Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Army fighters that Short had lined up on the aprons -- were they fueled or armed? Given the anti-sabotage reasoning for this displacement, I'd suspect they weren't fueled or armed, but I don't know. Anyone here have the dope?

 

[muskeg13]

The Army fighters that Short had lined up on the aprons -- were they fueled or armed? Given the anti-sabotage reasoning for this displacement, I'd suspect they weren't fueled or armed, but I don't know. Anyone here have the dope?

No and no. See Reluctant Poster's #366 above.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

No and no. See Reluctant Poster's #366 above.

There's more response time, then.

 

[mack8]

There is no way that the USN is going to tuck its tail between its legs and run back to San Francisco. The loss of reputation would be enormous for the USN and for that matter the US itself. Morale within the Navy would plummet. The US would be announcing to the world that they are allowing Japan to run uncontested in the Pacific for the next full year (until the Essex and Lexington arrive). Japan would have won a tremendous strategic victory without firing a shot. All because the USN is terrified of a half dozen flying boats based 1500 miles away.

Meanwhile the world is watching the heroics of the Royal Navy fighting convoys through to Malta and Murmansk at great cost in men and ships while the USN is imitating the Regia Marina. USN will not be greeted warmly by the US civilian population. The British are battling terrible odds while USN hiding behind their skirts.

The USN has ambitions of displacing the RN as the worlds finest Navy. By retreating they would be condemning themselves to playing little brother to the RN and the US Army. The USN has established parity with the RN on paper through some clever treaties but real test is battle. Hiding in port is not the path to glory.

As Admiral Cunningham succinctly put it during the evacuation of Crete "It takes three years for the Navy to build a ship it will take 300 years to build a new tradition."

I think my post is much misunderstood. Depending on the scenario and how many US carriers we are talking about, basing them on the West Coast would be purely a military necessity to minimize the risks for them, nothing to do with running or abandoning. Obviously Hawaii will still be defended by the troops and the hundreds of planes, and probably sizeable DD, cruiser and sub forces, but the carriers will simply temporarily operate from the mainland to minimize the risk from subs or air attacks they would potentially face if they would be docking IN PEARL HARBOUR to refuel, replenish or whatever. They can't stay at sea forever.

And correct me if i'm wrong, but weren't all the combat ready old BBs operating from the West Coast with Pye during the Midway battle?

If Midway is in japanese hands i see nothing unusual in basing the carriers on the West Coast, in fact it will be a folly to keep their most important assets (ESPECIALLY if the USN have actually lost the battle of Midway and they are down to only 2 or 3 carriers, Saratoga, Wasp and maybe one other survivor) 1100 miles away from an enemy base, exposed to subs and seaplanes attacks, with no intermediate friendly base inbetween (not yet anyway - i don't think Kauai qualifies, too close, though of course it will be useful to give warning of any air attacks). And who knows, maybe the japanese could contemplate a one way night torpedo mission with their G4Ms. They would absolutely salivate to get at the US carriers if they are kept in Hawaii!

I did looked into the possibility of basing the carriers at Lahaina or perhaps some other anchorage on Maui or on Hawaii itself, but presumably all those places will be watched by IJN subs and the facilities seem inadequate to protect the carriers while anchored/docked. Would certainly welcome input on this subject though.

 

[mack8]

One of the first air-to-air downing of an A6M, was by a P-36A.

Aside from the 99 P-40B/Cs on hand, the AAC had 39 P-36As on site. (There were also 14 P-26 fighters)
Add to that number, 37 F4Fs, 27 SBDs and 8 F2As of the USN and USMC.

With enough advance warning, they could do some damage to the Japanese, especially considering that the few P-40s and P-36s that did manage to get aloft, downed 9 Japanese aircraft.

As it stands, the IJN lost 29 aircraft over Pearl Harbor, 20 to AA and a further 111 that managed to return to their carriers were damaged beyond repair.

Re the USN/USMC numbers, pretty sure there were not 37 F4Fs on Oahu, and also there are some SB2Us too. At any rate many of those planes were either reserve for the carrier groups, replacement pool etc. In fact this table seem to suggest just 10 available fighters:
Airplane Damage Report - Pearl Harbor

I'm confused about the dive-bombers though, they don't jibe with the OOBs i've seen, presumably the 60 total number and 41 available must include some Enterprise ones (18?)?

Also the 111 damaged aircraft were not all beyond repair, just out of service, most were back in service during next day or subsequently, iirc only about 21 or so - i seem to recall this number from somewhere, possibly Osamu Tagaya's excellent D3A book -of that number was truly beyond repair and were either jettisoned or taken back to Japan.

Also i seem to recall the figure of 240 aircraft still available for a hypothetical 3rd strike (from memory 60 kanbaku, 80 Zeros and 100 kanko?), from the same author/book.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think my post is much misunderstood. Depending on the scenario and how many US carriers we are talking about, basing them on the West Coast would be purely a military necessity to minimize the risks for them, nothing to do with running or abandoning.

I don't think the risks would have been big. This is not a 6 Dec 41 asleep-at-the-wheel scenario, this is an active base in wartime with hundreds of aircraft, including four or so Patwings that could literally give 30_ hours of warning for an enemy carrier strike -- not to mention multiple fighter squadrons to combat such a strike, with radar now providing additional warning.

G4Ms couldn't reach PH from Midway anyway, French Frigate shoals was already being denied the H6Ks, and subs were always going to be a threat.

What risk did you have in mind to support the idea of removing the carriers from the field of battle? And how might that affect one's offensive plans?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I don't think the risks would have been big. This is not a 6 Dec 41 asleep-at-the-wheel scenario, this is an active base in wartime with hundreds of aircraft, including four or so Patwings that could literally give 30_ hours of warning for an enemy carrier strike -- not to mention multiple fighter squadrons to combat such a strike, with radar now providing additional warning.

G4Ms couldn't reach PH from Midway anyway, French Frigate shoals was already being denied the H6Ks, and subs were always going to be a threat.

What risk did you have in mind to support the idea of removing the carriers from the field of battle? And how might that affect one's offensive plans?

It took the Enterprise 6 days to sail from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor. You double the time required to react to any move by the Japanese.
What's the point in having ships if you are afraid to use them. The Japanese are the ones who have to conserve ships not the Americans. If you stay in the west coast you are conceding Guadalcanal and Port Moresby to the Japanese. It is far easier to defend territory than to retake it.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

According to this website the abortive raid on Pearl Harbor by 2 H8Ks was detected at 200 miles. Due to the low visibility the fighters couldn't find the bombers but by the same token the bomber couldn't find the target. The Germans and British had beam guidance systems to help them find the targets at night but even with the benefit of those they couldn't hit precision targets.

Japan's little-known 2nd surprise attack on Hawaii failed in more ways than one

Three months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Imperial Navy sought to repeat a surprise bombing raid on the island using its newest long-range aircraft, the “flying boat” Kawanishi H8K.

www.stripes.com

Also on March 10, 1942 the Japanese tried an H8K reconnaissance mission over Midway but it was shot down by Buffalos.

 

[SaparotRob]

I never knew Buffalos took out an H8K. Any more info on that?

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

I never knew Buffalos took out an H8K. Any more info on that?

A Búfalo from from VMF-211:

Flying Boats Flew Japan’s Little-Known Follow-On Raid On Pearl Harbor

The second attempted attack on Pearl Harbor indirectly changed the course of the war in the Pacific.

www.thedrive.com

 

[EwenS]

The Germans and British had beam guidance systems to help them find the targets at night but even with the benefit of those they couldn't hit precision targets.

Not quite true.

The British Oboe system, which used a number of widely separated radar beams from ground stations, was developed as the most accurate bombing system of WW2 and it was very accurate, once the small problem of aligning the European maps with British maps was sorted out. One pilot talks about training to consistently put his bombs in a triangle 27 yards on each side.

But it was not without its difficulties. Crews required extensive training in its use. Each pair of transmitters could only handle about 3-5 aircraft per hour. And its range was limited to about 300 miles. and the further from the transmitters the higher the aircraft had to fly, often reaching 30,000ft at the limits of its range. For that reason its use was largely, but not exclusively, limited to Mosquito Pathfinder aircraft for target marking.

Oboe (navigation) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Oboe

Oboe ‘Blind Bombing’ System Group Captain Keith James ‘Slim’ Somerville joined the Wireless Development Unit (later 109-Squadron) at Boscombe Down. Intelligence & …

masterbombercraig.wordpress.com

Oboe - AMES Type 9000

This section describes the Oboe AMES Type 9000 blind bombing system and its capabilities

www.radarpages.co.uk

Because of all the difficulties in its operation it would have been of no use in the Pacific war.

 

[33k in the air]

Not quite true.

The British Oboe system, which used a number of widely separated radar beams from ground stations, was developed as the most accurate bombing system of WW2 and it was very accurate, once the small problem of aligning the European maps with British maps was sorted out. One pilot talks about training to consistently put his bombs in a triangle 27 yards on each side.

But it was not without its difficulties. Crews required extensive training in its use. Each pair of transmitters could only handle about 3-5 aircraft per hour. And its range was limited to about 300 miles. and the further from the transmitters the higher the aircraft had to fly, often reaching 30,000ft at the limits of its range. For that reason its use was largely, but not exclusively, limited to Mosquito Pathfinder aircraft for target marking.

Wasn't G-H (a.k.a. Gee-H) an improvement upon Oboe?

Because of all the difficulties in its operation it would have been of no use in the Pacific war.

LORAN would be, though,

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Not quite true.

The British Oboe system, which used a number of widely separated radar beams from ground stations, was developed as the most accurate bombing system of WW2 and it was very accurate, once the small problem of aligning the European maps with British maps was sorted out. One pilot talks about training to consistently put his bombs in a triangle 27 yards on each side.

But it was not without its difficulties. Crews required extensive training in its use. Each pair of transmitters could only handle about 3-5 aircraft per hour. And its range was limited to about 300 miles. and the further from the transmitters the higher the aircraft had to fly, often reaching 30,000ft at the limits of its range. For that reason its use was largely, but not exclusively, limited to Mosquito Pathfinder aircraft for target marking.

Oboe (navigation) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Oboe

Oboe ‘Blind Bombing’ System Group Captain Keith James ‘Slim’ Somerville joined the Wireless Development Unit (later 109-Squadron) at Boscombe Down. Intelligence & …

masterbombercraig.wordpress.com

Oboe - AMES Type 9000

This section describes the Oboe AMES Type 9000 blind bombing system and its capabilities

www.radarpages.co.uk

Because of all the difficulties in its operation it would have been of no use in the Pacific war.

Let me rephrase they couldn't hit a target as small as an aircraft carrier

 

[Peter Gunn]

You need a copy of Alan D Zimm's "Attack on Pearl Harbor - Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions"

In that book he devotes a whole chapter (chapter nine What might have been: alerted Pearl Harbor defences) of some 20 pages to just the questions you are pondering, with estimates of Japanese losses under various circumstances.

Read the Amazon preview and the reviews for a better indication of its contents.

The Attack On Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions: Amazon.co.uk: Zimm, Alan D.: 9781612001975: Books

Buy The Attack On Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions by Zimm, Alan D. (ISBN: 9781612001975) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

Thanks, ordered it up on Kindle.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I don't think much Japanese raiding will happen. Every drop of fuel, every bomb, every bullet, and every gram of food will be coming over more than 2,000 miles of ocean at the same time logistic needs are ramping up in New Guinea and the Solomons. Any raid will be unescorted and be going up against a couple of hundred American fighters.

I mentioned the nearer bases to point out that B-24s could hit MI without a problem. I know at least one was built by Jun 42 already, though it was not up to PH standards of quality.

As for "early warning", we already had radar at PH, and would put it on outliers as well, so it's a little more than 30 minutes' notice, I think. The SCR-270 on 7 Dec lit up almost an hour before the first wave hit. Even a P-39 could get to altitude with that sort of warning.



Right. I'm pretty sure that had Midway fallen, that building would have been sped up. Don't you?

Here's a talk Parshall gave to the Naval War College about nine years ago. Go to 26:00 minutes to hear a discussion about the decisiveness of the battle. It directly addresses whether the loss of Midway would be devastating.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y9rkKtK1b44&t=3s

 

[EwenS]

While looking for some other information over on the Combined Fleet site, I found the following note on the TROM for Shokaku. This is a usually well sourced site. The surprise for me is that the decision not to include CarDiv 5 in the Midway Operation pre-dated Coral Sea and the losses they suffered.

17 May 1942 following the damaged Shokaku's return to Japan and previous notification of 14 May that CarDiv 5 would not be available for Midway -

"Despite the impending MI operation, pre-MO Operation plans to transfer a number of CarDiv 5's air crews to other units proceeds as planned, as replacement aircraft are not available.[1]"

Note 1: The pre-Coral Sea plans to transfers aviators of CarDiv 5 to other bases or carriers coupled with the lack of adequate ready replacement aircraft for Coral Sea losses was the main reason CarDiv 5 was not pressed to participate in the Midway Operation. No doubt this sentiment to proceed with the scheduled transfers was strengthened by the May 14 message sent to Combined Fleet that CarDiv 5's losses and that ZUIKAKU had lost 40% of her aviators precluded that carrier's ready use. At the time it was apparently felt that the addition of ZUIKAKU as a "one division ship" with weakened air complement was redundant and would raise more logistical and tactical problems than it would solve. Only hindsight makes it seem obviously a wrong decision.(The Japanese apparently did not think so even in hindsight, for after Midway. When a similar situation obtained after the Santa Cruz battle, the same choice was made and an opportunity to reinforce ZUIKAKU's weakened air group with HIYO's was not taken and she was instead sent home on November 4, 1942 two days after SHOKAKU, thus missing the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November.) As it was, ZUIKAKU was on May 25 allocated to the latter June phase of the projected Aluetians Operations should she be required.

Throughout the early carrier operations the IJN did not rate the aircrews of CarDiv 5 on Shokaku & Zuikaku as highly as those of the other carriers. This was because they were the least well trained. The air groups were only formed in Sept/Oct 1941.

Shokaku was left with 2 Val and 3 Kate aboard after being damaged at Coral Sea. The rest of her air group was either lost or aboard Zuikaku. Zuikaku herself had lost 40% of her own airgroup.

Zuikaku's TROM notes the following in relation to her air group as she returned to Japan after Coral Sea with the related note -

"At battle's end heading back to Japan, ZUIKAKU has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes."


Note 1: Though operational and battle loss figures vary slightly among the sources for Coral Sea, fortunately they all agree in the detail of most interest to historians: how many aircraft remained to Zuikaku on 9 May. If the nine fighters were delivered to Rabaul after the battle (this is unclear) this number was reduced even further. This is the important factor for examining the question of why she was omitted in the Midway Operation. Though Shokaku apparently had 2 dive-bombers and 3 attack planes still aboard after her bomb damage, the Japanese were loath to mix the air groups. Thus officially, both carrier's air groups were considered damaged and lacking after Coral Sea and were besides scheduled to be further diluted. (See next).


So clearly what was on Zuikaku was the sum total of the two carrier groups that remained. Not even the equivalent of a single group for one of these ships.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

You need a copy of Alan D Zimm's "Attack on Pearl Harbor - Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions"

In that book he devotes a whole chapter (chapter nine What might have been: alerted Pearl Harbor defences) of some 20 pages to just the questions you are pondering, with estimates of Japanese losses under various circumstances.

Read the Amazon preview and the reviews for a better indication of its contents.

The Attack On Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions: Amazon.co.uk: Zimm, Alan D.: 9781612001975: Books

Buy The Attack On Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions by Zimm, Alan D. (ISBN: 9781612001975) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

I have to say I am disappointed in this book. I lost interest when I read the following statement:

"Japanese warships were optimized for speed and offensive power, and had considerably less resistance to damage and less damage control capability then comparable US Navy ships."

My BS meter was immediately pinned to full. It may be argued that Japanese damage control was less effective than the USN (although I personally think the difference is exaggerated) but there is no doubt that the Japanese warships were tough. In fact when it comes to heavy cruisers that the Japanese ships was tough as any heavy cruiser in the world and their combat record reflects that.

The author further compounds this in the footnote to this statement when he uses the Yamato as an example. He claims that the Yamato had a poor anti torpedo design. This is related to the incident were Skate torpedoed Yamato and a defect was revealed where the junction between the upper and lower main armored belt failed and 3000 tons of water were shipped. This does not make the Yamato a poorly constructed ship.

In Yamato's last battle it absorbed at least 11 torpedoes before succumbing and its sister the Musashi took 19 torpedoes before it sank. Taking one defect and extrapolating it to a badly constructed ship is nonsense.

Note that the Iowas' torpedo protection was considered defective by the USN. A mock up failed in testing and the system was redesigned for the final 2 (uncompleted) ships. See the following:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSp9OlnGsNE
I will finish reading the book but I am very skeptical.

 

[mack8]

While looking for some other information over on the Combined Fleet site, I found the following note on the TROM for Shokaku. This is a usually well sourced site. The surprise for me is that the decision not to include CarDiv 5 in the Midway Operation pre-dated Coral Sea and the losses they suffered.

17 May 1942 following the damaged Shokaku's return to Japan and previous notification of 14 May that CarDiv 5 would not be available for Midway -

"Despite the impending MI operation, pre-MO Operation plans to transfer a number of CarDiv 5's air crews to other units proceeds as planned, as replacement aircraft are not available.[1]"

Note 1: The pre-Coral Sea plans to transfers aviators of CarDiv 5 to other bases or carriers coupled with the lack of adequate ready replacement aircraft for Coral Sea losses was the main reason CarDiv 5 was not pressed to participate in the Midway Operation. No doubt this sentiment to proceed with the scheduled transfers was strengthened by the May 14 message sent to Combined Fleet that CarDiv 5's losses and that ZUIKAKU had lost 40% of her aviators precluded that carrier's ready use. At the time it was apparently felt that the addition of ZUIKAKU as a "one division ship" with weakened air complement was redundant and would raise more logistical and tactical problems than it would solve. Only hindsight makes it seem obviously a wrong decision.(The Japanese apparently did not think so even in hindsight, for after Midway. When a similar situation obtained after the Santa Cruz battle, the same choice was made and an opportunity to reinforce ZUIKAKU's weakened air group with HIYO's was not taken and she was instead sent home on November 4, 1942 two days after SHOKAKU, thus missing the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November.) As it was, ZUIKAKU was on May 25 allocated to the latter June phase of the projected Aluetians Operations should she be required.

Throughout the early carrier operations the IJN did not rate the aircrews of CarDiv 5 on Shokaku & Zuikaku as highly as those of the other carriers. This was because they were the least well trained. The air groups were only formed in Sept/Oct 1941.

Shokaku was left with 2 Val and 3 Kate aboard after being damaged at Coral Sea. The rest of her air group was either lost or aboard Zuikaku. Zuikaku herself had lost 40% of her own airgroup.

Zuikaku's TROM notes the following in relation to her air group as she returned to Japan after Coral Sea with the related note -

"At battle's end heading back to Japan, ZUIKAKU has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes."


Note 1: Though operational and battle loss figures vary slightly among the sources for Coral Sea, fortunately they all agree in the detail of most interest to historians: how many aircraft remained to Zuikaku on 9 May. If the nine fighters were delivered to Rabaul after the battle (this is unclear) this number was reduced even further. This is the important factor for examining the question of why she was omitted in the Midway Operation. Though Shokaku apparently had 2 dive-bombers and 3 attack planes still aboard after her bomb damage, the Japanese were loath to mix the air groups. Thus officially, both carrier's air groups were considered damaged and lacking after Coral Sea and were besides scheduled to be further diluted. (See next).


So clearly what was on Zuikaku was the sum total of the two carrier groups that remained. Not even the equivalent of a single group for one of these ships.

And yet the same authors claim the Zuikaku COULD have been sent to Midway if they wanted to with 25 Zero, 17 D3A and 14 B5N (the damaged aircraft are said to likely be ready a day or two after the Coral Sea battle). And regarding the dilution, of note is that quite a lot more crews than the numbers of aircraft suggest would have been available, because some ditched and were recovered near the carriers (not sure how many atm (7?), but Tagaya has a good account, just have to add the numbers up), or their planes were jettisoned (12 in all iirc, 3 Zero, 4 D3A and 5 B5N - presumably the more damaged ones, though again Tagaya gives an example of at least one D3A that was not badly damaged) in the rush to land the returning strike.

Previously i suggested a way to give Zuikaku a full airgroup if they would have sent it, they only needed some B5Ns (6-7) from Kaga to fill the kanko squadron.

 

[mack8]

Here's a talk Parshall gave to the Naval War College about nine years ago. Go to 26:00 minutes to hear a discussion about the decisiveness of the battle. It directly addresses whether the loss of Midway would be devastating.

Could you repost the link, as i'm not seeing anything? Thanks.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Could you repost the link, as i'm not seeing anything? Thanks.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y9rkKtK1b44&t=3s