Improve That Design: How Aircraft Could Have Been Made Better (Cold-War Edition)

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Since the runway he was landing on didn't appear to be sliding off to the right? To correct, they'd have to crab slightly to the right to stay with the ship. I assume you'd treat this just like a crosswind?

While this is a rather silly question: When it comes to the deck pitching and stuff, are aviators supposed to simply act as if the deck will line itself back up and resist any efforts to "chase the deck"?
 
Since the runway he was landing on didn't appear to be sliding off to the right? To correct, they'd have to crab slightly to stay with the ship?
There's a sweet spot between straight down the deck and straight down the angle (closer to the angle) where the crab is so minimal as to become a very minor concern compared to glide slope, AOA, alignment, and airspeed control.


When it comes to the deck pitching and stuff, are aviators supposed to simply act as if the deck will line itself back up and resist any efforts to "chase the deck"?
In the old days, and especially with recips, it was all on the LSO, who had to counter deck movement by his own judgement, and waveoff the aircraft if it arrived at the "in close" point out of position to make a safe landing.
Today's carriers have gyro stabilized glide slopes that average out the ship's motion and guide the plane to that "average" point. It's still up to the LSO to judge whether a safe landing can be made from that point. A rising deck and a "dive for the deck" move by the pilot can collapse the landing gear on even the most robust plane. A plane trying to come down on a plunging deck can float past the four wire and touch down so far down the angle that it runs off the end before it's ready to lift back off. Neither option is any fun at all.
 
There's a sweet spot between straight down the deck and straight down the angle (closer to the angle) where the crab is so minimal as to become a very minor concern compared to glide slope, AOA, alignment, and airspeed control.
Meaning a barely perceptible crab with the name of the game being to keep the deck in the middle of your field of view?
In the old days, and especially with recips, it was all on the LSO, who had to counter deck movement by his own judgement, and waveoff the aircraft if it arrived at the "in close" point out of position to make a safe landing.
When did they switch from gyro-stabilized glide-slopes? Was this present in Vietnam when you served in the Navy?

As for the plunging deck, I assume the pilot would be waved off, or the pilot would just abort and power away right?
 
When did they switch from gyro-stabilized glide-slopes? Was this present in Vietnam when you served in the Navy?
It was there, in theory, in the newer Forrestal class ships, but according to flight crews it, and the Approach Power Compensator, were "not quite ready for prime time". Most carrier landing aids had a tendency to be introduced a little before all the bugs were worked out, leading aviators to look at them with a jaundiced eye.
 
So it was there, but not terribly reliable? As a result, the LSO was the person telling the pilot what to do. My guess is you had to have faith in the LSO as if he were some kind of deity (or at least some kind of supernatural entity)?
 
So it was there, but not terribly reliable? As a result, the LSO was the person telling the pilot what to do. My guess is you had to have faith in the LSO as if he were some kind of deity (or at least some kind of supernatural entity)?
The LSO is ALWAYS the person telling the pilot what do, except in the case of a carrier controlled instrument approach. Out there in the heaving windy darkness, Mother Nature is capable of gyrations the engineers never imagined. She delights in stepping outside the boundaries of what these systems can handle.
LSOs strive to justify the faith in them that keeps pilots alive by being as error proof as humanly possible. To an inhuman degree. A good LSO can wave approaches more accurately than he can fly them himself. Standing out there on his platform, the LSO has a unique perspective on the approach, as he is closer to ground zero than anyone else on the ship, except the center deck PLAT camera, which is unmanned.
I was lucky enough in my flight student days to have a couple instructors who could teach someone to fly better than they could fly themselves. I was later occasionally accused of that sort of instructing myself. The best LSOs are like that, and they all strive to be, or they don't stay LSO for long.
 
And he could fly them pretty awesome himself. That's why he's the LSO.
I was lucky enough in my flight student days to have a couple instructors who could teach someone to fly better than they could fly themselves. I was later occasionally accused of that sort of instructing myself.
I know what you mean.
 
And he could fly them pretty awesome himself. That's why he's the LSO.
Not every "hot stick" aviator has the makings of an LSO, just as not every "good stick" pilot has the makings of a good instructor. An intuitive understanding of the physics of flight, an ability to calmly and quickly impart crucial information, a low adrenaline level, an immunity to arrogance, a resilient ego, and supreme self confidence are the necessary ingredients. Ice would, with a little seasoning, make a great LSO. Maverick, NWIH!
Potential LSOs are spotted early in their careers and subjected to a lengthy apprenticeship out there on the platform supporting the active LSOs. They have to hard wire the flight characteristics of every aircraft type the carrier supports into their nervous systems. For this they are absolved of some of the collateral duties every officer has to assume in addition to their regular job. An embarked squadron doesn't have enough officers to have a full time non aviator for each of the ancillary duties, such as Mess Officer, Recreation Officer, Maintenance and Maintenance Supply, as well as the "core" staff functions such as Admin, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics/Supply. In fact there are very few non-flying officers at all. It's all about berthing space and resource consumption while deployed. Non-flying officers are mostly part of ship's company and serve the ship, not the Air Wing. Like the catapult and arresting gear officers, Air Boss and Deck Handler, Intermediate Maintenance, Ship's Supply, Damage Control, Communications, Intelligence, Engineering, and Reactor officers, to name a few.
Cheers,
Wes
 
X XBe02Drvr

I did some looking on the A3J/A-5 Vigilante and, while there's a possibility I might be wrong: It would appear that the design started out as a replacement for the AJ and A3D, with the ability to fly low at high-subsonic speeds while carrying a bomb that it could pop out the back doing a LABS maneuver.

The top speed was later increased to Mach 2 (some sources seem to have implied the ability to achieve 2.5 for a short period followed by a short burst up to Mach 3.0), with apparently a high and low-altitude delivery capability.

As time went on, the concern about being able to deliver up high, and the strategic bombing capability to be handled by SLBM and ICBM's, lead to it either being slated to deliver down-low (as originally intended), or flying reconnaissance (which it did).
 
It would appear that the design started out as a replacement for the AJ and A3D, with the ability to fly low at high-subsonic speeds while carrying a bomb that it could pop out the back doing a LABS maneuver.
During A3J's lengthy gestation from concept to deployed weapon system a lot of things changed. For example, the effectiveness of SAMs and radar guided AAA grew dramatically, making the loft bombing option problematical.

The top speed was later increased to Mach 2 (some sources seem to have implied the ability to achieve 2.5 for a short period followed by a short burst up to Mach 3.0)
One of the things that changed along the way was the significant gain in afterburning thrust of the J79 engine, such that a little aerodynamic tweaking could make supersonic in the weeds a reality. Lots of "high and fast" jets can't handle the dense air at sea level and actually bust mach. The Vige and the Thud could. What do these two birds have in common? Massive air intakes with variable geometry inlet ducting, large volume but highly streamlined area rule fuselage, and very thin wings.
The Vige, like all of its contemporaries, was limited to approximately Mach 2.5 brief dashes by the buildup of heat compromising the integrity of the canopy and windshield. No pilot wants a lapfull of molten plexiglass on the other side of Mach. And most jets other than the V&T pair couldn't haul enough gas to go that fast for very long, anyway.
 
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My understanding of the A-5 was that the design was adapted from the Mach 3 F-108 Rapier, with J-79 engines in place of the Rapier's YJ-93. Later, the Russians used the A-5 as a template for the MIG-25 Foxbat.
 
That looks remarkably similar to the Myasishchev M-4.

Just as an aside, I know why they used bicycle landing gear, but I've never been a particular fan of the system.

This has a slightly different landing gear than the B-52 or XB-51 bicycle system. This takes the B-36 wing mounted landing gear and puts them side by side in the fuselage; a narrow track rather than a bicycle.
 
During A3J's lengthy gestation from concept to deployed weapon system a lot of things changed. For example, the effectiveness of SAMs and radar guided AAA grew dramatically, making the loft bombing option problematical.
While I have no idea what kind of ECM (or even just RHAW/RWR) the A3J was to be equipped with, but it seemed that the SA-2's threat might have been a bit overblown for a number of supersonic airplanes.

The A3J was able to pull g-loads of 4.65 normal / 6.98 ultimate when subsonic; maximum g-load would be less, but it seems plausible it could routinely execute 2g maneuvers without too much trouble. That would make it difficult for the SA-2's radars to get a lock as the earlier radars (even as of 1965) took around 70-75 seconds to go from lock-on to firing.

The B-58 was another comparison, though it had much better range. It seemed to have a decent jammer, and could comfortably pull 2g's in turns at altitude and speed. Whether it could do more, I'm not sure, but there were some claims that it could maneuver with fighters at light-weights (Phil Rowe, a B-58 DSO wrote about how his pilot, after having F-4 pilots mock their ungainly aircraft following an IRAN did a steep climb and a series of aileron roles at their reduced weight -- around 100,000 lb.), but there would have been some effective limits to the aircraft's maneuverability outside the structural limits, such as the fact that the gyros used in the bomb/nav system either tumbled or suffered gimbal lock following a steep climb and abrupt aileron rolls (ironically, the same scenario I described earlier), and the systems didn't seem to have a "push to cage" feature. There did appear to be switches to isolate various parts of the aircraft's navigation components, but nothing regarding push-to-cage, that I'm aware of.

My understanding of the A-5 was that the design was adapted from the Mach 3 F-108 Rapier, with J-79 engines in place of the Rapier's YJ-93. Later, the Russians used the A-5 as a template for the MIG-25 Foxbat.
Not exactly. North American seemed to use a lot of cross-pollination in their designs, however. The A3J, XB-70, and F-108 all used an all-moving tail, the XB-70 and F-108 both used ejection capsules and J-93's.

There was a high-performance design that was either an offshoot or a parallel development of a reconnaissance plane with a top speed in excess of Mach 3 using a J58 engine. The design was rejected and, while they wanted to incorporate it into the A3J, NAA was against it, as it would require a redesign.

The MiG-25 was said to take it's design cues from the A3J, though I'm not totally sure if that's true or not -- there's lots of aviation myths that have been busted over the years.
 
it seemed that the SA-2's threat might have been a bit overblown for a number of supersonic airplanes.
In a loft bomb maneuver an SA2/Ajax class missile isn't your primary threat. Unless it's acquired you before you've commenced your pullup, it probably can't get to "Fire!" in time. Radar directed AAA, OTOH, can, and did account for many of the Vigilante losses in Vietnam.
it seems plausible it could routinely execute 2g maneuvers without too much trouble. That would make it difficult for the SA-2's radars to get a lock
Surviving SAMs in Vietnam was not so much about avoiding lock as it was about evading the missile in flight. The beam the missile rode was quite maneuverable in "free" lock mode, but once the missile was in flight, was constrained to the missile's maneuver limits. Early SA2s had no inherent homing capability. They were BUFF busters. An appropriately timed high G turn into the missile would place you inside the missile's minimum turn radius, and once your doppler rate in the missile's sensor started to drop, it would detonate, somewhere out behind you. This was not the Vigilante's strong suit (despite the verbiage in Wikipedia), as it's high speed and weight, smallish wing, and high wing loading made for an evasive turning radius best described as "majestic". Defensive ECM, or "deck 'em" was the bacon-saver of choice.
 
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In a loft bomb maneuver an SA2/Ajax class missile isn't your primary threat.
Yes, but it is why you're flying low in the first-place. That said: I wasn't talking about the threat of the SA-2 at low altitude, but high altitude.
Surviving SAMs in Vietnam was not so much about avoiding lock as it was about evading the missile in flight.
Well, obviously -- but if you can inhibit a lock effectively, you might not have to deal with the missile (that was my point).
The beam the missile rode was quite maneuverable in "free" lock mode, but once the missile was in flight, was constrained to the missile's maneuver limits.
As far as I understand, the missile was command guided. It used a beam to aim at the target, but the missile didn't maneuver itself to keep itself within the beam by onboard sensors: The command-guidance system told the missile where to go to keep it with the beam (I'm not sure if the USAF realized the missile was command-guided or beam-riding). Regardless, if they thought the missile was as agile as the beam: It might explain why they thought the missile would be so difficult to defeat.
Early SA2s had no inherent homing capability.
I guess at a later period of time, they gave the missile some onboard capability (I do remember reading about Linebacker II, where they were using EB-66's to use it's own jamming to cover the B-52's jamming strobes, so the SA-2's couldn't be lined up on the strobe). I also remember that they used a transponder at some point (the downlink), which they didn't have earlier.
Defensive ECM, or "deck 'em" was the bacon-saver of choice.
The DECM would be able to inhibit a lock or interfere with the missiles guidance: I'm not sure how effective it was, but that should have given planes like the B-58 and A3J/A-5 a good shot at coming in high and fast past 1962. I wouldn't be surprised if the SA-2's used in the USSR might have had some features the NVN's didn't have, but one serious concern I could see would be the SA-2E which had a nuclear-warhead provision.

I'm not sure if we knew that they had it, but we had already developed SAM's with (MIM-14) with nuclear-tipped warheads, and might very well have suspected they'd develop them. That said, I'm not sure how many they had fielded.
 
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Well, obviously -- but if you can inhibit a lock effectively, you might not have to deal with the missile itself.
For an RA5C straight and level on a photo run at medium altitude (Death Alley) inhibiting lock with multiple sites acquiring you at once, wasn't in the cards with pilot devoted to maintaining track and RAN occupied with his sensors, as that required spending a lot of attention on the DECM equipment. I'm told that the procedure of choice was to switch on the guidance signals "jammer" at first indications of a launch, which could automatically scan the various guidance signal frequencies and then send out supposedly legitimate, but confusing guidance signals to the missile. It also supposedly sent out every self-destruct signal that SIGINT had ever recorded from east bloc equipment, just in case, as well as attempting to disrupt the beam.
The DECM would be able to inhibit a lock or interfere with the missiles guidance: I'm not sure how effective it was, but that should have given planes like the B-58 and A3J/A-5 a good shot at coming in high and fast past 1962. I
The Vietnam era PECM and DECM we've been discussing didn't exist in their later developed form back in 1962 when the B58 and A5 were removed from the high altitude arena. SAMs were a prohibitive threat.
 
If you couldn't inhibit a lock, then preventing the missile from blowing you up seems to make sense.
It also supposedly sent out every self-destruct signal that SIGINT had ever recorded from east bloc equipment, just in case, as well as attempting to disrupt the beam.
That's a pretty smart move, actually!
 

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