Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[R Leonard]

For what it might be worth re: the Zuikaku at Midway problem

Buried in Elliott Carlson's Joe Rochefort's War, along about page 359 of my Kindle copy, the following pops out in reference to Zuikaku and Midway. He is referring to the time before the battle, but after the Japanese changed the JN-25(b) code near the end of May:

"Unable to read current traffic, Rochefort's cryppies started re-evaluating old JN-25(b) messages fo information that might have been overlooked. They hit paydirt on 31 May. An IJN dispatch noted that fighter pilots from the carrier Zuikaku had been transferred to a Northern Force unit that departed Ominato 26 May. The discovery ruled out any possibility that the Zuikaku – now with few planes and no fliers – would see action in the Midway campaign. 37

"37 COM 14 to COMB 310545 CINCPAC microfilm file NARA II."

Haven't been able to locate this decrypt myself, but Carlson is pretty thorough. For a while leading up to the battle, there was some concern in USN circles that Zuikaku might indeed be involved - provided the IJN followed the USN practice of putting disparate squadrons on a carrier and calling it an air group - but it looks like here that the IJN had something else in mind that pushing a cobbled air group out on Zuikaku.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Even without the fighters being alerted, at Pearl Harbor the Japanese lost 8% of their force, not counting damaged -- most to AA.

Had the fighters gotten earlier alert, that number would likely be larger, though how much so is open to debate. It would not have stopped the attack, but at least an early alert may have reduced on-the-ground losses? Maybe the torpedo attacks aren't as successful?

In addition to getting most of the approx. 150 American fighter aircraft and many bombers airborne, a confirmed 20-30 min warning would give all the warships time to call action stations, close hatches and ready AA weapons. Perhaps a destroyer or two could be rushed into position alongside the outer most battleships. With a half hours warning Pearl Harbour is a different affair.

 

[SaparotRob]

I don't know how to quantify it but 20-30 minutes warning, even after minutes lost to sheer disbelief, has got to get some ammo lockers opened up, hatches closed and engines warming up. Nevada had a couple of boilers lit, so sayeth legend. She did get under way after the first strike. Would she have time to exit Pearl before the first wave or just wind up clogging the channel?
The damage may have been less. Japanese losses would've been higher but the net result would've been the same. Hopefully with a little more organization, Enterprise's planes might not have been fired upon.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I don't know how to quantify it but 20-30 minutes warning, even after minutes lost to sheer disbelief, has got to get some ammo lockers opened up, hatches closed and engines warming up. Nevada had a couple of boilers lit, so sayeth legend. She did get under way after the first strike. Would she have time to exit Pearl before the first wave or just wind up clogging the channel?

Ideally 20-30 mins is not sufficient time for the battleships to weigh and start moving, as if they make it to open water they're at greater risk of irretrievably sinking, or if hit while within PH, blocking the harbour. Instead use this time to close up, prepare fire control, light up (if any) radars, and ready weapons.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

In addition to getting most of the approx. 150 American fighter aircraft and many bombers airborne, a confirmed 20-30 min warning would give all the warships time to call action stations, close hatches and ready AA weapons. Perhaps a destroyer or two could be rushed into position alongside the outer most battleships. With a half hours warning Pearl Harbour is a different affair.

The USAAC is not getting 150 fighters airborne in 30 minutes. They are not all waiting at the end of the runway ready to roll off. They will be queing up for their turn. In fact looking at the layout of Wheeler they have a fair bit of taxiing from where they are parked to the runway. They are not practiced in scrambling and if they hurry too much accidents will happen.
In any event they don't have 150 fighters.

The USAAC has 64 P-40s 20 P-36s and 10 P-26s available. 84 not including the P-26s. The Marine corps has 11 F4Fs in total. Getting 20 in the air at the correct altitude would be an accomplishment. Note the the ones that did take off during the first was took 30 minutes to leave the ground from a small field with only 10 fighters present.

The claim that they would head directly to the anchorage and intercept the torpedo bombers is suspect. The USN didn't think a torpedo attack was possible why would the USAAC go looking for them?

The other thing that gets discounted is the number of US planes that would fall to friendly fire. Without IFF and real fighter direction that becomes a real issue. As it was US AA shot down quite a few US aircraft.

 

[Peter Gunn]

I agree, it's complete nonsense. Imo, if one has the time one can look at kill ratios and number of aircraft involved in various Pacific air combats through spring 1942. The Zero was a formidable opponent at this time, and an unknown for most US pilots despite claims otherwise, so the 43 Zeros in the first wave would have probably hold off most of the 80 or so US interceptors scrambled, and shoot down or damage a lot of them. And the 35 in the second wave would do the same with whatever US interceptors still airborne. Of course, some US interceptors will get to the bombers where they will down quite a few, but nothing like Zimm thinks.

*SNIP*

So the Zeros, in this equation, are outnumbered 2 to 1 but are going to totally dominate the air battle? On what planet?

Granted, they were formidable opponents and well flown, but come on, the P-40's aren't being flown by trainee's for God's sake. I believe Welch and Taylor proved the Zero was fully capable of getting it's ass kicked by a properly flown P-40. As for the interceptors not getting to the attack aircraft that's pure bollocks. Even outnumbered by Mustangs guarding the Forts over Europe, German interceptors still managed to hit the bombers. You're telling me that the Zero is so superior that NO interceptors are going to get through? Even though the escorts are outnumbered two to one in your scenario?

I postulated perhaps 40-60 interceptors getting airborne and in a relative position. You're of the opinion they'd make no difference to the attack and only get their asses shot off?

Hmm... interesting.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

So the Zeros, in this equation, are outnumbered 2 to 1 but are going to totally dominate the air battle? On what planet?

Granted, they were formidable opponents and well flown, but come on, the P-40's aren't being flown by trainee's for God's sake. I believe Welch and Taylor proved the Zero was fully capable of getting it's ass kicked by a properly flown P-40. As for the interceptors not getting to the attack aircraft that's pure bollocks. Even outnumbered by Mustangs guarding the Forts over Europe, German interceptors still managed to hit the bombers. You're telling me that the Zero is so superior that NO interceptors are going to get through? Even though the escorts are outnumbered two to one in your scenario?

I postulated perhaps 40-60 interceptors getting airborne and in a relative position. You're of the opinion they'd make no difference to the attack and only get their asses shot off?

Hmm... interesting.

Germany had fighter control that worked. They knew what to expect. They had hours to prepare for a raid . They knew what altitude the Americans were coming in at. To compare a well developed AWS in 1943 to a non functional system on 1941 is ludicrous.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Germany had fighter control that worked. They knew what to expect. They had hours to prepare for a raid . They knew what altitude the Americans were coming in at. To compare a well developed AWS in 1943 to a non functional system on 1941 is ludicrous.

To think interceptors that outnumber the escort 2 to 1 would get slaughtered is equally ludicrous.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The USAAC is not getting 150 fighters airborne in 30 minutes. They are not all waiting at the end of the runway ready to roll off. They will be queing up for their turn. In fact looking at the layout of Wheeler they have a fair bit of taxiing from where they are parked to the runway. They are not practiced in scrambling and if they hurry too much accidents will happen.
In any event they don't have 150 fighters.

View attachment 733886
The USAAC has 64 P-40s 20 P-36s and 10 P-26s available. 84 not including the P-26s. The Marine corps has 11 F4Fs in total. Getting 20 in the air at the correct altitude would be an accompaniment. Note the the ones that did take off during the first was took 30 minutes to leave the ground from a small field with only 10 fighters present.

The claim that they would head directly to the anchorage and intercept the torpedo bombers is suspect. The USN didn't think a torpedo attack was possible why would the USAAC go looking for them?

The other thing that gets discounted is the number of US planes that would fall to friendly fire. Without IFF and real fighter direction that becomes a real issue. As it was US AA shot down quite a few US aircraft.

Launch 60 fighters in 30 Minutes
That's 1 every 30 seconds. Aircraft carriers could achieve this rate with lots of practice
For example the 1st wave at Pearl Harbor the IJN launched 183 aircraft from 6 flight decks in 15 minutes, a 30 second average. This was the best they ever archived. The USN was not as capable as the IJN at this time. Note that this required a lot of preparation. The aircraft lined up at end of deck with engines fully warmed up . The navies have a lot of practice at doing quick launches, the USAAC does not. The P-40s are parked on the flight line. They need to taxi over to the runway. Taxing tail draggers is not easy and would take time if accidents are to be avoided. There will be congestion with aircraft lining up in a limned area.
Perhaps they could take off 2 at a time perhaps, but perhaps not.

Then there's the refueling problem. I doubt there are 60 fuel trucks. Let's assume there are 10, each one would have to refuel 6 P-40s. I not sure how long it takes to refuel a P-40, but 5 minutes seems as quick as you could expect. That equates to 30 minutes to refuel 60 and that doesn't include the time to get the trucks from where they are parked to the apron. Once each airfare is refueled you can start up and taxi over to the runway. If all goes well your first 10 start launching after 15 minutes. 5 minutes later your second 10 can go. This assumes nothing goes wrong.

Let's also not forget that the ammunition was safely stored in a hanger and had to loaded in to belts before loading into the planes. Also many of the guns had been removed. Armors are going to be very busy.

The two aircraft flow by Taylor and Welch were at the auxiliary air field at Haleiwe and were fully armed and refueled. Even then they didn't get into the air until ½ after the attack started.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I don't know how to quantify it but 20-30 minutes warning, even after minutes lost to sheer disbelief, has got to get some ammo lockers opened up, hatches closed and engines warming up. Nevada had a couple of boilers lit, so sayeth legend. She did get under way after the first strike. Would she have time to exit Pearl before the first wave or just wind up clogging the channel?
The damage may have been less. Japanese losses would've been higher but the net result would've been the same. Hopefully with a little more organization, Enterprise's planes might not have been fired upon.

Getting a steamship underway isn't simply a matter of lighting the boiler. Steam turbines a required a lot of TLC to get them running without damaging them. They do not react well to the introduction of water. Once you have reached a high enough steam temperature you can start warming up the steam lines. They must be hot enough to ensure steam will not condense into water. Once that is achieved you can introduce steam into the turbine itself to start warming it up while using the turning gear to rotate it to avoid bowing the shaft. If you rush the blades will expand faster than the casing with disastrous results. When I worked in power plants it took hours to start up. These were much bigger machines with much higher temperatures and lower internal tolerances so I assume the ship would be quicker but I can't see less than 1/2 hour. Warships went from steam plants to gas turbines in large part because of the much quicker reaction time. Certainly it wasn't fuel economy.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Germany had fighter control that worked. They knew what to expect. They had hours to prepare for a raid . They knew what altitude the Americans were coming in at. To compare a well developed AWS in 1943 to a non functional system on 1941 is ludicrous.

So the Zeros, in this equation, are outnumbered 2 to 1 but are going to totally dominate the air battle? On what planet?

Granted, they were formidable opponents and well flown, but come on, the P-40's aren't being flown by trainee's for God's sake. I believe Welch and Taylor proved the Zero was fully capable of getting it's ass kicked by a properly flown P-40. As for the interceptors not getting to the attack aircraft that's pure bollocks. Even outnumbered by Mustangs guarding the Forts over Europe, German interceptors still managed to hit the bombers. You're telling me that the Zero is so superior that NO interceptors are going to get through? Even though the escorts are outnumbered two to one in your scenario?

I postulated perhaps 40-60 interceptors getting airborne and in a relative position. You're of the opinion they'd make no difference to the attack and only get their asses shot off?

Hmm... interesting.

Welch and Taylor were fighting Vals. Taylor claimed 2 Vals and Welch claimed 3 Vals and a Zero. Out of the 9 Zeros lost I am aware of at least 2 lost to other causes.

Untitled Document

My scenario is that 60 P-40s in the air was not possible unless many many things changed starting well before Dec 7.

 

[GrauGeist]

Three P-36 pilots each downed an enemy, too.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Three P-36 pilots each downed an enemy, too.

Yes, of the of the 4 Zeros claimed 3 were credited to P-36s

 

[Peter Gunn]

*SNIP*

My scenario is that 60 P-40s in the air was not possible unless many many things changed starting well before Dec 7.

I agree, I think we're arguing (or perhaps debating is better) from the same side. Waaay back in the thread I postulated a scenario where perhaps 40 Warhawks or so got airborne. BUT, in order to do that MANY things had to go differently. No where have I said they'd run a perfect intercept, no where have I said it was possible in the OTL for it to even happen without several changes to actual events. My post #375 explains more about my thoughts on the whole affair.

Somewhere along the line my 40 Warhawks got expanded to 80+ and then those 80+ where going to get totally waxed by 40+ Zeros, which I find is further from reality than my original thought of a batch of P-40's getting into the air. Zero's and their pilots were good but AAF P-40's weren't going to be flown by trainee's for God's sake.

Regardless, I agree, there were many factors that had to change (which I stated earlier) before American interceptors were going to be able to effectively meet the IJN attack.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I don't know how to quantify it but 20-30 minutes warning, even after minutes lost to sheer disbelief, has got to get some ammo lockers opened up, hatches closed and engines warming up. Nevada had a couple of boilers lit, so sayeth legend. She did get under way after the first strike. Would she have time to exit Pearl before the first wave or just wind up clogging the channel?
The damage may have been less. Japanese losses would've been higher but the net result would've been the same. Hopefully with a little more organization, Enterprise's planes might not have been fired upon.

Actually there is a statement by the admiral in charge of the battleships in port that he, on his own initiative, had two 5 in guns on each battleship at the ready to go with crews nearby and ammunition easily accessible. I like to back up my statements with actual quotes but i'm driving myself crazy tying to relocate it.

 

[AZRailwhale]

What is also foolhardy is to show up with carriers with under strength air compliments.
Either through combat losses or through general shortages and partially trained crews.

How many aircraft did the Zuikaku have on board after Coral sea?
Jun'yō had 36 planes (no Kates) , not her nominal 42-48 and she had only been in commission for a month. The aircraft groups may have been well trained but the ship's crew and the deck crew were not. It takes time get used to a new ship. Jun'yō was also slow and not a good fit speed wise for the other carriers. Taking the Jun'yō to Midway on her shakedown cruise was close to taking the Prince of Wales out to attack the Bismarck.
Zuihō had 24 planes and not her nominal 30. Six A5Ms, six A6Ms and 12 Kate's.

Japanese believed they had sunk the Yorktown at Coral Sea. Sending 4 operational carriers and one back up to deal with 2 American carriers and the atoll may have seemed safe.
Bringing another 3-4 carriers in a rag-tag collection did not bring a corresponding increase in fighting power.

For the mission to the Aleutians Ryūjō's air group now consisted of 12 A6M2 Zeros and 18 B5Ns plus two spares of each type.

Four carriers to bring 90 planes plus Zuikaku's survivors?

Well, maybe the Americans get decoyed by the small carriers and sink most of them instead of the big carriers?

Junyo was only three knots slower than Kaga. Being brand new and Kaga having been on continuous operations since Pearl, they both probably had about the same effective speed.

 

[AZRailwhale]

The CAP was a disorganised mess as well as also requiring the decks to be clear for refueling and rearming hampering the attacking force switching munitions below decks, if I had extra carriers I'd load them with zero's and use them as an autonomous force dedicated to fleet defence.

The problem with that is there were no spare Zeros. The second line Japanese carriers were flying Claudes. Claude's had none of the Zero's advantages against Wildcats.

 

[PAT303]

That just makes the whole attack worse, not enough front line aircraft.

 

[AZRailwhale]

A better idea over adding some questionable CV's to the mix, how about not frittering away your advantage in ships? Yamamoto was so "into" deception believing he had to lure the American CV's out of hiding that he spread his fleet all over the damn place. He (and the IJN GHQ) totally misread their opponents by figuring the USN was cowering in port and would have to be tricked into battle. He/they figured that if the Americans knew what all he had at sea they would stay in port, hence his ridiculous scheme of "distant cover" which was, in reality, no cover at all.

First, I'd put the big useless BB's out in front as a airpower sink to soak up attacks from the USN/USAAF and add the four cruisers and their escorts of the bombardment group to the AA screen of Kido Butai. KdB didn't need more CV's, they needed more support for the four they had present, the IJN had groups of ships all over the place doing nothing more than parading around the Pacific burning precious fuel. Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu were quite capable of getting the job done if given the right plan and support.

Second, nix the whole Aleutians debacle, total waste of ships, aircraft and manpower, any cruisers and destroyers there could be added to Kdb's AA screen.

Third, well, NOT underestimate a United States Navy that was totally NOT cowering in port and if I may coin a phrase, Effing SPOILING for a fight.

Deception wasn't what was needed at Midway by the IJN, overwhelming force was.

Also remember, if Yamamoto HAD concentrated his force like he should have, Nimitz might have let them just have Midway knowing he could retake it at any time after the fleet would be forced to retire. Fletcher and Spruance were under orders to give battle only if they had an advantage, if it looked to be going south on them, they were to pull out and preserve the CV's.

And speaking of Midway itself, Shattered Sword points out that it most definitely would NOT have been a given that the Japanese invasion would succeeded. Reading up on the preparations that were made, it's very probably that the landing troops would have been slaughtered as they tried to come ashore, leaving a bloody mess in the lagoon and a mighty fleet of surface units looking on, floundering around with nothing to support and open to aerial attack.

If the Japanese had not completely underestimated the USA, it would never have gone to war. The Japanese never stopped underestimating the USA until it got nuked.

 

[GrauGeist]

If the Japanese had not completely underestimated the USA, it would never have gone to war. The Japanese never stopped underestimating the USA until it got nuked.

The Japanese Navy wanted to draw the USN into a "grand showdown", which the USN avoided.

Instead, the US Navy ground down the IJN piecemeal, which worked against the IJN's doctrine.

It wasn't about under estimating, it was instead, two entirely different operational philosophies.

The problem with that is there were no spare Zeros. The second line Japanese carriers were flying Claudes. Claude's had none of the Zero's advantages against Wildcats.

The last operational A5Ms were aboard the IJN Shoho at Coral Sea.