Given what you’ve got, how would you organize RAF Malaya April-Nov 1941 onwards?

[taly01]

Geo-politically it was in Englands interest for Japan to go to war against ABDA forces, to draw USA into WW2 in europe, that was something Churchill learned in WW1. So maybe Empire forces were purposefully kept minimal to encourage Japan

They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.

 

[Admiral Beez]

They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.

I think mainly the British were caught off guard by the very rapid increase in Japanese forces in FIC. In early November there were hardly any IJAF aircraft in southern FIC. It was only just before the December 8th attack on Malaya that the IJAF moved aircraft from Formosa, China and northern FIC.

So, to their credit, until late November 1941, the RAF was the right size to deal with the limited IJAF assets in FIC. Which presents a challenge to my opening post.... if the RAF appears to have the strongest air force in the region, how do we justify making changes? What the British need is on the ground intel in FIC, China and Formosa.

 

[buffnut453]

You've certainly countered most points and proposals thus far well enough. May I suggest we put that aside for the moment, and instead can you tell us what your proposal is? You've got the beginnings of something below with Buffaloes straffing airfelds. Presumably the IJAF will modify their airfield practices after the first day or so of straffing attacks.

Yes, IJAAF will modify their tactics. However, restricting the number of airfields they can use will hinder their ability to disperse. Essentially, Japan bet big and, for reasons various, won. British forces could turn things around but it would require everything to go right...and for more imaginative preparations to be started far sooner.

As noted previously, I'd be using the single PR Buffalo and the Hudsons to keep an eye on areas where known Japanese actions were being undertaken. The airfields used by the IJA on Idu Phu Quoc didn't exist until the Japanese hacked them out of the jungle. British diplomats were aware of the activity and ensured the Far East Coordination Board (FECB - Far East Command's intelligence centre) were aware. Ongoing PR/visual reconnaissance missions would identify when the airfields became operational and when IJAAF fighters arrive, tipping off Singapore of this key indicator of future offensive action. This approach is not without risks, not least because the overwater journey from Malaya to Idu Phu Quoc would be challenging to complete in a single-engined aircraft...however, it was probably a risk worth taking. I'd also convert a few more Buffalos for PR missions to expand intelligence collection capacity and provide fallback options if the first airframe was lost.

Another key improvement should be expansion of the telephone network between northern Malaya and Singapore. IIRC there was a single line which greatly hindered communication between the forward airfields and AHQFE. The ability to share tactical information rapidly from various forward locations was absolutely critical and relying on a single phone line is ridiculous (and easily identifiable as a shortfall without the benefit of hindsight).

I'd also establish and train an air warning reporting network tied into a ground controlled intercept capability in the AHQFE Fighter Operations Room. Chennault managed to do this in Burma so, again, no reason why it shouldn't be doable in Malaya. The stories in Bloody Shambles of air raid warning being provided by an airman waving a flag on the airfield boundary are appalling. A trained observer corps, coupled with communication back to the Fighter Operations Room at AHQFE would at least ensure some degree of integrated warning with the potential of ground control interception.

Reducing the number of airfields in northern Malaya is a two-edged sword. While it certainly reduces the number of sites to defend, it also limits dispersal options. Certainly, the siting of the airfields could have been better but there's little to be done during 1941 to overcome that. I would have recommended more all-weather operating surfaces in northern Malaya or, if that's not feasible, at least improving drainage so that airfields like Sungei Patani didn't flood, which limited both operations and aircraft dispersal. I'd also improve aircraft maintenance facilities at the northern airfields. Hangarage was virtually non-existent with many airfields simply having lean-to sheds to shield groundcrew from the sun while working on the aircraft. Operational readiness levels can't be effectively maintained if you don't have the adequate facilities.

I'd ensure that night-flying capabilities were implemented at all airfields to improve operational flexibility (as it was, only a few of the airfields in Singapore had even the most rudimentary night operating capabilities). I'd also ensure every Blenheim, Hudson and Vildebeest squadron was fully capable of operating at night. Navigation aids were non-existent so this would involve risks to aircraft and crews, but it would enhance the the operational performance of the entire bombing force.

Finally, I'd take steps to ensure every operational Buffalo squadron could meet minimum standards of gunnery performance and were current in adopting the latest tactical formations borne of experience in Europe. The gunnery qualification would ensure issues with gun stoppages could be identified long before actual combat, while the tactical formation piece would improve operational performance...and stop time being wasted on tactically inflexible vic formations.

That's probably enough to be going on with for now...

 

[buffnut453]

Geo-politically it was in Englands interest for Japan to go to war against ABDA forces, to draw USA into WW2 in europe, that was something Churchill learned in WW1. So maybe Empire forces were purposefully kept minimal to encourage Japan

If the USA wasn't going to enter WW2 given the threat posed by Germany, it's hardly likely we'd go to war over Britain's colonial outposts. Again, there are a lot of "what if's" associated with any ploy by Britain to deliberately weaken defences in the Far East...and little chance of achieving the goal of bringing the US into the war. Also, please note that Britain greatly expanded its forces in Malaya in 1940-1941, to include increasing the number of Army battalions, fielding the Buffalo fighter squadrons from March 1941 onwards (prior to that point, there were no fighters in the Far East), increasing the number of bomber squadrons, and forming Force Z. These moves don't exactly tally with the idea that British forces were "purposefully kept minimal".

They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.

Nope, the Brits had a pretty good idea of Japanese capabilities. They knew about Japanese amphibious capabilities and had intelligence about the performance of most of Japan's frontline aircraft, the big exception being the lack of knowledge of the Ki-43.

They also had a pretty good handle on overall operational performance. Years of watching Japanese forces operating in China gave them a decent understanding. The problem is that the assessments were always made in comparative terms against British equivalent formations and, unfortunately, the forces in Malaya/Singapore were far below those equivalent British capabilities. Many of the Indian Army battalions were little more than recruits, many of whom had scarcely fired a rifle...and none had seen a tank. Expecting such poorly trained forces to stand up to a sizeable Japanese invasion force was a fatal example of ethnocentrism in Britain's assessment of its Far Eastern adversary.

 

[taly01]

If the USA wasn't going to enter WW2 given the threat posed by Germany, it's hardly likely we'd go to war over Britain's colonial outposts. Again, there are a lot of "what if's" associated with any ploy by Britain to deliberately weaken defences in the Far East..

Probably USA own actions in encouraging embargo of oil to Japan was the main driver towards Japan's Pacific war. I only learned earlier this year Japan had occupied French-Vichy-Vietnam in 1940. This was the big trigger that led to the US led oil embargo, and it makes more sense to me now. Obviously Dutch-East Indies(Indonesia) was also a defeated European nations colony the Japanese could also claim, and the source of oil needed. So USA maneouvered itself into war, as guarantor of no oil for Japan policy.

I'd also establish and train an air warning reporting network tied into a ground controlled intercept capability in the AHQFE Fighter Operations Room.

If England was to strengthen far east significantly, knowing what happened to Vietnam 1940, then mid-1941 and Barabarossa gave it some relief to send more RAF to Malaya. Perhaps some Hurricanes should have been sent then, as the Buffalos problems were already becoming apparent, also radar sets at least for Singapore was essential if they were serious, from BoB experience.

, I'd take steps to ensure every operational Buffalo squadron could meet minimum standards of gunnery performance

It says volumes that more gunnery tests/qualifications weren't been held, probably lack of ammunition. Especially as most pilots were not experienced, they could trained them on Buffalos fitted with 2x0.303's. It seems rather a flaw that a warplane had guns that weren't reliable, although I wonder if the Buffalo gun "jam" problems are a bit overstated.

 

[buffnut453]

Probably USA own actions in encouraging embargo of oil to Japan was the main driver towards Japan's Pacific war. I only learned earlier this year Japan had occupied French-Vichy-Vietnam in 1940. This was the big trigger that led to the US led oil embargo, and it makes more sense to me now. Obviously Dutch-East Indies(Indonesia) was also a defeated European nations colony the Japanese could also claim, and the source of oil needed. So USA maneouvered itself into war, as guarantor of no oil for Japan policy.

Japan's primary goal in starting the war against Britain was to take over the oilfields of the NEI. I suspect if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor that America still wouldn't have entered the war just because Japan attacked Thailand Malaya en route to the NEI.

If England was to strengthen far east significantly, knowing what happened to Vietnam 1940, then mid-1941 and Barabarossa gave it some relief to send more RAF to Malaya. Perhaps some Hurricanes should have been sent then, as the Buffalos problems were already becoming apparent, also radar sets at least for Singapore was essential if they were serious, from BoB experience.

Radar stations were being established in Malaya in late 1941 but progress was incredibly slow. One of the files in the UK National Archives record's a senior officer's frustration in early December 1941. I'm paraphrasing because I don't have the quote to-hand but he essentially said "We should give the radar equipment to the Japanese so they can set it up for us."

The problem with sending any additional resources to Singapore is that the Far East was right at the bottom of the priority list. In the middle of 1941, the British were fighting in Greece, the Middle East and North Africa. London was also facing pleas from Moscow for materiel support precisely because of Barbarossa. Against that strategic context, Malaya and Singapore come a very distant 5th or 6th from a priority perspective.

It says volumes that more gunnery tests/qualifications weren't been held, probably lack of ammunition. Especially as most pilots were not experienced, they could trained them on Buffalos fitted with 2x0.303's.

I agree, hence my recommendation that more effort should have been expended on air gunnery training. The RAF did initially fit .303s to the wings of Buffalos in the Far East due to fears of lack of .50 cal ammunition. After the retreat from Malaya, 453 Sqn also experimented with wing-mounted .303s in an attempt to reduce aircraft weight. Your idea would therefore seem eminently sensible, and there's no really good explanation for why it didn't happen. Perhaps the lack of operational experience across the squadrons caused air gunnery to be under-prioritized in training and work-up schemes. Certainly 453 Sqn conducted several splash-firing exercises so they did at least some gunnery training, but it clearly wasn't sufficient to identify the problem with the wing guns.

It seems rather a flaw that a warplane had guns that weren't reliable, although I wonder if the Buffalo gun "jam" problems are a bit overstated.

I don't think they are overstated. The problems were so bad in the early days of the Japanese invasion of Malaya that AHQFE sent the solitary operational PR Buffalo to Sungei Patani with more powerful gun solenoids in a bid to get 21 Sqn's wing guns working properly. In one engagement a few days previously, only 3 out of 12 guns worked...so, clearly, it was a major issue.

It should also be noted that every wing installation of .50 cals suffered problems in 1941-42 including P-40s in the Philippines, early P-51s and even F4Fs (according to Lundstrom, the latter's feed problems weren't fully resolved until the autumn of 1942!).

 

[Admiral Beez]

Radar stations were being established in Malaya in late 1941 but progress was incredibly slow. One of the files in the UK National Archives record's a senior officer's frustration in early December 1941. I'm paraphrasing because I don't have the quote to-hand but he essentially said "We should give the radar equipment to the Japanese so they can set it up for us."

The problem with sending any additional resources to Singapore is that the Far East was right at the bottom of the priority list.

That's no excuse for the radar though, as it was in country. It just needed to be set up and used. That's my one hope in this thread, that we can seize opportunities to give some urgency and expediency in preparations.

It should also be noted that every wing installation of .50 cals suffered problems in 1941-42 including P-40s in the Philippines, early P-51s and even F4Fs (according to Lundstrom, the latter's feed problems weren't fully resolved until the autumn of 1942!).

Apparently at Pearl Harbour several of the defending P-36 and P-40s suffered jams of their .50 cals.

I have to wonder what the RAF's combat experienced fighter pilots were all doing once the BoB was over and the Luftwaffe fighting in Russia. Some must be in North Africa, but where are the rest?

 

[yulzari]

Geo-politically it was in Englands interest for Japan to go to war against ABDA forces, to draw USA into WW2 in europe, that was something Churchill learned in WW1. So maybe Empire forces were purposefully kept minimal to encourage Japan

They were probably very surprised by how effective the Japanese forces were.

It would be hard for England to go to war with anyone having being bereft of any armed forces since 1707. England is a nation in it's own right. Not a synonym for the United Kingdom.

 

[taly01]

It would be hard for England to go to war with anyone having being bereft of any armed forces since 1707. England is a nation in it's own right. Not a synonym for the United Kingdom.

That may be legally correct, but I doubt the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and Wales were motivators in establishing the British Empire and its policy. But I shouldn't accuse all the English, maybe just the "city of london" bankers

 

[Admiral Beez]

That may be legally correct, but I doubt the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and Wales were motivators in establishing the British Empire and its policy. But I shouldn't accuse all the English, maybe just the "city of london" bankers

That was going to be my reply to yulzari 's pedantry.

 

[Peter Gunn]

And that's what drives me mad about the post-ww1 British. Always afraid to offend, always reactionary, seeking the passive approach and founded in wishful thinking and willful neglect of situational awareness and intelligence, combined with an parsimonious unwillingness to prepare. For example, leaving hundreds of Spitfires essentially idle in Britain as the Luftwaffe was being ground down in Russia, sending Hurricanes made in Canada to Russia instead of Malaya, etc, etc.

...

I am British, but the place went all weak-kneed after the First World War, always looking for the easy, cheapest and politest way out of a bind, never drawing a line in the sand with a willing fist to take the first overt, indisputable move if she was offended.

I understand your point, but I think inadvertently you hit the nail on the head in your second quoted post. With approximately 1,000,000 commonwealth battlefield deaths, over 2,100,000 commonwealth wounded and nearly bankrupting the country, it's not too surprising that the British government was/has been loath to risk another bloodletting.

That of course, is just my observation.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I understand your point, but I think inadvertently you hit the nail on the head in your second quoted post. With approximately 1,000,000 commonwealth battlefield deaths, over 2,100,000 commonwealth wounded and nearly bankrupting the country, it's not too surprising that the British government was/has been loath to risk another bloodletting.

Agreed, that's certainly what gutted the spine of Britain from 1920 onwards, leading to a loss of its empire, its top tier economic/industrial position and its foreign policy willpower. But there was another path.

For starters, throughout the 1920s and 30s Britain continuously antagonizes and isolates Japan. At the 1921 Imperial Conference, ANZ pushed for renewal of the alliance with Japan, as a means to protect ANZ's isolated position, but Britain canceled the treaty. This could be argued as necessary to curry favour in Washington. But as a result of this, Australia wanted to partner with Britain on expanded Imperial military strength in the Pacific, but the rarely used Singapore base aside, London always declined. Then throughout the 1930s and up to Dec 1941 Britain keeps poking Japan, uses economic sanctions to push Japan to the breaking point, whilst Britain has done nothing militarily to prepare for the entirely predictable and inevitable reaction. By autumn 1941 RAF Fighter Command was mostly idle at home, with the Luftwaffe grinding itself to death in Russia. But Britain chose to send no first line fighter or strike squadrons to Malaya. What's the point of poking Japan throughout the 1930s if you refuse to take measures to manage Japan's reaction?

 

[MikeMeech]

Agreed, that's certainly what gutted the spine of Britain from 1920 onwards, leading to a loss of its empire, its top tier economic/industrial position and its foreign policy willpower. But there was another path.

For starters, throughout the 1920s and 30s Britain continuously antagonizes and isolates Japan. At the 1921 Imperial Conference, ANZ pushed for renewal of the alliance with Japan, as a means to protect ANZ's isolated position, but Britain canceled the treaty. This could be argued as necessary to curry favour in Washington. But as a result of this, Australia wanted to partner with Britain on expanded Imperial military strength in the Pacific, but the rarely used Singapore base aside, London always declined. Then throughout the 1930s and up to Dec 1941 Britain keeps poking Japan, uses economic sanctions to push Japan to the breaking point, whilst Britain has done nothing militarily to prepare for the entirely predictable and inevitable reaction. By autumn 1941 RAF Fighter Command was mostly idle at home, with the Luftwaffe grinding itself to death in Russia. But Britain chose to send no first line fighter or strike squadrons to Malaya. What's the point of poking Japan throughout the 1930s if you refuse to take measures to manage Japan's reaction?

Hi

At the 1921 Imperial Conference the Australian and New Zealand governments were in general agreement with Britain about renewal of the agreement with the Japanese although they were problems with it. The Canadian Prime Minister Mr Meighen was bitterly opposed (as was his predecessor Sir Robert Borden), he:

"... refused to believe that any agreement between Britain and Japan, no matter in what form, could fail to injure Britain's relations with the United States. Moreover he took the view that the most desirable solution of the problems of Imperial economy and defence, i.e. agreed disarmament, was possible; but that the participation of America was essential, and that that participation would be hopelessly impeded by the renewal of a treaty which many Americans could only regard as directed in some measure against their own country. Finally, he argued that although many people claimed that Japan had loyally observed her part of the bargain so far, yet she had for long past pursued her own selfish ends and would continue to do so."(page 18 of 'Grand Strategy' Volume 1, by N. H. Gibbs.)

The Imperial Conference was followed by the Washington Conference and most of the inter-war relationships in the Pacific was Britain and the Dominions keeping in with the USA to a great extent. British 'antagonizims' to Japan included allowing the USA to transport armaments through Burma to the Chinese forces fighting the Japanese. Indeed one reason that the Japanese invaded Burma was to stop that traffic.

Mike

 

[Juha3]

Frankly, with hindsight, the only adequate advise from Pulford to Percival would have been: "Cable to London and demand that all, including us, civil and military top leaders should be replaced by more capable and forceful leaders. And begin immediately train your troops to jungle warfare." All other actions would have been inadequate.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Frankly, with hindsight, the only adequate advise from Pulford to Percival would have been: "Cable to London and demand that all, including us, civil and military top leaders should be replaced by more capable and forceful leaders. And begin immediately train your troops to jungle warfare." All other actions would have been inadequate.

I like your thinking. The longtime governor Shelton Thomson should also be tossed, as it was on his demand that no defensive positions be build, lest they annoy the rubber plantations. When the Japanese took Malaya and Singapore they were amazed to find warehouses with piles of ready mix cement and rebar for building defensive works, but never used.

But what should our new forceful leaders do when they arrive? Given what was on hand, had they arrived in April 1941 could Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery himself, arguably Britain's best defensive strategist and tactician; and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, the victor of the Battle of Britain have done any better? I hope someone good takes Monty's place in North Africa.

If were swapping out any soldiers it's Indians for Nepalese. The Japanese don't stand a chance if the Gurkhas are holding the jungle night.

 

[SaparotRob]

Frankly, with hindsight, the only adequate advise from Pulford to Percival would have been: "Cable to London and demand that all, including us, civil and military top leaders should be replaced by more capable and forceful leaders. And begin immediately train your troops to jungle warfare." All other actions would have been inadequate.

You've got to admit he's right. It's the same frustration as: "Test a few of those torpedoes."
Too bad it's hindsight and wasn't foresight.

 

[Juha3]

I like your thinking. The longtime governor Shelton Thomson should also be tossed, as it was on his demand that no defensive positions be build, lest they annoy the rubber plantations. When the Japanese took Malaya and Singapore they were amazed to fill piles of ready mix cement and rebar for building defensive works, but never used.

But what should our new forceful leaders do when they arrive? Given what was on hand, had they arrived in April 1941 could Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery himself, arguably Britain's best defensive strategist and tactician; and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, the victor of the Battle of Britain have done any better? I hope someone good takes Monty's place in North Africa.

If were swapping out any soldiers it's Indians for Nepalese. The Japanese don't stand a chance if the Gurkhas are holding the jungle night.

Monty was not the only capable and forceful British general, one of those goes. And someone like Park for the Air. And some realistic civil servants to the key positions on the civil side. With troops trained for jungle warfare you nullified one of Japanese key advantages. You don,t have to swap troops, just train the ones you have, look chindits. And troops that can operate in the jungle are difficult targets for air forces, that was true still in late 60s and mid 70s, look e.g. Vietnam. And you have 2x as many troops than the attacker and with ability to use civilian labour to help military for building defensive positions and new roads under jungle canopy you enhance your fighting power and staying power.

 

[Admiral Beez]

J Juha3 I'm on board for jungle warfare. We're an avation forum, so what's the plan for the RAF? Are we too early technologically for radio directed CAS for our Commonwealth Chindits? Can the RAF Buffalo carry bombs, like the Dutch ones? Not that there are enough Buffaloes for both fighter and CAS.

 

[Shortround6]

The Buffalo (at least the American ones) was rated/equipped to carry a pair of 100lb bombs.

Unknown if the British or Dutch versions had similar capability. (like actual racks/shackles and dropping gear. )

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Buffalo (at least the American ones) was rated/equipped to carry a pair of 100lb bombs.

Unknown if the British or Dutch versions had similar capability. (like actual racks/shackles and dropping gear. )

Hmm, a challenge as Britain didn't have 100 lb bombs. General-purpose bomb - Wikipedia. But then again, they have to bring in foreign .50 cal belts, so some US-origin 100 lb. incendiary bombs would be useful in attacking IJAF airfields.