German fuel situation and what to improve on it, 2.0

[Engineman]

So for me the discussion is over.

Eng

 

[Deleted member 68059]

The book also refers to that fact. The history of the production of synfuel is also highlighted there. At the end of the day, it's about this: Hitler thought before the war that he would have achieved self-sufficiency by producing synfuel. It quickly turned out that this was a mistake and that he and his allies were dependent on Romania. However, Romania was a country that was very easily defeated 20 years earlier. In 1940 Romania handed Moldova over to the USSR, almost without a fight. This gave the "Romania question" central importance. The war could only be won with Romanian oil. War with the USSR was only a matter of time for ideological reasons. In the end, there's no denying that 1940 was the only year the Axis didn't suffer from severe energy problems.

Everyone had severe energy problems, the entire D-Day air-cover operation was very close to being curtailed at one stage because of supply issues,
at this stage (June 8th) just one raid on the depot on the Thames could have stopped Allied Overlord air cover.

Romanian oil turned out to be irrelevant for the Luftwaffe because the quality wasn't up to being used to make
aviation fuel. Substantial stocks were built up from captured supplies in 1940, and except for an understandable
(temporary) crisis point when the Russian campaign turned sour, and when the Hydrogenation plants were smashed
in mid-44, Germany was doing not badly for fuel, from late 42 to mid 44, the supply situation was steadily improving
as new plants like Brüx in Czechoslovakia came online.

 

[yellownose]

The book also covers the problems of the US and other powers. It also goes in-depth when it comes to who obtained fuel from which sources. I recommend just reading the book. It's very well written. The Admiral, who wrote the foreword, points out that this book has been reprinted because it fits to the current situation. He is obviously referring to the current tensions between the US & Nato and major global energy suppliers. If you think this book is providing bad information then it would be a national security threat. I assume that they only get the best in military history to read, so I don't doubt the validity.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Allied range with Trucks
View attachment 722093

The Red Ball express is in no way comparable to Wehrmacht capabilities on the Russian front. France had roads Russia did not. The US was able to run 10 ton semitrailers over French roads which was impossible in the East. The terrible conditions on the Eastern Front was why the Germans built thousands of Maultiers and RSOs

The Red Ball express was a temporary expedient that only lasted 83 days. In that time the trucks were beaten to death and availablity became a huge problem. It is interesting to note that much of the cargo was only shipped as far as the Seine where it were trans loaded to the railways.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Logistics2/USA-E-Logistics2-5.ht

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Which part of "the discussion is over" didn't you understand? I am not reading that wall of text. I chose to believe officers of the US military over a dude on the internet. Sorry!

It cannot be over, you keep discussing things. I note that a man serving on a ship in the Pacific and another who served in an armoured division are considered impeccable sources on the world's oil supply during the war, at least Goralski worked in the oil industry. Thanks for the oil production, confirming the figures I have already given. Not surprising when you look at the authors.

You know it all and everybody is wrong. I am the crazy one here. I understood. Now stop posting your walls of text, because I am not reading them.

The one who claims everyone is wrong is the one that receives the most corrections. And as noted the data is also the graph you declared misleading.

It took me a long time to post excerpts from a book and I believe that this is what happened.

And I noted the issues created by not including more of the text.

If somebody is interested how much oil Germany got from it's main source in western Germany, how much they imported and so on, there you go, I provided some tables.

Which duplicated data already provided, some of which you ruled misleading.

Just some info on the book Oil&War. Many books contain bad information, so therefore it is legitimate to ask oneself which quality requirements a book fulfills.

There is quality of the reference then there is quality of use of the reference.

In the end, there's no denying that 1940 was the only year the Axis didn't suffer from severe energy problems.

Apart from 1939? Anyway the quotes being extracted from Oil and War show problems at a tactical level, not overall fuel supply as the unquoted material around these quotes show, the extra material also shows how rubber and (working) vehicle numbers were also a problem.

Consider the following, praising the authors is not the same as showing their information is correct, after that comes whether the quotes being used properly reflect the author's conclusions.

I recommend just reading the book.

I have, several times a while ago now, along with the USSBS report and lots of other fuel supply related material. That is why I know how big the difference is between what you claim the book says and what it actually says, plus some of the times there are simple errors. Part of dealing with someone who repeatedly, passionately claimed only the USAAF did any damage to German liquid fuel production, or did almost all of it, or would switch and claim the RAF failure to bomb more threw away the chance to end the war in Europe in 1944.

The Admiral, who wrote the foreword, points out that this book has been reprinted because it fits to the current situation. He is obviously referring to the current tensions between the US & Nato and major global energy suppliers.

The new edition is dated 2021, given normal lead times that makes it finalised in 2020 or when the world decided staying at home was the done thing and world fuel consumption dropped, the current major energy problems started in Q2/2022.

If you think this book is providing bad information then it would be a national security threat. I assume that they only get the best in military history to read, so I don't doubt the validity.

Quite a major over statement and again no analysis of the data. At a strategic level the Germans did not suffer liquid fuel problems until mid 1944 and really towards Q3/44 as the summer battles were so critical Luftwaffe reserves were allowed to run down.

Being an aviation site I am sure the numbers of those passionate about US Army supply is probably similar to those passionate about knitting. The US published a number of supply related histories as part of the US Army Green Wall, few, including me, have read them all, my summary of the (mostly) US supply situation in France in 1944/45 comes to 60,000 words. It helps to stop a number of invalid claims, they stole all our supplies, super General X would have won it yesterday sort of thing. It shows the size of the medical crisis the allies hit in Germany, Belsen alone required a 14,000 bed hospital, the US allowance pre D-Day was some 103,690 beds for 1,340,000 troops. The Rhine was set up as a Typhus barrier, you were dusted with DDT if you moved west across the river. Where typhus breaks out in Germany the Displaced Persons have some immunity, being already exposed to it in the German camp system, they had a 3% death rate, the Germans a 35% rate. The medical air evacuations within the theatre, those back to the US and some medical supplies being short shelf life means there is quite a lot of aviation in the medical histories.

Pre D –Day The Transport Corps wanted 240 truck companies (the 2.5 ton truck companies had 48 trucks each on the basis 40 on road, 8 under repair on average), and a 2 to 1 ratio heavy to light trucks, plus 2 drivers per truck. In May 1944 up to 100% overloading was allowed for trucks in favourable circumstances on good, hard roads. So a 48 2.5 ton truck company was assumed to have 40 trucks in service, to be able to drive on average 50 miles forward/driver/day times 5 tons to give 10,000 forward ton miles. Trailers could also be towed and double loaded as well. The US was gearing up to produce the heavier trucks experience in North Africa had shown were necessary, this took time and hampered 2.5 ton truck production in 1944. There would be a major upgrade in the winter of 1944/45, truck companies sent to South France to pick up the larger vehicles.

Transport companies as of June 1944, 25 with 2.5 ton trucks, 36 with 2.5 ton cab over engine (light loads like piping), 27 with 750 gallon tanker trucks, 9 with 2,000 gallon semi trailer tanks, 2 with 5 ton refrigerator vans (reefers), 2 with 45 ton tank transporters and 59 with 10 ton semi trailers, total 160, so just under half were heavy trucks. The tank transporter trailers could carry 25 tons of cargo if required. At least some of the tank transporters came from the British and in order to obtain 2.5 ton trucks 1st Army had engaged in swapping with the Red Cross, the British and even SHAEF HQ giving 1.5 ton trucks for the 2.5 ton ones. Most of the time the 9 2,000 gallon tanker truck and 5 of the 750 gallon tanker truck companies form a bulk POL hauling service. Not all the companies were operational. The British lent truck units to help 3rd Army during the initial break out.

French roads had been under maintained since 1940 and it was soon discovered many of the roads were too narrow or too fragile to stand the traffic, for the entire campaign "In all more than 50% of the total engineer effort at divisional level and above in 21st Army Group was directed to route maintenance." The heavier the truck the more damage it does to the road, the French roads and associated bridges were not engineered for US heavy trucks.

As of 25 August 1944 the Red Ball system was consuming 300,000 gallons of fuel and 800 tyres per day.

On 8th May 1945 there were 260 truck companies in the theatre, including 125 4-5 ton truck/tractors or 10 ton semi trailers and 92 2.5 ton truck or truck/tractor.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

It cannot be over, you keep discussing things.

1.

2. Everyone always wants the last word…

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Rudel's Poodles? Seriously?



Just stick with the yellownose account, please.

 

[marathag]

The Red Ball express was a temporary expedient that only lasted 83 days. In that time the trucks were beaten to death and availablity became a huge problem. It is interesting to note that much of the cargo was only shipped as far as the Seine where it were trans loaded to the railways.

I listed that to give an idea of scale, and as you point out, not even the USA with far more reliable vehicles, and more of them, could not continue it forever.
But they didn't have to, as the US Military Railway Service worked feverishly to restore rail lines and bridges, and repair damaged French locomotives and Rolling Stock as was slow to bring in US replacement locos and cars.

 

[Shortround6]

Hundreds of this type were in England awaiting transport to France-Europe on D-Day.

 

[ThomasP]

"Being an aviation site I am sure the numbers of those passionate about US Army supply is probably similar to those passionate about knitting."

Good one.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

2. Everyone always wants the last word…

Really?

A number of US built locomotives were put into service in Britain as loans. Operation Overlord wanted lots of coasters, as in 1942 a survey found almost no US coastal shipping was suitable for cross channel work, the invasion would need newly built ships or use UK shipping. When the UK coasters failed to be returned on time the British became reluctant to release the locomotives on time. The rail plan assumed few captures of rolling stock etc. in France but ready availability of French rail staff which did not happen. Details follow.

The US shipped around 400 locomotives to England starting in November 1942. By 28th September 1943 there were 341 in use plus 33 in shops and 26 awaiting alterations, apparently they were shipped needing alterations, like hand brakes, which meant they were not a complete bonus, competing with the local locomotives for repair facilities. By 15th February 1944 398 of the US locomotives were in use. Pre war the British railways put into service around 600 locomotives a year, but for 28 months to the end of December 1941 only 359 had been built, and the government had requisitioned 378 of which 138 were lost in France. Thanks to holding onto older, normally retired locomotives the overall drop in numbers was around 200 but the military also wanted locomotives for other theatres. Britain raised production of steam locomotives from 272 in 1940 to 1,050 in 1944, mainly using the Austerity design, 450 of which were in service on 14th March 1944. By the end of June some 1,720 out of the expected requirements of 3,404 locomotives for continental operations (2,270 for the US forces) have arrived in England. In addition to the locomotives the US had sent 20,351 rail cars to the UK by 31st May 1944 for continental operations, of which 7,106 had been assembled. It was expected the allies would have to provide some 57,000 rail cars for continental operations.

By March 1944, as the British railways overloaded, 1/3 of US Army cargo was moved from the ports by road, in May came restrictions on civilian rail transport. The invasion was putting three extra loads on the railways, the export of the armies, the replacement for the coastal shipping used to support the landings and the rerouting of cargo that would have normally used the ports the armies were using. Initially some 396 coasters totalling 623,000 DWT were considered suitable and each used underwent an on average 3 month refit (extra armament, accommodation, strengthened masts and smoke making equipment) the refit program began in October 1943 just before the railways began having their usual winter problems. As it turned out the reduction in war damage to the coaster fleet meant the tonnage available in the winter of 1943-4 was about the same as the previous year. Despite agreements to hand back ships after the initial invasion it turned out that between December 1943 and the end of 1944 another 64 coasters of 100,000 DWT were added to the invasion fleet. After the refits the ships went back into service until they began to be withdrawn in April 1944 and all were handed over by 15th May. The trade to Eire suffered the biggest cuts, which also helped security.

In March 1944 the plan called for 250,000 DWT of coasters to be retained after D+42 until at least D+120, this was 150,000 DWT more than the previous plan, and in April SHAEF expected to retain at least 250,000 DWT for most of the campaign. Help was sought from the US and Canada but none was available for the initial assault which would take 420 coasters of 655,000 DWT from the British fleet. This was around 46% of the total fleet or 57% of the operational tonnage in January 1944. So around half the fleet was employed. Overall the British coaster trade dropped by around 500,000 tons of cargo a month from June 1944 until after the end of the war in Europe. In the month 15 March to 15 April 1944 some 2,625,100 tons of cargo were moved in the coasters. Relaxation of sailing restrictions thanks to lower hostile activity and the employment of some ocean going ships were the main ways the shortage was overcome.

The US logistics history claims that 2/3 of the British coaster fleet was assigned to cross channel work, some 184 coasters 625,000 DWT were allocated, which appears to be an over estimate in terms of percentage of tonnage and an underestimate in the number of ships. (The figures in the previous paragraphs are from the UK transport history). The US history notes one result was 1/4 of British blast furnaces were temporarily shut down. As far as I can see the use of stocks and the fact they were the smaller furnaces meant around a 10% cut in steel production for a time in 1944. For the invasion the US allocated 176 steel and 400 wooden barges, 100 small tugs (up to 186 feet long), 23 sea going tugs and 30 60 ton floating cranes. The smaller tugs are sent as deck cargo, many of the barges were loaded onto car floats and towed across the Atlantic.

On 10th July the first locomotives and rolling stock delivered to France. On 11th July the first train is run, manned by the 729th Railway operating battalion. It will take until October for French engine crews to be used. Language barriers and the difficulty in restoring operations of the northern rail network means the planned use French civilians under military supervision (Phase II operations) cannot be done for a long time, stretching the available military units. By the end of July some 126 miles of rail track was working, 48 locomotives and 184 cars had been imported, 100 locos, 1,641 freight and 76 passenger cars had been captured.

On 2nd September the first hospital train Cherbourg to Paris is run, to give an idea of the state of the railways the journey takes 80 hours, or around walking pace.

As of 1st October Northern France has 4,788 miles of rail track under operations, 2,775 being double track.

By the end of 1944 the allies had moved some 1,500 locomotives to France and had repaired some 800 captured locomotives. The British were resisting returning all the locomotives loaned to them as partial compensation for the use of the coaster fleet until the coaster fleet was returned. And SHAEF wanted more coastal shipping not less. In the end the return of the last of the loaned locomotives was promised for March 1945. In South France some 4,000 miles of track were in service, with the usual problems with congestion and weather. All up some 3,500 miles of single and 5,000 miles of double track were in service to "various standards", around a third of the French rail system.

 

[wiking85]

I listed that to give an idea of scale, and as you point out, not even the USA with far more reliable vehicles, and more of them, could not continue it forever.
But they didn't have to, as the US Military Railway Service worked feverishly to restore rail lines and bridges, and repair damaged French locomotives and Rolling Stock as was slow to bring in US replacement locos and cars.

For all the claims the US was so good at logistics, they couldn't even achieve what the Germans did with trucks over much worse infrastructure in Russia in 1941.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Really?

Relax, I was not talking about you. I was commenting on how he said he was done, but kept posting on it.

 

[33k in the air]

For all the claims the US was so good at logistics, they couldn't even achieve what the Germans did with trucks over much worse infrastructure in Russia in 1941.

Was that because the German performance was great? Or was it because the Soviet performance was terrible? People so often think the former and never seem to consider the latter might have contributed enormously to the early German success.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

Was that because the German performance was great? Or was it because the Soviet performance was terrible? People so often think the former and never seem to consider the latter might have contributed enormously to the early German success.

Probably a bit of both, Russia did pretty much collapse early on, people go on about Stalingrad and Kursk and forget that the Germans got within a few miles of the outskirts of Moscow.

 

[33k in the air]

Probably a bit of both, Russia did pretty much collapse early on, people go on about Stalingrad and Kursk and forget that the Germans got within a few miles of the outskirts of Moscow.

Yes, but by the time the Germans reached the outskirts of Moscow its force was spent. A large gulf had grown between what Berlin thought was happening at the front versus what the reality was.

 

[Shortround6]

If you want compare logistics support or logistics "lift" we need to compare ton/miles per/s day or metric ton/km per day/s.

How much of the German forces actually made the deep penetrations and how effective they were when got there tends to get overlooked.

And yes the opposition. Even ground pounders with horse transport can cover a fair amount of ground in month if they don't have to do much fighting.

 

[marathag]

For all the claims the US was so good at logistics, they couldn't even achieve what the Germans did with trucks over much worse infrastructure in Russia in 1941.

You mean, getting pushed out of Russia?

The German advances were done over mostly intact Soviet* and French infrastructure

While US Troops may have gotten bored with the monotonous C and K Rations, they didn't have to dine on Dodge or GMC, or go without.


*yeah, the guage change was a delay, but easier than replacing hundreds of miles of wrecked RR Lines and Bridges and damaged/destroyed RR Rolling Stock and locos

 

[wiking85]

Was that because the German performance was great? Or was it because the Soviet performance was terrible? People so often think the former and never seem to consider the latter might have contributed enormously to the early German success.

Mostly the former. There was Soviet performance problems, but in terms of sheer numbers the Soviets had an absurd advantage over the Germans, which the Wallies also had when they were attack in 1944 across France. The Germans meanwhile had a numerical disadvantage in 1941 and a foe which ended up stronger at the end of the campaign than they were at the start of it, yet still pushed to the outskirts of the capital of their enemy while still at war with the British. The Wallies in 1944 had every possible advantage and still did worse than the Germans in 1941.

You mean, getting pushed out of Russia?

The German advances were done over mostly intact Soviet* and French infrastructure

While US Troops may have gotten bored with the monotonous C and K Rations, they didn't have to dine on Dodge or GMC, or go without.


*yeah, the guage change was a delay, but easier than replacing hundreds of miles of wrecked RR Lines and Bridges and damaged/destroyed RR Rolling Stock and locos

They weren't pushed out until 1944 and only then with massive American and British help. In 1941-42 they were advancing and inflicting millions of casualties. In 1941 alone they took around 3.5 million prisoners as they were advancing over shit infrastructure. France was a 1st world infrastructure nation, the USSR was 3rd world. Intact Soviet infrastructure was as bad as fighting in North Africa.

Remind me when the Germans starved in 1941 due to lack of rations? Also you act like the Soviets didn't scorch earth the infrastructure and mass destroy food.

Scorched earth - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, many district governments took the initiative to begin a partial scorched-earth policy to deny the invaders access to electrical, telecommunications, rail, and industrial resources. Parts of the telegraph network were destroyed, some rail and road bridges were blown up, most electrical generators were sabotaged through the removal of key components, and many mineshafts were collapsed.

Dnieper Hydroelectric Station - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

During World War II, the strategically important dam and plant was dynamited by retreating Red Army troops in 1941 after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. American journalist H. R. Knickerbocker wrote that year:[7]

The Russians have proved now by their destruction of the great dam at Dniepropetrovsk that they mean truly to scorch the earth before Hitler even if it means the destruction of their most precious possessions

File:Vytautas the Great bridge in Kaunas, destroyed by the retreating Soviet army, Kaunas, Lithuania, 1941.webp - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

Vytautas the Great bridge in Kaunas, destroyed by the retreating Soviet army, Kaunas, Lithuania, 1941

Plus you're ignoring the horrific guerrilla war behind the lines that threatened logistics constantly:

Scorched Earth

Scorched Earth

spartacus-educational.com

The scorched earth policy and the formation of guerrilla units behind the German front lines, created severe problems for the German war machine which was trying to keep her three million soldiers supplied with the necessary food and ammunition.

Soviet partisans - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Something the Allies didn't have to deal with. Which is even more of an embarrassment for them that they got outperformed by the Germans.


Allied troops also took from French farms as they advanced, especially as their logistics repeatedly hit snags during the advance that summer. Remind me who bombed all that infrastructure they were counting on to advance? Doesn't sound like good planning.
At least the Germans had planned ahead and used the Brandenburgers to try and prevent bridge and infrastructure sabotage:

Bradenburgers: Germany's Special Forces in World War II

The elite 'Bradenburgers,' or Brandenburg commandos, scored many spectacular successes during clandestine operations.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

 

[wiking85]

Yes, but by the time the Germans reached the outskirts of Moscow its force was spent.

No more than the Wallies were in September 1944 when they lost at Arnhem to a vastly more spent force, which was also trying to stave off collapse in the east, failed to capture Antwerp for months, and then got hung up on the Westwall until spring 1945. That despite Germany being spent, bombed into ruins, and fighting the Soviets with the bulk of their army. Somehow the US had to borrow 400 Shermans from the Brits to replace their losses and run out of infantry so had to pressgang clerks into combat roles and even let up on their racist segregation policies to get enough manpower.

Understand I'm not trying to crap on the Allies just because, I'm trying to point out the actual reality of the situation since there is so much misinformation and terrible analysis in most WW2 histories that are based on nothing more than nationalist jingoism. The Wallies specifically appear to have been better at logistics than they actually were (on land I mean, their naval logistics were superb) simply by having so much stuff. That was simply a function of the US having more industrial resources than the rest of the world combined (legacy of WW1), unfetter access to resources, and virtually zero threats at home and virtually unlimited industrial labor not just from their own people but imported labor from Latin America. WW2 was about the haves vs. the have nots and the have nots, with major exceptions, tended to be significant more efficient and effective with what they had, including in logistics, than the haves, who could simply throw resources at the problem to overwhelm it. So you end up in situations specifically with the US where given their massive resources they should have been able to surmount the problems they faced in France quickly, but instead faced major problems from September 1944 on due to logistics that was only overcome after several months of scrambling to fill in the gaps despite not having to deal with a growing guerrilla warfare problem, having a friendly France able to help them, and having massive Commonwealth manpower. Oh and a much smaller enemy force than what they themselves had. In contrast the Germans were outnumbered 2:1 by December 1944.