Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Not saying it can' be true, just saying it's amazing that such a lightly armed aircraft with very modest performance can do so well, he F4U had such a performance advantage it should have been able to cruise in at near the Ki-43's top speed and engage and disengaged at it's choosing, likewise the Oscar could neither catch nor run away from the Corsair, it makes you wonder what tactics or situation the Corsairs were in that allowed the Oscars to get an advantage.

To be clear, the Corsair stat was against A6M, probably A6M5 which is a bit faster than the Oscar II (and better armed)

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

To be clear, the Corsair stat was against A6M, probably A6M5 which is a bit faster than the Oscar II (and better armed)

EDIT: Sorry I posted before I saw this had been addressed

 

[mack8]

Initially it was the A6M2/3 models facing the F4U-1 for most of 1943, the A6M5 as i understand appeared in combat units in fall (can't recall now which month exactly, probably must be in the book).

PS: aparrently it was late September.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I've said this before, but want to re-emphasize, the design differences between Japanese and European, Russian and American aircraft are in part down to different industrial capacity and philosophy, but I think probably in larger part down to the Theaters, and the environments they were operating in. We are often tempted to use too simplistic of a yard stick to measure all planes by, and we like using the ones that make 'our' planes (the aircraft from the countries where we live) look the best. Americans tend to look at 1944-1945 in both Europe and the Pacific, especially the daylight Strategic Bombing campaign and the big naval battles in the Pacific like Midway. Brits look at the Battle of Britain, the night bombing campaign, and ground war in Europe in 1944-45. People who like the Finns focus mainly on the Winter War and the early part of the war with the Soviets. Some people who really like the German stuff (you know who you are) focus on their uneven victories over the Soviets and various other people in the first two or three years of WW2. And there are also some who fetishize the Samurai spirit of the Japanese and focus on their uneven victories in China and the Pacific especially early in the war.

And that is natural and fine. A lot of us were drawn into WW2 aviation as kids. I still build models. I used to play Il-2.

But I think we have to watch our youthful enthusiasm / nostalgia / nationalism to make sure it doesn't go sour and saturated with contempt for other societies which was so much of the problem during WW2. It's also fun to put the other guy's hat on once in a while and see the conflict from their perspective. To look at and enjoy the brilliance of some of their aircraft designs (or the sheer magnificent ugliness of some of the earlier French planes for example!).

The war was different in the Soviet Union, in China, in the South Pacific, in North Africa and the Middle East, and the aircraft used were adapted differently in each Theater (even when they were sometimes the same aircraft). As people say, fighters follow the bombers so if the bombing is mostly tactical support for a ground war, that is one type, if it's mostly naval combat and attacking islands and ports, that is another, and if it's strategic bombing (day or night) that is still another. These all require different capabilities to be emphasized. So that means there is not a one size fit's all criteria for what is the best plane. This varies in space and also over time. What was good in the Soviet union in 1941, say a Stuka, probably wouldn't work in the Pacific in 1944.

For me the fighting in the middle or tipping point parts of the war, say middle 1942 through middle 1943, are the most interesting, because that is when the outcome was most in doubt, but all other periods and every Theater have their own aspects which make them interesting and sometimes terrifying. Convoy fights in the frozen far north around Norway to me are just as interesting as muddy tropical battles in New Guinea or the dogfights above tank battles in the deserts of Egypt.

 

[SaparotRob]

You had me at "sheer magnificent ugliness.."

 

[Shortround6]

We can also go by the numbers at times.
The countries were not equal in industrial capacity or human capacity. There was actually a huge disparity between the US (#1) and Italy (#6, not counting France) in steel production alone by a factor of about 40 to 1. The US had a huge advantage in the number of engineers and draftsmen. I am not saying they were smarter, just that the US had more of them to speed designs (of practically anything) along.

The concept of a global war was also not on anybody's mind in the 1930s. Just about all aircraft were designed with local conditions in mind.
The British did keep in mind the Empire but at times they were shortsighted. Empire/colonial duties were often different (or less intense) than European duties.
The Soviets had more experience with extreme weather than just about anybody else.
The Japanese, with their minds on expansion into China, Manchuria and south east Asia probably were the most interested in range of the major powers.

Things in 1930s were often limited by what was possible, not what could be thought of. And with aviation what was possible varied by the year if not every few months.

Once the Western war started, Sept 1939 as apposed to the war in Asia, it was found that a lot of the 1920s-1930s theories were not valid. It took time to rethink, retool and come up with new theories. And at times the nations that joined late (Dec 1941) didn't want to pay attention to other nations that had been fighting for over two years.

The concept that a small group of elite warriors (sailors, soldiers, airmen) could win a large scale war against large numbers was attractive for a number of reasons, Some pride or belief in national/racial superiority and sometimes because it meant they could go cheap on the weapons or numbers.

With aircraft there was a constant and not at times, steady progression, there were fit's and starts but the trend could be seen. If you want to play on the world stage you have to keep up.
The Japanese were not keeping up. Part do to industrial base. Part due to misreading the time available. They were also gambling on a short war (cheap) and misread the situation (the Americans would not fight a long war)

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

We can also go by the numbers at times.
The countries were not equal in industrial capacity or human capacity. There was actually a huge disparity between the US (#1) and Italy (#6, not counting France) in steel production alone by a factor of about 40 to 1. The US had a huge advantage in the number of engineers and draftsmen. I am not saying they were smarter, just that the US had more of them to speed designs (of practically anything) along.

The concept of a global war was also not on anybody's mind in the 1930s. Just about all aircraft were designed with local conditions in mind.
The British did keep in mind the Empire but at times they were shortsighted. Empire/colonial duties were often different (or less intense) than European duties.
The Soviets had more experience with extreme weather than just about anybody else.
The Japanese, with their minds on expansion into China, Manchuria and south east Asia probably were the most interested in range of the major powers.

Things in 1930s were often limited by what was possible, not what could be thought of. And with aviation what was possible varied by the year if not every few months.

Once the Western war started, Sept 1939 as apposed to the war in Asia, it was found that a lot of the 1920s-1930s theories were not valid. It took time to rethink, retool and come up with new theories. And at times the nations that joined late (Dec 1941) didn't want to pay attention to other nations that had been fighting for over two years.

The concept that a small group of elite warriors (sailors, soldiers, airmen) could win a large scale war against large numbers was attractive for a number of reasons, Some pride or belief in national/racial superiority and sometimes because it meant they could go cheap on the weapons or numbers.

With aircraft there was a constant and not at times, steady progression, there were fit's and starts but the trend cold be seen. If you want to play on the world stage you have to keep up.
The Japanese were not keeping up. Part do to industrial base. Part due to misreading the time available. They were also gambling on a short war (cheap) and misread the situation (the Americans would not fight a long war)

All good points, and well said. Clearly the Japanese (and I think the Germans too) were betting on a relatively short war. For both of them for sure one of the most critical resources they were missing was the "black gold" of the 20th Century - oil, and neither of them were able to secure a sufficient supply. Major problem for Italy too, and it would have been for the Soviets probably if the US and UK weren't helping them with it. The Japanese also clearly didn't have the industrial capacity of the US, or even probably the UK or Germany. But they kept up fairly well in spite of it. At least for a while.

And I would argue that the Japanese were still in contention in terms of aircraft through the end of 1943. Maybe into early 1944. Which is pretty late, and probably past the point where they had already really lost the naval war. Maybe it wasn't so obvious then. It really seems that the Hellcat made the big difference in the Pacific. The Navy, rather Borg-like, struggled on mainly with their overloaded and underpowered F4F-4s for the second half of 1942 and all through 1943, and I don't think that was such a great match-up with their Japanese opposition, but then they got a big reward in the much, much more capable F6F, and in smaller numbers, the faster and faster F4U.

I also don't personally buy the idea that the German or British aircraft in this same period were necessarily superior to the Japanese types. I admit this is probably harder to prove. But we get some idea of the likely matchups just from the fact that many of the same aircraft did fight in both regions - Spitfires and P-38s fought from England. Hurricanes and P-40s and P-38s and Spitfires, and even Wildcats / Martlets and P-39s, A-36s and other planes fought in the Med as well as in the Pacific. A-20 bombers, B-25s, B-24s, Beauforts, Beaufighters and Wellingtons also fought in both the Med and Pacific. There was not a huge disparity in outcomes, except maybe with the P-38 doing a lot better in the Pacific I'll grant that one.


We tend to forget that the Germans were in a sharp decline in 1944 too. Sure they had Jets and Ta-152s, but they didn't have so many trained pilots to fly these any more, and their industry was having trouble maintaining the quality they once had. Was a BF 109 in 1945 as well made as one from 1942?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

They also wasted a lot of resources on everything from Death Camps to 'wonder weapons' like V-1 and V-2 which had questionable merit in terms of affecting the outcome of the war. I guess von Braun did help us get to the moon though...

 

[BarnOwlLover]

I guess in some ways we can say that the IJA and IJN were more pragmatic. It can be argued that Unit 731 was a waste as far as yielding anything useful (and was a war crime), though the IJA did use chemical weapons quite a few times in China when the Second Sino-Japanese War was yet to become a full fledged World War II theater. The IJA and IJN did also try their own long range heavy bomber program to bomb at least parts of the US, but they aborted it fairly quickly (at least compared to Germany) when it became clear that they lacked the technology and industry capabilities to make such an aircraft.

Granted, Japan also had the problems of a small country and a small economy. The IJN took priority for steel and such, primarily for warship production. That left the IJA with obsolete or obsolescent AFVs for most of World War II (most of the good ones that got built were held in Japan and were produced in 1944/45). And it can be said that the Yamato class battleships were a waste, though when they were commissioned it wasn't clear that the aircraft carrier would overtake the main battleship as the lead ship in naval formations.

The problem wasn't smarts or know-how, but technology and infrastructure. Soviets kinda had the same problem, and even Germany with producing the 2000+hp engines that heavy bombers and high performance fighters needed.

 

[Vincenzo]

in the ACIG databast i just find 5 MiG-15 + 1 damaged for the F9F for 3 lost to MiG-15

ever in the ACIG 57 MiG-17 and 13 MiG-19/J6 for the Phantom in Vietnam*
and 13 Phantom for the MiG-17/J5, only 3 for the MiG-19/J6


* i did the sum so it's possible the miss one or more entry, easier for the Phantom victories, were much more to check

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the Ki-43.
The Ki-27 was a huge advance on technology over the older biplanes. Fixed landing gear not withstanding.
But the official requirements for what lead to Ki-43 showed no such change.
Range and climb to 5000 meters showed very little change, speed at 4,000meters was only 7% better and armament was the same.
The insistence on nearly identical powers of maneuver was a big part of the problem in the delay of bring the Ki-43 to service.
The requirement was issued in early 1938.
The first prototype flew Jan 1939 and 2 additional aircraft were completed in Feb and March. Test results were bad, the planes were overweight, high drag and did not handle well.
Nakajima managed to convince the Army to fund 10 additional airframes for development. Weight was cut, aerodynamics improved and a bunch of other changes.
the 1st of these was completed in Nov 1939 and different airframes were used for different purposes. The 7th was the first plane fitted with the 12.7mm machine guns, the 8th was first plane to get the 'butterfly' flaps. the 10th was the first to get everything. This plane was completed in Sept of 1940, (it also used a two blade, two pitch prop) It took the JAAF until Jan 1941 to finally decide to order in quantity.
There were about 40 in service on Dec 7th 1941. It performed well against the odds, sods and cast-offs in South East Asia.

The Japanese had also issued a requirement in 1939 during/after the Nomonhan incident that lead to the Ki-44, Ki-60 and Ki-61.

The Ki-43 II got the two speed engine, a stronger wing to stop structural failures and slightly clipped wings, some armor and somewhat protected tanks so the actual combat capabilities were notch above the Ki-43 I. But it didn't show up until early 1943. It was given to existing units with experienced pilots.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One thing worth noting about the Ki-43 (and the Ki-27 as well) is that they had pretty good visbility. That may have been a more important factor than is initially obvious.

 

[Shortround6]

The Japanese also clearly didn't have the industrial capacity of the US, or even probably the UK or Germany. But they kept up fairly well in spite of it. At least for a while.

The Japanese as far as steel goes had about 60% of the steel production of GB and about 1/3 or less that of Germany. However there was the British commonwealth, Canada out produced Italy most years. Japan effectively stopped production of large (cruisers or larger) warships except what was already laid down even the the sister of the Shinano was ordered broken up in place in March of 1942 when 30% complete.

It really seems that the Hellcat made the big difference in the Pacific. The Navy, rather Borg-like, struggled on mainly with their overloaded and underpowered F4F-4s for the second half of 1942 and all through 1943, and I don't think that was such a great match-up with their Japanese opposition, but then they got a big reward in the much, much more capable F6F, and in smaller numbers, the faster and faster F4U.

1943 was a sort of hole as far as the US Navy and carrier warfare goes. There were no carrier vs carrier battles in 1943. There were a bunch of carrier vs Islands/bases battles.
The introduction of the F6F was a bit deceptive. They hade built just under 600 by the end of June 1943 and were cranking them out at ever increasing number (250 in August, 400 in Nov) The units that went into action in the 2nd half of 1943 were trained on them stateside. There was was room, if needed, for a more rapid deployment.
By Jan 1st 1944 they had built 2446 F4Us and 2557 F6Fs. both planes would more than double production in 1944.

I also don't personally buy the idea that the German or British aircraft in this same period were necessarily superior to the Japanese types. I admit this is probably harder to prove. But we get some idea of the likely matchups just from the fact that many of the same aircraft did fight in both regions - Spitfires and P-38s fought from England. Hurricanes and P-40s and P-38s and Spitfires, and even Wildcats / Martlets and P-39s, A-36s and other planes fought in the Med as well as in the Pacific. A-20 bombers, B-25s, B-24s, Beauforts, Beaufighters and Wellingtons also fought in both the Med and Pacific.

The thing is that sometimes the planes (or versions) used in Asia were not the same as the ones used in Europe, or they were introduced later in time.
The Japanese had a major change in late 1942/43 when they introduced two speed superchargers to a lot of aircraft which kept them in game longer.
also number have to be taken into account. The A-36 for instance only served with 3 fighter groups, two in Italy and one in Burma and the one in Burma (the 311th) and in the 311th they only equipped one squadron. One squadron is hard to draw decent numbers from. Also remember that Asian Front was getting dribs and drabs of aircraft until end of 1943 or early 1944. often small units and and aircraft that were considered 2nd best at times, again over 3 1/2 years things changed.
I will try to show as the this thread goes on that the Japanese were behind the west in technical development with most of their aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

One thing worth noting about the Ki-43 (and the Ki-27 as well) is that they had pretty good visbility. That may have been a more important factor than is initially obvious.

well, if the goal was in close, high G maneuvering, having good visibility/situational awareness was probably very important.

The low drag (or not so low) hoods and canopies of the 109, Spitfire, P-36, D. 520 etc probably were a hindrance.

 

[Juha3]

I used Bloody Shambles V3 to look at Hurricane vs Ki43 combats some years back, and if all one does is make a tally of the kill/loss ratio between them, then it doesn't look that good for the Hurricane. When you look at the number of sorties flown vs the number of kills, you realize that the number of Hurricanes lost to KI-43s was so small (a very low sortie loss rate) and over such a long time frame that it wasn't really an issue for the Hurricanes, which were typically flying low altitude strike missions, and were constantly at a disadvantage in terms of situational awareness and altitude. I expect that the same was true for the B-24s.

Now I don't quite follow you. The crew of a heavy bomber would seem to have pretty good situational awareness due to several gunners looking in every direction, not to mention flying in formation, plus there were navigators and radio operators doing navigation. And in interceptions, the bombers almost always determined the combat height, and the US heavy bombers with their turbocharged engines had a higher optimum height than the Ki-43s.

I agree that B-24 losses were usually light and both sides had meager resources.
BTW just noticed than at least 27 Nov 1943 both 7th and 308th BGs participated an escorted attack on Rangoon. Both sent 28 bombers and lost 1 and 2 B-24s respectively.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

well, if the goal was in close, high G maneuvering, having good visibility/situational awareness was probably very important.

The low drag (or not so low) hoods and canopies of the 109, Spitfire, P-36, D. 520 etc probably were a hindrance.

I think in any kind of air combat, good visibility / situational awareness is very important. The Japanese seem to have gotten past the turtledeck cockpit design a bit sooner than most fighter designs in other countries.

 

[Shortround6]

The Ki-44 makes an interesting counter point to the Ki-43.
It started later but caught up somewhat. First prototype flew Aug 1940 just before the last couple of Ki-43 pre production aircraft. there were 3 prototypes and later 7 pre production aircraft. This habit of ordering a small series of planes for troop trials may have been counter productive. Granted this was pretty common for the US Army in the late 30s (they ordered a bunch of things as "Y" series planes) but perhaps a few more prototypes and then decide to either build something or not. the small series production often delayed actual production by months.
At any rate the Ki-44 development went smoother than the Ki-43 although it took a while to get the plane up to the design speed with changes in cowl flaps, intake ducts and so on. Plane was also over weight (rather common in a bunch of countries). They rebuilt the 2nd and 3rd prototypes to the same standard as the 7 pre production machines and issued them to a trial unit that used in Dec 1941 in the Burma area. Please note that that this group of trials aircraft made up about 18% of the retractable landing gear single seat fighters of the JAAF in the theater. These aircraft had a pair of 7.7mm guns in the cowl, a 12.7mm gun in each wing and without synchronization offered a much firepower than the Ki-43. They could also do over 360mph and could dive faster than most (all?) of their adversaries. They also carried about 500 liters of fuel and may very well have been short ranged compared to the Ki-43 but probably not far off the range of European fighters. They started another small batch of 40 aircraft 9Most or all with four 12.7mm guns) and after the Doolittle raid the earlier aircraft were called home incase the US repeated the raid. Over the summer of 1942 Nakajima worked on installing a two speed supercharger and this was the Japanese army's best shot at equaling the western fighters, with 1520hp at sea level, 1440hp at 7055ft and 1320hp at 17,225ft in late 1942 and using standard Japanese fuel.
Regular production of the Ki-44 II (with pilot armor and rudimentary fuel tank protection) started in Nov 1942, same month as the Ki-43 II. Ki-44s were reserved mostly for home defense or for the protection of the Sumatran oil refineries.
Granted the Ki-44s needed longer runways. The Ki-44 was about as good as it got for Japanese single seat fighters until the Ki-84 showed up in the late summer of 1944.

Apparently there was no effort to make a big wing Ki-44 or try to stuff a bigger engine in the Ki-43 and lets be honest, 980hp at 6000meters for the engine in the Ki-43 II at the end of 1942 is not that great, about as good as the engine in the F4F but about 200hp less than the engine in the P-40F let alone some of the other western fighters.

 

[RCAFson]

Now I don't quite follow you. The crew of a heavy bomber would seem to have pretty good situational awareness due to several gunners looking in every direction, not to mention flying in formation, plus there were navigators and radio operators doing navigation. And in interceptions, the bombers almost always determined the combat height, and the US heavy bombers with their turbocharged engines had a higher optimum height than the Ki-43s.

I agree that B-24 losses were usually light and both sides had meager resources.
BTW just noticed than at least 27 Nov 1943 both 7th and 308th BGs participated an escorted attack on Rangoon. Both sent 28 bombers and lost 1 and 2 B-24s respectively.

Yes, bombers would be better than fighters but if there's broken cloud or by going up sun the fighters can often gain an element of surprise especially on a small formation. Of course on the bomb run the bomber can't maneuver:

On 26 November all flights were called off because of weather. With two days gone and nothing accomplished, the planned schedule was thrown aside, and on the 27th, AAF Liberators accompanied by Lightnings, and Mitchells escorted by Mustangs, struck at Insein. Despite determined interception by a large number of enemy fighters just prior to the bomb run, results of the attack were excellent. In a subsequent report General Davidson, in command of the Tenth Air Force since August, estimated that at least 70 per cent of the buildings and installations of the locomotive works were destroyed.51 In the aerial fight which developed from the interception, Japanese pilots pressed their attacks home time after time. After the mission returned, it was found that four P-51's, two P-38's, and three B-24's had been lost. One of the Mustangs shot down was piloted by Colonel Melton, commander of the 311th Group, who was seen to bail out and land in territory where natives were generally friendly. One of the B-24's landed in water off the coast and nine of the crew were rescued. Thirteen enemy fighters were claimed destroyed, seven probably destroyed, and four others damaged.52

An attack on Botataung docks was set for the following day, the 28th. Since the provision of escort for B-24's at approximately 18,000 feet and mediums operating at about 9,000 feet was too great an undertaking for the few fighters left, the mediums on that day attacked Sagaing instead of flying with the heavies to Rangoon. Over the targets the Liberators encountered far less resistance than on the preceding day and no American aircraft was lost. Four interceptors were shot down and five more claimed as probables. Heavy damage was done to the dock area and results of the mission were considered very good.53
The 29th and 30th of November were set aside for maintenance, but on 1 December the B-24's revisited Insein while the B-25's bombed Myitnge bridge. All available fighters, now only ten P-51's and fifteen P-38's, were assigned as escorts to Insein. Delayed in taking off from Kurmitola by heavy fog and unable because of poor communications to warn the bombers, the P-51's failed to finish refueling at Ramu in time to make the rendezvous. The mission went out with only the fifteen P-38's to protect it.54
Japanese fighter strength in the Rangoon area apparently had been at a low ebb on 28 November, but in the two intervening days they must have brought in heavy reinforcements from neighboring regions. When the bombers made their run from north to south in order to avoid heavy antiaircraft fire, the sixty-odd enemy fighters already aloft were able to make head-on attacks out of the sun. The first assault was as devastating as it was surprising. Enemy aircraft were in firing distance before they were sighted, concentrating on the formation leaders. The 7th Group, forming the first wave, bore the brunt of the attack. On the first pass the group leader, his left wingman, and a squadron leader were knocked out. Three planes pulled up to close the gaps in the formation and soon afterward one of the three was lost. Three others tried to cover the group leader, who was losing speed and altitude, and thus did not complete the bomb run. The P-38's could give little direct assistance, as they had their hands full with other fighters still above the bomber formation.55
When the planes of the 308th Group arrived and were ready to begin their bomb run, the attacks were repeated by a slightly smaller number of aircraft. Sometimes enemy fighters came in three abreast, all concentrating on a single plane. At other times they approached in a

---

string, each plane making a pass and pulling away to allow the next in line to come in. The lead plane of the 308th was shot down on the first pass, just before the bomb run, and the plane which took its place was badly hit during the run. Attacks persisted after bombs were away, enemy pilots singling out cripples; but the P-51's finally arrived in time to offer some protection on the return, losing one ship in their brief participation.56
Bombing results of the costly mission were largely unobserved because of the continuing fighter attacks during the bomb run, but the pattern was believed good. American losses, however, were appallingly high--six B-24's and one P-51 destroyed and five B-24's seriously damaged.57
The American phase of the operation came to a close on the afternoon of 4 December when AAF bombers ran successful mining missions to Rangoon and Moulmein without encountering resistance or suffering losses. The AAF missions on 25, 27, and 28 November and 1 December resulted in the loss of twelve B-24's, eight P-51's, and two P-38's, while many other craft of various types were temporarily unusable because of damage sustained.58

HyperWar: The Army Air Forces in WWII: Vol. IV [Chapter 14]

Other sources state that KI-45s participated:

Pacific Wrecks - November 27, 1943

Chronology of WWII Pacific War events, missions and losses on this date with links to locations, aircraft and ships. Covers U.S. Army Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Australian, New Zealand and Japanese.

pacificwrecks.com

 

[Shortround6]

As far as B-24s vs Ki-43s (or any other fighter) goes..................
They have different jobs.
The B-24s are supposed to be bombing things and going home to come back and bomb again.

The Ki-43s (or other fighter) are supposed to stop them from bombing to start with and failing that, keep them from coming back.

For the B-24s (or other bomber) shooting down fighters is down on the list. Sort of a bonus. Keeping from getting shot down is 2nd goal after putting bombs on target. Shooting down fighters is 3rd.

 

[Juha3]

Yes, I noticed when rechecking from the Young's booklet last night that also on 1 Dec 43 both 7th and 308th participated the attack on Insein locomotive repair shop in Rangoon. After 14 B-24 aborts 44 bombers attacked, there were some 50 defending fighters from 21st (Ki-45s), 64th and 204th Sentais, both of the latter had Ki-43s. 6 B-24s were shot down but two of them were first damaged by AA and dropped out from formation and then finished off by fighters. The loss of the lead plane of the 308th formation just before the formation had started its bomb run. In the confusion that followed 5 a/c flew past the primary target , three more missed it with their bombs and only 15 dropped on the railway works. The 64th Sentai claimed 7 B-24s shot down, while the 204th 2 and the Ki-45-equipped 21st one. So the loss rate of the B-24s reaching the target area was 13.6 % in spite of the small escort force.

And on 24 Aug 1943 over Hankow China Ki-43s shot down 4 out of 7 attacking B-24s losing one to defensive fire and 2 to 6 escorting P-40s. And on 15 Sept 43 4 out of 5 B-24s attacking Haiphong in French Indo-China were lost to 35 Ki-43s, one Ki-43 was lost.