Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

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Junyo was only three knots slower than Kaga. Being brand new and Kaga having been on continuous operations since Pearl, they both probably had about the same effective speed.
Kaga hit a reef at Palau on 9 Feb 1942 as a consequence of which her speed was reduced to 18 knots. So after operations against Darwin & Java she was sent home for docking and repairs. She arrived at a Sasebo on 22 March and repairs and maintenance took until 4 May to complete.
 
The Japanese Navy wanted to draw the USN into a "grand showdown", which the USN avoided.

Instead, the US Navy ground down the IJN piecemeal, which worked against the IJN's doctrine.

It wasn't about under estimating, it was instead, two entirely different operational philosophies.


The last operational A5Ms were aboard the IJN Shoho at Coral Sea.
The Japanese never accepted that Americans would willingly fight them. And you are wrong, Hosho was carrying Claudes at Midway and Junyo and the other carrier on the Dutch Harbor raid were carrying a mix of Zeros and Claudes.
 
Actually there is a statement by the admiral in charge of the battleships in port that he, on his own initiative, had two 5 in guns on each battleship at the ready to go with crews nearby and ammunition easily accessible. I like to back up my statements with actual quotes but i'm driving myself crazy tying to relocate it.
Found it. Taken from
XXXII. CONDITIONS AT PEARL HARBOR PRIOR TO ATTACK
Very worthwhile reading

"However, each battleship had two 5" anti‑aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned in addition to the anti‑aircraft control (page 419). This condition was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned guns were required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including antiaircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti‑aircraft control (director room) was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to remain aboard were sufficient to man all anti‑aircraft guns.

Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific conditions of readiness set forth in sub‑heading G of 2CL‑41 were maintained by the Fleet while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and December. He said that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in effect at the time of the attack because be gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had increased the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had established 24‑hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and two of the 5" anti‑aircraft guns on each ship were to be told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the anti‑aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking, eight 5 anti‑aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or four quads of 1" 1. (p. 397)
Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship was in port, they were not under any condition of readiness, i.e., under conditions one, two or three. They had two machine guns manned at all times and ammunition ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by. They were operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October and a security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to prevent sabotage by requiring a security patrol. There were no changes ordered prior to December 7 that he could remember. (p 413‑4)"
 
Gotta love this place, in a thread about KdB at Midway being expanded we're now discussing Pearl Harbor scenarios. :lol:

But to return to the OT, as I understand it, IJN planning was based on tides and such, but had they waited even a few more days they would have had Saratoga to contend with as well as the three Yorktowns. Adding her 80 odd aircraft to the mix would be interesting, not going to speculate what might have happened because anything could have happened.

But as a quick thought, perhaps the extra air group of CV-3 puts down Hiryu in the 10:20 attack and Yorktown lives to fight another day. Damn, I speculated when I said I wouldn't, well...
 
And you are wrong, Hosho was carrying Claudes at Midway and Junyo and the other carrier on the Dutch Harbor raid were carrying a mix of Zeros and Claudes.
Not true. The carriers that supported the Aleutian operation were Junyo & Ryujo and their air groups are set out below, with not a Claude in sight:-

The fighter complement on Junyo at Midway consisted of 18 Zeros. 6 from her own air group and 12 from the 6th Kokutai. The remainder of her air group comprised 15 Type 99 D3A Val dive bombers

Ryujo had started WW2 with the A5M Claude but her fighter squadron swapped them out for the A6M2 Zero when she returned to Japan on 23 April 1942. She had 12 aboard at Midway plus 18 Type 97 B5N torpedo bombers (a mix of B5N1 & B5N2).

It was Zuiho that had an air group containing the Type 96 A5M Claude. 6 A5M4 Claude, 6 A6M2 Zero and 12 Type 97 B5N2 Kate TB. She was part of the screen for the Midway Invasion Force.

Hosho didn't carry any fighters during the Midway operation. Her aircraft complement was reduced to 8 (other sources say 6) Type 96 Yokosuka B4Y1 biplane torpedo bombers for AS work. Hosho was part of the escort to the Japanese Main Body.

The information is in "Shattered Sword" and was drawn from the Japanese Air Group records.
 
Granted, they were formidable opponents and well flown, but come on, the P-40's aren't being flown by trainee's for God's sake.

Commander Taylor said that about 50 percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well trained: the other percent were green. (p. 353)
 
The Japanese never accepted that Americans would willingly fight them. And you are wrong, Hosho was carrying Claudes at Midway and Junyo and the other carrier on the Dutch Harbor raid were carrying a mix of Zeros and Claudes.

I thought Hosho only had torpedo bombers aboard for Midway?
 
Yes, the Hosho was attached to the First Fleet. There were two smaller carriers (seaplane tenders) also attached to the First Fleet: IJN Chiyoda (which was transporting submarines) and IJN Nisshin (which was also carrying submarines) along with IJN Zuiho, which was part of the invasion force (Second Fleet) which had a compliment of A6Ms and B5N2s.
 
In regards to the Hosho, by the time that war broke out, she had become mostly a training and transport carrier, much like the USN's USS Langley (CV-1).
Langley CV-1 was converted to a seaplane carrier in 1936/37 and redesignated AV-3. That was to release the carrier tonnage to build Wasp CV-7 while remaining within the terms of the 1922 Washington Treaty. As part of that she lost the forward third of her flight deck and was therefore unable to operate anything else after that point. Photo is of her in 1942 just before her loss.
 
Langley CV-1 was converted to a seaplane carrier in 1936/37 and redesignated AV-3. That was to release the carrier tonnage to build Wasp CV-7 while remaining within the terms of the 1922 Washington Treaty. As part of that she lost the forward third of her flight deck and was therefore unable to operate anything else after that point. Photo is of her in 1942 just before her loss.
The old girl is looking pretty rough in that photo, lot's of hard miles it looks like.
 
Getting a steamship underway isn't simply a matter of lighting the boiler. Steam turbines a required a lot of TLC to get them running without damaging them. They do not react well to the introduction of water. Once you have reached a high enough steam temperature you can start warming up the steam lines. They must be hot enough to ensure steam will not condense into water. Once that is achieved you can introduce steam into the turbine itself to start warming it up while using the turning gear to rotate it to avoid bowing the shaft. If you rush the blades will expand faster than the casing with disastrous results. When I worked in power plants it took hours to start up. These were much bigger machines with much higher temperatures and lower internal tolerances so I assume the ship would be quicker but I can't see less than 1/2 hour. Warships went from steam plants to gas turbines in large part because of the much quicker reaction time. Certainly it wasn't fuel economy.
I stumbled upon a Royal Navy instructional film describing the very process.

View: https://youtu.be/uwMRCU0olS0?si=lzMPR0iM5lQLppC2
 
So if Nevada ditched the narrator, she could've raised steam in time.
The Nevada already had enough steam built up because she was due to switch boilers for power, so as one was building up, the other was cooling down, which was just enough to get under way.
One reason why there was a delay in her getting underway, was the Captain wasn't aboard. The ship's OD took charge and ordered her underway as she was taking hits, which most likely saved her from worse damage.
 
The Nevada already had enough steam built up because she was due to switch boilers for power, so as one was building up, the other was cooling down, which was just enough to get under way.
One reason why there was a delay in her getting underway, was the Captain wasn't aboard. The ship's OD took charge and ordered her underway as she was taking hits, which most likely saved her from worse damage.
This is the official Damage Report for her at PH.

I very much doubt she had enough steam up initially. She received an order from the Arizona to sail before the latter blew up at 0806. Nevada didn't begin to move until 0832 - 0840. She was the only Battleship that could have sailed that morning regardless of their steam position. Those that weren't bombed/torpedoed and disabled were wedged between the piers and ships moored outboard. And that order to leave was cancelled as she moved down harbour.

There is a diagram in the report showing her movements that day.

The only hit she took before casting off was a single torpedo port side abreast her forward turrets during the first wave torpedo attack around 0810 that morning. She was targeted by the Japanese dive bombers AFTER she began moving down Battleship row towards the harbour entrance. She took 5 bomb hits within the space of a few minutes around 0900 from the dive bombers in the second wave.


As to exactly who was in command as she move see this USNI article

Note how the Captain's report issued on 15 Dec differs from the Damage Report about the timing of one or two of the bomb hits as well as the above article as to which officer was conning the ship. Note it was signed by Scanland, who had left the ship on the 8th Dec.

The Damage Report is dated 18 Sept 1942 long after things had quietened down enough for everything to be pieced together.
 

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