Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,637
- Dec 6, 2006
Before we start giving credit to the USAAC for being able to conduct a perfect response to the air attack on Pearl Harbor I would point to the ineptitude they showed in the attack on the Philippines 9 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.As I've stated many times, I'm not sanguine on "what if's" but...
With a four hour lead time from the attack by U.S.S. Ward, supposing the Navy DID contact General Short's HQ with the news of a possible impending attack.
I don't know enough about General Short to know if he was a panjandrum or a man of action or, more likely, somewhere in between. But, if he did act (and after all, Washington had sent out the war warning) immediately and started recalling personnel and getting the interceptors ready, by the time the radar warnings came in (giving a one hour notice and hence, were heeded this time) I think a swarm of P-40s was going to put quite the kink in the IJN's day.
As for the Naval response, Kimmel certainly could have the ships buttoned up and ready for action even with the one hour notice provided by the radar sighting. One of my questions is, if the Ward sinking of the midget sub, giving four hours lead time, would the BB's try to get underway and out of the harbor? That would probably be a bad thing as now any potential sinking is in deep water with the ship lost and higher crew casualties.
However if, as C Conslaw opined, the ships run smoke generators and torpedo nets with all AA manned it'd be a tough nut to crack for the IJN flyers. Granted, USN AA of 1941-42 was a pittance compared to 1944 and beyond but still, manned and ready I'm sure they could have taken a healthy toll on the attacking force.
Again, just my two pfennigs worth where everything falls into place perfectly, and as I say, you can't really tell what might have happened with total certainty but it is interesting and fun to speculate.
From Craven and Cate:
Despite have several hours of lead time and having ample time to fully prepare their aircraft and having ample radar warnings (as well as from ground observers) they still got caught with their pants done because they did not have any real fighter control capability. As the RAF had demonstrated in the Battle of Britain the key to success is having a efficient organization that can analyze data quickly and accurately. The USAAC did not have this capability. In fact as the USN proved later in 1942 at the battles of the Solomons and Santa Cruz they still didn't understand how to conduct a successful interception. It was until they saw the system of HMS Victoria in 1943 that they finally got the point. There is a misconception that fighter control is a simple matter of telling the pilots to take off and head north.
I suggesting reading this website on the history of fighter direction:
Radar and the Fighter Directors
ethw.org
And Commander Taylors description of the capabilities (lack of) of fighter direction at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7:
PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION: Taylor
www.ibiblio.org
Page 366
www.ibiblio.org
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD: Taylor
www.ibiblio.org
And Major Bergquist
PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION: Bergquist
www.ibiblio.org
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD: Bergquist
www.ibiblio.org