Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Conslaw]

The Navy would not have abandoned Pearl Harbor. Hawaii defenses had already been strengthened by June 1942, and efforts were ongoing.

Even in December 1941, Japan was only able to achieve the results it did with more than a little bit of luck combined with the fact that the US was not completely on a wartime footing. Given the radar warning the US received, if it had been acted upon, and with the forces available at wartime readiness, the US could have met the oncoming air strike many miles out to see with about 100 US fighters. The ships would have either been undocked or covered by smoke-screens and torpedo nets. Antiaircraft guns would have been manned and ready. Any aircraft on the ground would have been in disbursed. The bottom line is that the Pearl Harbor raid could easily have cost the Japanese half of the attacking aircraft and achieved a fraction of the results.

If the radar warning at Pearl Harbor had been heeded, the air group losses by Japan could have been on the order of the losses at Coral Sea, rendering all six carriers combat ineffective even if the carriers themselves made it out unharmed.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Look at how bitterly the USN fought at Guadalcanal. I can't imagine they'd run to the West Coast if they lost Midway.

Aside from the loss of prestige, they'd be throwing away the one big advantage they had: being closer to the action than the IJN based at the Inland Sea ports.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Look at how bitterly the USN fought at Guadalcanal. I can't imagine they'd run to the West Coast if they lost Midway.

Aside from the loss of prestige, they'd be throwing away the one big advantage they had: being closer to the action than the IJN based at the Inland Sea ports.

That's one of the points I was trying to make. They would be ceding the Pacific to the Japaneses

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That's one of the points I was trying to make. They would be ceding the Pacific to the Japaneses

They'd also be ceding one of the finest natural harbors in the Pacific, protected by multiple airbases and tens of thousands of troops. It would be comparable to the Japanese evacuating Rabaul because the Marines took Guadalcanal Tulagi. The USN would also be allowing IJN subs to throttle West Coast bases.

The fleet leaving Pearl without a fight simply is not going to happen, and whoever suggests it is going to be fired by Adm King mos' skosh. He did not tolerate timidity.

 

[GrauGeist]

USN caving in was never going to happen. Period.

How many times during the war, starting at Pearl Harbor/Philippines, did they rise above and beyond the call of duty in the face of adversity?

There are simply too many instances to cite here, where the Navy (and Army) shocked the Japanese with their tenacity.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

If the radar warning at Pearl Harbor had been heeded, the air group losses by Japan could have been on the order of the losses at Coral Sea, rendering all six carriers combat ineffective even if the carriers themselves made it out unharmed.

The US may have made a better showing but there were many deficiencies that would have prevented a full response. The sugar cane barons wouldn't let the US army site their AA guns on their farms therefore many of the guns were not in position and would have taken hours to bring into action. The air corps also would have taken too long to get any more than a token number into action as the air and ground crews were scattered all over the island. The ammunition was locked in warehouses and would have taken time and manpower to get to the aircraft. The aircraft were unarmed and many unfueled. Do not forget this was not the era of instant communication that we live in.
Excerpt from "7 December 1941 The Airforce Story":

https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/17/2001329818/-1/-1/0/AFD-100917-040.pdf

The navy would have a better chance in the fact their the AA was available. However they didn't take the early warning system seriously and did not support it as they should have. They couldn't be bothered to provide the liaison Officers as they were supposed to and lines of communication between the early warning system and the navy had not been established. In any event the navy only has themselves to blame. They spotted a midget submarine 4 hours before the attack. The USS Ward reported sinking another submarine more than 1 hour before they attack but the navy still did nothing. Note point (d) in the following excerpt from the Hart Inquiry;

The original document is here:

EXHIBIT NO. 23 (HART INQUIRY)

 

[Peter Gunn]

As I've stated many times, I'm not sanguine on "what if's" but...

With a four hour lead time from the attack by U.S.S. Ward, supposing the Navy DID contact General Short's HQ with the news of a possible impending attack.
I don't know enough about General Short to know if he was a panjandrum or a man of action or, more likely, somewhere in between. But, if he did act (and after all, Washington had sent out the war warning) immediately and started recalling personnel and getting the interceptors ready, by the time the radar warnings came in (giving a one hour notice and hence, were heeded this time) I think a swarm of P-40s was going to put quite the kink in the IJN's day.

As for the Naval response, Kimmel certainly could have the ships buttoned up and ready for action even with the one hour notice provided by the radar sighting. One of my questions is, if the Ward sinking of the midget sub, giving four hours lead time, would the BB's try to get underway and out of the harbor? That would probably be a bad thing as now any potential sinking is in deep water with the ship lost and higher crew casualties.

However if, as C Conslaw opined, the ships run smoke generators and torpedo nets with all AA manned it'd be a tough nut to crack for the IJN flyers. Granted, USN AA of 1941-42 was a pittance compared to 1944 and beyond but still, manned and ready I'm sure they could have taken a healthy toll on the attacking force.

Again, just my two pfennigs worth where everything falls into place perfectly, and as I say, you can't really tell what might have happened with total certainty but it is interesting and fun to speculate.

 

[GrauGeist]

One of the first air-to-air downing of an A6M, was by a P-36A.

Aside from the 99 P-40B/Cs on hand, the AAC had 39 P-36As on site. (There were also 14 P-26 fighters)
Add to that number, 37 F4Fs, 27 SBDs and 8 F2As of the USN and USMC.

With enough advance warning, they could do some damage to the Japanese, especially considering that the few P-40s and P-36s that did manage to get aloft, downed 9 Japanese aircraft.

As it stands, the IJN lost 29 aircraft over Pearl Harbor, 20 to AA and a further 111 that managed to return to their carriers were damaged beyond repair.

 

[SaparotRob]

The amount of AA fire the USN had up for the second wave was impressive enough to be noted by IJN pilots. I can't remember where or when I read that but I hope I'm correct. The ball wasn't dropped by the guys at the point of the spear. Which is why Pearl got the shaft.

 

[GrauGeist]

The amount of AA fire the USN had up for the second wave was impressive enough to be noted by IJN pilots. I can't remember where or when I read that but I hope I'm correct. The ball wasn't dropped by the guys at the point of the spear. Which is why Pearl got the shaft.

Once they realized they were under attack, they were scrambling to get air defenses going and by the second wave, the AA was fierce.

Aside from downing or damaging IJN aircraft, they managed to down or damage quite a few American aircraft as well as wreaking havoc in nearby towns and installations with the AA fallout.

 

[EwenS]

As I've stated many times, I'm not sanguine on "what if's" but...

With a four hour lead time from the attack by U.S.S. Ward, supposing the Navy DID contact General Short's HQ with the news of a possible impending attack.
I don't know enough about General Short to know if he was a panjandrum or a man of action or, more likely, somewhere in between. But, if he did act (and after all, Washington had sent out the war warning) immediately and started recalling personnel and getting the interceptors ready, by the time the radar warnings came in (giving a one hour notice and hence, were heeded this time) I think a swarm of P-40s was going to put quite the kink in the IJN's day.

As for the Naval response, Kimmel certainly could have the ships buttoned up and ready for action even with the one hour notice provided by the radar sighting. One of my questions is, if the Ward sinking of the midget sub, giving four hours lead time, would the BB's try to get underway and out of the harbor? That would probably be a bad thing as now any potential sinking is in deep water with the ship lost and higher crew casualties.

However if, as C Conslaw opined, the ships run smoke generators and torpedo nets with all AA manned it'd be a tough nut to crack for the IJN flyers. Granted, USN AA of 1941-42 was a pittance compared to 1944 and beyond but still, manned and ready I'm sure they could have taken a healthy toll on the attacking force.

Again, just my two pfennigs worth where everything falls into place perfectly, and as I say, you can't really tell what might have happened with total certainty but it is interesting and fun to speculate.

Torpedo nets. These are large, very heavy and require specialist ships to lay and recover them. And they had to be hand made which took time. So they need be manufactured and laid well in advance of an attack. Even 4 hours notice is highly unlikely to offer an opportunity to deploy them.

But if the water is too shallow for torpedoes to operate in, as the USN assumed, they are useless anyway. So first you have to change the mindset.

Net and Boom Defenses

Smoke. Can be a double edged sword. Unless smoke is made sufficiently early, allowed to deploy across the harbour to a sufficient depth, (for which some breeze would be required) and in conditions to ensure it doesn't disperse (not too much wind), all well and good. Ships smoke from funnels won't be enough. It tends to hang low on the water. It will need additions of chemical smoke from around the harbour. Again a lot of preparation is required. AIUI the addition of chemical smoke making apparatus on USN warships only began later of the war.

The downside of smoke is that it makes your AA next to useless. These are the days of visual directors. Your gun crews can't see their targets. AA fire becomes a blind barrage at best.

Worst case, as happened on one of the Tirpitz raids, was that there was insufficient time for the smokescreen to fully deploy. So while the ship's gunners were blinded, the ship's masts were still sticking up through the cloud so giving an aiming point for the attacking aircraft. And filling a relatively narrow fjord hemmed in with mountains is rather different from the much more and significantly larger open space of Pearl Harbor.

So both techniques require a lot of pre-planning and pre-positioning of assets. That would require a lot more than 4 hours even if the kit were available.

There was another problem not so far mentioned. Available crew. Most of the ordinary enlisted seamen had returned after Saturday night liberty ashore. But numbers of the senior enlisted personnel and officers were absent, often living ashore with their families. Some ships were short of 50% of their officers. Those missing were often the key personnel in running and defending the ships. How long to locate them and get them back on board? Each ship would be in a different position, with some being able to leave and some not.

Zimm in his book reckoned 40 mins to bring the ships to a state where they would be ready to defend themselves with plenty of ammunition to hand. Nevada took just over an hour to get underway. But she was single moored. The other BB were double moored that day. So in board ships can't move until outboard ones do, further complicating any attempt to move out of PH. And getting the BB to sea is of little good unless the cruisers and destroyers are able to leave with them.

So staying put and increasing the volume of AA fire by having reached a higher state of readiness might well have been the best solution in both the short and long term.

 

[Shortround6]

Getting to sea requires the boilers to be generating steam.

Most of these ships had 1 or 2 boilers running at "idle" for domestic use, electric generation and any steam equipment.
Arizona had been rebuilt with 6 boilers instead of the original 12 but going from cold boiler to making real steam took hours.
Each boiler on the Arizona was good for just under 6,000hp. so it took a while to go from 'idle' to full power.
1 boiler might give enough steam for steerage/maneuver in harbor.
Clearing the channel at 8-12 knots (2 boilers?) is a real gamble between air attack and submarine attack.

 

[GrauGeist]

One of the reasons why the Nevada was able to get underway, she already had built up a head of steam before the attack commenced.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

As I've stated many times, I'm not sanguine on "what if's" but...

With a four hour lead time from the attack by U.S.S. Ward, supposing the Navy DID contact General Short's HQ with the news of a possible impending attack.
I don't know enough about General Short to know if he was a panjandrum or a man of action or, more likely, somewhere in between. But, if he did act (and after all, Washington had sent out the war warning) immediately and started recalling personnel and getting the interceptors ready, by the time the radar warnings came in (giving a one hour notice and hence, were heeded this time) I think a swarm of P-40s was going to put quite the kink in the IJN's day.

As for the Naval response, Kimmel certainly could have the ships buttoned up and ready for action even with the one hour notice provided by the radar sighting. One of my questions is, if the Ward sinking of the midget sub, giving four hours lead time, would the BB's try to get underway and out of the harbor? That would probably be a bad thing as now any potential sinking is in deep water with the ship lost and higher crew casualties.

However if, as C Conslaw opined, the ships run smoke generators and torpedo nets with all AA manned it'd be a tough nut to crack for the IJN flyers. Granted, USN AA of 1941-42 was a pittance compared to 1944 and beyond but still, manned and ready I'm sure they could have taken a healthy toll on the attacking force.

Again, just my two pfennigs worth where everything falls into place perfectly, and as I say, you can't really tell what might have happened with total certainty but it is interesting and fun to speculate.

To be clear the minesweeper Condor reported a periscope at 03.57. No one is going to order a full mobilization of Pearl Harbor based on a very junior officer reporting a periscope. The Ward followed up the report but didn't find and attack the submarine until 06.37. As I stated previously this was an hour before the attack.
The radars had picked some activity starting at 06.15 but the big the large size of flight wasn't detected determined until a little after 07.00 07.15 giving less than a hour
only 33 minutes to react.

No torpedo nets

No smoke generators

Very little Army AA

 

[Peter Gunn]

Torpedo nets. These are large, very heavy and require specialist ships to lay and recover them. And they had to be hand made which took time. So they need be manufactured and laid well in advance of an attack. Even 4 hours notice is highly unlikely to offer an opportunity to deploy them.

But if the water is too shallow for torpedoes to operate in, as the USN assumed, they are useless anyway. So first you have to change the mindset.

Net and Boom Defenses

Smoke. Can be a double edged sword. Unless smoke is made sufficiently early, allowed to deploy across the harbour to a sufficient depth, (for which some breeze would be required) and in conditions to ensure it doesn't disperse (not too much wind), all well and good. Ships smoke from funnels won't be enough. It tends to hang low on the water. It will need additions of chemical smoke from around the harbour. Again a lot of preparation is required. AIUI the addition of chemical smoke making apparatus on USN warships only began later of the war.

The downside of smoke is that it makes your AA next to useless. These are the days of visual directors. Your gun crews can't see their targets. AA fire becomes a blind barrage at best.

Worst case, as happened on one of the Tirpitz raids, was that there was insufficient time for the smokescreen to fully deploy. So while the ship's gunners were blinded, the ship's masts were still sticking up through the cloud so giving an aiming point for the attacking aircraft. And filling a relatively narrow fjord hemmed in with mountains is rather different from the much more and significantly larger open space of Pearl Harbor.

So both techniques require a lot of pre-planning and pre-positioning of assets. That would require a lot more than 4 hours even if the kit were available.

There was another problem not so far mentioned. Available crew. Most of the ordinary enlisted seamen had returned after Saturday night liberty ashore. But numbers of the senior enlisted personnel and officers were absent, often living ashore with their families. Some ships were short of 50% of their officers. Those missing were often the key personnel in running and defending the ships. How long to locate them and get them back on board? Each ship would be in a different position, with some being able to leave and some not.

Zimm in his book reckoned 40 mins to bring the ships to a state where they would be ready to defend themselves with plenty of ammunition to hand. Nevada took just over an hour to get underway. But she was single moored. The other BB were double moored that day. So in board ships can't move until outboard ones do, further complicating any attempt to move out of PH. And getting the BB to sea is of little good unless the cruisers and destroyers are able to leave with them.

So staying put and increasing the volume of AA fire by having reached a higher state of readiness might well have been the best solution in both the short and long term.

Thanks, I appreciate what you're saying and your detailed response.

I must admit that I didn't think the USN had either torpedo nets or smoke generators at Pearl Harbor, I was merely working off C Conslaw post but, let me be more clear at what I was driving at in my "what if".

For the USN response I'm merely presupposing that either the Ward sinking or the radar warning gives the ships in the harbor enough time to button up and get AA manned and ready. That can mean a much hotter welcome for the IJN first wave and yes, while much of senior personnel are ashore, I'm certain there would be enough guys that know what they're doing to get the ships ready to repel an air attack. You have to admit, manned and ready even with a skeleton crew, the ships will lay down a much better AA barrage than they did historically, I reference the response to the second wave as an example. As I stated, 1941 USN AA is a shadow of the powerhouse it would become but that would be better than being caught flat footed as happened IRL.

For the USAAF, what might have happened had even 40-60 P-40's are able to get airborne and into a decent intercept position. The Japanese are going to lose a lot more than the 9 credited to fighters historically. If that had happened, the first day of the war for the U.S. is going to involve one hell of an air battle sometime after 7:30. Also had the interceptors been waiting, what would the IJN resources be after a good donnybrook like that? I know they were planning a third wave but after the first two waves get bounced around by AA and P-40's in this manner I'd bet there's no third wave in this scenario either.

Between the AAF interception and ships AA ready and waiting, I'm curious if there would have been any thought given to a third wave as historical. Losses might have been prohibitive in that respect.

Again, just my two cents worth and this is one of the "what if's" I've pondered over the years.

 

[EwenS]

Thanks, I appreciate what you're saying and your detailed response.

I must admit that I didn't think the USN had either torpedo nets or smoke generators at Pearl Harbor, I was merely working off C Conslaw post but, let me be more clear at what I was driving at in my "what if".

For the USN response I'm merely presupposing that either the Ward sinking or the radar warning gives the ships in the harbor enough time to button up and get AA manned and ready. That can mean a much hotter welcome for the IJN first wave and yes, while much of senior personnel are ashore, I'm certain there would be enough guys that know what they're doing to get the ships ready to repel an air attack. You have to admit, manned and ready even with a skeleton crew, the ships will lay down a much better AA barrage than they did historically, I reference the response to the second wave as an example. As I stated, 1941 USN AA is a shadow of the powerhouse it would become but that would be better than being caught flat footed as happened IRL.

For the USAAF, what might have happened had even 40-60 P-40's are able to get airborne and into a decent intercept position. The Japanese are going to lose a lot more than the 9 credited to fighters historically. If that had happened, the first day of the war for the U.S. is going to involve one hell of an air battle sometime after 7:30. Also had the interceptors been waiting, what would the IJN resources be after a good donnybrook like that? I know they were planning a third wave but after the first two waves get bounced around by AA and P-40's in this manner I'd bet there's no third wave in this scenario either.

Between the AAF interception and ships AA ready and waiting, I'm curious if there would have been any thought given to a third wave as historical. Losses might have been prohibitive in that respect.

Again, just my two cents worth and this is one of the "what if's" I've pondered over the years.

You need a copy of Alan D Zimm's "Attack on Pearl Harbor - Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions"

In that book he devotes a whole chapter (chapter nine What might have been: alerted Pearl Harbor defences) of some 20 pages to just the questions you are pondering, with estimates of Japanese losses under various circumstances.

Read the Amazon preview and the reviews for a better indication of its contents.

The Attack On Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions: Amazon.co.uk: Zimm, Alan D.: 9781612001975: Books

Buy The Attack On Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions by Zimm, Alan D. (ISBN: 9781612001975) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

 

[muskeg13]

One of the first air-to-air downing of an A6M, was by a P-36A.

Aside from the 99 P-40B/Cs on hand, the AAC had 39 P-36As on site. (There were also 14 P-26 fighters)
Add to that number, 37 F4Fs, 27 SBDs and 8 F2As of the USN and USMC.

With enough advance warning, they could do some damage to the Japanese, especially considering that the few P-40s and P-36s that did manage to get aloft, downed 9 Japanese aircraft.

As it stands, the IJN lost 29 aircraft over Pearl Harbor, 20 to AA and a further 111 that managed to return to their carriers were damaged beyond repair.

According to Appendix B in "7 December 1941 The Airforce Story," of the P-40s and P-36s on hand, only 64 and 20 respectively were in commission at the time of the attack. That's just less than a 61% availability rate, that varied day-to-day. This makes a pool of 84 first line fighters potentially available to meet the initial attack. The obsolete P-26s were only kept as training aircraft, and should be kept out of any "what if" calculations for the initial attack.

Now, given the peacetime alert status in Hawaii that morning, how many of the 84 available fighters should we reasonably expect to be able to be fueled, armed and airborne if given a 45 minute to 1 hour notice to scramble? I use this advanced warning time based on the Ward's second message, the one sent at 0653 that they had engaged a submarine operating in a restricted area and the 0702 Opana Point report to Ft. Shafter of incoming aircraft.

Alertness in Hawaii had understandably become more relaxed since the 27 November "War Warning" that didn't mention Hawaii and failed to produce any hostilities. So, how many aircraft should we reasonably expect to be on rapid response alert early on a Sunday morning in peacetime, even knowing that the Japanese were up to no good? 10% ? 25% ? And, it's not just aircraft availability, it's pilots and ground crew sitting around on ground alert. Even in hindsight, we can't reasonably expect the Hawaiian commanders to have kept their forces on high wartime alert indefinitely when we weren't at war. If 1 in 4 available aircraft and their flight and ground crews were maintained on a rotating alert schedule, there could have been about 20 fighters to meet the initial attack, if they'd been ordered to scramble. It's also reasonable for a plan to have been in effect so that off duty personnel could be recalled on short notice.

Short exercised poor judgement in many areas, his obsession with sabotage was questioned by Marshall, but nothing was done to correct Short's misdirected focus. At a minimum, AAF fighters not on immediate ground alert should have been fueled and maintained in revetments as available with belted ammunition stored in locked containers located close by.

 

[GrauGeist]

According to Appendix B in "7 December 1941 The Airforce Story," of the P-40s and P-36s on hand, only 64 and 20 respectively were in commission at the time of the attack. That's just less than a 61% availability rate, that varied day-to-day. This makes a pool of 84 first line fighters potentially available to meet the initial attack. The obsolete P-26s were only kept as training aircraft, and should be kept out of any "what if" calculations for the initial attack.

Now, given the peacetime alert status in Hawaii that morning, how many of the 84 available fighters should we reasonably expect to be able to be fueled, armed and airborne if given a 45 minute to 1 hour notice to scramble? I use this advanced warning time based on the Ward's second message, the one sent at 0653 that they had engaged a submarine operating in a restricted area and the 0702 Opana Point report to Ft. Shafter of incoming aircraft.

Alertness in Hawaii had understandably become more relaxed since the 27 November "War Warning" that didn't mention Hawaii and failed to produce any hostilities. So, how many aircraft should we reasonably expect to be on rapid response alert early on a Sunday morning in peacetime, even knowing that the Japanese were up to no good? 10% ? 25% ? And, it's not just aircraft availability, it's pilots and ground crew sitting around on ground alert. Even in hindsight, we can't reasonably expect the Hawaiian commanders to have kept their forces on high wartime alert indefinitely when we weren't at war. If 1 in 4 available aircraft and their flight and ground crews were maintained on a rotating alert schedule, there could have been about 20 fighters to meet the initial attack, if they'd been ordered to scramble. It's also reasonable for a plan to have been in effect so that off duty personnel could be recalled on short notice.

Short exercised poor judgement in many areas, his obsession with sabotage was questioned by Marshall, but nothing was done to correct Short's misdirected focus. At a minimum, AAF fighters not on immediate ground alert should have been fueled and maintained in revetments as available with belted ammunition stored in locked containers located close by.

Eight fighters got airborn while under attack - that's minus minutes warning.

And second line fighters (P-26) were pressed into service during the attack on the Philippines.

 

[muskeg13]

Eight fighters got airborn while under attack - that's minus minutes warning.

And second line fighters (P-26) were pressed into service during the attack on the Philippines.

Right. If the Hawaiian Department (Short's Army) had maintained anywhere near the percentage of personnel on base that PAC Fleet kept onboard its ships (don't remember if it was 1/3 or 1/2), probably a lot more than eight fighters could have been employed. However, there's still the issue of parking unarmed and possibly unfueled aircraft in compact neat rows on the flight line with ammunition inaccessible.

Yes, P-26s were used in the Philippines, by the Philippine Air Force. The P-26 wasn't a first line service aircraft in the AAF any longer, but was kept around for pilots to maintain their required minimum flying hours. Now, this was in peacetime, pre-Japanese attacks. Once the attacks had occurred and many first line aircraft had been damaged of destroyed, everything flyable was pressed into service, including B-10/12s and A-12s. Obsolete 'training" aircraft just wouldn't have been the first in the air to oppose the Japanese. They would only be employed after options for using P-40s, P-36s, and in the Philippines, P-35s, had been explored.

 

[GrauGeist]

And let's remember that the Navy and Marines had Wildcats available.

The original suggestion was about a possible four hours notice. This would have been more than enough time to come to general quarters.

If the situation was dire, I am sure that the Air Corps, Marines and Navy would have put anything in the air that could shoot: P-26s, SBDs, P-40Bs and so on.

When you're fighting for survival, you'll use whatever you have at arm's length, be it a shovel, a pocket knife or an "obsolete" fighter.