German fuel situation and what to improve on it, 2.0

[Deleted member 68059]

Then you consistently deny that Germany was suffering from an oil shortage from the very beginning.

Data says no.

Stocks of vehicle gasoline didn't fall seriously until mid 1944. (German tanks were Petrol fuelled, with your reference to the Polish ground campaign),
until then production more or less equalled consumption.

 

[Shortround6]

A major problem the Germans had (and the allies) was getting the "stocks" of fuel to the units or areas that needed it. Didn't matter how much fuel they had sitting in Italy for example if they couldn't get past Malta into NA ports.

So you are going to get supply officers saying they had enough fuel while officers on or near the front lines saying there were shortages and having to adjust/curtail operations to suit the fuel on hand and/or what they can expect over the next few weeks.

 

[33k in the air]

Data says no.

Stocks of vehicle gasoline didn't fall seriously until mid 1944. (German tanks were Petrol fuelled, with your reference to the Polish ground campaign),
until then production more or less equalled consumption.

View attachment 721880

The question here might be the amount of those stocks as compared to amount of stocks the Allies thought appropriate. According to the graph, from 1941 through the first half of 1944, the amount of stocks ranged between about 340,000 metric tons to 540,000 metric tons.

From The Wages of Destruction (p.412):

The contrast to the Anglo-American combination could hardly have been more stark. Britain produced barely 1 million tons of synthetic fuel per annum. But it made up for this by importing oil at a phenomenal rate. In 1942, despite the fierce naval battles raging in the Atlantic, Britain managed to import 10.2 million tons. This was five times the amount received by Germany from Romania, at a time when the Wehrmacht had an army of more than 3 million men locked in intense combat on the Eastern Front. In 1944, in preparation for Normandy, shipments of oil to Britain peaked at more than 20 million tons, nine times the maximum figure ever imported by Germany during the war. In January 1941, when Germany is sometimes described as being 'glutted' with oil, stocks came to barely more than 2 million tons. In London, alarm bells went off whenever stocks fell below 7 million tons. So great was the disparity that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, charged with assessing Germany's economic situation, had difficulty believing its highly accurate estimates of German oil stocks. To the British it seemed implausible that Hitler could possibly have embarked on the war with such a small margin of fuel security, an incredulity shared by both the Soviets and the Americans, who agreed in overestimating Germany's oil stocks by at least 100 per cent.

Based on this, it seems the Germans were operating with a very narrow reserve of fuel compared to their opponents. Any major disruption or unexpected problem, and that narrow reserve is gone.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

The question here might be the amount of those stocks as compared to amount of stocks the Allies thought appropriate. According to the graph, from 1941 through the first half of 1944, the amount of stocks ranged between about 340,000 metric tons to 540,000 metric tons.

From The Wages of Destruction (p.412):



Based on this, it seems the Germans were operating with a very narrow reserve of fuel compared to their opponents. Any major disruption or unexpected problem, and that narrow reserve is gone.

Yes that had to make do with less than the Allies, and definitely operated on a more frugal basis than we did, but what they had was enough to invade Russia with several million men (and come quite close to winning, in fact), whilst also running the Afrika Korps and operating in France. That's quite an effort, I don't think that fuel shortages (excepting those of a logistical nature) seriously degraded any of their plans until 1944. Obviously if they had the sort of production volumes we had, their success would have probably been increased, but I don't think they were actually prevented from success by shortages until the fuel plants were smashed in mid 44.

Logistical shortages certainly occurred, but if you read the ULTRA transcripts, especially in Africa, its clear that the reason they kept running out there was because we knew when the fuel was being sent and made sure that very large amounts of it were destroyed on route. I.e. not strictly speaking a problem with insufficient production.

 

[yellownose]

I don't know where this graph is from. But even if it is correct, it is misleading.

Ok, the situation before 1944 in quotes from the book "Oil & War" by Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg, Marine Corps University Press, 2021.This is military history for members of the military. I assume that the military is analyzing this war soberly and cannot afford to make any mistakes in the evaluation

German concerns about losing Russia as an oil source, albeit temporarily, were very real.
[...] .
It was General Thomas who provided the Nazi leader with the grim facts. It was calculated that a total of 150 divisions would be needed to advance into the Soviet Union (144 were actually employed). Fuel requirements were initially estimated to be 65,000 barrels a day, or 45 percent more than had been consumed by the entire German military since September 1939. As the invasion drew closer, the anticipated fuel usage was increased to a more realistic figure of 110,000 barrels a day for the army alone. The Luftwaffe would need another 50,000 barrels daily. It was a rule of thumb that a Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter plane required 100 gallons of fuel to remain aloft for one hour; other aircraft requirements were similarly measured. A German tank consumed two gallons of fuel to advance 1.6 km; however, that consumption ratio did not take into account the fact that only 3 percent of the roads in the Soviet Union were then hard-surfaced. Such realities prompted a surge in stockpiling. The German planners believed that, even under the most optimistic conditions, the Russian campaign could be launched with only enough fuel for 60 days of sustained attack. Simply put, the blitzkrieg—a short campaign—had to work, or victory would be impossible. When detailed planning began in August 1940, Germany had only nine armored divisions and 3,420 tanks. The number of divisions was to be increased to 19 before the operation, and another 13 divisions of motorized infantry were to be assembled. Each armored division was to be equipped with 160–200 tanks. Production had to be increased rapidly to meet the quotas. There was no room for optimism of the kind expressed at the highest levels of the Nazi hierarchy. It seemed unlikely there would be enough fuel for the mechanized forces or for transporting goods by truck. Further, Russian roads were notoriously bad, and wide-gauge Russian railroads would be useful only when the entire system was adapted to handle standard-gauge German tankers and freight cars. With prospects for oil bleak, German officials imposed stiff conservation measures at home, and draconian steps were inflicted on the occupied countries.
[...]
The arithmetic of oil at the end of 1940 did not add up to self-sufficiency. By then, Germany had the production of 234,550 barrels of oil under its control
each day. It needed, by the standards of the last year of peace, a total of 575,000. That was the consumption in 1938 of the Axis nations and those lands that
were to fall under Hitler's domination in the first year of the war. The Axis empire now stretched from Arctic Norway to the Mediterranean, from the English
Channel to the Bug and San rivers in Poland. That vast area had not been energy sufficient in normal times. Its needs had been filled by importing about 60
percent of oil consumption, mostly from the United States and Latin America. Even the need for 575,000 barrels a day in Hitler's Europe was a bare minimum figure, sufficient only for maintaining an economy of peace. A nation at war, according to the experts, would require a doubling or tripling of oil requirements, estimates that proved to be remarkably accurate.
[...]
The situation was complicated further by Hitler's decision to go to Mussolini's aid when the latter's armies were routed in North Africa and the Balkans. German troops landed in Tripoli on 13 February 1941, and they invaded Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April, all moves that required oil.
[...]
Hans Kolbe, who spied for the United States throughout much of the war from his post in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, said, in a postwar interrogation in Wiesbaden on 23 –24 September 1945, [...] "The German need to obtain Soviet oil was deemed the primary reason for the attack," the transcript of the interrogation said in summarizing Kolbe's remarks. "Since the Soviet deliveries were insufficient to satisfy German demands for bringing the war [in the west] to a conclusion, the only recourse appeared to be the seizure and exploitation by the Germans of oil resources in the Soviet Union."
[...]
it was known that even if stockpiles were seized, Russian fuel was extremely low in octane and would require a benzol additive before use by German vehicles. Benzol was stockpiled but would not be available to units on a regular basis. Plans were made to transport Romanian oil directly to the front, but trucks were
not available to do so in sufficient quantities despite a flurry of truck buying in Switzerland in the spring of 1941. Civilian trucks were commandeered in Germany; captured French trucks were given to their owners in exchange. Tires were in such short supply that steel rims were used as substitutes. Production of rubber soles for shoes and boots was stopped. Seventy-five German infantry divisions were each given 200 peasant carts, called panjes, to carry their loads
[...]
After 1940, the panzers were constantly short of fuel and constituted a small—though feared—part of the Wehrmacht. Blitzkrieg was a fizzle after 1940.
When Hitler invaded Russia, the German Army was equipped with a total of 600,000 motorized vehicles. That same army's mobility, however, was severely circumscribed by its dependence on 650,000 horses attached to its 134 field divisions. Only 17 divisions were armored, and 13 more were motorized infantry. The bulk of the force that invaded Russia was little changed from the kaiser's army that fought in World War I.
[...]
Some studies conclude that 70 percent of the Wehrmacht's movement was horse-pulled, not horse-powered.
[...]
Shortages of the pack animals persisted throughout the Russian campaign. During the deadly winters, horses were particularly susceptible to cold, and their death rate when exposed to subfreezing temperatures was far greater than that of humans
[...]
Germany's supply difficulties were compounded enormously by having to provide 3,000 tons of horse feed daily to its dispersed divisions.
In turn, scarce fuel was expended bringing animal food forward. It exceeded the amount used for hauling both troop rations and fuel needed for battle
operations. Supply officers and planners would have preferred a higher level of mechanized support for fighting a modern war, but that was beyond Germany's industrial reach and resources. Inadequate supplies of fuel and incompetent meshing of vehicle production with demonstrated needs forced the army to restrict its mobility. Panzer units in combat were capable of advancing up to 97 km daily before refueling. Ordinary infantry groups could go only half that far. As had been demonstrated in France, armored forces regularly had to wait for the infantry to catch up in order to not risk encirclement.
[...]
Germany, always sensitive to its military fuel needs, built its forces on the assumption of limited supplies. Material combat needs were stringently reviewed with the knowledge that fuel might be limited.
[...]
More than 3 million troops were to invade Russia, spearheaded by 3,580 tanks; 7,184 artillery pieces; and 2,800 aircraft. Logistical details were not important to Hitler. He chose to ignore warnings of impending fuel shortages
[...]
On 9 October,
the quartermaster general of the Wehrmacht outlined the distressing fuel situation. Army vehicles were estimated to be 24,000 barrels short of minimum
fill-up levels. While 720,000 barrels were to be delivered during the month, the amount was inadequate for new offensive operations or major redeployments. Problems surfaced in other areas. Tires were being depleted at a rate that would leave none left by March. Motor transport was in a perilous state.
Army Group Center alone had lost one-third of its vehicles in the first month of the campaign. Even if enough replacement trucks could be brought to the
front, there would not be enough fuel to keep them moving.

Shipments of oil directly from Romanian refineries to the front helped ease the fuel problem somewhat, but the Germans found that captured Russian stocks, as predicted, could not be used without a further refining and treatment process involving benzol. Further, virtually all Russian tanks, including the mainstay T-34s (medium tank) and the Kliment Voroshilovs (heavy tank), operated on diesel fuel, and those captured supplies were useless to the gasoline-driven German panzer units.
[...]
The fuel shortages had been predicted, and within days after the invasion began indications of the crisis began surfacing. On 5 July, the Luftwaffe VIII Corps
reported it was curtailing missions in support of the invading force because it did not have enough aviation fuel.
Its commander, General Wolfram von Richthofen, said, "Supply is for us the greatest difficulty." Panzers on their way to Smolensk ran dry and stopped even though opposition was minimal. Army Groups North and Center halted advances in August to reform when fuel supplies were exhausted and none had been stockpiled in rear supply areas for continuation of their advances
[...]
On 28 October, panzer commander Heinz Guderian found, "We could advance only as fast as our supply situation would allow." That amounted to
only five miles a day. Panzers and infantrymen could no longer expect support from the air. The Luftwaffe, which had destroyed 2,000 Soviet planes
in the first days of the invasion, was losing its dominance over the Russian skies. Soviet air power was rebounding as German planes were increasingly grounded because of fuel shortages. As few as 10 bombing missions were mounted each day by the Fourth Air Fleet by mid-September, compared with
hundreds the previous month. Records of V Corps are filled with repeated requests for emergency fuel deliveries; the only responses to the requests were that none was available, "nor was an adequate reserve of supplies to be expected at the airfields in the near future."
[...]
Guderian's panzer corps, which started the campaign with 600 tanks, was reduced to 50 by 13 November. And there was not enough fuel for even that number to go forward. In writing to his wife the following week, Guderian vented his frustrations: "The ice cold, the lack of shelter, the shortage of clothing, the heavy losses of men and equipment, the wretched state of our fuel supplies, all this makes the duties of a commander a misery."
[...]
December found Army Group South in retreat because it had run out of fuel and ammunition.
[...]
Even Rommel's first offensive almost faltered at the start because of a fuel shortage. While leading his 5th Light Division, the original unit from which the Afrika Korps was formed to hurl the British out of Libya in March 1941, Rommel's tanks ran out of fuel within days. Only by sending every division truck he had to the rear to bring back fuel could he continue the advance. He left his force helplessly immobile for a full 24 hours, a disastrous situation had the British attacked during
that static interlude
[...]
Rommel's introduction to campaigning in North Africa, and every subsequent action, was characterized by a scramble for fuel. At every turn, the Desert Fox was limited by insufficient supplies. His record is a chronicle of despair about a lack of gasoline for his tanks and subsequent inability to press his advantages. No commander on either side during World War II suffered more fuel uncertainties during prolonged periods of time than Rommel.
The primary reason for the precarious fuel-supply problem was the inability of the Axis to control the eastern Mediterranean because the Italian Navy never had sufficient fuel for its ships to operate in that sector
[...]
No military arm of the Axis suffered fuel shortages as grave as its navies. The formidable German and Italian fleets required about 26,000 barrels of oil
daily. As early as December 1941, the navies were receiving only 42 percent of their needs. The combined oil reserves of both Germany and Italy at the time
would have provided enough fuel for only four months of consumption even at reduced levels.
[...]
Admiral Eberhard Weichold, who served as Germany's chief liaison officer to the Italian admiralty (the Supermarina), would later state:

• The Italian navy had undertaken the necessary preparations [to move its fleet bases from Italy to Greece and Crete] but it must be remembered that the execution of this planned transfer and the rapidity with which it could be done depended above all on the fuel problem. Because the German High Command, as well as the German Navy General Staff, remained deaf to my every effort to have fuel oil shipments increased, the necessary shift of Italian naval power eastward never took place.

[...]
Italy depended on Germany, hardly a nation with any abundance itself, to provide virtually all its oil. The Italians produced a mere trickle domestically, only 150 barrels daily in 1940.
[...]
Normal Italian consumption was 58,000 barrels daily, making it dependent on imports for 92 percent of its needs in 1940.
[...]
Germany, dependent on the Italians to transport supplies for Rommel's Afrika Korps, agreed to supply them 670,000 barrels a month when Rommel was
pinched by inadequate fuel shipments. The Germans explained they would like to have given the Italians more fuel for transiting the Mediterranean, but
the demands for gasoline on the Russian front and disruptions on rail routes between Romania and Italian ports made that impossible.
[...]
With the Italian Navy rendered ineffective in the eastern Mediterranean because of a lack of fuel, the flow of fuel to drive the Axis forces in North Africa was disrupted with disastrous consequences. At first, Germany tried to close the supply gap by putting into service all the merchant ships it could muster. These were mostly captured vessels. In the first five months of 1941, however, 11 of the cargo ships were sunk hauling material to Rommel. Those losses amounted to 42,000 tons of shipping, and there was no way to replace them.
[...]
In order to provide air cover for the surface ships trying to deliver fuel, Hitler personally ordered the transfer of various Luftwaffe units from the Russian front. Rommel, however, did not need more planes. Depleted supplies in December restricted combat aircraft to a single sortie per day. Neither planes nor tanks were of
use without gasoline.
[...]
Fuel for the Wehrmacht remained critically short. Only one-third of the amount that Germany had stockpiled in 1941 was on hand now a year later.
The only hope for sufficient fuel was getting Russian oil. Hitler recognized this, telling General Paul von Kleist, who would lead forces driving for the
Caucasus, that unless the Russian oil fields were seized by the fall it would be impossible to prosecute the war.
[...]
It soon became apparent that the drive for Grozny and the Dagestan wells was falling apart. General Von Kleist [...] declared that the main cause for failing to reach the major Caucasian oil fields was a lack of fuel.

Alright? Let's lay this idea to rest that there wasn't a severe fuel shortage prior to 1944.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

I don't know where this graph is from. But even if it is correct, it is misleading.

Ok, the situation before 1944 in quotes from the book "Oil & War" by Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg, Marine Corps University Press, 2021.This is military history for members of the military. I assume that the military is analyzing this war soberly and cannot afford to make any mistakes in the evaluation

German concerns about losing Russia as an oil source, albeit temporarily, were very real.
[...] .
It was General Thomas who provided the Nazi leader with the grim facts. It was calculated that a total of 150 divisions would be needed to advance into the Soviet Union (144 were actually employed). Fuel requirements were initially estimated to be 65,000 barrels a day, or 45 percent more than had been consumed by the entire German military since September 1939. As the invasion drew closer, the anticipated fuel usage was increased to a more realistic figure of 110,000 barrels a day for the army alone. The Luftwaffe would need another 50,000 barrels daily. It was a rule of thumb that a Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter plane required 100 gallons of fuel to remain aloft for one hour; other aircraft requirements were similarly measured. A German tank consumed two gallons of fuel to advance 1.6 km; however, that consumption ratio did not take into account the fact that only 3 percent of the roads in the Soviet Union were then hard-surfaced. Such realities prompted a surge in stockpiling. The German planners believed that, even under the most optimistic conditions, the Russian campaign could be launched with only enough fuel for 60 days of sustained attack. Simply put, the blitzkrieg—a short campaign—had to work, or victory would be impossible. When detailed planning began in August 1940, Germany had only nine armored divisions and 3,420 tanks. The number of divisions was to be increased to 19 before the operation, and another 13 divisions of motorized infantry were to be assembled. Each armored division was to be equipped with 160–200 tanks. Production had to be increased rapidly to meet the quotas. There was no room for optimism of the kind expressed at the highest levels of the Nazi hierarchy. It seemed unlikely there would be enough fuel for the mechanized forces or for transporting goods by truck. Further, Russian roads were notoriously bad, and wide-gauge Russian railroads would be useful only when the entire system was adapted to handle standard-gauge German tankers and freight cars. With prospects for oil bleak, German officials imposed stiff conservation measures at home, and draconian steps were inflicted on the occupied countries.
[...]
The arithmetic of oil at the end of 1940 did not add up to self-sufficiency. By then, Germany had the production of 234,550 barrels of oil under its control
each day. It needed, by the standards of the last year of peace, a total of 575,000. That was the consumption in 1938 of the Axis nations and those lands that
were to fall under Hitler's domination in the first year of the war. The Axis empire now stretched from Arctic Norway to the Mediterranean, from the English
Channel to the Bug and San rivers in Poland. That vast area had not been energy sufficient in normal times. Its needs had been filled by importing about 60
percent of oil consumption, mostly from the United States and Latin America. Even the need for 575,000 barrels a day in Hitler's Europe was a bare minimum figure, sufficient only for maintaining an economy of peace. A nation at war, according to the experts, would require a doubling or tripling of oil requirements, estimates that proved to be remarkably accurate.
[...]
The situation was complicated further by Hitler's decision to go to Mussolini's aid when the latter's armies were routed in North Africa and the Balkans. German troops landed in Tripoli on 13 February 1941, and they invaded Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April, all moves that required oil.
[...]
Hans Kolbe, who spied for the United States throughout much of the war from his post in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, said, in a postwar interrogation in Wiesbaden on 23 –24 September 1945, [...] "The German need to obtain Soviet oil was deemed the primary reason for the attack," the transcript of the interrogation said in summarizing Kolbe's remarks. "Since the Soviet deliveries were insufficient to satisfy German demands for bringing the war [in the west] to a conclusion, the only recourse appeared to be the seizure and exploitation by the Germans of oil resources in the Soviet Union."
[...]
it was known that even if stockpiles were seized, Russian fuel was extremely low in octane and would require a benzol additive before use by German vehicles. Benzol was stockpiled but would not be available to units on a regular basis. Plans were made to transport Romanian oil directly to the front, but trucks were
not available to do so in sufficient quantities despite a flurry of truck buying in Switzerland in the spring of 1941. Civilian trucks were commandeered in Germany; captured French trucks were given to their owners in exchange. Tires were in such short supply that steel rims were used as substitutes. Production of rubber soles for shoes and boots was stopped. Seventy-five German infantry divisions were each given 200 peasant carts, called panjes, to carry their loads
[...]
After 1940, the panzers were constantly short of fuel and constituted a small—though feared—part of the Wehrmacht. Blitzkrieg was a fizzle after 1940.
When Hitler invaded Russia, the German Army was equipped with a total of 600,000 motorized vehicles. That same army's mobility, however, was severely circumscribed by its dependence on 650,000 horses attached to its 134 field divisions. Only 17 divisions were armored, and 13 more were motorized infantry. The bulk of the force that invaded Russia was little changed from the kaiser's army that fought in World War I.
[...]
Some studies conclude that 70 percent of the Wehrmacht's movement was horse-pulled, not horse-powered.
[...]
Shortages of the pack animals persisted throughout the Russian campaign. During the deadly winters, horses were particularly susceptible to cold, and their death rate when exposed to subfreezing temperatures was far greater than that of humans
[...]
Germany's supply difficulties were compounded enormously by having to provide 3,000 tons of horse feed daily to its dispersed divisions.
In turn, scarce fuel was expended bringing animal food forward. It exceeded the amount used for hauling both troop rations and fuel needed for battle
operations. Supply officers and planners would have preferred a higher level of mechanized support for fighting a modern war, but that was beyond Germany's industrial reach and resources. Inadequate supplies of fuel and incompetent meshing of vehicle production with demonstrated needs forced the army to restrict its mobility. Panzer units in combat were capable of advancing up to 97 km daily before refueling. Ordinary infantry groups could go only half that far. As had been demonstrated in France, armored forces regularly had to wait for the infantry to catch up in order to not risk encirclement.
[...]
Germany, always sensitive to its military fuel needs, built its forces on the assumption of limited supplies. Material combat needs were stringently reviewed with the knowledge that fuel might be limited.
[...]
More than 3 million troops were to invade Russia, spearheaded by 3,580 tanks; 7,184 artillery pieces; and 2,800 aircraft. Logistical details were not important to Hitler. He chose to ignore warnings of impending fuel shortages
[...]
On 9 October,
the quartermaster general of the Wehrmacht outlined the distressing fuel situation. Army vehicles were estimated to be 24,000 barrels short of minimum
fill-up levels. While 720,000 barrels were to be delivered during the month, the amount was inadequate for new offensive operations or major redeployments. Problems surfaced in other areas. Tires were being depleted at a rate that would leave none left by March. Motor transport was in a perilous state.
Army Group Center alone had lost one-third of its vehicles in the first month of the campaign. Even if enough replacement trucks could be brought to the
front, there would not be enough fuel to keep them moving.

Shipments of oil directly from Romanian refineries to the front helped ease the fuel problem somewhat, but the Germans found that captured Russian stocks, as predicted, could not be used without a further refining and treatment process involving benzol. Further, virtually all Russian tanks, including the mainstay T-34s (medium tank) and the Kliment Voroshilovs (heavy tank), operated on diesel fuel, and those captured supplies were useless to the gasoline-driven German panzer units.
[...]
The fuel shortages had been predicted, and within days after the invasion began indications of the crisis began surfacing. On 5 July, the Luftwaffe VIII Corps
reported it was curtailing missions in support of the invading force because it did not have enough aviation fuel.
Its commander, General Wolfram von Richthofen, said, "Supply is for us the greatest difficulty." Panzers on their way to Smolensk ran dry and stopped even though opposition was minimal. Army Groups North and Center halted advances in August to reform when fuel supplies were exhausted and none had been stockpiled in rear supply areas for continuation of their advances
[...]
On 28 October, panzer commander Heinz Guderian found, "We could advance only as fast as our supply situation would allow." That amounted to
only five miles a day. Panzers and infantrymen could no longer expect support from the air. The Luftwaffe, which had destroyed 2,000 Soviet planes
in the first days of the invasion, was losing its dominance over the Russian skies. Soviet air power was rebounding as German planes were increasingly grounded because of fuel shortages. As few as 10 bombing missions were mounted each day by the Fourth Air Fleet by mid-September, compared with
hundreds the previous month. Records of V Corps are filled with repeated requests for emergency fuel deliveries; the only responses to the requests were that none was available, "nor was an adequate reserve of supplies to be expected at the airfields in the near future."
[...]
Guderian's panzer corps, which started the campaign with 600 tanks, was reduced to 50 by 13 November. And there was not enough fuel for even that number to go forward. In writing to his wife the following week, Guderian vented his frustrations: "The ice cold, the lack of shelter, the shortage of clothing, the heavy losses of men and equipment, the wretched state of our fuel supplies, all this makes the duties of a commander a misery."
[...]
December found Army Group South in retreat because it had run out of fuel and ammunition.
[...]
Even Rommel's first offensive almost faltered at the start because of a fuel shortage. While leading his 5th Light Division, the original unit from which the Afrika Korps was formed to hurl the British out of Libya in March 1941, Rommel's tanks ran out of fuel within days. Only by sending every division truck he had to the rear to bring back fuel could he continue the advance. He left his force helplessly immobile for a full 24 hours, a disastrous situation had the British attacked during
that static interlude
[...]
Rommel's introduction to campaigning in North Africa, and every subsequent action, was characterized by a scramble for fuel. At every turn, the Desert Fox was limited by insufficient supplies. His record is a chronicle of despair about a lack of gasoline for his tanks and subsequent inability to press his advantages. No commander on either side during World War II suffered more fuel uncertainties during prolonged periods of time than Rommel.
The primary reason for the precarious fuel-supply problem was the inability of the Axis to control the eastern Mediterranean because the Italian Navy never had sufficient fuel for its ships to operate in that sector
[...]
No military arm of the Axis suffered fuel shortages as grave as its navies. The formidable German and Italian fleets required about 26,000 barrels of oil
daily. As early as December 1941, the navies were receiving only 42 percent of their needs. The combined oil reserves of both Germany and Italy at the time
would have provided enough fuel for only four months of consumption even at reduced levels.
[...]
Admiral Eberhard Weichold, who served as Germany's chief liaison officer to the Italian admiralty (the Supermarina), would later state:

• The Italian navy had undertaken the necessary preparations [to move its fleet bases from Italy to Greece and Crete] but it must be remembered that the execution of this planned transfer and the rapidity with which it could be done depended above all on the fuel problem. Because the German High Command, as well as the German Navy General Staff, remained deaf to my every effort to have fuel oil shipments increased, the necessary shift of Italian naval power eastward never took place.

[...]
Italy depended on Germany, hardly a nation with any abundance itself, to provide virtually all its oil. The Italians produced a mere trickle domestically, only 150 barrels daily in 1940.
[...]
Normal Italian consumption was 58,000 barrels daily, making it dependent on imports for 92 percent of its needs in 1940.
[...]
Germany, dependent on the Italians to transport supplies for Rommel's Afrika Korps, agreed to supply them 670,000 barrels a month when Rommel was
pinched by inadequate fuel shipments. The Germans explained they would like to have given the Italians more fuel for transiting the Mediterranean, but
the demands for gasoline on the Russian front and disruptions on rail routes between Romania and Italian ports made that impossible.
[...]
With the Italian Navy rendered ineffective in the eastern Mediterranean because of a lack of fuel, the flow of fuel to drive the Axis forces in North Africa was disrupted with disastrous consequences. At first, Germany tried to close the supply gap by putting into service all the merchant ships it could muster. These were mostly captured vessels. In the first five months of 1941, however, 11 of the cargo ships were sunk hauling material to Rommel. Those losses amounted to 42,000 tons of shipping, and there was no way to replace them.
[...]
In order to provide air cover for the surface ships trying to deliver fuel, Hitler personally ordered the transfer of various Luftwaffe units from the Russian front. Rommel, however, did not need more planes. Depleted supplies in December restricted combat aircraft to a single sortie per day. Neither planes nor tanks were of
use without gasoline.
[...]
Fuel for the Wehrmacht remained critically short. Only one-third of the amount that Germany had stockpiled in 1941 was on hand now a year later.
The only hope for sufficient fuel was getting Russian oil. Hitler recognized this, telling General Paul von Kleist, who would lead forces driving for the
Caucasus, that unless the Russian oil fields were seized by the fall it would be impossible to prosecute the war.
[...]
It soon became apparent that the drive for Grozny and the Dagestan wells was falling apart. General Von Kleist [...] declared that the main cause for failing to reach the major Caucasian oil fields was a lack of fuel.

Alright? Let's lay this idea to rest that there wasn't a severe fuel shortage prior to 1944.

How EXACTLY is it "misleading", it shows STOCKS, PRODUCTION and CONSUMPTION of motor vehicle fuel from 1940>1945, there is
literally NO means by which that does not encompass the entire vehicle fuel position of Germany in WW2.

By the way that "misleading" graph is from the official US evaluation of the oil war in Germany, and was made at the time
using the actual German data.

FYI, that book is not all that good, its reasonably full of quite glaring errors, like claiming that the synthetic fuel plant at Billingham in the UK never produced any fuel.
(I already previously posted the British wartime production graph from Billingham).

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

In 1950 the British were building their nuclear weapons. At that time, the British government probably sent an inquiry about how effective these weapons would be. The document I posted probably is the reply from those people who build it.

Someone who complains about how untrustworthy so much of history is then writes probably about where a study came from and who wrote it?

Key factors like weapon size and detonation altitude are not given, the 1940/41 RAF night bombers were exporting bombs in the general direction of Europe and usually hitting it. The RAF thought it was hitting key targets, the Germans were trying to figure out what the RAF targets really were. The actual atomic attacks were to 1945 accuracy, Arthur Harris, for attacks on German cities, excluding Berlin, target photographs plotted, in early 1942 under 25% within 3 miles, in February 1945 over 85%, so about 4 times more accurate. USAAF radar aimed bombs, particularly early, could do worse than the 1942 night bombers. And guess what, the report says 80 inaccurate or 20 accurately aimed nuclear bombs when it comes to casualties. And who says they would be night nuclear attacks?

1,300,000 - 500,000 = 800,000, divided by 300 gives the average effective bomb yield of under 3 Kt, or a fraction of the yields achieved in 1945, The nuclear strikes did not destroy all, Nagasaki had its local geography limiting damage. To destroy the urban areas of Berlin would take multiple strikes.

As noted the Germans are fanatical enough they keep going through atomic strikes but are said to be busy surrendering as the enemy has lots more tanks and aircraft, like in Egypt in late 1942, Italy in late 1943 and France from mid 1944, yet no such mass surrenders happened for those reasons.

Hitler probably said that Paris should be defended, In that case, the Allies would have had to choose between having infantry fight around every house, or to bomb the city like Manilla. Von Choltitz probably thought that in this case he'd rather surrender, and sell himself as the "savior of Paris". Strategically it would have made total sense to fight for Paris, because urban warfare causes enormous casualties, especially with the tactics of that time,

Another probably. Looks like there were no orders for defending Paris beyond the general ones and nowhere near the number of troops available anyway, the Germans in Paris were pulling out while trying to hold the transit routes open as long as possible. With enough Germans to properly defend the city the FFI uprising would have ended very quickly. Interesting after denying there could possibly be any destroy Paris orders comes a scenario to destroy Paris, with the allies doing much of the destroying.

The British wiretapped the cells in German POW camps.

That is actually what I understand it to be, but not the point of my use of your words.

I highly doubt that Hitler thought it would even be possible that he can order the Germans to genocide themselves. You say "I only have one document" - you don't even have one document. You believe the nonsense from Speer that Hitler told him by phone to order the ethnic suicide of the German people. That doesn't make sense. Hitler's testament doesn't fit into the same reality.

Who said Genocide? Genocide themselves, mass suicide? I have plenty of documents, like strength returns and do not accept the idea it must be in the Hitler testament to be real. Ethnic suicide = ceasing to speak German and dropping all German culture? What I know is the Germans were doing scorched earth and destruction where possible, like all the bridges across the Rhine, whether Hitler gave an additional order for more destruction is another matter but within the character of the man and within the character of Speer to exaggerate any order and definitely his role in stopping it.

Their Panzers ran out of fuel in Poland. Insufficiant logistics were responsible for this, but that also has to do with the poor mechanization, or ability to fully mechanize.

The US Army ran out of fuel in France "that also has to do with the poor mechanization, or ability to fully mechanize." so the US had oil shortages. Try and understand the difference between tactical and strategic shortages. No army supply system, not even the US one, could use trucks except for the "final mile", they needed working rail lines.

Anyhow, I can't convince you, you just double down. So for me the discussion is over.

You said that at the start then wrote 5 more paragraphs.

Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force on the front line, 10 strike days a month, 2 divisions under each bomb carpet, allied troops move forward, round up the survivors, retreat before new German troops arrive with their wonder infantry weapons. 40 divisions a month wiped, the air commanders would not like it but then again they would have been locked out of Germany by those flak firing Me262.

Artillery in France, responsible for the majority of German army casualties. What would have happened if the ammunition supply was better.

Factoring in all the non divisional units the theoretical standard US corps formation had 4 divisions, (1 armored), 1 cavalry, 1 tank destroyer, 2/3 of an armored and 4 artillery groups translating to 2 or 3 tank battalions, 4 tank destroyer battalions, 1 artillery observation battalion, 16 artillery battalions, 1 chemical mortar battalion (assuming no allocation of units to army level) and probably 4 AA auto weapons battalions. The average US infantry division, with 9 line infantry battalions, had 8 artillery battalions behind it counting the divisional and non divisional artillery.

However excessive ammunition stocks had ended up in North Africa. The result was a cut back of US ammunition production, even closing plants in the winter of 1943/44. When it was reversed the problem was 100% employment and lots of better jobs out there.

Almost no heavy artillery ammunition was shipped to Europe between October 1943 and June 1944, despite the theatre being around 20% below authorised levels in May. Light and Medium artillery ammunition shipments had also been effectively stopped between January and May 1944, despite the theatre having 75% or authorised levels in May. In September 1944 First army replies to a request on ammunition consumption by pointing out it has never been supplied at the authorised rate and so the army is not able to determine whether the rate is adequate. On 11th October the ammunition situation is such that 8 day allocations must now do for 33 days, starting from 5th October, some units had already used stocks. No additional ammunition would be issued before 7th November.

In the period 15th to 21st October 3rd Army 105mm ammunition expenditure is 1.1 rounds/gun/day in action, compared with the desired rate of 60, a total of 3,401 rounds fired. First Army was better off, expending 309,469 rounds at 30 rounds/gun/day. The 155mm howitzer ammunition expenditure was similar, 3rd Army called of the Metz attack due to a lack of ammunition.

During November 1944 21st Army group releases 100 25 pounders and 60 days ammunition supply to 12th Army group, they are divided up amongst the three US armies. Then renewed for another 60 days in January.

Lack of 8 inch ammunition sees under half the guns in theatre used in 1945. January to March 1945 ammunition supply from the US potential is 29.6 rounds/gun/day for 105mm howitzer versus the desired 45, 155mm howitzer 23.5 versus 33, 155mm gun 13.3 versus 25, 8 inch howitzer 5.5 versus 25. During January the ammunition for the 4.2 inch mortar is added to the artillery ammunition system, mainly because much of it was defective, until this was fixed the mortar was fired only when absolutely necessary and only by use of a lanyard.

Message size rules means from now on abbreviated quotes, pages numbers from Oil and War.

I don't know where this graph is from. But even if it is correct, it is misleading.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, to quote "This is military history for members of the military. I assume that the military is analyzing this war soberly and cannot afford to make any mistakes in the evaluation"

quotes from the book "Oil & War" by Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg, Marine Corps University Press, 2021.This is military history for members of the military. I assume that the military is analyzing this war soberly and cannot afford to make any mistakes in the evaluation

The reference is liked. Oil & war : how the deadly struggle for fuel in WWII meant victory or defeat / Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg. New York : Morrow 1987, obviously been reprinted. The authors were not present during WWII which under your rules makes them lesser sources at least.

German concerns about losing Russia as an oil source, albeit temporarily, were very real.

Germans overall fuel production 1940 to 1943 was 4,652,000 tons, 5,542,000 tons, 6,368, 000 tons, 7,508,000 tons, not quite an extra million tons per year.

Romanian Oil Production, Thousand Tons and Exports in tons, columns are year / Crude Oil production / Drilling (km) / Refinery Runs / Domestic Consumption / Exports to Czechoslovakia and Germany / Exports direct to the German Army/ exports to Italy and Albania

1938 / 6610 / 288 / 6228 / 1674 / 999,240 / nil / 560,475
1939 / 6240 / 256 / 5837 / 1785 / 1,285,153 / nil / 629,350
1940 / 5810 / 235 / 5472 / 1862 / 1,429,807 / nil / 342,943
1941 / 5577 / 253 / 5255 / 1811 / 2,885,229 / 34,351 / 761,667
1942 / 5655 / 339 / 5237 / 2098 / 1,822,207 / 369,452 / 862,179
1943 / 5266 / 344 / 4903 / 2007 / 1,795,555 / 715,749 / 391,354

In the above possibility crude exported from Romania is double counted when refined in Germany, in 1940 Germany refined 1,454,000 tons of fuel from crude, in 1943 1,933,000 tons.

UK Official History the Economic Blockade. In 1940 Germany received 3,032,830 metric tons of imports from the USSR, plus 166,242 tons from Japan, 71,902 tons from Iran and 327 tons from Afghanistan, all via the USSR. In 1941 the figures were USSR 1,362,269 metric tons, Japan 212,366 tons, Iran 27,177 tons, Afghanistan 2,103 tons. Around 1/3 of this were food and 1/4 fuel in 1940, and over 1/2 of the 1941 imports were food, 1/5 fuel. So 450,000 tons of fuel in 1940, 270,000 tons in the first 6 months of 1941. In 1941 imports from Africa were 3,811,732 metric tons, in January to August 1942 3,194,766 tons. About 40 to 50% of these were food and a third fertilisers, Germany controlled Europe wanted food.

Also note Oil and War state Germany controlled fuel deliveries to Italy, which is not strictly correct, given Romania, also some of the fuel from Romania was shipped by tanker

It was General Thomas who provided the Nazi leader with the grim facts.

Prediction

The arithmetic of oil at the end of 1940 did not add up to self-sufficiency.

The Nazis were quite content to allow economic declines in western Europe, the French, etc. economies were at economic peace, the countries were not fielding active military forces from home supplies, Vichy France did fight in Syria. The consumption calculations have incorrect assumptions.

... trucks were not available to do so in sufficient quantities ... Tires were in such short supply

So fuel, rubber and trucks are competing to see which is the main limit. We have someone deciding it was fuel from a reference noting it was a combination.

After 1940, the panzers were constantly short of fuel and constituted a small—though feared—part of the Wehrmacht. Blitzkrieg was a fizzle after 1940.

Small being about the same percentage, counting German motorised divisions as well, as the US army. Though of course when and how you count things comes into play, the SS, the Luftwaffe, the occupation forces called divisions, the British had 8 official divisions in Britain in 1944/45 not meant or fit for combat. The after 1940 should be more after 1942, the thrusts to Stalingrad and the early 1943 backhand blow also qualify as mobile warfare.

Germany's supply difficulties were compounded enormously by having to provide 3,000 tons of horse feed daily to its dispersed divisions.

Which is why the Heer had a live off the land arrangement, they were crossing much agricultural land which still used lots of animal power, but the book does not seem to make allowances for this.

Page 70 "As the invasion began, oil was in short supply, and the gamble of reaching the Caucasian oil fields in time to replenish the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was risky at best." Except there was no 1941 plan to reach the Caucasus, the dream was the USSR would collapse, with the Germans taking over administration. The Caucasus was the 1942 objective.

Page 77 "General Thomas sounded the first alarm on 29 September when he reported that frontline supplies were running short." Followed by

On 9 October, the quartermaster general of the Wehrmacht outlined the distressing fuel situation. Army vehicles were estimated to be 24,000 barrels short of minimum fill-up levels.

So once again it is the deliveries to units not the amount of fuel available. Nice edit.

The fuel shortages had been predicted, ... On 5 July, the Luftwaffe VIII Corps reported it was curtailing missions ... Panzers on their way to Smolensk ran dry ... Army Groups North and Center halted advances in August to reform when fuel supplies were exhausted ... On 28 October, panzer commander Heinz Guderian found, "We could advance only as fast as our supply situation would allow."

So once again supply problems at the front.

The Luftwaffe,... was losing its dominance over the Russian skies. Soviet air power was rebounding as German planes were increasingly grounded because of fuel shortages.

The Red Air Force was operating from prepared airfields versus Luftwaffe on often temporary ones, plus supply difficulties.

Guderian's panzer corps, which started the campaign with 600 tanks, was reduced to 50 by 13 November. And there was not enough fuel for even that number to go forward.

So lack of combat power and other supplies now competed with lack of local fuel and it was a Panzer Gruppe/Army.

December found Army Group South in retreat because it had run out of fuel and ammunition.

Not surprising given it was at Rostov.

Even Rommel's first offensive almost faltered at the start because of a fuel shortage.

He had the fuel but not at the front line.

The primary reason for the precarious fuel-supply problem was the inability of the Axis to control the eastern Mediterranean because the Italian Navy never had sufficient fuel for its ships

Anybody here recall earlier mention of how the Italian navy could have done with more fuel? Plus the third of the Italian Merchant Marine trapped overseas because Mussolini declared war before recalling them. The port capacity in Libya set up to service a population of "773,000 native and 66,500 white", most of whom were not in the trading system, or the locations of the ports, or the orders to stay in western Libya. Anyone surprised that OKH might supply things on the basis its orders were going to be followed? Add the air escorts, given how the convoys were attacked.

Page 188

"Germany's overall supply situation at the time was described by Field Marshal Franz Halder as "disastrous." As Hitler waited for his offensive to roll, the Wehrmacht counted only 140 tanks fully serviceable on the eastern front among 16 panzer divisions. Only 7,500 motor vehicles were available to replace the 75,000 lost. Try as it did, the supply corps could find only 20,000 horses to make up for the 180,000 that were killed or died in the winter of 1941 – 42. The High Command staff concluded the situation "cannot be made Good" " followed by

Fuel for the Wehrmacht remained critically short. Only one-third of the amount that Germany had stockpiled in 1941 was on hand now a year later.

Note once again only fuel problems are being quoted. So a tenth of the vehicle and a ninth of the horse losses were replaced. The book goes on to page 194 (where the next quote comes from) detailing the changes of orders, how far behind the front line the rail heads were, the lack of rail transport, claims on how the forces at Stalingrad could have made the oil fields instead, the way oil rig production was limited by the amount of steel available.

It soon became apparent that the drive for Grozny and the Dagestan wells was falling apart.

Going well beyond your rail head and increasing your front line length several times does tend to cause you to stop, even more if troops are redepolyed.

Alright? Let's lay this idea to rest that there wasn't a severe fuel shortage prior to 1944.

Let's lay to rest this idea you have any real idea of the situation, or understand the difference between tactical and strategic shortages, or are accurately reporting sources. The book makes it clear supply at the front was the issue, the Germans never ran out of a fuel reserve. Supplies of fuel, rubber and the vehicles competed to see which would run out first.

US Red Ball Express, the original idea was to tow trailers but that stopped as there were not enough tyres, and yes just like the Germans rubber, fuel and the vehicles themselves competed to see which would run out first, or the roads would wear out, in some cases road repairs were abandoned as uneconomic, new routes chosen. The western allies removed all animal transport from their armies in the ETO, they did not totally motorise their infantry.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

This thread is being watched by the mod/admin team. The posts are getting snippy. Lets all not let it get out of hand.

 

[33k in the air]

Yes that had to make do with less than the Allies, and definitely operated on a more frugal basis than we did, but what they had was enough to invade Russia with several million men (and come quite close to winning, in fact), whilst also running the Afrika Korps and operating in France. That's quite an effort, I don't think that fuel shortages (excepting those of a logistical nature) seriously degraded any of their plans until 1944. Obviously if they had the sort of production volumes we had, their success would have probably been increased, but I don't think they were actually prevented from success by shortages until the fuel plants were smashed in mid 44.

That is an important question: how much did the low reserves constrain the operational plans? If supply is tight, would one think the planning would reflect that, while if supplies are ample, planning might be more expansive and take in more options.


A quick question regarding the chart you provided: does that include aviation fuel and its production and consumption? Or is it strictly for ground vehicles, e.g. tanks, trucks, self-propelled artillery, armoured cars, etc.?

 

[yellownose]

G Geoffrey Sinclair Which part of "the discussion is over" didn't you understand? I am not reading that wall of text. I chose to believe officers of the US military over a dude on the internet. Sorry!
Btw, here is Germany's domestic oil production

Source: Landesamt für Bergbau, Energie und Geologie, a departement of the government of Lower Saxony.

So now, there you go. I don't care if you think this is wrong. I get it, everybody is wrong but you. You know it all and everybody is wrong. I am the crazy one here. I understood. Now stop posting your walls of text, because I am not reading them.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

G Geoffrey Sinclair Which part of "the discussion is over" didn't you understand? I am not reading that wall of text. I chose to believe officers of the US military over a dude on the internet. Sorry!
Btw, here is Germany's domestic oil production

View attachment 722017

Source: Landesamt für Bergbau, Energie und Geologie, a departement of the government of Lower Saxony.

View attachment 722018

View attachment 722019

View attachment 722020

So now, there you go. I don't care if you think this is wrong. I get it, everybody is wrong but you. You know it all and everybody is wrong. I am the crazy one here. I understood. Now stop posting your walls of text, because I am not reading them.

The top one is crude oil production, something which everyone knows perfectly well Germany had almost none of, hence why they had a synthetic industry.

The others are just the tables of the graph I posted which you say you don't like.

Ignoring those incongruities, what exactly are you claiming that these tables show ?

 

[yellownose]

I wasn't replying to you. I am not sure if Geoffrey knows that. I haven't read his post, I just skimmed some of it. It took me a long time to post excerpts from a book and I believe that this is what happened. If somebody is interested how much oil Germany got from it's main source in western Germany, how much they imported and so on, there you go, I provided some tables.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

This thread is being watched by the mod/admin team. The posts are getting snippy. Lets all not let it get out of hand.

Posting it one last time…

 

[33k in the air]

In 1950 the British were building their nuclear weapons. At that time, the British government probably sent an inquiry about how effective these weapons would be.

Let's look at some basic numbers.

The uranium-based Little Boy bomb had a yield of 15 kilotons. That's 15,000 metric tons of TNT which is 16,534 short tons, or about 33 million pounds. The US 500-lb GP bomb, by far the most commonly dropped type of bomb in the ETO by the USAAF, had a filling of about 267 lbs of TNT (when that filling was used). Which means that one atomic bomb was the equivalent to more than 123,800 bombs of the 500-lb GP class.

The plutonium-based Fat Man bomb had a yield of 21 kilotons. That works out to some 173,400 bombs of 500-lb GP class.

1 x 9.700-lb uranium bomb was equivalent to about 123,800 x 500-lb GP bombs in terms of raw destructive power.
1 x 10,300-lb plutonium bomb was equivalent to about 173,400 x 500-lb GP bombs in terms of raw destructive power.

This is the scale of power the early atomic bombs offered. (The development of the hydrogen bomb pushed that scale up even more dramatically.)

 

[ThomasP]

Another factor to be considered - if Germany had still been in the war (and doing well in terms of killing Allied soldiers) and it had been deemed necessary - the US would almost certainly have planned first use of the A-bomb against German targets. My opinion is that the US would have saved up a few and then dropped them on at least 10 major cities/communication-transport-manufacturing centers. The Allies would have planned for losses and for following up with more before the Germans could have begun effectively reacting. Using such a method no country at the time would have been able to survive as a coherent nation.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

According to this article 150 km was the practical radius for Wehrmacht supply trucks.

WW2 CLASH - THE LOGISTICS THAT SUPPORT THE BLITZKRIEG

A 1941 German Panzer division had 14.373 men and required 30 tons of supplies per day when inactive to 700 tons per day in heavy fighting

ww2clash.com

 

[marathag]

According to this article 150 km was the practical radius for Wehrmacht supply trucks.

WW2 CLASH - THE LOGISTICS THAT SUPPORT THE BLITZKRIEG

A 1941 German Panzer division had 14.373 men and required 30 tons of supplies per day when inactive to 700 tons per day in heavy fighting

ww2clash.com

Allied range with Trucks

 

[yellownose]

Just some info on the book Oil&War. Many books contain bad information, so therefore it is legitimate to ask oneself which quality requirements a book fulfills. Just to show you that I haven't posted excerpts from some obscure and unimportant book, or some old book with theses that have been refuted, here is some information about oil&war and the authors:

Russell Freeburg - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Robert Goralski - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Oil & War with co-author Robert Goralski of NBC News, was published in 1987 by William Morrow and Company. The book told about the deadly struggle for oil in the years before and during World War II and how control of it eventually meant victory or defeat. It was part of a public television series in 1993 on oil.

The foreword was written by Admiral James G. Foggo III

James G. Foggo III - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

James Gordon Foggo III MSC (born September 2, 1959) is a retired United States Navy admiral who last served as commander of United States Naval Forces Europe-Africa and commander of Allied Joint Force Command Naples. He previously served as the director of Navy Staff. Prior to that, he served as the commander of United States Sixth Fleet.

Foggo writes in the foreword:

I share a common view with retired Marine Corps General James N. Mattis in opining that if you want to learn something new, read an old book. In his recent memoir, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, Mattis bluntly asserts that "if you haven't read hundreds of books, you are functionally illiterate, and you will be incompetent, because your personal experiences alone aren't broad enough to sustain you." [...]
Therefore, my hat is off to Marine Corps University Press for its decision to reprint the book Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in World War II Meant Victory or Defeat, written by Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg. The late NBC News correspondent Robert Goralski saw service with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific during World War II. He later covered the Korean and Vietnam conflicts as a journalist. He is the author of World War II Almanac, 1931–1945 and wrote and lectured on military affairs and energy. He died in 1988 in McLean, Virginia. Russell W. Freeburg served in the European theater of World War II with the U.S. Army. He fought with the 8th Armored Division in the Ardennes, This book is extremely well-researched and written in a style that appeals to historians, researchers, and warfighters alike. [...]
We must ensure that oil is never used as a weapon against the United States. It is time to think outside of the box.
Accordingly, after reading Oil & War, I can understand why Marine Corps University Press chose to republish this work, for it remains as relevant a piece of research in 2021 as it did in 1987. I regret not having been able to include it as one of "Foggo's Forty!"
Read this book and recommend it to others—you will not be disappointed

So it is a classic. It was written by WW2-veterans, it is considered a classic, officers read it and derive future strategies from it. So I presented it here because I believe that this book is thoroughly researched and made better by the fact that the authors were there themselves.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

 

[yellownose]

View attachment 722116

The book also refers to that fact. The history of the production of synfuel is also highlighted there. At the end of the day, it's about this: Hitler thought before the war that he would have achieved self-sufficiency by producing synfuel. It quickly turned out that this was a mistake and that he and his allies were dependent on Romania. However, Romania was a country that was very easily defeated 20 years earlier. In 1940 Romania handed Moldova over to the USSR, almost without a fight. This gave the "Romania question" central importance. The war could only be won with Romanian oil. War with the USSR was only a matter of time for ideological reasons. In the end, there's no denying that 1940 was the only year the Axis didn't suffer from severe energy problems.