Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
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German fuel situation and what to improve on it, 2.0
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
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I'm not claiming there weren't synergies in co-location. Like needing a single large hydrogen plant feeding both a HB plant and a Bergius plant instead of two separate smaller ones, logistics infrastructure like roads, rail, port facilities etc. Just saying that as far as the chemical processes themselves are concerned, beyond the supply of hydrogen there's no particular reason they need to be co-located.
From the perspective of resiliency (against bombing, say) they arguably should have dispersed them more (I recall you making this argument, if not in this thread then elsewhere?). Even at a cost in economic efficiency.
Shortround6
Major General
WW II alternative fuels didn't work for tactical vehicles.
They could and did use trucks, busses and cars with similar systems but the loss of payload (weight/volume) was large
They could and did use trucks, busses and cars with similar systems but the loss of payload (weight/volume) was large
yosimitesam
Airman 1st Class
Actually, Britain had a very small amount of indigenous petroleum which they exploited, but it added only a small amount to their requirements. Sherwood Forest oil field
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,381
- Dec 6, 2006
They also had shale oil in Scotland. See my previous posts on British avgas production which did not use indigenous British oil.
History site for shale oil mining in Scotland
Museum of the Scottish Shale Oil industry - Scottish Shale
The history of the Scottish shale oil industry, and the communities that served it, told through the collections and archives of the Museum of the Scottish Shale Oil Industry.
www.scottishshale.co.uk
This page has links to various companies involved and also links to oil production in other areas of the U.K.
Shale Oil Companies - Scottish Shale
Information about each shale oil company and associated organisations
www.scottishshale.co.uk
Thank you, this was a very interesting PhD thesis!
Also pertinent to the discussions in this thread is Chapter 11: Back to Coal, that describes various campaigns mostly in the 1930'ies to revert the RN back to coal. The motivation for these seem to be about having an indigenous supply, and also an argument about providing local jobs in the Welsh coal fields. It seems various experiments around improvements to coal combustion in ships had been done, similar to ones mentioned in this thread. Pulverized coal had been experimented with, both using onboard pulverizers as well as delivering pulverized coal to the ship. In the end these approaches were discarded as being inferior to fuel oil in terms of calorific value, bulk of pulverizing equipment, and fire risk.
One thing which seems somewhat successful is experiments with what they called colloidal fuel, essentially coal dust mixed with fuel oil in a colloidal suspension with about 30-40% coal. That is, pretty similar to the coal-water slurries discussed earlier in this thread, except using fuel oil instead of water. It seems this was somewhat workable, the main problem seems to be if the suspension was left to sit then eventually the coal dust would settle in the tanks and form a hard sludge. Cunard also experimented with colloidal fuel in one of their ocean liners, apparently successfully. But it seems it wasn't enough and eventually colloidal fuel faded away. Maybe due to the added logistical hassle in needing both a source of oil and coal, as well as the pulverizing equipment and mixing facilities to produce the fuel? https://www.nature.com/articles/130086b0.pdf
Finally, chapter 11 also discusses various efforts to produce fuel oil substitutes from indigenous sources like coal or oil shale. The conclusion seems to be that while these did in principle work, the volumes achievable and the cost meant they never became an alternative to oil at the strategic level. Now the situation in Germany was of course very different, in that Germany had no access to oversea oil in the event of a war, contrary to Britain.
I will just add this little piece of information.
In C.Douglas' 'The Secret Horse Power Race" pg 343, there is recorded a planned output of C3 fuel peaking at 80% of production in 1945. The USN 145 July 1945 report states that they estimate that 2/3rds of production was C3 by wars end (both figures are unrealistic). C3 needed much more processing than B4, resulting in a loss. To increase fuel, likelihood of fuel arriving to units, and overall logistics in accessing the correct fuels, there was a serious push in 'boosting' (sorry I cant think of a better term) B4 up to C3 quality. Many engine manufactures were producing their newest engines that were designed to run on the B4. Producing only B4 could have saved fuel by not requiring extra refining procedures.
BUT!
'Boosting' B4 up to C3 quality was nothing short of a disaster. The recipe was flawed and engines began to malfunction.
P.s. rather than 2/3rds of fuel being C3 by wars end, I have found that B4 and C3 were roughly equal, at least in April 1945. From reading into CHA T2422, NARA T321 and the ULTRA files in the HW-5 series, by late 1944 it still seems that B4 was the main front line fuel available to units (this is against the planned 65% as can be read in the planned production in 'The Secret Horse Power Race" pg 343).
TL : DR - To increase avgas production, try to stick to B4 as the main frontline fuel to reduce production related losses (this was actually a course of action that took place, but things went sour by the turn of 1944/45)
In C.Douglas' 'The Secret Horse Power Race" pg 343, there is recorded a planned output of C3 fuel peaking at 80% of production in 1945. The USN 145 July 1945 report states that they estimate that 2/3rds of production was C3 by wars end (both figures are unrealistic). C3 needed much more processing than B4, resulting in a loss. To increase fuel, likelihood of fuel arriving to units, and overall logistics in accessing the correct fuels, there was a serious push in 'boosting' (sorry I cant think of a better term) B4 up to C3 quality. Many engine manufactures were producing their newest engines that were designed to run on the B4. Producing only B4 could have saved fuel by not requiring extra refining procedures.
BUT!
'Boosting' B4 up to C3 quality was nothing short of a disaster. The recipe was flawed and engines began to malfunction.
P.s. rather than 2/3rds of fuel being C3 by wars end, I have found that B4 and C3 were roughly equal, at least in April 1945. From reading into CHA T2422, NARA T321 and the ULTRA files in the HW-5 series, by late 1944 it still seems that B4 was the main front line fuel available to units (this is against the planned 65% as can be read in the planned production in 'The Secret Horse Power Race" pg 343).
TL : DR - To increase avgas production, try to stick to B4 as the main frontline fuel to reduce production related losses (this was actually a course of action that took place, but things went sour by the turn of 1944/45)
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Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
There are three different measures you need for a complete picture, stocks, consumption and production - and sadly its virtually impossible ( I have spent considerable time and money trying), to get these three IF you want them to include a breakdown by fuel type. This is the case because the fuels were all made from raw ingredients at blending stations
which were not at the fuel refineries. So you cannot see what was made from the refinery outputs (the fuels B4 and C3 were blended monthly to order, and I have
only found a tiny few blending order requests, which of course does not tell you stocks or consumption either).
I have a bit more info if you look at stocks, although the results here are also partial, as they do not necessarily include every storage facility in Germany,
and also, in the case of the 1945 figures the total stocks are very tiny relative to 1943, so the relative levels of B4/C3 from a tiny total stock
size needs to be taken with caution. However the data plotted shows certain trends which are difficult to discount.
Please note again, this is STOCK, which does not necessarily mean consumption, and since that is not
known, it also cannot be used to infer production. However, the C3 fuel did not store well, so
we can guess that it must be a reasonable picture of production in the 3 or 4 months prior.
Later in the war, the German supply situation became such that the fuel did not really
rest in these tanks for much time, it was supplied more or less as it was blended. So
as the war progresses, this graph probably represents consumption & production to
an ever increasing extent.
I also have a "snapshot" of PRODUCTION in 1941 (do not compare directly to graph above which is STOCK),
which suggests that production % of C3 was about 20% at the end of 1941.
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Good research Calum!
Below is the graph I was able to compile looking at only B4 and C3. A3, J2 etc fall outside of my interest, they are not recorded.
I will state that I am looking at STOCKS, to me production matters a bit less as you state on pg. 350 that the depots were doing ever more of the required blending. If true, stocks present at Luftgaus seem to be a solid indication of what was available because they were blending it.
Anyway, the graph samples B4 and C3 for days I could measure, the average for the month is exactly 50% B4, 50% C3. All fronts. I don't care about units as I'm looking for a ratio, so to tons vs tonnes vs cbm debate can be neatly avoided if each location measures their stocks in a consistent unit for a given day which is the case here. HW-5 goes a bit further in some of its reporting as it will usually given a CONSUMPTION and STOCK figure, but these are not always present in the files.
This is what I could offer to replace a 'guess' at the end of the war. It is not perfect, but it is based on more data than a guess.
Below is the graph I was able to compile looking at only B4 and C3. A3, J2 etc fall outside of my interest, they are not recorded.
I will state that I am looking at STOCKS, to me production matters a bit less as you state on pg. 350 that the depots were doing ever more of the required blending. If true, stocks present at Luftgaus seem to be a solid indication of what was available because they were blending it.
Anyway, the graph samples B4 and C3 for days I could measure, the average for the month is exactly 50% B4, 50% C3. All fronts. I don't care about units as I'm looking for a ratio, so to tons vs tonnes vs cbm debate can be neatly avoided if each location measures their stocks in a consistent unit for a given day which is the case here. HW-5 goes a bit further in some of its reporting as it will usually given a CONSUMPTION and STOCK figure, but these are not always present in the files.
This is what I could offer to replace a 'guess' at the end of the war. It is not perfect, but it is based on more data than a guess.
Attachments
More on Sherwood forest oilfields
http://dukeswoodoilmuseum.com/Darcy Oil.htm and http://dukeswoodoilmuseum.com/War Years.htm
http://dukeswoodoilmuseum.com/Darcy Oil.htm and http://dukeswoodoilmuseum.com/War Years.htm
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