VALENGO
Senior Airman
Gentlemen, an easy one for you: did this bug really existed or is it just a joke?, any info about performance?.
MesserSpit
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fubar57
General
Daimler Benz(?) installed in a captured Spit
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Yes, it's a real Spitfire Vb (EN830 - radio code NX-X), hit by flak over France on 18 November 1942. The pilot, P/O Scheidhauer was able to set it down in a turnip field without too much damage and was taken prisoner. A sad side-note about Scheidhauer: he was later shot and killed during a mass escape of prisoners.
This Spitfire project was not the first time a Daimler-Benz engine was installed in a Spitfire, it had been done on an older mark of Spitfire using a DB601. That project was a failure, since the earlier Spitfires had a smaller cowling and not enough room for the Daimler-Benz, so it was abandoned.
In this particular case, they were able to fit the DB605 into the Spitfire because the Vb series had a larger engine bay. The tests proved to have some remarkable results, however, by the time they had concluded the tests, the new Spitfire IX had been put into service, rendering the performance of the DB605 Spitfire obsolete.
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VALENGO
Senior Airman
Thank you all for the replies!. I find an irony of destiny here: the german family name of the spit pilot. If I´m not wrong, when german pilots was asked about what they needed to beat the RAF, Galland replied "Spitfires". This one could have been his dream maked true.
MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
There was an article on that modification in Scale Modeler magazine back in the late 60's, including how a modeler took a 1/32 Revell Spitfire Mk 1 and put on the engine section on it from a 1/32 Revell Me-109F. The article said that the airplane was popular with off-duty Luftwaffe pilots, who found it had better performance than a standard 109.
The DB-601/603/605 engine was significantly larger in displacement than the Merlin of the Spitfire. At a bit under 1650 cu in, the Merlin was the smallest displacement front line fighter engine of the whole war. The addition of the two stage two speed supercharger of the Merlin 60 series made the Merlin perform a like a much larger engine, thus saving the Spitfire from becoming obsolete and making the P-51 a war-winner.
When first berated by Goring and then asked what the German pilots needed to beat the RAF in the BoB, Adolph Galland replied, "A squadron of Spitfires." Galland said that he thought the BF-109 a better airplane than the Spitfire, but given Goring's orders for the 109's to fly close escort of the bombers, Spitfires would be better, because of their tighter turning radius. I also suspect it was because those tactics threw away the 109's superior high altitude performance.
The DB-601/603/605 engine was significantly larger in displacement than the Merlin of the Spitfire. At a bit under 1650 cu in, the Merlin was the smallest displacement front line fighter engine of the whole war. The addition of the two stage two speed supercharger of the Merlin 60 series made the Merlin perform a like a much larger engine, thus saving the Spitfire from becoming obsolete and making the P-51 a war-winner.
When first berated by Goring and then asked what the German pilots needed to beat the RAF in the BoB, Adolph Galland replied, "A squadron of Spitfires." Galland said that he thought the BF-109 a better airplane than the Spitfire, but given Goring's orders for the 109's to fly close escort of the bombers, Spitfires would be better, because of their tighter turning radius. I also suspect it was because those tactics threw away the 109's superior high altitude performance.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
By the way, since the airframe was actually a Spitfire, should the project actually be called a "SpitterSchmitt"? 
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- #9
VALENGO
Senior Airman
Feuer spucken...
woodhaven
Airman
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- #11
VALENGO
Senior Airman
Thanks, woodhaven, you are becoming the source!!. 
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- #13
VALENGO
Senior Airman
Well, I agree about bouchon, it is ugly for me. I find interesting the Spit DB, instead.
The source of this quote is Adolph Galland, who had his own reasons for his disloyalty to Goering, who was after all his commanding officer, post war. It was picked up and repeated by some other Luftwaffe veterans after the war, they too may have had their own agendas, distancing themselves from Goering and the Nazi apparatus which ran the one Service which owed its very existence to the Nazis.
There is no evidence that this order came from Goering, it came from the Staff of the 'Luftflotten' engaged in the campaign against Britain.
I should post this in the 'Aviation Myths' thread!
Cheers
Steve
I'll add to this. I would argue that the BoB was an example of the much vaunted German doctrine of 'Auftragstaktik'. In a simplistic form this was the practice of senior commanders and their staff (Goering, Jeschonnek, Schmidt, with the exception of Goering an inexperienced bunch, the latter two were too young to have served in WW1) telling their inferiors what the overall objective was and them allowing them to get on with the operational planning to achieve this.
The problem was that this planning was disbursed onto mainly the two' Luftflotten' involved in the battle.
Luftflotte 2 was commanded by Albert Kesselring, an artillery officer who had held a staff appointment in WW1. His Chief of Staff, Wilhelm Spiedel, had commanded a company of storm troopers in WW1.
Luftflotte 3 was commanded by Hugo Sperrle, the only senior Luftwaffe commander to have anything like the equivalent experience in air operations to his RAF opponents. His Chief of Staff, Gunther Korten, had been an infantry officer in WW1 and his chief of operations, Karl Koller, had been teaching at the Munich police academy in the five years before the BoB.
Given these factors it is hardly surprising that there was no overall strategic vision and there was no coordination of tactics within the Luftflotten, let alone between them. These were mistakes that could not be made when fighting a centrally directed air force, the Battle itself being run principally by two of the architects of the air defence system they now managed.
Incidentally, throughout the period we British call the BoB, roughly 50% of Bf 109 sorties were 'Freiejagd' and not escorts at all.
There were problems with the escort role.The Luftwaffe bombers did not fly like the Americans in defensive boxes that occupied nearly as much air space vertically as horizontally , they flew in a broad front formation, much more difficult for the fighters to cover.
Then there is the intention. By the time of 'Big Week' it was made clear to the fighters of the 8th Air Force that their mission had change, they were no longer to prioritise the safe return of the bombers, they were to shoot down Luftwaffe fighters, lots of them, as many as possible. The Luftwaffe in 1940 never adopted any such policy, in fact it never adopted any coherent policy at all.
Cheers
Steve
The problem was that this planning was disbursed onto mainly the two' Luftflotten' involved in the battle.
Luftflotte 2 was commanded by Albert Kesselring, an artillery officer who had held a staff appointment in WW1. His Chief of Staff, Wilhelm Spiedel, had commanded a company of storm troopers in WW1.
Luftflotte 3 was commanded by Hugo Sperrle, the only senior Luftwaffe commander to have anything like the equivalent experience in air operations to his RAF opponents. His Chief of Staff, Gunther Korten, had been an infantry officer in WW1 and his chief of operations, Karl Koller, had been teaching at the Munich police academy in the five years before the BoB.
Given these factors it is hardly surprising that there was no overall strategic vision and there was no coordination of tactics within the Luftflotten, let alone between them. These were mistakes that could not be made when fighting a centrally directed air force, the Battle itself being run principally by two of the architects of the air defence system they now managed.
Incidentally, throughout the period we British call the BoB, roughly 50% of Bf 109 sorties were 'Freiejagd' and not escorts at all.
There were problems with the escort role.The Luftwaffe bombers did not fly like the Americans in defensive boxes that occupied nearly as much air space vertically as horizontally , they flew in a broad front formation, much more difficult for the fighters to cover.
Then there is the intention. By the time of 'Big Week' it was made clear to the fighters of the 8th Air Force that their mission had change, they were no longer to prioritise the safe return of the bombers, they were to shoot down Luftwaffe fighters, lots of them, as many as possible. The Luftwaffe in 1940 never adopted any such policy, in fact it never adopted any coherent policy at all.
Cheers
Steve
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- #16
VALENGO
Senior Airman
Thanks, Steve, very clear and very deep. I think that germans was so "invincible" because of the combined action of three forces: airplanes, troop and tanks in a sinergic way. Over England there was only one of those three. Let´s add to this the excellent analysis you made of the staff and the result become quite obvious.