Given what you’ve got, how would you organize RAF Malaya April-Nov 1941 onwards?

[varsity07840]

Don't let the IJAF take intact airfields and you won't need to strafe them. And if you're staffing airfields you've surrendered intact, you've already lost air superiority. Unless you're suggesting strafing IJAF airfields in Thailand and FIC, now that I can support.

The IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffaloes. The Ki-43 has advantages, but shares the same armament of a Sopwith Camel, that of twin .303 mg in front of the pilot, and nothing else. The Ki-27 has the same poor armament and none of the performance advantages of the Ki-43. The only reasonable criticism of the Buffalo is that there aren't enough of them. Malaya is bigger than the entire UK, which in Dec 1941 has eighty fighter squadrons. Give Malaya two dozen Buffalo squadrons and the Ki-43 and Ki-27 will meet their match.

I'm still perplexed why the British allowed Japan to seize FIC after the fall of France. Once France capitulated, Britain attacked the French fleet in North Africa, acted to seize or isolate French territory in the Caribbean and Africa, including invading Madagascar, Morocco and Algeria. But Churchill did nothing from the fall of France in May 1940 to Japan's invasion of the territory in Sept 1940. FIC had only a small garrison and could have been quickly overwhelmed or convinced to cooperate by a British landing from Singapore in June 1940. This would have denied the IJAF the bases to attack Malaya in Dec 1941.

If the IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffalo, why did the British undertake a crash program to reduce its weight?

 

[Admiral Beez]

If the IJAF fighters weren't better than the Buffalo, why did the British undertake a crash program to reduce its weight?

IDK, perhaps when faced with massive enemy numerical superiority you need to improve ROC and eek out every small advantage. But good or bad, it's what they've got. For their small number the Buffaloes did manage to shoot down a good number of IJAF aircraft.

I would like to see more fighter-spec Blenheims, but not to face Nates and Oscars. Trouble is, a Blenheim fighter is no faster than a Betty.

 

[buffnut453]

Blenheim fighters won't give much in the way of capability benefits because they're too slow for most Japanese aircraft. They' might make a useful CAS asset, which is how 27 Sqn's aircraft were used in their initial ops. The addition of a pair of Light Series Carriers under the fuselage would allow for carriage of 8x small bombs to augment the gun pack. However, I wouldn't want to operate them until the Japanese fighter force had been considerably degraded...unless they were specially trained as night intruders.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Blenheim fighters won't give much in the way of capability benefits because they're too slow for most Japanese aircraft. They' might make a useful CAS asset, which is how 27 Sqn's aircraft were used in their initial ops. The addition of a pair of Light Series Carriers under the fuselage would allow for carriage of 8x small bombs to augment the gun pack. However, I wouldn't want to operate them until the Japanese fighter force had been considerably degraded...unless they were specially trained as night intruders.

I agree. Really, the RAF has one mission.... to find and destroy the IJN troop transports. Once they've established a beachhead the game is up and the RAF should withdraw south to a position of strength to await reinforcements or flee to Sumatra and Burma. The British army should have executed Matador and taken airfields in Thailand before the IJAF.

So much of the post-Victorian British military experience has been passively waiting, politicking, appeasing, or reacting to what potential enemies may do. It's hard to imagine that the same country that preemptively, without a declaration of war in 1807 sailed its battle fleet into Copenhagen harbour, bombarded the city and destroyed the Danish fleet, with Britain's justification that Denmark "may" present a future threat. I am British, but the place went all weak-kneed after the First World War, always looking for the easy, cheapest and politest way out of a bind, never drawing a line in the sand with a willing fist to take the first overt, indisputable move if she was offended. We see this in Malaya and Britain's lack of aggressive posturing to Japan's moves against FIC, moves that were clearly a preparation for a move on DEI and Malaya, and a wedge into Thailand. More recently we saw this at the Falklands, where an emotionally lost nation couldn't be bothered to react to clear signs that it was about to be invaded. How they ever built an empire to last five hundred years (1497 Newfoundland founded, 1997 exit from Hong Kong), nearly as long as the Roman Empire (if we accept 27 BC – 476 AD) is incredible. But all Empires, as the USA will find out have their climax and decline.

Back to Malaya. In June 1940, at the Fall of France a British naval task force must sail to FIC, and the RAF must establish airbases there, ideally with the help of Free French units. If this doesn't happen, and we're back to April 1941, the RAF must make plans to destroy newly constructed IJAF bases in southern FIC and in Thailand. Don't wait for Japan, do a Copenhagen and attack the bases in October 1941. Things are clearly going badly for the Germans in Russia, and FDR needs a push, so Britain takes the initiative. Yes, some provocation or premise will need to be contrived by Britain so that FDR doesn't have a bird.... so find it.

 

[buffnut453]

I agree. Really, the RAF has one mission.... to find and destroy the IJN troop transports. Once they've established a beachhead the game is up and the RAF should withdraw south to a position of strength to await reinforcements or flee to Sumatra and Burma. The British army should have executed Matador and taken airfields in Thailand before the IJA.

There's a lot to unpack in that post. Personally, I think the focus on the troop transports was misplaced, and Brooke-Popham was caught on the horns of a dilemma regarding Matador: if he executed it before the Japanese attack, he would gift Tokyo a propaganda coup and, somewhat perversely, could give Japan an excuse to invade Thailand "to liberate it from British unprovoked aggression."

To my mind, the best option Brooke-Popham had available was to employ the specially-converted Buffalo PR airframe to image the islands off the coast of Indo-China. One of the consular officials in Saigon provided Singapore with intelligence on Japanese efforts to build airfields on Idu Phu Quoc island and Brooke-Popham had identified the presence of short-range Japanese fighters as a key indicator of impending attack. Regular PR missions during the first week of December 1941 would have identified the deployment of the IJAAF fighter force and its location, on Idu Phu Quoc, was a clear indicator of the intended attack axis (i.e. seaborne invasion) because you always put your fighters up-threat from the territory you're trying to defend. In early December 1941, AHQFE had a solitary PR Buffalo available for operations. It was the short-range conversion with standard fuel and oil tankage; a long-range airframe was later added to the fleet with increased fuel and oil capacity. However, even the short-range airframe had sufficient legs to reach Idu Phu Quoc from northern Malaya.

Armed with this irrefutable imagery intelligence, Brooke-Popham could have approached the Thai government to persuade them of Japanese intentions, and openly proclaimed those intentions via the press. Such engagement could have persuaded the Thai leadership to invite the British into Thai territory to enable Matador.

As it was, Brooke-Popham couldn't attack the ships before the landings took place because that would have been an "unprovoked" attack. Also, finding a convoy is hard...and even if you find it, you can't do much about it until they actually start landing, by which time it's too late.

 

[Admiral Beez]

regarding Matador: if he executed it before the Japanese attack, he would gift Tokyo a propaganda coup ..... Brooke-Popham couldn't attack the ships before the landings took place because that would have been an "unprovoked" attack.

And that's what drives me mad about the post-ww1 British. Always afraid to offend, always reactionary, seeking the passive approach and founded in wishful thinking and willful neglect of situational awareness and intelligence, combined with an parsimonious unwillingness to prepare. For example, leaving hundreds of Spitfires essentially idle in Britain as the Luftwaffe was being ground down in Russia, sending Hurricanes made in Canada to Russia instead of Malaya, etc, etc.

 

[buffnut453]

And that's what drives me mad about the post-ww1 British. Always afraid to offend, always reactionary, seeking the passive approach and founded in wishful thinking and willful neglect of situational awareness and intelligence, combined with an parsimonious unwillingness to prepare.

I think you're being a tad harsh in your comments. Given that Britain was standing alone in late November 1941, why would they actively want to kick off a fight on another front? To do so makes little sense, hence why I think it was critical for Britain to provide clear evidence of Japan's hostile intentions towards Thailand.

The Thai government was caught between a rock and a hard place, with 2 large powers bristling at each other right on their doorstep. Understandably, they tried to appease both Britain and Japan. The only way to nudge Bangkok towards Britain's cause was to provide solid evidence of Japan's intentions but such proof was not forthcoming.

 

[Admiral Beez]

There's a lot to unpack in that post. Personally, I think the focus on the troop transports was misplaced.

Okay, but if the RAF isn't attacking the IJA at sea, and not attacking IJAF airfields in FIC and Thailand, what should the RAF in Malaya be doing beyond covering a retreat towards Singapore and ultimately a surrender?

Blenheim fighters...might make a useful CAS asset ... I wouldn't want to operate them until the Japanese fighter force had been considerably degraded.

The IJAF fighter force is not going to be considerably degraded unless its airfields are destroyed.

The modified Singapore strategy called for any RN units in Malaya to withdraw to Ceylon once the fighting started. This is was Phillips and Force Z should have done. Perhaps that's the strategy for the RAF as well, cover a Dunkirk-like evacuation from Singapore and then bug out to Java and Burma once the IJA has landed.

 

[buffnut453]

Okay, but if the RAF isn't attacking the IJA at sea, and not attacking IJAF airfields in FIC and Thailand, what should the RAF in Malaya be doing beyond covering a retreat towards Singapore and ultimately a surrender?The IJAF fighter force is not going to be considerably degraded unless its airfields are destroyed.

I didn't say that the RAF shouldn't attack the ships. I said that the emphasis on finding the invasion fleet was misplaced from the perspective of enabling a decision to implement Matador.

I also didn't say that the RAF shouldn't attack IJAAF airfields. I said that the blinkered focus on using bombers to attack airfields instead of using Buffalos to strafe the aircraft on the ground was a missed opportunity.

Of note, you don't need to destroy the IJAAF airfields (not that a force of Blenheims could destroy an airfield in any case). You need to reduce their effective fighter force. Destroying them on the ground is WAAYYYY more efficient than trying to tangle with them in the air which, again, is why strafing would have been a better approach than dropping a couple of bombs from a Blenheim.

The modified Singapore strategy called for any RN units in Malaya to withdraw to Ceylon once the fighting started. This is was Phillips and Force Z should have done. Perhaps that's the strategy for the RAF as well, cover a Dunkirk-like evacuation from Singapore and then bug out to Java and Burma once the IJA has landed.

There's no way, once Japan has initiated conflict, that the RN and RAF are going to scuttle off and leave the army to stand alone. That's antithetical to the ethos of either service. Also, if the IJA invades Thailand, there's no path to Burma for anyone. One of the main rationales for the airfields in northern Malaya was as part of the reinforcement route from India. That route was cut as soon as the Japanese took Thailand.

Thailand was the lynchpin of their entire strategy because it gave them internal lines of communication and enabled centrally-located air power to be employed south into Malaya and northwest into Burma, maximizing operational flexibility. Again, this is something that should have been self-evident to anyone looking at a map of the region, which should have driven Far East Command to find ways of preventing the Japanese occupation of Thailand...and that needed British forces in Thailand at the latter's invitation to stand any chance of success.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

What happened to these Chinese-Malay pilots? Were they sent to Canada in time to return to fight? If not, where did they go?


And look at these Tiger Moths. These would be ideal for low level reconnaissance work, running up and down the coast looking for invasion forces.
Speaking of Canada, a long forgotten contribution of Canada's in Malaya is Chinese Canadians of Force 136 | The Canadian Encyclopedia

Re the newly trained Malay pilots, see Talalla brothers flew high during WW2 | New Straits Times

The Elementary Flying Training school was based at Kallang, Singapore, so this film may have been taken there. At 28 seconds you have the Governor Sir Shelton Thomas leading an inspection of the cadets. Following him is a flying officer, I think, followed by Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command, then by Air Vice Marshal Pulford, commander of RAF Far East Command, after him it looks like a Group Captain. This could be R L Nunn, who commanded the Malayan Volunteer Air Force, and may also have had the EFTS as well. Nunn was a part timer, his real job was director of the Public Works Department. I'd love to know if it is him!

At 42 seconds you have the Brewster Buffalo's taking off, again I think Kallang, looking at the way the airfield is curved around the coast line

And at 1.38, you have the poor sod who got given the Boys anti tank rifle, what a beast that is, no wonder so many were thrown when troops retreated!

Great little film Admiral Beez, well done

 

[Admiral Beez]

Thailand was the lynchpin of their entire strategy because it gave them internal lines of communication and enabled centrally-located air power to be employed south into Malaya and northwest into Burma, maximizing operational flexibility. Again, this is something that should have been self-evident to anyone looking at a map of the region, which should have driven Far East Command to find ways of preventing the Japanese occupation of Thailand...and that needed British forces in Thailand at the latter's invitation to stand any chance of success.

A British security guarantee to Thailand would have done the trick. A large part of Britain's lack of spine and initiative comes from the dithering of FDR and the USA.

 

[SaparotRob]

Dithering by the U.S.A. perhaps. Dithering by FDR, not so much.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Dithering by the U.S.A. perhaps. Dithering by FDR, not so much.

IDK, had Germany not declared war and had Japan attacked only the DEI and Malaya I'm not convinced that FDR would push Congress to go to active war against either until well into winter 1942, when both Malaya and DEI are already surrendered into Japan's hands.

Certainly FDR was sending military equipment to both the USSR and UK, but he'd have his work cutout pushing Congress for a DoW.

 

[SaparotRob]

And pushing he was. From my foggy memory, the USN was actively searching and notifying RN surface forces of U-Boats. The U.S. did the destroyers (and other stuff, I think) for bases deal. There were armaments deals and other non neutral activities. FDR spoke on one of his Fireside Chats of lending your neighbor your hose if his house were on fire. It amazes me how much he got away with in isolationist America.

 

[special ed]

The US was also allowing US service members to participate in missions. The co-pilot on the British Catalina that spotted the Bismark was a US Naval officer.

 

[SaparotRob]

Did not know that.

 

[Shortround6]

And pushing he was. From my foggy memory, the USN was actively searching and notifying RN surface forces of U-Boats. The U.S. did the destroyers (and other stuff, I think) for bases deal. There were armaments deals and other non neutral activities. FDR spoke on one of his Fireside Chats of lending your neighbor your hose if his house were on fire. It amazes me how much he got away with in isolationist America.

See Neutrality Patrol - Wikipedia

One aspect of the Neutrality Patrol was that it freed up quite a number of RN ships to perform escort duty in the Eastern Atlantic as the US was effectively providing a number of "escorts" in the western Atlantic so the British didn't have to.

England was also allowed to purchase a large amount of "stuff" from the "U.S. Steel Export Co" which was actual a "front". The US armed services would declare all manor of small arms and ammunition and other things "surplus" and the items would be purchased by U.S. Steel and then resold to the British to avoid the appearance of the US supplying Britain from US military stockpiles.

See Chapter X: Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America

 

[SaparotRob]

See Neutrality Patrol - Wikipedia

One aspect of the Neutrality Patrol was that it freed up quite a number of RN ships to perform escort duty in the Eastern Atlantic as the US was effectively providing a number of "escorts" in the western Atlantic so the British didn't have to.

England was also allowed to purchase a large amount of "stuff" from the "U.S. Steel Export Co" which was actual a "front". The US armed services would declare all manor of small arms and ammunition and other things "surplus" and the items would be purchased by U.S. Steel and then resold to the British to avoid the appearance of the US supplying Britain from US military stockpiles.

See Chapter X: Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America

Thanks SR6. That filled in some gaps in my knowledge.

 

[buffnut453]

A British security guarantee to Thailand would have done the trick.

Given the under-strength nature of British forces in Malaya, would such a security guarantee have carried any meaning or have been of any value?

Let's assume such an agreement existed. What happens if Japan attacks Thailand? Would the British push forces into Thailand to honour the agreement? Doing so would leave Malaya yet further exposed.

The only way to realistically offer guarantees to Thailand is to massively reinforce Malaya in early 1941 but that wasn't going to happen given other priorities at the time.

 

[Admiral Beez]

No static line of defensive positions would work in Malaya.

It doesn't really matter where the airfields are located. It's plain stupid to try and wrest air superiority

Blenheim fighters won't give much in the way of capability benefits

The only way to nudge Bangkok towards Britain's cause was to provide solid evidence of Japan's intentions but such proof was not forthcoming.

finding a convoy is hard...and even if you find it, you can't do much about it until they actually start landing, by which time it's too late.

....but that wasn't going to happen given other priorities at the time.

You've certainly countered most points and proposals thus far well enough. May I suggest we put that aside for the moment, and instead can you tell us what your proposal is? You've got the beginnings of something below with Buffaloes straffing airfelds. Presumably the IJAF will modify their airfield practices after the first day or so of straffing attacks.

But I'm proposing that the Buffalos were used to strafe airfields, hence helping secure air superiority. Given the qualitative and quantitative advantage the Japanese held over the RAF fighters, I think early morning strafing runs against key airfields would be a far more effective use of the few available Buffalos than how they were used - frittered away in standing patrols trying (and failing) to protect their own airfields.