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I think mainly the British were caught off guard by the very rapid increase in Japanese forces in FIC. In early November there were hardly any IJAF aircraft in southern FIC. It was only just before the December 8th attack on Malaya that the IJAF moved aircraft from Formosa, China and northern FIC.They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.
You've certainly countered most points and proposals thus far well enough. May I suggest we put that aside for the moment, and instead can you tell us what your proposal is? You've got the beginnings of something below with Buffaloes straffing airfelds. Presumably the IJAF will modify their airfield practices after the first day or so of straffing attacks.
Geo-politically it was in Englands interest for Japan to go to war against ABDA forces, to draw USA into WW2 in europe, that was something Churchill learned in WW1. So maybe Empire forces were purposefully kept minimal to encourage Japan
They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.
If the USA wasn't going to enter WW2 given the threat posed by Germany, it's hardly likely we'd go to war over Britain's colonial outposts. Again, there are a lot of "what if's" associated with any ploy by Britain to deliberately weaken defences in the Far East..
I'd also establish and train an air warning reporting network tied into a ground controlled intercept capability in the AHQFE Fighter Operations Room.
, I'd take steps to ensure every operational Buffalo squadron could meet minimum standards of gunnery performance
Probably USA own actions in encouraging embargo of oil to Japan was the main driver towards Japan's Pacific war. I only learned earlier this year Japan had occupied French-Vichy-Vietnam in 1940. This was the big trigger that led to the US led oil embargo, and it makes more sense to me now. Obviously Dutch-East Indies(Indonesia) was also a defeated European nations colony the Japanese could also claim, and the source of oil needed. So USA maneouvered itself into war, as guarantor of no oil for Japan policy.
If England was to strengthen far east significantly, knowing what happened to Vietnam 1940, then mid-1941 and Barabarossa gave it some relief to send more RAF to Malaya. Perhaps some Hurricanes should have been sent then, as the Buffalos problems were already becoming apparent, also radar sets at least for Singapore was essential if they were serious, from BoB experience.
It says volumes that more gunnery tests/qualifications weren't been held, probably lack of ammunition. Especially as most pilots were not experienced, they could trained them on Buffalos fitted with 2x0.303's.
It seems rather a flaw that a warplane had guns that weren't reliable, although I wonder if the Buffalo gun "jam" problems are a bit overstated.
That's no excuse for the radar though, as it was in country. It just needed to be set up and used. That's my one hope in this thread, that we can seize opportunities to give some urgency and expediency in preparations.Radar stations were being established in Malaya in late 1941 but progress was incredibly slow. One of the files in the UK National Archives record's a senior officer's frustration in early December 1941. I'm paraphrasing because I don't have the quote to-hand but he essentially said "We should give the radar equipment to the Japanese so they can set it up for us."
The problem with sending any additional resources to Singapore is that the Far East was right at the bottom of the priority list.
Apparently at Pearl Harbour several of the defending P-36 and P-40s suffered jams of their .50 cals.It should also be noted that every wing installation of .50 cals suffered problems in 1941-42 including P-40s in the Philippines, early P-51s and even F4Fs (according to Lundstrom, the latter's feed problems weren't fully resolved until the autumn of 1942!).
It would be hard for England to go to war with anyone having being bereft of any armed forces since 1707. England is a nation in it's own right. Not a synonym for the United Kingdom.Geo-politically it was in Englands interest for Japan to go to war against ABDA forces, to draw USA into WW2 in europe, that was something Churchill learned in WW1. So maybe Empire forces were purposefully kept minimal to encourage Japan
They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.
It would be hard for England to go to war with anyone having being bereft of any armed forces since 1707. England is a nation in it's own right. Not a synonym for the United Kingdom.
That was going to be my reply toThat may be legally correct, but I doubt the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and Wales were motivators in establishing the British Empire and its policy. But I shouldn't accuse all the English, maybe just the "city of london" bankers
And that's what drives me mad about the post-ww1 British. Always afraid to offend, always reactionary, seeking the passive approach and founded in wishful thinking and willful neglect of situational awareness and intelligence, combined with an parsimonious unwillingness to prepare. For example, leaving hundreds of Spitfires essentially idle in Britain as the Luftwaffe was being ground down in Russia, sending Hurricanes made in Canada to Russia instead of Malaya, etc, etc.
I am British, but the place went all weak-kneed after the First World War, always looking for the easy, cheapest and politest way out of a bind, never drawing a line in the sand with a willing fist to take the first overt, indisputable move if she was offended.
Agreed, that's certainly what gutted the spine of Britain from 1920 onwards, leading to a loss of its empire, its top tier economic/industrial position and its foreign policy willpower. But there was another path.I understand your point, but I think inadvertently you hit the nail on the head in your second quoted post. With approximately 1,000,000 commonwealth battlefield deaths, over 2,100,000 commonwealth wounded and nearly bankrupting the country, it's not too surprising that the British government was/has been loath to risk another bloodletting.
Agreed, that's certainly what gutted the spine of Britain from 1920 onwards, leading to a loss of its empire, its top tier economic/industrial position and its foreign policy willpower. But there was another path.
For starters, throughout the 1920s and 30s Britain continuously antagonizes and isolates Japan. At the 1921 Imperial Conference, ANZ pushed for renewal of the alliance with Japan, as a means to protect ANZ's isolated position, but Britain canceled the treaty. This could be argued as necessary to curry favour in Washington. But as a result of this, Australia wanted to partner with Britain on expanded Imperial military strength in the Pacific, but the rarely used Singapore base aside, London always declined. Then throughout the 1930s and up to Dec 1941 Britain keeps poking Japan, uses economic sanctions to push Japan to the breaking point, whilst Britain has done nothing militarily to prepare for the entirely predictable and inevitable reaction. By autumn 1941 RAF Fighter Command was mostly idle at home, with the Luftwaffe grinding itself to death in Russia. But Britain chose to send no first line fighter or strike squadrons to Malaya. What's the point of poking Japan throughout the 1930s if you refuse to take measures to manage Japan's reaction?
I like your thinking. The longtime governor Shelton Thomson should also be tossed, as it was on his demand that no defensive positions be build, lest they annoy the rubber plantations. When the Japanese took Malaya and Singapore they were amazed to find warehouses with piles of ready mix cement and rebar for building defensive works, but never used.Frankly, with hindsight, the only adequate advise from Pulford to Percival would have been: "Cable to London and demand that all, including us, civil and military top leaders should be replaced by more capable and forceful leaders. And begin immediately train your troops to jungle warfare." All other actions would have been inadequate.
You've got to admit he's right. It's the same frustration as: "Test a few of those torpedoes."Frankly, with hindsight, the only adequate advise from Pulford to Percival would have been: "Cable to London and demand that all, including us, civil and military top leaders should be replaced by more capable and forceful leaders. And begin immediately train your troops to jungle warfare." All other actions would have been inadequate.
I like your thinking. The longtime governor Shelton Thomson should also be tossed, as it was on his demand that no defensive positions be build, lest they annoy the rubber plantations. When the Japanese took Malaya and Singapore they were amazed to fill piles of ready mix cement and rebar for building defensive works, but never used.
But what should our new forceful leaders do when they arrive? Given what was on hand, had they arrived in April 1941 could Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery himself, arguably Britain's best defensive strategist and tactician; and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, the victor of the Battle of Britain have done any better? I hope someone good takes Monty's place in North Africa.
If were swapping out any soldiers it's Indians for Nepalese. The Japanese don't stand a chance if the Gurkhas are holding the jungle night.
Hmm, a challenge as Britain didn't have 100 lb bombs. General-purpose bomb - Wikipedia. But then again, they have to bring in foreign .50 cal belts, so some US-origin 100 lb. incendiary bombs would be useful in attacking IJAF airfields.The Buffalo (at least the American ones) was rated/equipped to carry a pair of 100lb bombs.
Unknown if the British or Dutch versions had similar capability. (like actual racks/shackles and dropping gear. )