German fuel situation and what to improve on it, 2.0

[33k in the air]

Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result.

In other words, the Soviets were weaker, and the superior numbers you keep citing immaterial. Thus the German success is at least as attributable to the weakness of their opponents as it is to German strength. Which is exactly my point.

Not necessarily a function of Soviet problems as much as the Germans were vastly more experienced and had better equipment.

In other words, German success is at least as attributable to the weakness of their opponent as it is to German strength. You make my point again.

. . . so the Soviets weren't slouches, despite being surprised.

Which is it? Were the Soviets no match for the Germans as you initially said? Or are they better than you initially said? It can't be both.

 

[Gary Cain]

Napoleon would argue you never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake. Which applies to any military at any time.

That is correct, but the Germans figured out early on that institutional thinking in the militaries of the rest of the world led to an inability to react quickly to opportunities that were presented by either the enemies errors, or unseen advantages due to weather, etc. That is what set them apart. Additionally, they had an amazing amount of initiative at the lower levels of leadership so even relatively small units would sometimes do things that even the higher ups hadn't considered.

 

[Juha3]

Eisenhower's lack of a good strategic mind was well understood at the time. Any one could have seen that even had Market Garden worked, which was at best iffy, logistically the entire advance and indeed the NW European front was in a bad situation and needed a functional port. For someone obsessed with wide front advances he very oddly shifted into a very uncharacteristic 'war winning' move that was clearly vastly more likely to fail than succeed...

Funny about the Antwerp situation you layout, because instead of waiting to clear the flanks or improve the situation they instead launched an offensive even deeper without a secured supply line. Bad planning yet again, which goes back to my central point: the Wallies weren't as good with logistics as is claimed and in fact screwed up badly by September 1944.

Again why launch Market Garden instead of securing the ports? The thrust wouldn't have ended the war and if successful left them in an even worse position.

The aim was end the war fast and eliminate the V-2 launch sites around The Hague, so probably the idea was that they would have got also Rotterdam with its huge harbour and so the importance of Antwerp would has been much smaller. Overly optimistic but maybe the risk was worth of taking. At least less than that taken by the WM in the Op. Barbarossa. When the december crises came shortage of ammo, fuel and winter cloathing had devastating effect. And a year later the same happened around Stalingrad, lack of fuel critically limited the operational possibilities for the 3 Panzer Divisions at Stalingrad and lack of supplies around Stalingrad made the lost of supply lines even more critical.

Of course the failure to take at least the Woensdrecht allowed the withrawal of the 15. Armee from south of the Schelde Estuary.

...Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result. Not necessarily a function of Soviet problems as much as the Germans were vastly more experienced and had better equipment. Still on day one alone the Germans lost more than on the worst day of the Battle of Britain, so the Soviets weren't slouches, despite being surprised.

that was 78 vs 75 but 10 of the losses on 22.6.1941 were miscellaneus a/c meaning planes like Hs 126s and Fi 156s etc. used only when ground forces were actively participating, at least one was a Fw 58. Invasion related air operations were a bit different from aerial bombing campaigns. Even Invasion related air operations differed sometimes so much that loss comparations are rather useless, on 10 May 1940 the LW lost 353 a/c but many of them were transport planes or Fi 156s.

 

[wiking85]

In other words, the Soviets were weaker, and the superior numbers you keep citing immaterial. Thus the German success is at least as attributable to the weakness of their opponents as it is to German strength. Which is exactly my point.

Weaker how? Less effective for sure. In terms of all numbers they were vastly superior. So what weakness do you mean?

In other words, German success is at least as attributable to the weakness of their opponent as it is to German strength. You make my point again.

Starting to sound like the Cathy Newman interview.

Which is it? Were the Soviets no match for the Germans as you initially said? Or are they better than you initially said? It can't be both.

What are you even talking about? I said the Soviets weren't pushovers based on the casualties they inflicted, but they were outmatched and took many more.

The aim was end the war fast and eliminate the V-2 launch sites around The Hague, so probably the idea was that they would have got also Rotterdam with its huge harbour and so the importance of Antwerp would has been much smaller. Overly optimistic but maybe the risk was worth of taking.

Doesn't seem like it, the prospects of success were exceedingly low.

At least less than that taken by the WM in the Op. Barbarossa.

But for Hitler's strategic mistakes Barbarossa would have worked.

When the december crises came shortage of ammo, fuel and winter cloathing had devastating effect.

That's overblown, per official Soviet history records the Soviets took something like 10:1 losses during December-February. The devastating losses were suffered by the Soviets. Check out Krivosheev for the Soviet losses and David Stahel's winter campaign book for the details.

And a year later the same happened around Stalingrad, lack of fuel critically limited the operational possibilities for the 3 Panzer Divisions at Stalingrad and lack of supplies around Stalingrad made the lost of supply lines even more critical.

Stalingrad was the product of so much more than just supply difficulties.

Of course the failure to take at least the Woensdrecht allowed the withrawal of the 15. Armee from south of the Schelde Estuary.

A major mistake.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Whether the rail systems north of the Pripet marshes in 1941 was more badly damaged than the French system in 1944 is unknown, probably less close to the start line but more later. Until the Germans crossed the old Baltic States and Polish border the 1939 rail gauge was standard, some changes had been made.

The US army had begun to supply army sized units in combat in Sicily and learnt that meant the invasion had to include the appropriate supply units. In France it was going to move to supplying an Army Group much further from the ports, it would learn much in 1944.

The Germans in the USSR could make up trains in Germany and send them to the front line, if there were any shortages reported it was possible to at least send the requirements towards the front quickly. The US army had a supply line that took weeks from US depot to arriving in France, then the ports had to be working well, not only landing cargo but clearing it to be put on trains to depots to sort it out and then forward despatch.

As the allies were liberators they needed to provide support to the civil populations and they were dealing with an average more urban population, cities rapidly become death zones without their support services. See the note about Berlin at the end of this message. When the US published the translations of intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic there are a couple from Paris in 1941 pleading for food packages. As noted the allies shipped over 6 million tons of civil relief into the ETO in the final year of the war. No record of German civil relief supplies.

One thing is clear from the supply histories, the Nazis were a bunch of locusts, creating shortages of most basic items everywhere, including food, fuel and clothing. The further the allies advanced the more civil relief supplies they needed to find and the more it competed for space on limited transport links. In effect the local food supply of France becomes worse the further north and east you go, with Belgium probably worse again.

On 15th August Anvil/Dragoon landings start, amongst the units landed in the first two days are 25 truck companies and 2 gasoline supply companies. The supplies include 300,000 blankets and 350,000 sets of Red Cross relief clothing for the civilian population, due to the known shortages. The French forces were mainly combat, very few supply units, so the US did much of the supply for the French 1st Army. The French were very reluctant to form rear area units, wanting to contribute the maximum number of combat troops.

On the day before Paris falls in a nice legal move the German Commandant transfers titles of all local food stocks to the International Red Cross, this was "thwarted" by the allies. Over 100,000 citizens of Paris have fled to the surrounding countryside, they are not permitted to return for several weeks as they can be fed more easily in the countryside. Food in Paris is reasonable but most is in the black market system, meaning only the wealthy have the money for proper food. On 24th August the Seine base section is activated to control the area around Paris, firstly for civil relief. As part of the relief efforts for Paris 5,000 French volunteers are given trucks and formed into provisional transport units (Later the trucks would be replaced by 1,500 trucks allocated for civil affairs). The units are allocated 5,000 gallons a day

In late August 12th Army Group noted it needed around 2,100 tons/day for fighter airfield construction. Paris was assessed as needing 2,000 tons/day by air but ended up with around 1,500 tons. At the end of August coal is becoming an urgent requirement, for rail traffic, Paris and for the approaching cold weather. A survey in early September of the Nord and Pas de Calais coal fields reveals 1,000,000 metric tons in stockpiles, 100,000 tons on barges, and 15,000 tons on rail cars. The barges were largely land locked by the destroyed bridges and other damage.

On 12th September (D+98) allied armies are on the D+350 line, so in 18 days they had captured territory the plan expected to have taken 260 days, but the advance has largely stopped in the North. As a further problem as the allies move further away from the coast they capture regions of increasing food shortages, Belgium in particular, plus Northern France, complicating the supply situation, since it means troops cannot easily find food locally instead they have to start devoting supply tonnage to civil relief. These needs will go up in winter with more coal needed. End September Rail infrastructure captured after the end of the pursuit was usually sabotaged, some 25% of track demolished, the allies had expected 50%.

Cargo transported by air August and September 1944. Columns are week ending / to 12th Army Group / to 21st Army Group / to Paris. Supply in tons (unknown whether short or long, probably short)

26 Aug / 4,185 / 350 / 0
2 Sep / 1,877 / 917 / 1,676
9 Sep / 3,516 / 2,787 / 975
16 Sep / 3,221 / 3,712 / 0
Total / 12,799 / 7,766 / 2,631
Grand total 23,216 tons, 2,849 by the RAF 20,367 by the USAAF.

At the end of October Toulon is handed to the French for civil relief supplies, since the supply situation in the south is that good, the limit is rail capacity, not port. 21st Army group "The problem of dealing with refugees, evacuation of displaced persons and accommodation was becoming serious, particularly in Second Army Area." There was no coal for civil heating. The allies needed to import a ton of pit props for every 40 tons of coal mined on the continent, pit props were proving to be the limiting factor along with manpower.

On 18th November the first coal barges arrive in Paris. On the 19th and 20th November Metz is captured, 3rd Army calls for 1,900 tons of civil relief for the population and receives 56 tons, only by using around 800 tons of captured food is the situation relieved.

By the end of November 1st Army had 7.3 days of POL, 3rd 6.7 days and 9th 9.3 days. By now there are German PoWs in French coal mines and logging camps.

In January the workers at Antwerp will go on strike due to a lack of food, clothing and coal. Some 646 trains will be delayed in France due to lack of coal. The tyre situation is so bad arrangements are made to manufacture them locally and the idea of buying some from Spain is considered. Lack of food and clothing for civilians lead to widespread strikes, in Belgium the result is coal production declines to 60% of the previous month. Bad weather means Paris is receiving only 12,000 tons of coal per day instead of the minimum requirement of 20,000 tons.

During the winter coal production and imports have always been below minimum requirements. SHAEF allocated 65 to 70% of the US forces requests and deliveries rarely exceeded 50% of the army's total need. Paris had been rationed to a few hours of gas and electricity every day.

On to Berlin post war, in the first months of occupation some 65% of newborns in Berlin die of disease, the ration is around 800 calories a day, 150 out of 240 hospitals are in service in July but there is a lack of supplies.

 

[33k in the air]

Weaker how? Less effective for sure. In terms of all numbers they were vastly superior. So what weakness do you mean?

Uh, YOU were the one who said they were no match for the Germans:

Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result.

If they were no match, then clearly they are weaker or else they would be a match.

What are you even talking about? I said the Soviets weren't pushovers based on the casualties they inflicted, but they were outmatched and took many more.

Your own words again:

Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Hi,
Methanol has been widely used in racing in the UK. However, it is limited in how many classes allow it. Speedway bikes (short dirt oval) and Sprint/Drag racing are/were the main users.

Eng

Methanol was a component of the fuel used up in Grand Prix racing until 130 Avgas was mandated starting with the 1958 seasonThe following link gives the fuel used by Mercedes Benz as 45% Benzene, 25% methyl alcohol, 23% aviation fuel, 3% acetone, 2% nitrobenzene and 2% top secret.

50 Years of Technical Development in Formula One

atlasf1.autosport.com

The oil companies had wanted to mandate ordinary automotive gasoline but there was no international standard for that.

 

[Engineman]

Methanol was a component of the fuel used up in Grand Prix racing until 130 Avgas was mandated starting with the 1958 seasonThe following link gives the fuel used by Mercedes Benz as 45% Benzene, 25% methyl alcohol, 23% aviation fuel, 3% acetone, 2% nitrobenzene and 2% top secret.

50 Years of Technical Development in Formula One

atlasf1.autosport.com

The oil companies had wanted to mandate ordinary automotive gasoline but there was no international standard for that.

Hi, I am guessing that the 2% might include more tetraethyl lead for P/N increase and Brominated compounds for preventing lead fowling of sparkplugs.

Eng

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Interesting article from 1942 in the Atlantic on the German oil situation.

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1942/06/russias-oil-and-hitlers-need/653693/

 

[yellownose]

Henlo,

I changed my mind on one thing. So originally I said that "if the Germans would have had the oil field they discovered after the war, the world would look very different". And I maintain that this was right. You can go through various "Butterfly effect"-scenarios here.

But I did some more research and thinking. So one thing I mentioned was that by increasing the US casualties the German government could have archived their goal from 1943 on, which is force the western allies on the negotiation table, because the US would not be willing to accept high casualties. I don't believe this anymore. And here's why: the situation for the US in WW2 was similar to the one of the UK (the empire, not only Britain) in WW1. There was no Germanophobia prior to the war, rather the opposite is the case, but once the war was on, it was on, and if you add all casualties up, including merchant navy, collonials and so on, the British lost close to a million men, but there was no significant collapse in morale. In my opinion the difference between WW1 and WW2 was that in WW1 the tanks&aircraft were supporting the infantry, while in WW2 the infantry was support for the the tank- and airforce, so by 1944/45, men with rifles would have been canon fodder without support. So fo course the performance would have been better with better support, and the advance on the eastern front would have been much quicker, but in the end there there still was too much untapped potential on the side of the western allies.

With everything else - I was right and you were wrong.

Btw this is the best I could find:


Not a piece of art, but ok.

 

[Juha3]

Doesn't seem like it, the prospects of success were exceedingly low.

I agree that with hindsight the idea was hugely optimistic. But that was the general attitude amongst Allies after the Great Swan from Normandy to the Netherlands' border. They hugely underestimated Germans ability to improvise and recover.

That's overblown, per official Soviet history records the Soviets took something like 10:1 losses during December-February. The devastating losses were suffered by the Soviets. Check out Krivosheev for the Soviet losses and David Stahel's winter campaign book for the details.

IIRC according to David Stahel Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942 it was more like 6:1 over the course of the Winter Offensive. Russian casualties amounted to over 1.5 million against around 260,000 Germans. But lack of proper cloathing caused unnecessary losses because of frostbites and extra sickness. In addition, freezing weakens the vigilance of of sentries and probably even reduced patrol activity as did the difficulties to move through deep snow. And the need to loot cloathings, food and shelter from locals increased the partisan activity.

Stalingrad was the product of so much more than just supply difficulties.

Of cource, but lack of fuel prohibited the use of German panzer formations inside the forming Stalingrad pocket (14., 16. and 24. Panzer Divs) against the armoured outer northern pincer.

A major mistake.

Agree

 

[wiking85]

I agree that with hindsight the idea was hugely optimistic. But that was the general attitude amongst Allies after the Great Swan from Normandy to the Netherlands' border. They hugely underestimated Germans ability to improvise and recover.

Apparently, but all the more unforgivable given ULTRA intel.

IIRC according to David Stahel Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942 it was more like 6:1 over the course of the Winter Offensive. Russian casualties amounted to over 1.5 million against around 260,000 Germans. But lack of proper cloathing caused unnecessary losses because of frostbites and extra sickness. In addition, freezing weakens the vigilance of of sentries and probably even reduced patrol activity as did the difficulties to move through deep snow. And the need to loot cloathings, food and shelter from locals increased the partisan activity.

I misremembered what he said in the book. On balance the casualties rations hugely favored the Germans. Also the casualties of winter were actually lower than during summer and fall 1941, while inflicting just as heavy of losses, in fact Soviet dead were higher as a percentage than in the rest of 1941 due to the weather. For all the talk of the Germans being unprepared it seems if anything Soviet troops were really not prepared for winter.

Of cource, but lack of fuel prohibited the use of German panzer formations inside the forming Stalingrad pocket (14., 16. and 24. Panzer Divs) against the armoured outer northern pincer.

By then the damage was done. I was talking about supply difficulties before the encirclement.

 

[Juha3]

Ultra helped only if Germans used radio communications, nearer the Germans got to the Reich more they could relied on landlines. One of the main reasons why the Wacht am Rhein surprised the Allies

When one chose to attack through wintery forests with much of snow during the WW2 the survival rate of wounded was bound to be poor. Soviet were not unprepared for the winter but they had to launch their attacks in a hurry so their logistics were badly lacking. At least in the northern part of the attacks some of the troops had only a limited supply of ammo even before they launched the attack and some were alredy hungry at that point. Soviet attack tactics were still poor, there were still around thoughts based on the old maxim "The Red Army does not count its losses".

We are both talking about supply difficulties before the encirclement. I was referring the fuels situation at the beginning of the Soviet counter attack ie. the fuel situation when the Germans began to react the Soviet break-through through the 3rd Rumanian Army.

 

[wiking85]

Ultra helped only if Germans used radio communications, nearer the Germans got to the Reich more they could relied on landlines. One of the main reasons why the Wacht am Rhein surprised the Allies

Often claimed, but Hitler didn't trust landline security. Mostly the Allies fucked up interpreting the info coming in through ULTRA. Some intel officers did pick up on the offensive and warned Eisenhower, but were ignored.

When one chose to attack through wintery forests with much of snow during the WW2 the survival rate of wounded was bound to be poor. Soviet were not unprepared for the winter but they had to launch their attacks in a hurry so their logistics were badly lacking. At least in the northern part of the attacks some of the troops had only a limited supply of ammo even before they launched the attack and some were alredy hungry at that point. Soviet attack tactics were still poor, there were still around thoughts based on the old maxim "The Red Army does not count its losses".

They didn't have to attack in a hurry, they chose to to try and take advantage of German overextension. It worked initially and they got carried away. If you read memoirs of German survivors of the fighting the Soviets had winter uniforms, but those didn't help and they found piles of Soviet troops frozen all over the place. At a certain point you need to be indoors with fire to survive certain levels of cold.

We are both talking about supply difficulties before the encirclement. I was referring the fuels situation at the beginning of the Soviet counter attack ie. the fuel situation when the Germans began to react the Soviet break-through through the 3rd Rumanian Army.

You mentioned something that happened inside the encirclement, so I thought that was what you were referring to in toto. Wasn't the issue less of an issue of fuel and more of mice chewing through wires in tank engines when they used hay to keep it from freezing? The mice got in to avoid the cold and nibbled on stuff.

 

[Juha3]

Now a long ago during my military service I was trained for winter warfare even guerrila type ie. operating behind enemy lines in winter. In northern coniferous forest zone one has plenty of wood around him, so plenty of means to build up shelter and keep up campfire. With proper cloathing minus 30 deg C is not a problem, of course one must be careful with ones nose and cheeks. And check one's toes time to time. And of course one needs energy. Remember even snow is a good insulating material. And before IR cameras became commomplace one could make one's fire so that it was difficult to detect. So when one knows the tricks northern coniferous forests were not unduly difficult enviroment to survive even in harsh winter.

I wrote "the use of German panzer formations inside the FORMING Stalingrad pocket". The mice were problem of the unlucky 22.PzD which formed the western flank of XXXXVIII PzAK with the 1. Rumanian Armoured Div. Its main battle tank was Pz 38(t). 14., 16. and 24. PzDivs were good divisions with German equipment. 22. PzD and 1. Rum AD ended up with the few panzern they still had outside the pocket on the western bank of the River Chir.

 

[wiking85]

Now a long ago during my military service I was trained for winter warfare even guerrila type ie. operating behind enemy lines in winter. In northern coniferous forest zone one has plenty of wood around him, so plenty of means to build up shelter and keep up campfire. With proper cloathing minus 30 deg C is not a problem, of course one must be careful with ones nose and cheeks. And check one's toes time to time. And of course one needs energy. Remember even snow is a good insulating material. And before IR cameras became commomplace one could make one's fire so that it was difficult to detect. So when one knows the tricks northern coniferous forests were not unduly difficult enviroment to survive even in harsh winter.

Trees are a wind break and can keep you from freezing somewhat. Operating in the open the attack especially wading through deep snow is something else entirely. Especially without the sun up.

I wrote "the use of German panzer formations inside the FORMING Stalingrad pocket". The mice were problem of the unlucky 22.PzD which formed the western flank of XXXXVIII PzAK with the 1. Rumanian Armoured Div. Its main battle tank was Pz 38(t). 14., 16. and 24. PzDivs were good divisions with German equipment. 22. PzD and 1. Rum AD ended up with the few panzern they still had outside the pocket on the western bank of the River Chir.

Ok. You still have yet to show us that they had a fuel problem. Not saying trying to be a dick about it, just pointing it out that you made the claim without showing that it was actually the case.

 

[Juha3]

if you don't get totally exhausted, you won't freeze when wading in deep snow, it's very heavy going. Of course, if you try too hard when dressed too well, the risk is that the sweat will wet the bottom layers of clothing. Then at some point you should be able to change dry underwear. In northernmost Finland in midwinter there is more than a month of "night", here in the south the sun rises even for a short time in even in midwinter, but one cannot count much on it. Wide open spaces are deadly if it's really cold and windy, but at least north of Moscow is quite forested IIRC. In more restective open spaces winds are not so nasty. And as we said the combat webbing was the warmest cloath the Finnish Army had.

Manfred Kehrig's Stalingrad, Analyse und Dokumentation (1974) is a good source on the supply situation at Stalingrad. When the Soviet attacked the operational range of 1.Rum AD was 200 km and that of 22.PzD 142 km, that of 14. PzD was only 25 km. And 16. and 24. PzDivn had only about 1/6 and 1/7 of the fuel 14. had.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

I just remembered something from watching the 24 Hours of Le Mans last weekend, where Total makes the fuel used at Le Mans and the WEC out of waste materials from wine making (grape skins, wine stills, etc). The process is basically ethanol to gasoline. Also in the past, Audi and Peugeot used diesel fuel made from gas to liquids from waste materials from natural gas refining.

Granted, some (or probably a lot) of this tech wasn't really viable during World War II or was in its infancy, but could it have been useful in general during World War II for all sides?

 

[Shortround6]

Granted, some (or probably a lot) of this tech wasn't really viable during World War II or was in its infancy, but could it have been useful in general during World War II for all sides?

Alcohol (ethanol) has some serious down sides as motor fuel.
It has around 1/2 the BTUs per gallon so if your truck has a 30 gallon tank you go 1/2 as far, yes you can make the tank bigger, or mount more than one tank. But that does mean your supply system need to move twice the tonnage of fuel. Better than no fuel but.....................
You can stretch gasoline with Alcohol like the commercial 85% blend. Much more than that and you need to re-jet the carb/s. or you run too lean which brings problems, like burned pistons.
Alcohol doesn't work well in low temperatures. Brazil for many years used ethanol based fuel to avoid paying for imported gasoline, I am not sure if they still do.
They used to make VW bugs that ran on Alcohol. However they had two fuel tanks, the main alcohol tank and a small tank (a gallon or so) of gasoline for starting in cold weather.
Think about that one. Needed a tank of starter fuel for cold weather......................in Brazil. Alcohol powered trucks on the Russian front?

Alcohol mixes well with water, helps of you get a small quantity of water in the tank/s, it mixes right in. What you can't do is drain it off the bottom like you can do with water in a gasoline tank. And at some point the water in the alcohol will affect performance and there is no easy way to get it out.


They knew about running race cars on alcohol in the 1920s if not earlier. They didn't want to deal with it if they had any alternative.

 

[wiking85]

What about natural gas as a fuel?