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Germans can start increasing the production in Belgium, include the production line(s) in France, and make the guns in Germany proper. Or, don't make a single HMG in Germany proper, make more of the 20mm weapons there instead.My point is that a production line that is cranking out a few dozen guns a month might not be of interest to the Germans, they need hundreds or thousands of guns per month.
By the same token, the Belgian Browning could've been trickling on the German bombers from 1941 on.They had also been working on their own MG 131 since at least 1938 and they were specifying it in number of aircraft in 1939-40 (shows up in some of the FW 187 specs).
Now it doesn't seem to have gone quite as planned and the MG 131 seems to have started trickling into Luftwaffe service in the spring of 1941 in bombers. For a gun that was supposed to have been fitted into cowl mounts that took quite a while to happen.
German position on HMGs is very much removed from the US position on HMGs. They can opt not to make a single HMG and their combat effectiveness is not changed by a single iota.Now the American .50 cal was certainly not in great shape in 1940 or 41 but for some reason everybody assumes that the Belgian version was ready go, reliable and durable and available in large numbers in the summer of 1940.
It took ten factories in the US to satisfy the demand for .50 cal guns at it's peak during the war.
The Germans don't seem to have had FN build very many (or any?) BARs and FN had the tooling to make BARs and even offered a quick change barrel version for sale in 1930s.
Again, see this from the German perspective. They also have months to test and, need be, debug the Belgian Browning, and it is not a weapon that will make or break their warfare anyway.I don't have reasons. But there was a lot of tooling in the FN factory for all sorts of weapons. The question is how much tooling they actually had for the 13.2mm machine gun and if the 13.2mm machine gun was actually a finished ready to go project. Or was it pretty much in the same state the US .50 was? unreliable in high altitude cold weather, feed problems while pulling Gs and so on. The Swedes and Finns had a while to sort out the problems.
Kinda off-topic, don't ya say?The whole things that cold had make the wwii different and mayby an Axis victory was a Italy more competent that take North afrika and middle east alone in 1940/41
Belgian industries had some Blue print of engines or aircraft that could had helped germany?I tedeschi possono iniziare ad aumentare la produzione in Belgio, includere la linea di produzione in Francia e produrre le armi in Germania vera e propria. Oppure, non produrre un singolo HMG in Germania vera e propria, ma produrre più armi da 20 mm lì.
La necessità tedesca di mitragliatrici pesanti era di gran lunga inferiore a quella dei cannoni da 20 mm, che erano le armi preferite da tutte e tre le armi della Wehrmacht.
Allo stesso modo, il Browning belga avrebbe potuto essere impiegato a pioggia sui bombardieri tedeschi a partire dal 1941.
L'MG 131 è presente nei disegni del 1942 per l'Fw 187. È presente nei primissimi disegni per l'Fw 190, come arma sincronizzata montata sulle ali, ma quel posto è stato rapidamente preso da un'arma più consistente, come ci si può aspettare.
La posizione tedesca sugli HMG è molto lontana dalla posizione statunitense sugli HMG. Possono scegliere di non costruire un singolo HMG e la loro efficacia in combattimento non cambia di un solo iota.
Nessuno ha detto che la Browning belga fosse disponibile in grandi quantità nell'estate del 1940. Sembra però che fosse più pronta all'uso della MG 131, ed era sicuramente più potente delle due.
BAR probabilmente non offriva nulla in più di MG 34, 42, ZB 26 e ZB 39, né stava riempiendo una nicchia che era presente. Forse fornire le materie prime per queste MG era considerata la mossa più prudente rispetto a fornire le materie prime per BAR?
D'altro canto, i tedeschi a volte (molte volte) non sembravano interessati ai progetti stranieri così come erano (tranne quello che trovavano nei magazzini) finché non è scoppiato il proverbiale incidente? Anche il loro utilizzo delle fabbriche ceche è stato meh , a mio parere, fino al 1942, ad esempio il valido sFH 37(t) non è andato da nessuna parte.
Di nuovo, guardate questo dalla prospettiva tedesca. Hanno anche mesi per testare e, se necessario, mettere a punto il Browning belga, e non è un'arma che farà la differenza nella loro guerra in ogni caso.
I don't think so.Belgian industries had some Blue print of engines or aircraft that could had helped germany?
From a set of British road tests of Steam Trucks in 1898-1901 the Leyland ran at average 212 psi and used .8 to 1.36 gallons of water per Ton-Mile, with capacity for 5 tons payload, 3 tons unladen and dry/empty. Water tank capacity was 138 gallonsUnfortunately, I don't have blueprints or full specifications for the Sentinel wagon, but the point of the condenser is that its we trade it's weight for the huge hundreds of kilos of water it was driving anyway, and that it doesn't have to stop every 30 miles. Of course, it's just an idea without calculation, but if I remember correctly we talk about 400 kg (cca 800 lb) of water so...
From a set of British road tests of Steam Trucks in 1898-1901 the Leyland ran at average 212 psi and used .8 to 1.36 gallons of water per Ton-Mile, with capacity for 5 tons payload, 3 tons unladen and dry/empty. Water tank capacity was 138 gallons
Notes on the test that the Steam was also far superior to horses on roads with even minor grades, and that water was easily available every 15 miles, wasn't economical for the weight, cost, and filtering the recovered water(removing the injected lube oil) when equipped with condensors, and they fell out of favor.
The later Sterling had far more power, and higher top speed than the Leyland, that given the laws at the time(1900) seems to have had a 5mph road speed limit
With that restriction in mind, a company had done a comparison with the Leyland for moving grain from docks, mill and warehouses.
For moving grain, one steamer moved 34.8 tons of bagged grain in a working day, vs 3 wagons each with a 2 horse team pulling
moved 12.6 tons worth
The Steamer on a cost basis for crew, wages and fuel, was also 3 Pounds 14 Shillings cheaper than the Horses and Drovers each day.
Getting Horses back on the Farms is the best thing to do for efficiency of army logistics, even with the additional up front costs
in 1939, roughly 900k horses were used as pack animals in the Heer.
From US AEF experience in WWI France, each horse would need to be reshod 4.8 times a year, from lost shoes, hoof growth, etc. I'll declare the German experience was similar.
So follow along. Heer has 2M horses in service once the War went into the USSR, the average weight of a draft horseshoe is 4 pounds. In one year, Germany needs to cast almost 77,000 tons of mild steel horseshoes
That's a lot of metal that can be used for more useful items than shoes.
Like Steam powered vehicles.
I'm using the shorthand that one of those can replace 6 horses in service.
Call that 150,000 Steamers. So would need 30,000 a year production rate on average or 2500 a month with a early start on production, like 1934 for start date. For a later start of production, the average will need to be higher to reach that goal of replacing all the Horses in the armed forces.
For perspective, 1940 thru end of the war, ICE Truck annual production averaged around 160,000, while 1939 after war started to 1940 was around 60,000, with production ramping up, if I'm reading my German truck production chart correctly.
Steam Vehicles will not be taking the place of ICE, that stays unchanged. The goal here is to eliminate horses from Army use.
Add to the shoes figure, the leather and accessories needed for livery.
Those are some interesting stats. I never considered the usage of steel as horse shoes before. I don't think I've ever seen it mentioned anywhere.
Horse drawn wagons use steel "tires" too, correct?Add to the shoes figure, the leather and accessories needed for livery.
A little off topic, but still towards logistics and consumption.
Yesterday I watched a good French TV show about the Maginot / Siegfried lines.
And so they mentioned that Germany spent (for all those dragon teeth and about 13000 bunkers) almost 700000 tons of steel reinforcement. That's the weight of 20 battleships. Of course it's not high alloy steel but ....
And yes without the West wall and a safe back they would have had a hard time deciding on war. But realistically the strongest part of the Siegfried line was propaganda anyway but it's hard to estimate how much they could have saved there.
Not just steel for the wheels, but for overall construction.Horse drawn wagons use steel "tires" too, correct?
Tough anti-horse crowd here.Not just steel for the wheels, but for overall construction.
The reach had steel flanges, the suspension was steel reinforced, there were "irons" to reinforce the corners and usually "stringers" to hold the frame together. Plus all the fasteners, etc.
Railways move far greater tonnage than even a fleet of steam lorries justifying the expenditure. You're not going to put these up one every road the lorries could possibly take. Basically as SR noted you are restricted to an out and back operation. See attached document:1950s Minnesota, that is even colder
View attachment 814142
Tanks were insulated, and had circulator pumps and steam heater for tanks that didn't have much use. The local well used to fill would be above freezing, that also helped.
Each tender needed over a thousand gallons
Most times, butHorse drawn wagons use steel "tires" too, correct?
Same requirement for Horse drawn equipment, or go for longer paths to stay with the permissible lower gradeOne thing to note, while horses do struggle when road isn't completely flat, the steamer are unable to operate when road has gradient greater than 1:8. So, in the rolling hills of the Russian steppe, you need road building equipment to flatten the terrain.
From US AEF experience in WWI France, each horse would need to be reshod 4.8 times a year, from lost shoes, hoof growth, etc. I'll declare the German experience was similar.
So follow along. Heer has 2M horses in service once the War went into the USSR, the average weight of a draft horseshoe is 4 pounds. In one year, Germany needs to cast almost77,00024,000 (edit, Friday night and bad at math) tons of mild steel horseshoes
Like Steam powered vehicles.
I'm using the shorthand that one of those can replace 6 horses in service.
Call that 150,000 Steamers. So would need 30,000 a year production rate on average or 2500 a month with a early start on production, like 1934 for start date. For a later start of production, the average will need to be higher to reach that goal of replacing all the Horses in the armed forces.
For perspective, 1940 thru end of the war, ICE Truck annual production averaged around 160,000, while 1939 after war started to 1940 was around 60,000, with production ramping up, if I'm reading my German truck production chart correctly.
Steam Vehicles will not be taking the place of ICE, that stays unchanged. The goal here is to eliminate horses from Army use.
Steam lorries are not a one to one alternative to the ICE lorry. They have a different logistical need. In a logistics based Heer planned army the steam lorry would complement the steam railway. The steam railway has much the same logistical complement as the steam lorry. It can transport vast bulk loads even better but cannot extend beyond its rail head and stations. It makes sense for the steam lorries to work out from each station and railhead as an integral part of the railway system. Working to local supply bases from which ICE lorries and horse transport can deliver to the end users.
One only has to take a look at the Prussian Moltke, who learned that they could not bring a bigger army into play than the Austrians etc but a lightbulb moment (oil lamp moment?) caused them to jump into an extensive railway building program and a planning staff. Who could thus mobilise far faster than their potential enemies therefore bringing more Prussian troops to the battlefield at the start of a war and defeat their enemies before the enemies could react. As more modern armies needed more 'stuff ' the above creation of a steam based Railway Corps as the fundamental base of Heer strategic planning is merely the same writ large.