Germany forgoes battleships, goes all in on CVs

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We seem to have two discussions going here.
One, is the carrier discussion
The other is the idea of scrapping (not building) the surface fleet and building trucks instead. That is the one that gives a big boost to British interests.
Take the weight of Graf Zeppelin, 2xBismarck, 2xScharnhorst and 3xDeutschlands and put that steel, copper, money, time and manpower into an equal weight of 6x6 drive trucks for moving fuel, supplies and troops and

Now Historically you had two Deutschlands (Graf Spee is already lost) and only two Hippers for Norway. Prinz Eugen was not completed until Aug 1940 but without the Bismarck and Tirpitz sucking up dock workers she could have been finished early. Seydlitz maybe, Lutzow is a real stretch, she was laid down 16 months after the Prinz Eugen. Getting her built and with a trained crew in time (training after commissioning could take several months) doesn't look good. Lutzow was sold to the Russians to pay for raw materials.

They were very good cruisers in a North Sea fight, in part because they were considerably beyond the supposed displacement. They already had some of the best AA armament of the late 1930s. However they had low freeboard and lacked range even with the high pressure steam.
What do you sacrifice to get the extra range, better freeboard and better AA armament?

Die trying is a good way to put it. Even with the two sisters the Kriegsmarine just about died trying as it was. Granted some of the ships were hit at the end of the campaign.
 
It all illustrates why the German navy had no business being an ocean going fleet. Dominate the Baltic yes, commerce raid with submarines and auxiliary cruisers yes, but it could not dominate any ocean. Only die dramatically. Even with the Great War fleet Germany could not dominate even the German Ocean/ North Sea let alone the North Atlantic. Trying with carriers merely alters the way the fleet dies. A Maritime Air Arm for them would be a better investment for the task keeping the British and French navies at arms length and reaching out to merchant shipping. Also the Germans would have to assume they would need to operate within the range of land based air opposition and attack.
 
I think we have to assume that the alternate reality ships have to be able to get out to sea, otherwise we are actually assuming that there is no point in building the CVs (or anything else) since we already know what happened in reality. Since the OP assumes they manage to build the CVs and "go all in", then the question (to me) becomes the timeline.

When do they lay down the 2x or 3x CVs?

When are they launched, completed, operational?

Do they survive until Japan enters the war?

What do they chose to use them for? ie North Atlantic commerce raiding and interdiction of Allied supply lines? Indian Ocean commerce raiding and interdiction of Allied supply lines? Join up with the Japanese in the PTO? Indian Ocean commerce raiding and interdiction of Allied supply lines - in coordination with the Japanese? Depending on when they become operational, what are the options?

If coordinating operations with the Japanese, maybe fuels supplied via Japanese sources?

If used in the Atlantic the British and US will have to divert resources, more than for the Bismarck and such. About the only thing worse for the convoys than the U-boats and the German BBs/BCs would be U-boats and German CVs.

If sent to the PTO that gives the US a possible wedgie in terms of carrier numbers in 1942.
 

I'd guess they'd still want some roughly cruiser-sized ships around for shore bombardment, commerce raiding, and countering the odd destroyer. For the Norway invasion, could they do it hop-by-hop, i.e. capturing southern Norway gives them airbases to provide air cover for naval invasions higher north etc.?


If Germany decides to not invest in capital ships, maybe they instead invest those resources into the Luftwaffe, particularly anti-ship capability. So if the RN moves capital ships to the Med, the Germans can counter by sending a few LW squadrons to help the Italians. Potentially resulting in a prequel to the sinking of the Repulse and PoW?

Presumably the RN would modify their own interwar BB program. The British may instead focus on the now likely larger German undersea and air strike threat and build more destroyers and fast track the Implacables.

I'm sure it would have an effect, but how big would it be? In the interwar years the RN was trying to keep up with the USA, Japan, France and Italy in addition to the Germans. If the Germans would be seen to drop out of the game, I'm not sure it would have a big effect on the naval arms race between the great naval powers.
 

The problem is geography, and will remain so unless the hypothetical also moves Britain a few hundred miles west.
 
in reverse
The Naval 'race' lasted 12-15 years. Some of the politics sorted itself out over that time. And you had the big economic recession which slowed things down a bit. British may have gone off the 2 power standard? France and Italy had both slowed down a bit in 30s. Yes Britain did want to replace the old "R"s in the late 30s they were not viewing the US in the same way they had viewed the US in 1922. And British pride was being overtaken by the British pocketbook. One big reason for the all the treaties with restricted size ships and guns.
The Remerging German navy was one more thing the British had to deal with.
Some of this is timing.
The Sisters were laid down in May of 1935 and the Hipper was laid down in July 1935. What kind of anti-ship capability could any airpower advocates foresee in 1935/36.
And in 1935/36 air power was daylight/good weather. At least among the more realistic air power advocates. Abilities would improve but in 1940-41-42 airpower was pretty iffy.
Worked fine at Taranto in 1940. Didn't work so good about a year and half later during the Channel Dash.
And while Italy was friendly with Germany in the mid/late 30s Italy didn't declare war until several weeks after the Invasion of France. Italy could not get out of the Med (naval forces) so they couldn't help with any German plans anywhere else in the world. Navies were seen a means of projecting power. For Germany to forgo that ability to project power, even a limited way, might not have been acceptable. Subs can't really project power, they can deny the other guy/s from projecting power but they cannot project power themselves.
Aircraft carriers became the ultimate in power projection but that took a while. A Forrestal class carrier held around several thousand tons of ordnance in it's magazines and could deliver most of it hundreds of miles from the carrier. Most 1930s carriers couldn't even dream of that day. The Lexington in 1936 held around 260 tons of bombs in her Magazines (and 24 torpedoes) and delivery was by biplane
The Germans did drive the British nuts with the ships they did have. The British used up to 20 ships to hunt down/look for the Graf Spee for example. In these scenarios the 3 pocket battleships remain but this illustrated Britain's problem and the behind the scenes effect a few large German ships could have. The disproportionate number of ships needed to first find and then attack/sink the German ships. This British don't want a dual (fair fight) they want to kill/sink them as fast as possible once they do engage.

Norway was a bit weird. Germany was trying to move fast and their victory was not assured, at least in capturing the whole country. The Hop-by-hop would work but it would take longer. The British/allies had poor planning and still almost managed to pull it off. I am referring to hanging on to Narvik. But since the Narvik was a large part of the reason for the invasion of Norway that was important.
There was no north to south railroad in Norway that came within hundreds of miles of Narvik or the Swedish iron ore mines. And in winter they only roads, if they existed, carried sleighs. Transport was by water or a few aircraft. The Germans lost several hundred Ju 52s during the invasion of southern Norway. This makes the hop-by-hop more of a slow step by step
It is over 600 miles (1000km) from Oslo to Narvik. It is about 1000 miles from Narvik to Inverness Scotland and just under 1200 miles from Narvik to the north coast of Germany.
The Allies, at one point, had over 24,000 men around Narvik.

The German light cruisers were a bit too light. They may have been good for shore bombardment but they were way too short ranged to be used for commerce raiding, not to mention that they weren't strong enough for heavy seas. Yes they could fight destroyers if the destroyers came to them. The Light cruisers were about 6,000 tons and the Hipper was about 14,000tons. The light cruisers carried nine 5.9 in guns and for comparison the British Arethusa class was about 5200-5300 tons for six 6in guns, These were about as small as the British thought a useful cruiser could be (outgun a merchant raider).
 
Good points. A few comments here and there..

Yes Britain did want to replace the old "R"s in the late 30s they were not viewing the US in the same way they had viewed the US in 1922.

Yes, but by the late 30'ies it's too late for any big course corrections.


Very much true. But this applies to an even greater extent to air power based on CV's which is the original topic of this thread! For the established naval powers to go all in on CV's in the 30'ies would be a huge gamble. But arguably Germany would have been in a better position to make such a gamble on air power than the great naval powers, since they knew they could never match them (well, the UK) in a Jutland v2.0, and Germany didn't have any overseas possessions that needed protection either etc. so they could largely rely on land-based air power.


True, the slower pace of a hop-by-hop campaign with air cover would have given the UK time to consolidate it's position around Narvik. OTOH if Germany had spent the resources they historically spent on capital ships on the Luftwaffe instead, life for British ships within range of German-held airfields in Norway could have been pretty sour.


The problem for Germany was that whatever they could build, their opponents could build bigger, better and more of. So from a commerce raiding perspective I guess the sweet spot would be something that could overcome some random lone warship it came across. But a battleship is too expensive just for commerce raiding. Light cruisers were pretty numerous, so something that could beat a light cruiser, and have a fighting chance against a heavy cruiser. So in that sense the Deutschland class might not have been too far off, and indeed the Graf Spee was quite successful and sank a lot of tonnage until the Brits eventually managed to corner it.
 
The Germans beat the British to Narvik with their destroyers, each carrying about 200 men. The Sisters provided escort and got into a gunfight with the Renown.
The German destroyers were nearly out of fuel and their tanker support got screwed up, only one out of three showed up.
British Destroyers went in the next day and shot up the German ships, and a number of merchant ships. Some importance as to Narvik may be judged by the fact that there were 25 ore carriers at anchor at the time. about 10-11 were sunk at this time.
The Warspite and 9 destroyers showed up 3 days after that. 2600 German Naval crew joined the 2000 troops on shore. The British, French, and Polish expeditionary force shows up a few weeks later and joins the Norwegians. The fighting lasts till the beginning of June. With increasing air support as time went on.

The Deutschlands were pretty good for a first effort. The diesels turned out to be a bit dodgy but nothing else was going to give close to the needed range.
The Scheer was actually the most successful German major warship raider of the war, capturing/sinking seventeen merchant ships for a total of 113,223 GRT on a cruise that lasted from Oct 1940 to April 1 1941. At one point in the Indian Ocean the British were using the Hermes and 5 cruisers to pursue her.
However that required a number of supply ships and with Ultra the longevity of supply ships got a lot shorter in 1941-42.
The Sister were too expensive and sucked up too much fuel to be really good at this. Go out, shoot up a convoy, get back home, try to repeat. Forces the British to either send battleships with each convoy or keep battleships at sea as distant escort. Make the British use up men and oil every day for occasional raids.
 
Another possibility with Germany going all in on CVs after the Deutschlands is that they make a total mess of it, and neither Graf Zeppelin or Peter Strasser enter service before 1942, if at all. By early 1941, Hitler orders a focus on U-boats, and the carriers are put on the back burner.
 
They already were with GZ!

The only way this even begins to work is if whatever moron in the Navy approved that clusterfuck aircraft trolley launch/handling system dies in 1935, and it never even gets designed!

If it gets green-lighted as historical, these carriers are useless floating deathtraps.
 
The IJN never used any catapult system, and the USN and RN rarely used theirs. The Germans should have just gone without. BTW, while not nearly as ridiculous as the German trolly, British catapult also needed a special fitting of sorts.

 
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Trolley on GZ was for 2 purposes:

1. By lifting the tail, in most cases the aircraft, specifically Bf.109 and Ju.87, could take off at heavier max takeoff weights - e.g. FiSK 199.
2. In event that GZ was surprised by RN forces, the trolley, with lifted tail, allows launching aircraft even in a down wind situation.

Was it ideal - h3ll no. But EMALS was 75+ years in future. Did it match the launch system already in place and crews were familiar with absolutely.
Was it better than the RN solution of jacking up planes at the accelerator and mounting them in place, while all the other planes waited, I would suggest yes. Planes are loaded on trolley in hanger ready to be lifted to deck and launched.

Would system have changed as Kriegsmarine gained experience? Your crystal ball is better than mine.

IMHO, Kriegsmarine needs to complete a CVL in 'mid 30s - an equivalent to Hosho/Argus/Langley and get some operational experience under their belt before building a fleet CV. You don't know what you don't know. A quick, small carrier tell you what does/doesn't work.

I get that hull for capital ship takes time, but Hitler wasn't predicting war until '44, so Raeder had time to build a "training carrier" before committing to the ultimate solution.


Personally, I've though Raeder should have built CFs (hybrid cruiser aircraft carrier) KM cruisers have to be timid versus RN anyways - they can't afford to be damaged or they will never make it home. Ability to launch and especially recover aircraft in conditions where operating Ar.196 wasn't possible helps avoid combat - Graf Spee successfully evaded HMS Cumberland.

More submarines before late '39 is a non-starter - the big lead smelter doesn't come online before mid '39 and submarines without batteries are pretty useless.
 
The trolley that the Fulmar is on is the same as the German one.

While the IJN might not have used a catapult on their carriers, the certainly used the exact same catapult/trolley on their seaplane tenders, battleships and cruisers.
 
Catapult development (or accelerators for the equipment placed on British carriers)

In 1922 the RN began developing shipboard catapults with the first model tested at sea in 1925. Early models were powered by compressed air and later by cordite. The aircraft sat on a trolley and the propulsive force was applied to that via a series of ropes or cables multiplying the force generated by the cordite. There were multiple types of these catapults that were fitted in batteships, cruisers and seaplane carriers through into WW2.

When it came to carrier acelerators the RN developed a hydraulic-pneumatic accelerator. A prototype tested on Glorious in 1928 proved unsuccessful. It was then 1935 before a pair of developed BH.I accelerator was fitted in Glorious, followed by Courageous, Ark Royal and Argus (1 unit). Subsequent models were used by British carriers into the late 1950s. The BH.I & BH.III used a trolley system, but it was not the same as that employed on the earlier catapults, being designed to fully collapse onto the deck after launch so minimising deck obstruction. The BH.III was modified from 1942 to launch US aircraft types tail down (the Martlets were the first type involved. But some early Martlets were modified for the British trolley). The first British aircraft designed for tail down launching was the Seafire XV which flew in prototype form in Sept 1944.

Britain also developed a cordite carrier accelerator, the only example of which was fitted in Pretoria Castle. There were also rocket powered catapults for use on the CAM ships.

Japan began its shipboard catapult development programme in 1924, testing its first in 1928. It developed both compressed air and gunpowder types, starting with the former before moving to the latter, until in WW2 developing both. So most of the catapult equipped cruisers had gunpowder models while Yamato, Musashi, and the reconstructed Ise & Hyuga and various submarines had compressed air types.

I'm less clear about US catapult development. The Lexingtons as completed in Nov/Dec 1927 were equipped with a single flywheel catapult intended only for the launch of seaplanes. They were so little used (5 times on Lexington in 1927/28 and then not again before a report in Oct 1931) that authority to remove them was given in 1932 although not implemented until 1936.

When Ranger was designed catapults were discussed. Flight deck catapults were dismissed as interfering with normal flight deck operations. Hangar deck catapults were desired to maximise launch rates and in the event of flight deck damage, but were not fitted due to lack of space. The only type available at that time was the P-type powder catapult already developed for battleships & cruisers

The USN then developed a hydraulic catapult for carrier use. Prototype H Mk I tested 1935. The H Mk.II went into the Yorktown & Wasp classes from Sept 1937. With both classes there were both flight and hangar deck catapults. But US carriers made little use of catapults until later on in WW2. Free take offs were the norm for all 3 major carrier nations in the 1930s. Postwar the USN was developing a powder C-10 catapult until saved by the appearance of the steam catapult.

Germany chose to go down the route of the compressed air catapult for the GZ. But its trolley arrangements were different from those of Britain. I'll post separately about her proposed aircraft operating procedures.

As I've noted before the mid-1930s were still early days of carrier development. Many ideas that some now consider stupid were part of that learning curve. So things like:-

Trolley launching equipment
Hangar deck catapults (in some ways had the same purpose as as the forward flying off decks in Furious, C&G, Akagi & Kaga)
Arrester gear at both ends of the flight deck (resulting in the requirement that US carriers sail backwards at speed)

Things that make modern carrier operations possible like angled flight decks, steam catapults and mirror landing sights all had to wait for Britain to invent them in the late 1940s and early 1950s
 
Graf Zeppelin aircraft handling arrangements (drawn from "Freedom of the Seas. The Story of Hitler's Aircraft Carrier - Graf Zeppelin" chapter titled "Carrier Operations. Deployment of a Kriegsmarine Carrier - Based on Original Operating Plans for the Graf Zeppelin" and other sources.)

Due to expected harsh North Atlantic weather all aircraft would normally have been kept in the hangar.

Up to 8 aircraft would have been maintained below decks at immediate readiness with their engines (drained of oil) heated to 70 degrees C by steam pre-heaters. The oil for them would be added just before deployment, having been heated to 60 degrees C in a storage vessel at the front of the hangar. Arming & fuelling would also have taken place in the hangar. As the most important function would have been defence of the carrier, it was the fighters (Bf 109T-1) that would have occupied the forward part of the upper hangar.

The launching trollies on which these immediate readiness aircraft sat, were in turn mounted on a transport trolley to aid manoeuvering in the hangar. On transferring such an aircraft to the flight deck it would be pushed to the lowered elevator and the launch trolley dropped onto the rails therein, leaving the transport trolley behind. On arrival on the flight deck (2-3 mins had been proved in tests) the engine would be started by compressed air, the aircraft would taxi forward guided by the rails embedded in the flight deck. The trolley would then latch onto the catapult to launch.

As initially designed the flight deck rails from the forward lift fed the starboard catapult and those from the midships lift fed the port. But in the final plans the midships lift could feed both cats. Each cat was powered by compressed air with storage to allow a test shot and 8 operational shots before the air reservoir required refilling. Using alternate cats aircraft could be launched every 30 secs. The real weakness in the system was that once the air was exhausted it took 50 mins to replenish. The whole compressed air launch system required heating to 20 degrees C to prevent the formation of ice with the rapid pressure changes it would experience.

After launch the trolley had to be recovered and carried below decks on a special track below flight deck level, and then pushed by hand back to the hangar (or back up to the flight deck according to this diagram). It is the main reason why the flight deck could not be carried all the way to the bow. It is also why the Italian carrier had her flight deck modified and cut short at the bow when the German catapult system was fitted to her. Note it was only the upper part of the trolley that collapsed as the aircraft left it





Note this is entirely different from the British launch trolley which was designed to collapse virtually flat on the deck to be returned up the catapult track to launch the next aircraft.

Without the cats, free takeoffs were envisaged from either aft for really heavy take offs (torpedo carriers) or from ahead of middle lift.

It clearly was not intended to put a range of aircraft on deck. There were no deck tie down points. Everything would come up from hangar either on a trolley sitting on the deck rails, or be briefly held in place by chocks before a quick launch.

Aircraft would have sought to land in a large circle painted on the stern of the ship with the arrester wires starting about 30m further forward. The edge of the flight deck was marked with white lines and was divided by lines across the deck into landing, preparation and take-off areas. For night landings a light system indicated windspeed. No mention of an LSO/Batsman to assist a pilot landing.

Aircraft landing would immediately be struck down into the hangar via the centre lift (no deck parks and no crash barrier). if not scheduled to fly again immediately, its fuel would be drained for safety along with the engine oil into below decks storage tanks. The oil tanks were heated so the contents were ready for the next sortie. The aircraft fuelling/defuelling points were equipped to also dispose of any vapours generated.

The aft portion of the upper hangar was reserved for aircraft maintenance with overhead cranes fitted. The forward part of the lower hangar contained an engine overhaul workshop.

Air Group
As she never completed it was always subject to change. The most often quoted group was from about 1938/39 and would have consisted of:-

10 Bf 109T-1 fighters
13 Ju 87C dive bombers
18 Fi 167 recce/torpedo bomber

Only the Fi 167 & Ju 87C had folding wings, and the Fi 167 was not designed for catapulting. By 1942 the air group would have consisted of Me 155 and Ju 87E (based on the Ju 87D), with the latter also serving as a torpedo dropper in which role it would have needed catapult launch.

There is still a lot about how the Germans intended to operate the aircraft on GZ that is not clear to me, and since she never became operational probably stilll had to be worked out.
 
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This photo is one of a series of Fulmar N4016 on the P (Pyrotechnic / Projectile) catapult test rig at RAE Farnborough in 1941. This catapult was the rocket powered system for the CAM ships. The ironwork on which the aircraft sits was manufactured from steel available at Farnborough (rumoured to have been salvaged from bomb damaged buildings on the airfield). The rocket pack, which I don't think is fitted in this photo, sat at the level of the gider, just behind the vertical after mount to the aircraft.

This is NOT the trolley used with the hydraulic catapults on the carriers. This one did not collapse at the end of its run. Instead it was meant to be slowed to a stop by a series of water filled tubes. This catapult was finally dismantled in 1952.

The project was started in Dec 1940 with the first Fulmar launch taking place on 17 Jan 1941. It was later tested with Hurricanes and the also early Seafires.

There is a rather dramatic photo around of a Seafire launch without the water retardation system operational. As the Seafire becomes airborne the trolley can be seen falling away but still being powered by its rocket pack!

And again this trolley is completely unrelated to anything on GZ.
 

Interesting. Did anyone else drain the oil and heat it separately? Did they have separate oil tanks for each engine? Otherwise it could be potentially disastrous if one engine on the verge of seizing has it's oil drained into a common tank and contaminates everybody's oil with metal shavings or unwanted chemicals (like petrol blown past cylinder rings..)?
 

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