If HeS 30 hadn’t been cancelled after 1942, could von Ohain’s “core team” reach ~4500 lbf with a pure axial design?

[10020070122]

Hi all, I'd like to ask a clearly framed hypothetical — mainly to understand the capability ceiling of von Ohain's camp, not just "could Germany do it in general".
Let's assume that after mid-1942 HeS 30 was NOT cancelled and instead received stable contracts/resources (no forced pivot away from it), with continuous rig time and production support. Also, for the purpose of this question I'm focusing on von Ohain's core/original team — i.e., not relying on Müller's axial "school" as the main driver.
Under that assumption, could von Ohain's side realistically evolve an HeS-30-type axial line into a more advanced pure axial engine in roughly the 4500 lbf (~20 kN) class, and get it close to practical use by 1944–45 (even if only as pre-production / small-batch prototypes)?
Why I'm asking:
1.von Ohain's earlier work seems strongest in making the turbojet system work (HeS 1/3/3B → HeS 8), mostly centrifugal/mixed concepts;
2.the "deep" axial compressor discipline (stage matching, surge margin, vibration/life, manufacturing consistency, fuel control + combustor pattern factor) appears more aligned with Müller's team;
3.HeS 30 was in the ~8–9 kN class, and jumping to ~20 kN feels like a generational step rather than simple scaling;
4.HeS 011 took a mixed/diagonal + axial route, and post-war summaries suggest the A-0 stage still needed significant production-readiness work (combustor redesign, bearing layout changes, etc.), hinting that rapid convergence is hard even with resources.
So without leaning on Müller's axial group, did von Ohain's core team have enough depth to push a pure axial compressor-turbine system toward higher pressure ratio / mass flow / Tt4 in that timeframe?

 

[MiTasol]

Welcome aboard and thanks for a great first post.

This is well outside my knowledge but this should develop into a very educational thread very quickly.

 

[bf109xxl]

Under that assumption, could von Ohain's side realistically evolve an HeS-30-type axial line into a more advanced pure axial engine in roughly the 4500 lbf (~20 kN) class, and get it close to practical use by 1944–45 (even if only as pre-production / small-batch prototypes)?

From German Jet Engine and Gas Turbine Development 1930-1945 by Antony L. Kay, Airlife Publishing Ltd, 2002:

Although it was abandoned at a fairly early stage in its development, the HeS 30 axial turbojet was the most promising of all the Heinkel engines, and was possibly the only one with any long-term value. The design was begun by Mueller (as one of a number of projects) at the Junkers Flugzeugwerke before 1938, and was a generally very advanced engine of small dimensions for its planned thrust.
...
The HeS 30 compressor, which achieved a pressure ratio of about 3:1 with only five stages, was designed by Rudolph Friedrich, an aerodynamicist at Junkers. Mueller's engine was actually built and put on test by about the end of 1938 but could not then run under its own power. Only by using an external compressed air supply and with a very high fuel consumption could the engine be brought up to about half speed. This engine was, in fact, abandoned by Junkers when that company accepted an official contract to develop a turbojet (later known as the Junkers 109-004) in 1939.
Mueller, however, promised to have his engine running within one year of his arrival at Rostock in October 1939. In fact, the first run was not made until more than two years had passed. It is not known how much the final HeS 30 design differed from the original design at Junkers.

 

[cherry blossom]

The quality of the HeS 30 is a difficult question. On one hand Heinkel had a history of claiming that his aircraft such as the He 100, He 119 and He 219 were potential world beaters. On the other hand the RLM had a history of not pushing engines that could have helped Germany, the DB 603, the Jumo 222 A/B-1 and the Jumo 004A. If we believe that it was running reliably in late 1942 and believe the quoted power and weight, it would have been a very good engine and could have rescued the He 280. It almost certainly used a similar amount of nickel and chromium as the Jumo 004A and that may have been a factor in its cancellation. However, those metals were available until 1944.

 

[bf109xxl]

The quality of the HeS 30 is a difficult question.

The topic starter was interested in the capabilities of von Ohain's group with regard to axial compressors. Considering that they had nothing to do with the initial development of the HeS 30, the answer is quite obvious.

It almost certainly used a similar amount of nickel and chromium as the Jumo 004A and that may have been a factor in its cancellation. However, those metals were available until 1944.

In any case, the possibilities for increasing the gas temperature before the turbine were very limited - it was unlikely that a major breakthrough could be expected. Even nickel-containing high-temperature alloys were not sufficiently heat-resistant at that time.

 

[10020070122]

The topic starter was interested in the capabilities of von Ohain's group with regard to axial compressors. Considering that they had nothing to do with the initial development of the HeS 30, the answer is quite obvious.

In any case, the possibilities for increasing the gas temperature before the turbine were very limited - it was unlikely that a major breakthrough could be expected. Even nickel-containing high-temperature alloys were not sufficiently heat-resistant at that time.

Compared with other late-war lines like the Jumo 004H and BMW's P.3306, the HeS 011 just doesn't seem to have the edge not in thrust, not in overall package size, and definitely not in development timeline. That's what keeps confusing me, because von Ohain looked genuinely ahead of the curve in his early work.
But after the HeS 3, he doesn't really seem to have a "big thrust" engine that actually makes it into the real world. (And yes, I know the usual explanation: Müller's HeS 30 axial program became the main technical track, and later RLM/Schelp requirements basically forced Heinkel-Hirth onto the 011 path.) Still, given that von Ohain was in charge on paper, it's hard to square that with how underwhelming the HeS 011 looks relative to its contemporaries.

 

[bf109xxl]

Compared with other late-war lines like the Jumo 004H and BMW's P.3306, the HeS 011 just doesn't seem to have the edge not in thrust, not in overall package size, and definitely not in development timeline. That's what keeps confusing me, because von Ohain looked genuinely ahead of the curve in his early work.
But after the HeS 3, he doesn't really seem to have a "big thrust" engine that actually makes it into the real world. (And yes, I know the usual explanation: Müller's HeS 30 axial program became the main technical track, and later RLM/Schelp requirements basically forced Heinkel-Hirth onto the 011 path.) Still, given that von Ohain was in charge on paper, it's hard to square that with how underwhelming the HeS 011 looks relative to its contemporaries.

Heinkel's (von Ohain's) main problem was the dispersion of human resources across many projects, which resulted in the organization of serial production suffering, so the RLM leadership had certain doubts about Heinkel's capabilities as a real engine manufacturer. As far as I understand, von Ohain did not have sufficient experience in developing axial compressors, which resulted in significant delays in the development of both the HeS 30 and HeS 011. Schelp decided that the HeS 011 had a better chance of success, as it was being worked on by the most experienced personnel in the field of axial compressors (Müller's team). In the face of the crisis, it is difficult for me to criticize this choice without knowing all the details. There are not many publications on this topic, and my knowledge is clearly insufficient to assess the personalities involved in these projects.

 

[10020070122]

Heinkel's (von Ohain's) main problem was the dispersion of human resources across many projects, which resulted in the organization of serial production suffering, so the RLM leadership had certain doubts about Heinkel's capabilities as a real engine manufacturer. As far as I understand, von Ohain did not have sufficient experience in developing axial compressors, which resulted in significant delays in the development of both the HeS 30 and HeS 011. Schelp decided that the HeS 011 had a better chance of success, as it was being worked on by the most experienced personnel in the field of axial compressors (Müller's team). In the face of the crisis, it is difficult for me to criticize this choice without knowing all the details. There are not many publications on this topic, and my knowledge is clearly insufficient to assess the personalities involved in these projects.

As far as I know, the HeS 30 was led by Müller, while the HeS 011 was under von Ohain.

 

[10020070122]

From German Jet Engine and Gas Turbine Development 1930-1945 by Antony L. Kay, Airlife Publishing Ltd, 2002:

Could Heinkel really match Jumo when it came to designing jet engines? In that sense, the HeS 30 seems like it was largely done by the Jumo side.