varsity07840
Airman 1st Class
- 178
- Jun 25, 2013
If the IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffalo, why did the British undertake a crash program to reduce its weight?
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If the IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffalo, why did the British undertake a crash program to reduce its weight?Don't let the IJAF take intact airfields and you won't need to strafe them. And if you're staffing airfields you've surrendered intact, you've already lost air superiority. Unless you're suggesting strafing IJAF airfields in Thailand and FIC, now that I can support.
The IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffaloes. The Ki-43 has advantages, but shares the same armament of a Sopwith Camel, that of twin .303 mg in front of the pilot, and nothing else. The Ki-27 has the same poor armament and none of the performance advantages of the Ki-43. The only reasonable criticism of the Buffalo is that there aren't enough of them. Malaya is bigger than the entire UK, which in Dec 1941 has eighty fighter squadrons. Give Malaya two dozen Buffalo squadrons and the Ki-43 and Ki-27 will meet their match.
I'm still perplexed why the British allowed Japan to seize FIC after the fall of France. Once France capitulated, Britain attacked the French fleet in North Africa, acted to seize or isolate French territory in the Caribbean and Africa, including invading Madagascar, Morocco and Algeria. But Churchill did nothing from the fall of France in May 1940 to Japan's invasion of the territory in Sept 1940. FIC had only a small garrison and could have been quickly overwhelmed or convinced to cooperate by a British landing from Singapore in June 1940. This would have denied the IJAF the bases to attack Malaya in Dec 1941.
IDK, perhaps when faced with massive enemy numerical superiority you need to improve ROC and eek out every small advantage. But good or bad, it's what they've got. For their small number the Buffaloes did manage to shoot down a good number of IJAF aircraft.If the IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffalo, why did the British undertake a crash program to reduce its weight?
I agree. Really, the RAF has one mission.... to find and destroy the IJN troop transports. Once they've established a beachhead the game is up and the RAF should withdraw south to a position of strength to await reinforcements or flee to Sumatra and Burma. The British army should have executed Matador and taken airfields in Thailand before the IJAF.Blenheim fighters won't give much in the way of capability benefits because they're too slow for most Japanese aircraft. They' might make a useful CAS asset, which is how 27 Sqn's aircraft were used in their initial ops. The addition of a pair of Light Series Carriers under the fuselage would allow for carriage of 8x small bombs to augment the gun pack. However, I wouldn't want to operate them until the Japanese fighter force had been considerably degraded...unless they were specially trained as night intruders.
I agree. Really, the RAF has one mission.... to find and destroy the IJN troop transports. Once they've established a beachhead the game is up and the RAF should withdraw south to a position of strength to await reinforcements or flee to Sumatra and Burma. The British army should have executed Matador and taken airfields in Thailand before the IJA.
And that's what drives me mad about the post-ww1 British. Always afraid to offend, always reactionary, seeking the passive approach and founded in wishful thinking and willful neglect of situational awareness and intelligence, combined with an parsimonious unwillingness to prepare. For example, leaving hundreds of Spitfires essentially idle in Britain as the Luftwaffe was being ground down in Russia, sending Hurricanes made in Canada to Russia instead of Malaya, etc, etc.regarding Matador: if he executed it before the Japanese attack, he would gift Tokyo a propaganda coup ..... Brooke-Popham couldn't attack the ships before the landings took place because that would have been an "unprovoked" attack.
And that's what drives me mad about the post-ww1 British. Always afraid to offend, always reactionary, seeking the passive approach and founded in wishful thinking and willful neglect of situational awareness and intelligence, combined with an parsimonious unwillingness to prepare.
Okay, but if the RAF isn't attacking the IJA at sea, and not attacking IJAF airfields in FIC and Thailand, what should the RAF in Malaya be doing beyond covering a retreat towards Singapore and ultimately a surrender?There's a lot to unpack in that post. Personally, I think the focus on the troop transports was misplaced.
The IJAF fighter force is not going to be considerably degraded unless its airfields are destroyed.Blenheim fighters...might make a useful CAS asset ... I wouldn't want to operate them until the Japanese fighter force had been considerably degraded.
Okay, but if the RAF isn't attacking the IJA at sea, and not attacking IJAF airfields in FIC and Thailand, what should the RAF in Malaya be doing beyond covering a retreat towards Singapore and ultimately a surrender?The IJAF fighter force is not going to be considerably degraded unless its airfields are destroyed.
The modified Singapore strategy called for any RN units in Malaya to withdraw to Ceylon once the fighting started. This is was Phillips and Force Z should have done. Perhaps that's the strategy for the RAF as well, cover a Dunkirk-like evacuation from Singapore and then bug out to Java and Burma once the IJA has landed.
What happened to these Chinese-Malay pilots? Were they sent to Canada in time to return to fight? If not, where did they go?
And look at these Tiger Moths. These would be ideal for low level reconnaissance work, running up and down the coast looking for invasion forces.
Speaking of Canada, a long forgotten contribution of Canada's in Malaya is Chinese Canadians of Force 136 | The Canadian Encyclopedia
A British security guarantee to Thailand would have done the trick. A large part of Britain's lack of spine and initiative comes from the dithering of FDR and the USA.Thailand was the lynchpin of their entire strategy because it gave them internal lines of communication and enabled centrally-located air power to be employed south into Malaya and northwest into Burma, maximizing operational flexibility. Again, this is something that should have been self-evident to anyone looking at a map of the region, which should have driven Far East Command to find ways of preventing the Japanese occupation of Thailand...and that needed British forces in Thailand at the latter's invitation to stand any chance of success.
IDK, had Germany not declared war and had Japan attacked only the DEI and Malaya I'm not convinced that FDR would push Congress to go to active war against either until well into winter 1942, when both Malaya and DEI are already surrendered into Japan's hands.Dithering by the U.S.A. perhaps. Dithering by FDR, not so much.
And pushing he was. From my foggy memory, the USN was actively searching and notifying RN surface forces of U-Boats. The U.S. did the destroyers (and other stuff, I think) for bases deal. There were armaments deals and other non neutral activities. FDR spoke on one of his Fireside Chats of lending your neighbor your hose if his house were on fire. It amazes me how much he got away with in isolationist America.
Thanks SR6. That filled in some gaps in my knowledge.See Neutrality Patrol - Wikipedia
One aspect of the Neutrality Patrol was that it freed up quite a number of RN ships to perform escort duty in the Eastern Atlantic as the US was effectively providing a number of "escorts" in the western Atlantic so the British didn't have to.
England was also allowed to purchase a large amount of "stuff" from the "U.S. Steel Export Co" which was actual a "front". The US armed services would declare all manor of small arms and ammunition and other things "surplus" and the items would be purchased by U.S. Steel and then resold to the British to avoid the appearance of the US supplying Britain from US military stockpiles.
See Chapter X: Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America
A British security guarantee to Thailand would have done the trick.
No static line of defensive positions would work in Malaya.
It doesn't really matter where the airfields are located. It's plain stupid to try and wrest air superiority
Blenheim fighters won't give much in the way of capability benefits
The only way to nudge Bangkok towards Britain's cause was to provide solid evidence of Japan's intentions but such proof was not forthcoming.
finding a convoy is hard...and even if you find it, you can't do much about it until they actually start landing, by which time it's too late.
You've certainly countered most points and proposals thus far well enough. May I suggest we put that aside for the moment, and instead can you tell us what your proposal is? You've got the beginnings of something below with Buffaloes straffing airfelds. Presumably the IJAF will modify their airfield practices after the first day or so of straffing attacks.....but that wasn't going to happen given other priorities at the time.
But I'm proposing that the Buffalos were used to strafe airfields, hence helping secure air superiority. Given the qualitative and quantitative advantage the Japanese held over the RAF fighters, I think early morning strafing runs against key airfields would be a far more effective use of the few available Buffalos than how they were used - frittered away in standing patrols trying (and failing) to protect their own airfields.