How Many Zeros?

http://www.cnatra.navy.mil/ebrief/d.../SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS/ACM FTI.pdf
Page 21 describes the Displacement Roll and has a nice diagram which shows how an attacking aircraft can use this maneuver to turn inside another aircraft.

tyrodtom said:

You do know that's just from a gamer's site don't you ? How about some real world reference to it?

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Funny, I didn't click the link, but I figured this wasn't from the period. Bandit, bogey, kill? Sounds like the vocabulary of Tom Cruise.

The first Wildcats to fly from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal were hand-me-down F4F-3s. That was fortuitous, actually because the F4F-3 had a higher climb rate and slightly higher top speed than the F4F-4. When they ran out of F4F-3s, they got F4F-4s and some F4F-3As. The 3A was a 3 with a single-staged supercharger. The pilots hated the 3A, but they were better than nothing. When the Marines couldn't get to altitude in time to match the Zeros, they would climb into the diving Zeros, and face them head-on. The American .50 guns could outrange, outpower and outnmeber the Japanese 7.7 MM. (The small ammunition supply of the 20 MM dictated careful use.) The stronger structure of the F4F also gave it an advantage in the head-on fights.

Displacement roll ok, vector roll, lol, the gamers like to spice their terminology up, I guess.

Conslaw said:

The first Wildcats to fly from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal were hand-me-down F4F-3s.

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Can you give us a source for that statement? The first F4F's came in on the CVE-1 Long Island which had very limited deck space. Every report and account I've read states the marines used only F4F-4's. Lundstroms First Team Vol 2. page 96: and Richard B. Frank's Guadacanal page 138, both state 19 F4F-4s with 12 fixed wing SBDs were launched to Henderson. The dozen fixed wing SBDs would have taken up far too much deck space to accommodate a shipment of 19 F4F-3s

By the time of the Guadacanal campaign I believe the F4F-3A had been withdrawn from front line service. They may have been deployed to defend essentially rear area bases like Noumea or Samoa or Johnston islands.

davebender said:

http://www.cnatra.navy.mil/ebrief/d...UPPLEMENTS/SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS/ACM FTI.pdf
Page 21 describes the Displacement Roll and has a nice diagram which shows how an attacking aircraft can use this maneuver to turn inside another aircraft.

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The energy tactics a modern jet can use, being very steamlined, with speedbrakes and very responsive modern jet engine, are a lot different from the energy manuvers a WW2 piston engine fighter could make use of. That T-45 the manual is for weighs about the same as a Me 262, but has almost 50% more thrust from a modern turbofan .

Conslaw said:

The first Wildcats to fly from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal were hand-me-down F4F-3s.

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To follow up on the location of the F4F-3s during the Guadalcanal campaign: Check out this web site from the naval history command:

Location of U.S. Naval Aircraft, World War II

and look at the entries for August 27, 1942. While this document is not totally reliable (the Yorktown, sunk at Midway is still carried as "out of action in the central Pacific," I guess accurate as far as it goes but failing to mention that it lay under a few miles of rather salty H2O.

The list of aircraft locations shows: essentially all significant naval fighter squadrons equipped with F4F-4s, that includes land based support commands. For Marine units the results are mixed as follows:

Marine units based at:
Samoa: VMF-111, 21 F4F-3
Numea: VMO-251, 15 F4F-3
Palmyra: VMF-211, 15 F2A-3
Efate: VMF-212, 16 F4F-3A
Hawaii: VMF-221, 30 F4F-3
Hawaii: VMF-222, 10 F4F-4
Guadalcanal: VMF-223, 19 F4F-4
Guadalcanal: VMF-224, 19 F4F (no variant identifier) but flown in from newly operational Espiritu Santo. Some modeling sites suggest VMF-224 flew -3s but a photo on a VMF-224 site shows what appears to be an F4F-4 distinguishable by its three wing gun ports. but in the photo its difficult to tell for sure.

VMF-224-4243GuadalcanalTourMainPage

Bottom line, The second group of 19 may have been 19 F4F-3... (late entry) but weren't (after checking the record).

Also late entry: VMO-251 apparently was using a mix of F4F-3 and F4F-3P photo birds. This squadron did ultimately deploy to Cactus but to provide recon, not air defense, although its pilots did fly such AD missions.. (Tillman: WA) AFAIK.

tyrodtom said:

Displacement roll ok, vector roll, lol, the gamers like to spice their terminology up, I guess.

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I know this much, you boys are rolling all over my little head.

There was a pilot in my Dad's club they referred to as, "Pappy." He's probably the one whom I heard this from. The "roll" I heard of was like a "peel off" except you completed the rotation until you were, in a manner of speaking, "back up on your feet." The Wildcat would resort to this tactic not only to try to shake a Zero that was hot on its tail but to actually wind up behind it. The Zero couldn't follow the Wildcat in the roll because it couldn't perform the maneuver as adeptly as the Wildcat could. This was a very fast roll, as opposed to a slow roll. The net result, though, was, you'd lose altitude, the Zero would go down after you to try to keep you in its sights, and, in no time, at that speed, it would overrun you. If the tactic worked, you'd be shooting up into the Zero's belly.

Further info on F4F-3 deployment to Guadalcanal. Just confirmation of one operating out of Cactus would be a surprise to me and I find myself surprised.

USN Overseas Aircraft Loss List October 1942

aircraft losses lists one F4F-3 lost at Guadalcanal 10/13/42 Bureau number: 3996. flown by VMF-221 pilot Lt. J.L. Narr. Since this list for October 1942 lists many F4F-4 losses, I suspect the F4F-3s were rare and flown in to replace lost aircraft although I suppose its entirely possible there were some in the initial batch of VF-224 aircraft.

http://www.aviationarchaeology.com/src/USN/LLSep42.htm

Checking the same list for September I find no F4F-3 losses for Guadalcanal and VMF-224 flying F4F-4s. Thus it appears the F4F-3 was a rare beast at Henderson.

I forgot, the F4F-3P was a photo bird and the one loss may very well have been one of the photo -3P photo birds deployed to Cactus.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Check out this web site from the naval history command:

Location of U.S. Naval Aircraft, World War II

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BOOKMARKED!

Just don't take it too seriously. I have found many errors in the listings in comparing them with well researched histories. (Particularly Lundstrom).

It looks like F4F-3s flown by either VMF-224 or VMF-223 at Cactus is a gamers or modelers idea. I can't find much in accounts to validate the possibility. During the period of maximum aerial combat VMF loses no F4F-3s but many F4F-4s as does VMF-223.

Late for the party as usual.


My opinion, Zeroes were critical to the success of the Japanese offensive to the beginning of May. That an aircraft could be carrier borne and outclass its land based opponents was unheard of before the Zero (though the Wildcat and the Sea Hurricanes did give it a bit of a nudge, they just werent as good as the Zero and still fell short of outclassing their opposition). That such an aircraft was Japanese was viewed with absolute consternation. Zeroes were probably more instrumental in achieving victory for the Japanese than any other single weapon system.

The Zeroe's rise to fame was rapid, but its fall was almost as rapid. Zeroes were the supreme dogfighter, and packed an impressive range, and a fair amount of firepower on a very limited engine output. Its legendary abilities did come at the price of structural strength and protection. Ammunition supply was very limited, and the counications equipment virtually useless. Pilots also seldom carried parachutes during the early part of the war at least. And the dive characterisitics of the type were very limited. At high speed the controls froze up and became very heavy and unresponsive. The ammunition carried oin the cannon were impact type so did not have much armour penetration capability

The allies were beginning to realize these weaknesses by October '42, tghough it took some time longer for the correct lessons to be accepted and leant. Basic rule was....dont get into a turning fight with a zero...attack from height, make a high speed diving pass and then use your speed to climb and get into position again for another pass.

A minor detail, and I acknowledge that I have previously had disagreements with buffnut about this (and dont want to go around again...its just that he and I dont agfree even on the basic facts on this issue) . So this should be viewed as my opinion, not necessarily facts....Over malaya, the two Sentais listed as being equipped with Ki 43s were, in my opinion, not fully equipped. At the outbreak of hostilities they had about 45 Ki-43s on strength. There was a fairly rapid re-equipment of these two Sentais with Ki-43s, but until that happened, and the airfields captured brought up to operational status (something not really completed until just before Christmas 1941), the IJAAF very much was outnumbered by the defending Allied fighters. But the the japanese had the proiceless advantage of holding the initiative, and also appear to have suffered low servicieability rates....

Ki27s never were never used used for fleet defence, this being reserved for the 25 Zeroes of the "Yawata Detachment". They may have been used for beachhead defence (ie the defence of the landward side of the beachhead, though I am unaware of that role ever being assigned to them.

The Oscar may be, in its own right, an under-valued IJAAF asset. Whether there were 45 or twice that number, its impact appears to me indisputable. I doubt the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF could have been so quickly overwhelmed without its service.

Pars, The IJAAF mechs told me they believe you meant to say "....enjoyed low serviceability rates." I don't know Buffnut's objection and feel it would be presumptuous to interject an opinion but Shores et al. (Bloody Shambles) seems to be in agreement with you. They list the 54th Sentai as having 24 Ki-43s in service while the while the 64th had 35 Ki-43 assigned as well as 6 Ki-27 (page 52-53). (With the total Ki-27 available approaching 200 throughout SE asia, including Formosa.) Two normal sized (24 Ki-43) Sentai would suggest 48 A/C, but such 'normal' numbers deviate frequently in any aviation arm regardless of country. The presence of 6 Ki-27 in the 64th suggest mixed types within an organization was as common in the IJAAF as it was in other air forces. It seems to me the USN and RN FAA was frequently in such straights but I don't know to what extent USAAF squadrons did that. I have to say, I've found minor inconsistencies in Shores numbers on occasion although in general I think he is an excellent source.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Just don't take it too seriously. I have found many errors in the listings in comparing them with well researched histories.

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OK, thanks very much for the benefit of your research efforts, crow, I'll note this.

oldcrowcv63 said:

The Oscar may be, in its own right, an under-valued IJAAF asset. Whether there were 45 or twice that number, its impact appears to me indisputable. I doubt the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF could have been so quickly overwhelmed without its service.

Pars, The IJAAF mechs told me they believe you meant to say "....enjoyed low serviceability rates." I don't know Buffnut's objection and feel it would be presumptuous to interject an opinion but Shores et al. (Bloody Shambles) seems to be in agreement with you. They list the 54th Sentai as having 24 Ki-43s in service while the while the 64th had 35 Ki-43 assigned as well as 6 Ki-27 (page 52-53). (With the total Ki-27 available approaching 200 throughout SE asia, including Formosa.) Two normal sized (24 Ki-43) Sentai would suggest 48 A/C, but such 'normal' numbers deviate frequently in any aviation arm regardless of country. The presence of 6 Ki-27 in the 64th suggest mixed types within an organization was as common in the IJAAF as it was in other air forces. It seems to me the USN and RN FAA was frequently in such straights but I don't know to what extent USAAF squadrons did that. I have to say, I've found minor inconsistencies in Shores numbers on occasion although in general I think he is an excellent source.

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Great post and really brings some good information forward IMO. I also believe that frontline numbers for the Japanesewould have been affected by the "newness of the Ki-43. It was a brand new type, and was still being accepted in the IJAAF generally, and the two Sentais fighting in Malaya. Doubtless there were numbers of those ostensibly on strength and available that would not be available for a range of reasons.

One of the reasons I believe the Spitfires and Hurricanes of the Commonwealth Air Forces and the RAF enjoyed less success than one would expect was the lessons learned in Europe and then mis-applied in the Pacific. Luftwaffe fighters were best countered by the RAF fighters by enticing them into a tight turning fight. At least thats what the RAF thought they should do. Ill bet the farm that knowledge came out with the pilots when transferred to the pacific, which of course is precisely what you dont do against an a/c like the A6M, or the Oscar.

Parsifal and I have been around on this one before but I cite the Japanese monograph on air operations over Thailand and Malaya which specifically identifies the Ki-27 units as providing air cover for the convoys starting on X-1 (7 Dec). 1st, 11th and 77th Sentai are all identified as providing convoy cover and protection over the landing forces, including the harbour at Singora. The units operated from Phu Quoc Island as well as Kampong Trach airfield on mainland Indochina.

That's what I get for posting late at night. I remembered the hand-me-down F4F-3 correctly to the extent that some Marine units received hand-me-down F4F-3s when they Navy squadrons converted to F4F-4. For example, VMF221 at Midway. I could not see confirmation that any of the Marine units initially went to battle on Guadalcanal with Dash-3s, so I was wrong on that. As far as I thought it was Lundstrom where I read about F4F-3 being first in at Guadalcanal. I did a Google book search and that was not confirmed. My apology. I did get confirmation that Joe Bauer's VMF-212 had F4F3As at Efete, but may have been replaced by dash-4 by the time of deployment at Guadalcanal. VMF-212 was deployed to Guadalcanal in detachments. During the dark days of October 1942, they sent in whatever they could to Guadalcanal. There were probably some old repaired planes thrown into the mix.

parsifal said:

I also believe that frontline numbers for the Japanesewould have been affected by the "newness of the Ki-43. It was a brand new type, and was still being accepted in the IJAAF generally, and the two Sentais fighting in Malaya. Doubtless there were numbers of those ostensibly on strength and available that would not be available for a range of reasons.

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Undoubtedly, but that same issue pertained to the RAF units too. A typical RAF fighter squadron comprised 18 airframes, 12 Initial Equipment (IE) and 6 Immediate Reserve (IR). The inclusion of IR airframes was done to account for maintenance, losses etc. So the front-line single-engine fighter strength in all of Malaya and Singapore was ostensibly 72 airframes compared to 59 Ki-43s plus the 3 Sentai of Ki-27s and a Chotai of Ki-44s. When the Japanese attacked northern Malaya, that pitched just one unit, 21 Sqn, against those 2 Sentai of Ki-43s. Even including 27 Sqn with their Blenheims (which had a dual fighter and bomber roles and shared Sungei Patani airfield with 21 Sqn) the odds are not improved one iota.

Even prior to the Japanese attack, by standard usage, the RAF units would only claim 48 fighters available for operations and, once the Japanese attack got underway, that number reduced markedly over northern Malaya due, in part, to Japanese air attacks but also to high losses due to accidents (eg 3 out of 13 airframes became lost and had to force-land on 13 Dec as 453 Sqn attempted to reinforce 21 Sqn).