Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

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Peter Gunn said:
As I've stated many times, I'm not sanguine on "what if's" but...

With a four hour lead time from the attack by U.S.S. Ward, supposing the Navy DID contact General Short's HQ with the news of a possible impending attack.
I don't know enough about General Short to know if he was a panjandrum or a man of action or, more likely, somewhere in between. But, if he did act (and after all, Washington had sent out the war warning) immediately and started recalling personnel and getting the interceptors ready, by the time the radar warnings came in (giving a one hour notice and hence, were heeded this time) I think a swarm of P-40s was going to put quite the kink in the IJN's day.

As for the Naval response, Kimmel certainly could have the ships buttoned up and ready for action even with the one hour notice provided by the radar sighting. One of my questions is, if the Ward sinking of the midget sub, giving four hours lead time, would the BB's try to get underway and out of the harbor? That would probably be a bad thing as now any potential sinking is in deep water with the ship lost and higher crew casualties.

However if, as C Conslaw opined, the ships run smoke generators and torpedo nets with all AA manned it'd be a tough nut to crack for the IJN flyers. Granted, USN AA of 1941-42 was a pittance compared to 1944 and beyond but still, manned and ready I'm sure they could have taken a healthy toll on the attacking force.

Again, just my two pfennigs worth where everything falls into place perfectly, and as I say, you can't really tell what might have happened with total certainty but it is interesting and fun to speculate.
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Before we start giving credit to the USAAC for being able to conduct a perfect response to the air attack on Pearl Harbor I would point to the ineptitude they showed in the attack on the Philippines 9 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
From Craven and Cate:
1690573851155.png

1690573975183.png

1690574129557.png

1690574714701.png

1690574763011.png

Despite have several hours of lead time and having ample time to fully prepare their aircraft and having ample radar warnings (as well as from ground observers) they still got caught with their pants done because they did not have any real fighter control capability. As the RAF had demonstrated in the Battle of Britain the key to success is having a efficient organization that can analyze data quickly and accurately. The USAAC did not have this capability. In fact as the USN proved later in 1942 at the battles of the Solomons and Santa Cruz they still didn't understand how to conduct a successful interception. It was until they saw the system of HMS Victoria in 1943 that they finally got the point. There is a misconception that fighter control is a simple matter of telling the pilots to take off and head north.

I suggesting reading this website on the history of fighter direction:
ethw.org

Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org ethw.org

And Commander Taylors description of the capabilities (lack of) of fighter direction at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7:

And Major Bergquist
 
Reluctant Poster said:
Before we start giving credit to the USAAC for being able to conduct a perfect response to the air attack on Pearl Harbor I would point to the ineptitude they showed in the attack on the Philippines 9 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
From Craven and Cate:
View attachment 731484
View attachment 731485
View attachment 731486
View attachment 731487
View attachment 731488
Despite have several hours of lead time and having ample time to fully prepare their aircraft and having ample radar warnings (as well as from ground observers) they still got caught with their pants done because they did not have any real fighter control capability. As the RAF had demonstrated in the Battle of Britain the key to success is having a efficient organization that can analyze data quickly and accurately. The USAAC did not have this capability. In fact as the USN proved later in 1942 at the battles of the Solomons and Santa Cruz they still didn't understand how to conduct a successful interception. It was until they saw the system of HMS Victoria in 1943 that they finally got the point. There is a misconception that fighter control is a simple matter of telling the pilots to take off and head north.

I suggesting reading this website on the history of fighter direction:
ethw.org

Radar and the Fighter Directors

ethw.org ethw.org

And Commander Taylors description of the capabilities (lack of) of fighter direction at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7:

And Major Bergquist
Click to expand...
As always I appreciate your response, however I think you overlooked my more detailed post #375.

First, I've read the Craven and Cate material extensively and am quite familiar with the info you posted. (thanks BTW). I'm also well aware of the inadequacies of US fighter control well into 1943 having studied (again, extensively) the carrier battles of 1942 as well as the Solomons Campaign, I never mentioned a "perfect response" to the PH attack.

I merely postulated what would happen if between 30 and 60 P-40's were able to get airborne before the attack came in. Even if many of them were in the wrong place initially, Oahu isn't that big so as soon as flak bursts are appearing over Pearl Harbor I'm pretty sure at least some of the Warhawks are going to find the attackers. Welch and Taylor didn't seem to have too much trouble finding the Japanese, why would the other 30 or 40 Warhawk pilots have any difficulty?

Heck, all they had to do was orbit Wheeler Field and they'd get into a furball with the IJN forces.
 
As I understand it, the only operational F4F Wildcats in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were 11 Marine F4Fs at Ewa. I am not aware of any other operational Wildcats, but the Navy may have had some in a depot waiting for assignment to carriers. These planes would not have had pilots or groundcrews. All of the F4Fs at Ewa were damaged early in the attack, and none became airborne.

In the counterfactual scenario where the first raid creates an alert in time to mount an organized response, I would expect the 11 F4Fs to do about as well as the Marine combined force of F4Fs and F2A fighters who intercepted the Japanese airstrike on Midway. They would have caused a few losses and then been effectively wiped out. Combined with losses to Army fighters and antiaircraft, plus general operational losses, Kido Butai's striking power would have been seriously diminished after two strikes at Pearl Harbor and the vicinity, and maybe the losses would have been high enough to call off the Indian Ocean raids. Roughly half of the Japanese planes striking Midway atoll were lost or damaged. I think if Hawaiian defenses were prepared the result would have been similar.
 
Conslaw said:
As I understand it, the only operational F4F Wildcats in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were 11 Marine F4Fs at Ewa. I am not aware of any other operational Wildcats, but the Navy may have had some in a depot waiting for assignment to carriers. These planes would not have had pilots or groundcrews. All of the F4Fs at Ewa were damaged early in the attack, and none became airborne.

In the counterfactual scenario where the first raid creates an alert in time to mount an organized response, I would expect the 11 F4Fs to do about as well as the Marine combined force of F4Fs and F2A fighters who intercepted the Japanese airstrike on Midway. They would have caused a few losses and then been effectively wiped out. Combined with losses to Army fighters and antiaircraft, plus general operational losses, Kido Butai's striking power would have been seriously diminished after two strikes at Pearl Harbor and the vicinity, and maybe the losses would have been high enough to call off the Indian Ocean raids. Roughly half of the Japanese planes striking Midway atoll were lost or damaged. I think if Hawaiian defenses were prepared the result would have been similar.
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Shattered Sword states:

The total casualties to the Midway strike force was eleven aircraft lost, with
another fourteen heavily damaged, and twenty-nine more shot up to some degree.
Fully half the aircraft involved had been hit. Counting missing aircraft and those
rendered out of commission, the mission had lost 23 percent of its strength in about
thirty minutes of combat. Twenty aviators were dead or missing, and several more
had been wounded. The Kanko crews on board CarDiv 2 must have been stunned.
Between the American fighters and the flak, their formations had been decimated.
Four had been shot down, four more damaged so badly they had to ditch, and another
nine put out of commission after they made it back. Every other kanko in CarDiv 2
had been damaged to some extent, In the ready rooms, the talk was grim. If this sort
of defensive fire. and casualty rate) was going to be the norm when tying against the
Americans, the carnier attack squadrons would be totally annihilated in the course of
a couple more strikes. This did not bode well for coming operations.
Click to expand...
 
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Even without the fighters being alerted, at Pearl Harbor the Japanese lost 8% of their force, not counting damaged -- most to AA.

Had the fighters gotten earlier alert, that number would likely be larger, though how much so is open to debate. It would not have stopped the attack, but at least an early alert may have reduced on-the-ground losses? Maybe the torpedo attacks aren't as successful?
 
PAT303 said:
Thats somber reading feeling you will be annihilated if the losses continue.
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The Japanese lost the war on 7 Dec 41. Nothing they could do as a nation could change that fact. They were going to get curb-stomped, and no fancy strategery was going to change that; they could only delay the inevitable.

Delusions of negotiated peace were, after the surprise attack and defeat of the USN at PH, just that: delusions.
 
RCAFson said:
Shattered Sword states:
Click to expand...
Well imo that is misleading from the authors, most out of service aircraft can be repaired in a day or two. The by far the most important number is how many aircraft are actually lost, at Midway was roughly 10% of the force.
If we add damaged and unserviceable japanese aircraft at Pearl Harbour how much would the "loss" ratio be? Genuinely curious about the number. I posted earlier that iirc there remained immediately about 80 Zeros (presumably including the CAP ones), 60 plus D3A and 100 B5N operational, so the balance between the known operational aircraft, losses and remaining operational planes should gives us an idea.
 
PS: I looked at the numbers, if 240 planes were still available out of 399 total, the "loss" figure is about 40%, though this is after TWO strikes.

A hypothetical second Midway strike would have actually incurred fewer losses, as the VMF squadron was almost wiped out (they accounted for probably half the B5N losses iirc, plus some damaged). The flak was obviously not surprised in the first attack, so in the second attack one can expect a fairly similar number of hits. I reckon 6-7 planes lost and perhaps 10-12 or so out of service.
 
mack8 said:
Well imo that is misleading from the authors, most out of service aircraft can be repaired in a day or two. The by far the most important number is how many aircraft are actually lost, at Midway was roughly 10% of the force.
If we add damaged and unserviceable japanese aircraft at Pearl Harbour how much would the "loss" ratio be? Genuinely curious about the number. I posted earlier that iirc there remained immediately about 80 Zeros (presumably including the CAP ones), 60 plus D3A and 100 B5N operational, so the balance between the known operational aircraft, losses and remaining operational planes should gives us an idea.
Click to expand...
I wanted to properly quantify the loss/damage results of the first strike. I agree that, given time, some of the damaged aircraft would have been repaired and returned to service.
 
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You don't want to be operating damaged aircraft in a combat scenario except in desperation. Tomonoga's death later that day, after taking off in his damaged Kate, shows why. In his death the Japanese lost a highly experienced torpedo-bomber leader, a veteran of Pearl Harbor. Even if the aircraft could be repaired on board in a day or two (and that would certainly depend on what the damage was), the damaged craft were mission kills.

We haven't even touched on the point that the Japanese suffered 20% aircrew fatalities in the morning strike, which would reduce the mass of any follow-on strikes, meaning the flak would likely be more concentrated.

In that context, I don't think Parshall and Tully's point is "misleading."
 
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Thumpalumpacus said:
You don't want to be operating damaged aircraft in a combat scenario except in desperation. Tomonoga's death later that day, after taking off in his damaged Kate, shows why. In his death the Japanese lost a highly experienced torpedo-bomber leader, a veteran of Pearl Harbor. Even if the aircraft could be repaired on board in a day or two(and that would certainly depend on t=what the damage was), the damaged craft were mission kills.

We haven't even touched on the point that the Japanese suffered 20% aircrew fatalities in the morning strike, which would reduce the mass of any follow-on strikes, meaning the flak would likely be more concentrated.

In that context, I don't think Parshall and Tully's point is "misleading."
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To be fair, there was about 10% crew casualties, since the most of the aircraft involved had 2 or 3 aircrew.
 
Dead pilot +2 surviving crew < combat effectiveness.
Surviving crew yanked out of sea what plane to give? < combat effectiveness.
So i think even if and thats a thing ..if.. crew were resqued it did not mean one would have the same combat power.
Its not all about how many are up, but how well as a fighting force those single planes will be.
 
Reluctant Poster said:
I have to say I am disappointed in this book. I lost interest when I read the following statement:

"Japanese warships were optimized for speed and offensive power, and had considerably less resistance to damage and less damage control capability then comparable US Navy ships."

My BS meter was immediately pinned to full. It may be argued that Japanese damage control was less effective than the USN (although I personally think the difference is exaggerated) but there is no doubt that the Japanese warships were tough. In fact when it comes to heavy cruisers that the Japanese ships was tough as any heavy cruiser in the world and their combat record reflects that.

The author further compounds this in the footnote to this statement when he uses the Yamato as an example. He claims that the Yamato had a poor anti torpedo design. This is related to the incident were Skate torpedoed Yamato and a defect was revealed where the junction between the upper and lower main armored belt failed and 3000 tons of water were shipped. This does not make the Yamato a poorly constructed ship.

In Yamato's last battle it absorbed at least 11 torpedoes before succumbing and its sister the Musashi took 19 torpedoes before it sank. Taking one defect and extrapolating it to a badly constructed ship is nonsense.

Note that the Iowas' torpedo protection was considered defective by the USN. A mock up failed in testing and the system was redesigned for the final 2 (uncompleted) ships. See the following:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSp9OlnGsNE
I will finish reading the book but I am very skeptical.
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Do not buy this book. It is a total waste of money. In one of his "analysis" he claims that if the US battle fleet had put to sea and was attacked that the AA of the fleet would have shot down 158 of 186 attackers of the first wave ie 85% losses. Note that this AA alone. This is absolute fantasy.
 
Peter Gunn said:
As always I appreciate your response, however I think you overlooked my more detailed post #375.

First, I've read the Craven and Cate material extensively and am quite familiar with the info you posted. (thanks BTW). I'm also well aware of the inadequacies of US fighter control well into 1943 having studied (again, extensively) the carrier battles of 1942 as well as the Solomons Campaign, I never mentioned a "perfect response" to the PH attack.

I merely postulated what would happen if between 30 and 60 P-40's were able to get airborne before the attack came in. Even if many of them were in the wrong place initially, Oahu isn't that big so as soon as flak bursts are appearing over Pearl Harbor I'm pretty sure at least some of the Warhawks are going to find the attackers. Welch and Taylor didn't seem to have too much trouble finding the Japanese, why would the other 30 or 40 Warhawk pilots have any difficulty?

Heck, all they had to do was orbit Wheeler Field and they'd get into a furball with the IJN forces.
Click to expand...
Thats exactly what the Japanese were expecting and that is why the Zeros went there. If the P-40s are in a furball over Wheeler they are not intercepting the bombers.
The Japanese were themselves surprised by the total surprise that they achieved. With no enemy opposition the Zeros switched to strafing.

1691453133186.png
 
Reluctant Poster said:
Do not buy this book. It is a total waste of money. In one of his "analysis" he claims that if the US battle fleet had put to sea and was attacked that the AA of the fleet would have shot down 158 of 186 attackers of the first wave ie 85% losses. Note that this AA alone. This is absolute fantasy.
Click to expand...
I agree, it's complete nonsense. Imo, if one has the time one can look at kill ratios and number of aircraft involved in various Pacific air combats through spring 1942. The Zero was a formidable opponent at this time, and an unknown for most US pilots despite claims otherwise, so the 43 Zeros in the first wave would have probably hold off most of the 80 or so US interceptors scrambled, and shoot down or damage a lot of them. And the 35 in the second wave would do the same with whatever US interceptors still airborne. Of course, some US interceptors will get to the bombers where they will down quite a few, but nothing like Zimm thinks.

Imo, that 75 figure from the wargame mentioned on that Discovery show looks quite realistic, i reckon about half each to US fighters and flak. I further reckon there will be about 15-20 Zeros and 50-60 plus attack planes lost. The US will lose probably 20-30 fighters plus some tens damaged, plus many of whatever other planes are still on the ground. I assume most of the US flyable bombers, seaplanes etc. will be airborne either to look for/attack the japanese carriers, or just scrambling out of the way, though probably some will still have the misfortune of crossing paths with some Zeros.

Ironically, i was quite suprised how weak a potential US counterattack would have been, the about 30 or so B-17/18/A-20s can hardly hope to hit anything with their high level bombing. Did any A-20s carried torpedoes at this time? The only dangerous planes are imo the Marine SBDs/SB2U but it's only about 20 or so of them potentially available, plus the Enterprise planes, about 36 SBDs (i don't see how the 18 or so TBDs will do any better than in subsequent actions). Really not that much to face the whole of KB.
 
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