Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
Last edited:
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I think you missed "(economically)"I think this gets cause and effect wrong. For fertilizer and explosives you need ammonia which you get from the Haber-Bosch process. For HB you need nitrogen, which you can distill from the atmosphere, and hydrogen. Nowadays hydrogen is produced via steam reforming of natural gas, back then it was coal gasification.
Coal hydrogenation via the Bergius process also requires a source of hydrogen (again, coal gasification), but other than that Bergius is not a step in the HB process or vice versa.
Now it made logistical sense to co-locate (as well as a more attractive bombing target) the HB plants with the Bergius plants and hydrogen plants, then as now hydrogen transportation and storage is very tricky. But they could have dispersed them, with one hydrogen production plant for the HB plant and another separate one for the Bergius plant.
I'm not claiming there weren't synergies in co-location. Like needing a single large hydrogen plant feeding both a HB plant and a Bergius plant instead of two separate smaller ones, logistics infrastructure like roads, rail, port facilities etc. Just saying that as far as the chemical processes themselves are concerned, beyond the supply of hydrogen there's no particular reason they need to be co-located.
Actually, Britain had a very small amount of indigenous petroleum which they exploited, but it added only a small amount to their requirements. Sherwood Forest oil fieldContinuing my spelunking into the coal-oil transition for warships, in the UK in the runup to WWI there was a great debate wrt modernizing the RN to switch from coal to fuel oil. The energy density, ease of handling (a surprisingly large percentage of the crew on a coal powered warship were stokers and coal trimmers) were clearly seen as revolutionary, however security of supply was a big concern. Like Germany, the UK had mountains of coal but no indigenous petroleum reserves.
It was only with the government acquiring a controlling stake in the Anglo-Persian oil company Anglo-Persian Oil Company - Wikipedia in addition/instead of access to American (Standard Oil) and Dutch (Shell) oil, the coast was considered clear for a wholesale shift to an oil powered RN.
RN command of the seas was the lynchpin in ensuring that the oil from Anglo-Persian could be transported back to Britain also in a crisis, not only to fuel the RN itself but also to ensure the future prosperity of a Britain civil economy that was beginning to transition to oil powered vehicles.
In contrast it seems the Germans adopted petroleum energy without ensuring access to a supply beyond assuming a quick war would give them access to oil fields in the east. The synthetic fuels obviously helped, but although they were a technological tour de force, they were very expensive.
They also had shale oil in Scotland. See my previous posts on British avgas production which did not use indigenous British oil.Actually, Britain had a very small amount of indigenous petroleum which they exploited, but it added only a small amount to their requirements. Sherwood Forest oil field
History site for shale oil mining in ScotlandThey also had shale oil in Scotland. See my previous posts on British avgas production which did not use indigenous British oil.
Thank you, this was a very interesting PhD thesis!If you haven't found it already, you might be interested in this study about the RN's move from coal to oil covering the period 1898 to 1939
Chapter 4 deals with history of APOC and its early relationship with the RN.
There are three different measures you need for a complete picture, stocks, consumption and production - and sadly its virtually impossible ( I have spent considerable time and money trying), to get these three IF you want them to include a breakdown by fuel type. This is the case because the fuels were all made from raw ingredients at blending stationsI will just add this little piece of information.
In C.Douglas' 'The Secret Horse Power Race" pg 343, there is recorded a planned output of C3 fuel peaking at 80% of production in 1945. The USN 145 July 1945 report states that they estimate that 2/3rds of production was C3 by wars end (both figures are unrealistic). C3 needed much more processing than B4, resulting in a loss. To increase fuel, likelihood of fuel arriving to units, and overall logistics in accessing the correct fuels, there was a serious push in 'boosting' (sorry I cant think of a better term) B4 up to C3 quality. Many engine manufactures were producing their newest engines that were designed to run on the B4. Producing only B4 could have saved fuel by not requiring extra refining procedures.
BUT!
'Boosting' B4 up to C3 quality was nothing short of a disaster. The recipe was flawed and engines began to malfunction.
P.s. rather than 2/3rds of fuel being C3 by wars end, I have found that B4 and C3 were roughly equal, at least in April 1945. From reading into CHA T2422, NARA T321 and the ULTRA files in the HW-5 series, by late 1944 it still seems that B4 was the main front line fuel available to units (this is against the planned 65% as can be read in the planned production in 'The Secret Horse Power Race" pg 343).
TL : DR - To increase avgas production, try to stick to B4 as the main frontline fuel to reduce production related losses (this was actually a course of action that took place, but things went sour by the turn of 1944/45)