a little advantage. In a dive the Mustang was slightly faster.
Spitfire: The D-9 was better in horizontal flight, dive and climb but in turns the Spitfire was considerably better.
Thunderbolt: In horizontal flight, climbing and turning, the D-9 was better. In a dive we were badly outclassed. (Never try to out-dive a Thunderbolt, they can dive like a bullet.)

Now, I don't know which pilots' accounts you are referring to, but many I have read are extremely positive about the D-9. Ossenkop's list is a good illustration of the relative strengths and weaknesses he perceived between the various types. A good pilot will attempt to fight to his aircraft's strengths whilst exploiting his enemy's weaknesses. No Luftwaffe fighter pilot, whatever he was flying, would try to initiate a turning fight against a Spitfire or try to out-dive a P-47. As the Technical Officer of I./JG 26 Ossenkop would surely have disseminated his opinion to other pilots in the Gruppe.

Cheers

Steve

Thank you for your input friend. And tbh i would have been more surprised not to have people disagree. Firstly i would just like to say a lot of people seem happy to simply quote statistics/aircraft performance rather than take into consideration all the variables of a paper flight compared to a real flight. Im sure you are aware that by the time the D series started its combat Germany was using very low grade fuel/oil. And in some cases even synthetic substitutes. Compared to the high octane 100% proof fuel the Allies were using. As for the Tempest, it was much faster than the Dora and any Tempest pilot would agree with that. I have even seen accounts of Typhoon pilots chasing down Doras. And as im sure you aware the Tiffy had the same massive Napier Sabre H-24-cylinder, liquid-cooled, sleeve valve, piston aero engine that after having its gremlins ironed out was capable of 2500hp +.

Im sure you would also agree that any airmen no matter what aircraft he flew would always say it was the best aircraft. Many people will say that the battle of britain could not have been won without the Spitfire. But any Hurricane pilot would tell you that was the plane that won the Battle of Britain and not the Spitfire. And personally i have to agree. But im going off on a tangent and will get back to the Dora. Everything about that aircraft suggests it was a bomber destroyer pure and simple. And while they may very well have hoped it to be a good dogfighter it simply wasnt. Just after the war ended the Russians captured a perfectly good D-9 and made comparative trials against some of their own fighters. In one mock dogfight a D-9 Vs La -5 they came to the conclusion the La -5 was superior in almost every aspect. Except probably going down in a dive fast lol The D series was just too heavy and too slow to turn/dogfight in. But hey this is just my opinion supported by quite a few facts.

Thank again for your reply.

P.S. Sorry i forgot to add. Many pilot claims of kills/aircraft shotdown should never be taken as gospel/truth. ww2 pilots were prone to some wild claims or just plain wrong assumptions. Claims from one side do not always match the losses from the other. I highly recommend anyone to research both sides claims for kills and losses as they dont always tally.

 

[TheArtOfFlight]

If you were a novice pilot thrown into a Dora in late 44 early 45 would complain about flying a bad aircraft?
And i think your quote about lumping the 200 series is a little like splitting hairs. The engine is the engine, it doesnt matter what gets bolted on afterwards to squeeze a few more horsepower out of it. And the Jumo on the Dora was set up originally for high altitude performance together with the paddle prop (also effective at high altitude to cut through the air) + an over the top array of firepower and your telling me the Dora wasn't a bomber destroyer.......
Next you will tell me the Do 335 was a dogfighter too.

But i respect your opinion and thank you for the input.