German fuel situation and what to improve on it, 2.0

[33k in the air]

Mostly the former.

People say this but I remain unconvinced; Soviet shortcomings always seem to be downplayed in favour of German superiority.

There was Soviet performance problems, but in terms of sheer numbers the Soviets had an absurd advantage over the Germans, which the Wallies also had when they were attack in 1944 across France. The Germans meanwhile had a numerical disadvantage in 1941 and a foe which ended up stronger at the end of the campaign than they were at the start of it, yet still pushed to the outskirts of the capital of their enemy while still at war with the British.

Numerical advantage means little if the effectiveness of those forces is poor. Let's look at some of the factors.

(1) Despite having been accurately warned of the impending German attack, Stalin ordered no mobilization nor unit preparation.
(2) Large number of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the opening days as a result.
(3) The leadership ranks of units had been greatly impacted by Stalin's purges, leaving too few experienced and knowledgeable commanders.
(4) Despite the superiority of some of the Soviet armour, there weren't enough of them and they were committed to battle in too few numbers.

It took some time for these errors to be corrected.

Remind me when the Germans starved in 1941 due to lack of rations? Also you act like the Soviets didn't scorch earth the infrastructure and mass destroy food.

Scorched earth - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Razing the ground in front of an invading army is a tactic that goes at least as far back as Alexander the Great. If you have no hope of holding that ground, razing it prevents that ground from being used by your enemy. Destroying bridges in front of an invader is a standard tactic given the movement complications it causes.

Dnieper Hydroelectric Station - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Interestingly, one of the things the Germans considered hitting with their air forces was the Soviet electrical generation network, because the German's own network was vulnerable to such attack, and it presumed the Soviet network was similarly vulnerable. The Germans lacked a strategic bombing force to really do such a campaign, however.

 

[Gary Cain]

not in a war its not.

Yeah, it truly was. No country had the technological base to develop those oil fields at that time.

 

[Snautzer01]

Yeah, it truly was. No country had the technological base to develop those oil fields at that time.

Neh.
Last i say about this is that if the germans knew oil was so close by the would have made an efford. Not only oil but how about Groningen gas? A panzer on natural gas is not only feasable but done at the time. So very defendable.
Nice big ploesti right besides the Reich.

If one does not know where the gold is only a fool would start to dig. Germans were no fools so looked else where. Tech in war time is very cheap. Time isnt.

 

[33k in the air]

No more than the Wallies were in September 1944 when they lost at Arnhem to a vastly more spent force, which was also trying to stave off collapse in the east, failed to capture Antwerp for months, and then got hung up on the Westwall until spring 1945.

Antwerp was captured Sept. 4, but the approaches to it didn't start to be cleared until almost a month later.

That despite Germany being spent, bombed into ruins, and fighting the Soviets with the bulk of their army.

Fighting a defensive battle is an inherently easier task than fighting an offensive battle. The defender has a big advantage that has to be overcome with superior numbers (with a 3:1 advantage for the attacker being the generally accepted ratio). The Germans used the bocage country in Normandy to great effect on the defensive.

Understand I'm not trying to crap on the Allies just because, I'm trying to point out the actual reality of the situation since there is so much misinformation and terrible analysis in most WW2 histories that are based on nothing more than nationalist jingoism.

And yet you seem to be supporting the idea of inherent German military superiority and saying little on the German problems. Point out Allied shortcomings all you want, but let's not pretend the Germans didn't have plenty of their own.

 

[wiking85]

People say this but I remain unconvinced; Soviet shortcomings always seem to be downplayed in favour of German superiority.

It is a pretty inescapable conclusion when you consider how many weapons the Soviets had, how many men, how much they lost, how far the Germans advanced, the guerrilla warfare problem, the shitty German equipment, the lack of airpower relative to the Soviets, etc. etc. etc. Soviet quality actually got worse in 1942 due to losing their entire pre-war trained army in 1941. Literally they lost more men than they had in their standing army in 1941. The Germans were simply at the very top of their game in 1941. Soviet shortcomings of course existed but any other army at the time in the world couldn't have done what the Germans pulled out in 1941. I'd argue even other 1944 armies couldn't have done it.

Numerical advantage means little if the effectiveness of those forces is poor. Let's look at some of the factors.

(1) Despite having been accurately warned of the impending German attack, Stalin ordered no mobilization nor unit preparation.

That is false, 800k men were being mobilized since April 1941 in secret. More than half the Soviet standing army was deployed at the Axis border in June 1941. Defensive preparations were not being made, offensive ones were, hence all the airfield construction near the border and massing of supply dumbs there. Not saying they were going to attack in June 1941 or even 1941, but they were coming eventually.

(2) Large number of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the opening days as a result.

Less than 5% of their total aircraft pool was lost on the first day and that number includes loses in combat, not just on the ground. No more than 3% were lost on the ground on day 1.

(3) The leadership ranks of units had been greatly impacted by Stalin's purges, leaving too few experienced and knowledgeable commanders.

Sure, but given the performance of even their handpicked officers like Zhukov in 1939 or the guys in the Far East in 1937-38 (they escaped the purge) the quality wasn't likely there even with those officers. Don't forget that the majority of the purged were not actually killed and simply rehabilitated even before the 1941 invasion. Rokossovsky for instead was tortured and nearly executed, but released and reinstated to command in 1940.

(4) Despite the superiority of some of the Soviet armour, there weren't enough of them and they were committed to battle in too few numbers.

It took some time for these errors to be corrected.

The Soviets had 20,000 operational AFVs in June 1941. Even the BT-7 was superior to the bulk of the Panzerwaffe. They committed them in huge numbers. In fact just in terms of T-34s and KV-1s they had more of those than all of the AFVs Germany committed to Barbarossa. They were countered by excellent tactics and use of FLAK and artillery. So few German aircraft were available that airpower was only a small part of overall Soviet AFV losses.

Razing the ground in front of an invading army is a tactic that goes at least as far back as Alexander the Great. If you have no hope of holding that ground, razing it prevents that ground from being used by your enemy. Destroying bridges in front of an invader is a standard tactic given the movement complications it causes.

Sure, which is what the Germans had to deal with a ton of it in 1941, but were able to keep advancing and sustaining their forces despite that and the guerrilla war. The guy I was responding to claimed only the Wallies had to deal with infrastructure destruction during their advance, which is pure nonsense. They also didn't have a growing guerrilla threat in their rear.

Interestingly, one of the things the Germans considered hitting with their air forces was the Soviet electrical generation network, because the German's own network was vulnerable to such attack, and it presumed the Soviet network was similarly vulnerable. The Germans lacked a strategic bombing force to really do such a campaign, however.

The Germans did not base their plan on their own infrastructure, which was nowhere near as concentrated as the Soviet one. In fact the Wallies refused to bother attacking the German system because they believed it was too diffuse to be worth attacking. The German plan for Eisenhammer was based on the knowledge they had of Soviet electrical infrastructure due to building much of it either pre-WW1 or during the interwar period when they and the Soviets were working together. Same during the 1940-41 period as well.

The Germans had the bombing force they just used it on other things. Eisenhammer was about to get underway in 1944, but Hitler diverted them to launch the Little Blitz against London.

 

[wiking85]

Antwerp was captured Sept. 4, but the approaches to it didn't start to be cleared until almost a month later.

Sure, I should have said they didn't bother capturing the necessary ground to make it operational despite it being basically undefended. Good logistical planning would have been to capture that port before trying to launch Market Garden.

Fighting a defensive battle is an inherently easier task than fighting an offensive battle. The defender has a big advantage that has to be overcome with superior numbers (with a 3:1 advantage for the attacker being the generally accepted ratio). The Germans used the bocage country in Normandy to great effect on the defensive.

Funny how the Germans didn't have to worry about that in 1941 despite starting outnumbered. Vastly so in weapons like tanks, artillery, and aircraft. But despite utter air dominance the Wallies took months to break out of Normandy even with an utterly wrecked infrastructure in the region and guerrilla war in Germany's rear. Plus of course the Soviets launching a crippling offensive in the East early in the offenisve.

And yet you seem to be supporting the idea of inherent German military superiority and saying little on the German problems. Point out Allied shortcomings all you want, but let's not pretend the Germans didn't have plenty of their own.

Results speak for themselves. Certainly Germany had massive issues, but they were able to overcome most of it to score arguably the single greatest series of offensive successes against the world's largest army and nation at the time.

 

[Shortround6]

You have several background factors in some of the Armies.
The Germans had much better training. For much of the 20s and 30s most German soldiers were being trained to a level of command 1-2 ranks higher than the ranks that they held.
It was supposed to make expansion of the army easier, it was also supposed to help keep combat effective units in spite of high casualties. Companies commanded by Sergeants for example, or a wounded officer and Sargent, Platoons commanded by corporals.
And actually commanded, as in they understood what the duties of platoon commander or company commander were.

Now in contrast you had the Russian army where, after the purges, many officers held positions 2-3 ranks higher than they should have held (or even higher). The Germans emphasized initiative. The Russians shot people that showed initiative or at least shot people that didn't follow orders. The French collapsed in part because of poor communications. Waiting for orders or not being able to get orders through. The French didn't shoot junior officers though, and junior could be Majors and Colonels.
Russian communication's may have been as bad as the French, Telegraph and phone systems and radio systems. Just like the French many of the Soviet tanks did not have radios and presence of a radio antenna does not mean there is a working radio inside the tank.
Motorcycle messengers, so beloved by the British, French and even the Germans, didn't work so well in Russia.

" Here comrade messenger, take this important message to General Borsht in Minsk from here in the Kremlin, it is only about 700km, You should be there in several days!"
Russian spare part supply was often more chaotic than the Germans, something like 1/2 of the prewar Russian tanks would not run do a lack of parts and maintenance.

 

[Gary Cain]

Sure, I should have said they didn't bother capturing the necessary ground to make it operational despite it being basically undefended. Good logistical planning would have been to capture that port before trying to launch Market Garden.

Funny how the Germans didn't have to worry about that in 1941 despite starting outnumbered. Vastly so in weapons like tanks, artillery, and aircraft. But despite utter air dominance the Wallies took months to break out of Normandy even with an utterly wrecked infrastructure in the region and guerrilla war in Germany's rear. Plus of course the Soviets launching a crippling offensive in the East early in the offenisve.

Results speak for themselves. Certainly Germany had massive issues, but they were able to overcome most of it to score arguably the single greatest series of offensive successes against the world's largest army and nation at the time.

There is no question that the German army was the most professional ever fielded. It helps when a dictatorship is your government type.

That they accomplished so much, with so little, is testament to that.

 

[EwenS]

Sure, I should have said they didn't bother capturing the necessary ground to make it operational despite it being basically undefended. Good logistical planning would have been to capture that port before trying to launch Market Garden.

Yes it is always portrayed as that simple. And that is hindsight.

Eisenhower summarised the position, based on the intelligence he had available, in a report dated around 9 Sept IIRC, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Octagon Conference held in Quebec City 12-16 Sept 1944. In it he expressed the view that one good kick at the door and Germany would collapse. He recognised the logistics problems. He acknowledged it was a risk, but in his opinion, a risk worth taking for the war to be over by Christmas 1944.

The Combined Chiefs discussed that report right at the start of the conference. The logistics issue was raised by the British CIGS Alanbrooke. Churchill & FDR saw that report. Everyone had a chance to overrule Eisenhower. All were satisfied with the course of action being proposed and Eisenhower given the go-ahead for his plans. Market-Garden then became the kick at the door.

Turned out the intelligence was wrong. But when you had the German retreat from Falaise all the way back across Northern France and Belgium in the space of a couple of weeks it is understandable. German morale bounced back much more effectively than thought possible. Or the other way of looking at it, the intelligence was trailing behind what had actually begun to happen on the ground.

And the position at Antwerp was not so clear cut as you present. The push from the Seine across northern France and Belgium by 21 Army Group was by 5 Armoured divisions reinforced with another 2 Armoured brigades. There was insufficient logistics support to move the supporting infantry divisions forward at the same time. When 11th Armoured reached Antwerp it was 40 miles ahead of the divisions on either flank in Brussels (Guards Armoured + 1 Armoured brigade) and Ghent (7th Armoured + 1 Armoured brigade) and there were still substantial German Forces in their rear and on the left flank. They had effectively punched through the retreating German Army and not pushed them ahead of their advance.

11th Armoured paused because it was outrunning its supplies and it needed to reorganise. And the opposition it faced quickly stiffened preventing it crossing the Albert Canal a day or two later.

The German 15th Army was able to withdraw along the coast in organised fashion leaving garrisons in all the major ports which 1st Canadian Army had been ordered to clear. It withdrew into the Breskens Pocket on the south side of the Scheldt taking advantage of a number of major canals in the area. Crossing these then became just like a river crossing. It was the same to the east of Antwerp. Major waterways limiting the actions Armoured divs could undertake.

 

[Shortround6]

There is no question that the German army was the most professional ever fielded. It helps when a dictatorship is your government type.

That they accomplished so much, with so little, is testament to that.

It started in the 1920s if not before. The army was planning for a rapid and large expansion well before Hitler ever showed up.
To do that you need a very well trained cadre, in fact over trained for the size of the army you are allowed by treaty.
You also cheat by helping set up weapons design staffs in other countries and setting up training establishments and test centers in other countries

Germans signed the deal with the Russians for the "tank school" in 1926.
6 Prototype "gross tractors" showed up in Russia in 1929
Model of one of them.

How many actually had turrets and guns at this point?
There was also a licht Tractor

Hitler certainly took advantage of work the Army (and Navy and air service) had done but saying that it was the result of a the dictatorial form of government is stretching things.

 

[33k in the air]

That they accomplished so much, with so little, is testament to that.

This, again, overlooks how some of their success was due to the shortcomings of and the mistakes made by their opponents. Operations do not occur in a vacuum.

 

[33k in the air]

Now in contrast you had the Russian army where, after the purges, many officers held positions 2-3 ranks higher than they should have held (or even higher). The Germans emphasized initiative. The Russians shot people that showed initiative or at least shot people that didn't follow orders. The French collapsed in part because of poor communications. Waiting for orders or not being able to get orders through. The French didn't shoot junior officers though, and junior could be Majors and Colonels.
Russian communication's may have been as bad as the French, Telegraph and phone systems and radio systems. Just like the French many of the Soviet tanks did not have radios and presence of a radio antenna does not mean there is a working radio inside the tank.
Motorcycle messengers, so beloved by the British, French and even the Germans, didn't work so well in Russia.

This is exactly the kind of thing I am referring to in regards to significant shortcomings contributing to German success, and these contributions being downplayed in favour of "the Germans are the bestest ever at warring".

 

[33k in the air]

Less than 5% of their total aircraft pool was lost on the first day and that number includes loses in combat, not just on the ground. No more than 3% were lost on the ground on day 1.

Citing total aircraft pool is deceptive. What matters is the number of aircraft within range of the front and able to participate in battles which matters. What's the percentage loss there? I notice you do not cite that.

The Soviets had 20,000 operational AFVs in June 1941. Even the BT-7 was superior to the bulk of the Panzerwaffe. They committed them in huge numbers. In fact just in terms of T-34s and KV-1s they had more of those than all of the AFVs Germany committed to Barbarossa.

Again you are fixated on total numbers and not the number available at the front and committed to battle at any given time.


Your opponent can outnumber you three to one, but if it feeds in that numerical advantage into battle in a piecemeal fashion such that it gets destroyed as it comes in, or the incoming forces are combat ineffective for any number of reasons, then that numerical advantage means little in practice.

 

[Gary Cain]

It started in the 1920s if not before. The army was planning for a rapid and large expansion well before Hitler ever showed up.
To do that you need a very well trained cadre, in fact over trained for the size of the army you are allowed by treaty.
You also cheat by helping set up weapons design staffs in other countries and setting up training establishments and test centers in other countries

Germans signed the deal with the Russians for the "tank school" in 1926.
6 Prototype "gross tractors" showed up in Russia in 1929
Model of one of them.
View attachment 722585
How many actually had turrets and guns at this point?
There was also a licht Tractor

Hitler certainly took advantage of work the Army (and Navy and air service) had done but saying that it was the result of a the dictatorial form of government is stretching things.

No, being a dictatorship allows you to do things that no republican form of government would ever allow. Germany has always been

autocratic, the dictatorship just made it easier for the autocrats to enforce their will. With the Monarchy there were some checks on the kaisers power. There were none with the fascists.

 

[Gary Cain]

This, again, overlooks how some of their success was due to the shortcomings of and the mistakes made by their opponents. Operations do not occur in a vacuum.

That's what being the best professional army in the world does for you. It ALLOWS you to capitalize on the mistakes of your enemies.

 

[wiking85]

Yes it is always portrayed as that simple. And that is hindsight.

Eisenhower summarised the position, based on the intelligence he had available, in a report dated around 9 Sept IIRC, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Octagon Conference held in Quebec City 12-16 Sept 1944. In it he expressed the view that one good kick at the door and Germany would collapse. He recognised the logistics problems. He acknowledged it was a risk, but in his opinion, a risk worth taking for the war to be over by Christmas 1944.

The Combined Chiefs discussed that report right at the start of the conference. The logistics issue was raised by the British CIGS Alanbrooke. Churchill & FDR saw that report. Everyone had a chance to overrule Eisenhower. All were satisfied with the course of action being proposed and Eisenhower given the go-ahead for his plans. Market-Garden then became the kick at the door.

Turned out the intelligence was wrong. But when you had the German retreat from Falaise all the way back across Northern France and Belgium in the space of a couple of weeks it is understandable. German morale bounced back much more effectively than thought possible. Or the other way of looking at it, the intelligence was trailing behind what had actually begun to happen on the ground.

And the position at Antwerp was not so clear cut as you present. The push from the Seine across northern France and Belgium by 21 Army Group was by 5 Armoured divisions reinforced with another 2 Armoured brigades. There was insufficient logistics support to move the supporting infantry divisions forward at the same time. When 11th Armoured reached Antwerp it was 40 miles ahead of the divisions on either flank in Brussels (Guards Armoured + 1 Armoured brigade) and Ghent (7th Armoured + 1 Armoured brigade) and there were still substantial German Forces in their rear and on the left flank. They had effectively punched through the retreating German Army and not pushed them ahead of their advance.

11th Armoured paused because it was outrunning its supplies and it needed to reorganise. And the opposition it faced quickly stiffened preventing it crossing the Albert Canal a day or two later.

The German 15th Army was able to withdraw along the coast in organised fashion leaving garrisons in all the major ports which 1st Canadian Army had been ordered to clear. It withdrew into the Breskens Pocket on the south side of the Scheldt taking advantage of a number of major canals in the area. Crossing these then became just like a river crossing. It was the same to the east of Antwerp. Major waterways limiting the actions Armoured divs could undertake.

Eisenhower's lack of a good strategic mind was well understood at the time. Any one could have seen that even had Market Garden worked, which was at best iffy, logistically the entire advance and indeed the NW European front was in a bad situation and needed a functional port. For someone obsessed with wide front advances he very oddly shifted into a very uncharacteristic 'war winning' move that was clearly vastly more likely to fail than succeed.

Alanbrooke's private journal pointed out Churchill was a moron and alcoholic legendary for his bad decisions. FDR was not much better. They were really the ones to overrule Eisenhower and not knowing better wouldn't have known what the actual issues were.

Anyone with half a brain understood that if you're extending your supply lines and having problems and the enemy is falling back on his even if he is weak he has the advantage.

Funny about the Antwerp situation you layout, because instead of waiting to clear the flanks or improve the situation they instead launched an offensive even deeper without a secured supply line. Bad planning yet again, which goes back to my central point: the Wallies weren't as good with logistics as is claimed and in fact screwed up badly by September 1944.

Again why launch Market Garden instead of securing the ports? The thrust wouldn't have ended the war and if successful left them in an even worse position.

Citing total aircraft pool is deceptive. What matters is the number of aircraft within range of the front and able to participate in battles which matters. What's the percentage loss there? I notice you do not cite that.

Not really given that we are talking about a 6 month campaign and within a week the entire functional aircraft pool was either moving or preparing to move to the front. So a minor loss on the first day only disrupts air operations for a the first few days, not the entire friggin' campaign. We're talking about the entire campaign, not just the first day, week, or month. That is where the 25k aircraft reserve matters, especially when the Axis had about 25% of that number in total over the entire campaign.

This describes the air campaign in detail:

Aerial warfare during Operation Barbarossa - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Again you are fixated on total numbers and not the number available at the front and committed to battle at any given time.

You're making an irrelevant point to the discussion at hand.

Your opponent can outnumber you three to one, but if it feeds in that numerical advantage into battle in a piecemeal fashion such that it gets destroyed as it comes in, or the incoming forces are combat ineffective for any number of reasons, then that numerical advantage means little in practice.

But that isn't what happened. Here is what actually happened on day 1 of Barbarossa (from the above link):

The VVS flew 6,000 sorties (in comparison to the Germans' 2,272 sorties) and VVS ZOVO put 1,900 aircraft into the air. They put up bitter resistance in the air, scoring a few successes. Such was the intensity and determination of the Soviet pilots they disregarded their losses and fought with a resolve which surprised German airmen. In several cases Soviet pilots rammed German machines, using the tactic of taran.[92]

The Red Air Force despite the surprise generated nearly 3:1 sorties over the Luftwaffe on the first day. Unfortunately the link muddles combat losses by lumping them in with losses on the ground, something you can tell from statements like these:

The VVS Kiev District had 23 of its airfields bombed it lost 192 aircraft, 97 on the ground.

Frankly the reality is the Soviets were no match for the Germans and suffered as a result. Not necessarily a function of Soviet problems as much as the Germans were vastly more experienced and had better equipment. Still on day one alone the Germans lost more than on the worst day of the Battle of Britain, so the Soviets weren't slouches, despite being surprised.

 

[wiking85]

No, being a dictatorship allows you to do things that no republican form of government would ever allow. Germany has always been

autocratic, the dictatorship just made it easier for the autocrats to enforce their will. With the Monarchy there were some checks on the kaisers power. There were none with the fascists.

Uh...you know the generals overruled the Kaiser repeatedly when he tried to prevent the war or the invasion of France. The check on power actually caused WW1. In fact in 1905 the Kaiser negotiated an alliance with the Czar Nicky and the generals on both sides overr-ruled them and cancelled the deal.

 

[Gary Cain]

Uh...you know the generals overruled the Kaiser repeatedly when he tried to prevent the war or the invasion of France. The check on power actually caused WW1. In fact in 1905 the Kaiser negotiated an alliance with the Czar Nicky and the generals on both sides overr-ruled them and cancelled the deal.

Ummmm, that's what I just pointed out. Monarchy's are not autocracies. They have some resemblance, but dictatorships are the only ones that allow unfettered control. If you think the generals had power over Hitler than ask yourself how 84 were able to be executed for treason?

 

[wiking85]

Ummmm, that's what I just pointed out. Monarchy's are not autocracies. They have some resemblance, but dictatorships are the only ones that allow unfettered control. If you think the generals had power over Hitler than ask yourself how 84 were able to be executed for treason?

Not really what I was getting at, which was the Kaiser had more than just checks, he had very little power in fact, the generals/deep state had all the real power.
Hitler didn't have unfettered control. In fact he was quite the weak dictator and his subordinates had massive leeway to do whatever they wanted, which caused Germany massive problems in WW2 (for ex: Goering and Canaris) or leading up to it (Goebbels and Ribbentrop). You're thinking of Mao or Stalin who killed their subordinates into complete submission.

84 were executed for treason because their plot to kill him failed spectacularly and during the war he built up the power of the SS so that he had a praetorian guard to do such things. It is somewhat questionable if he could have done the same pre- or even early war. And of course they had some power over him, after all they basically planned Kursk without his input and during 1941 the 'stand fast' strategy was von Bock's. Plus they also ignored his demands, like upgunning the Pz III with a long 50mm gun before Barbarossa. When he found out he was pissed, but did nothing about it. Manstein defied him repeatedly and only after Hitler got pissed enough was he fired, but not killed.

 

[33k in the air]

That's what being the best professional army in the world does for you. It ALLOWS you to capitalize on the mistakes of your enemies.

Napoleon would argue you never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake. Which applies to any military at any time.