Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Shortround6]

As knock on effects go, it may be small but abandoning the Aleutian campaign may or may not be profitable for the Japanese in the long run. How many Aircraft, and troops/equipment went into the Aleutians in the summer/fall of 1942?
The idea of giving the US free reign to advance down the Aleutians was part of what drove the raid.

It also acted like a training exercise for two Japanese carriers which were not up to full strength in any case.

 

[GrauGeist]

CinCPac OpOrd for Midway

My Uncle's boat, the Grayling (SS-209) was attacked by one of Midway's B-17s, too.
A crash dive took her out of harm's way.

 

[R Leonard]

My Uncle's boat, the Grayling (SS-209) was attacked by one of Midway's B-17s, too.
A crash dive took her out of harm's way.

And the B-17 drivers claimed sinking a Japanese cruiser!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The IJN burnt a lot of oil in 1942/43. The USN's early carrier raids achieved almost nothing in strategic or tactical terms, except for training USN personnel and provoking the IJN with the Doolittle raid. A carrier/cruiser raid on Midway wouldn't do much either (as per the IJN raid on 4 June) unless the TF sticks around for a day or two and then a KB interception becomes more probable.

But being closer, it would be much easier to apply more force more often.

You keep saying that Midway is essentially worthless, yet the USN would run risks to neutralize it or retake it, and this seems a bit contradictory. I've explained in earlier posts why the USN wanted Midway and what they used it for and the IJN would do the same: Sub base, Recon, and ASW airbase.

Two things you may not be considering: the proximity to PH would make raiding much more feasible in force and more often; and also, the political pressure generated by that proximity would make retaking it politically necessary.

The historical outcome at Midway turned on faulty IJN recon even with the USN having a very good idea when to expect the KB. With more IJN carriers there's a good chance that the USN TFs are spotted early and hit early. If the USN gets beaten at Midway, along with the drubbing that Allied shipping is taking from 'Drumbeat' then King is most probably toast along with his SW Pacific first strategy.

Again, that depends on the circumstances. if calculated risk saw the US carriers not engage at all (and those were Nimitz's orders), then King's job is probably safe. But again, second-order counterfactuals only clutter the discussion table.

If the USN doesn't contest the IJN landing at Midway we still end up with King's SW Pacific strategy stalled and the Allied position in the MTO and IOTO in a precarious position and King probably gets the boot unless he bows to the high command's 'Germany First' strategy.

FDR was a big supporter of King's. Look at it this way: King wasn't given the boot after the two biggest American naval defeats of the war happened in 1942 (the Drumbeat massacre and Savo Island).

In which case taking back Midway has to wait until the Essex and CVL classes start to arrive and in the meantime some of the USN carriers are repositioned to protect the IO ( and the SLOC to India and Australia via the IO). The Marines and US Army units are sent to Australia and NG to fight the IJA.

As Anglophobe as King was, and with the Japanese 1100 miles from PH, I don't think politics or strategy would allow the hypothetical move. The main threat a Japanese force on Midway would present would be close stationing of subs, but those will be vulnerable to airstrike while in the lagoon.

 

[GrauGeist]

And the B-17 drivers claimed sinking a Japanese cruiser!

And the B-17 crew was astonished at how fast that Japanese cruiser sank, too!

 

[mack8]

Just add something should have done previously, the G4M does not have the range to attack PH, i've read somewhere once that the maximum radius of the G4M was 880nm, not sure if with a torpedo or reduced bombload.

So with Midway in japanese hands the danger would "only" be from H6K an H8K nuisance raids, and IJN subs staged through Midway. So imo it will be foolish NOT to withraw the carriers and battleships temporarily, risking a lucky bomb hit or sub attack hit while being at Pearl.

Btw the document posted by R Leonard, shows exactly what J Lundstrom pointed, Nimitz comitted to battle 2 vs 5 initially, and he was expecting much stronger escorts for Nagumo. Ironically if Nagumo had with him the other 2 Kongos and another cruiser division, with the extra search planes chances are high he would have spotted TF16 or 17 in time, about 06.30 or so.

Also note no mention of Yamamoto's 7 battleships! So the US intelligence was not all seeing. Actually after Midway due to the IJN code change already on May 27, they lost the ability to read their mail, hence being constantly one step behind the japanese for most of Guadalcanal battle - at Eastern Solomons intel said the IJN carriers were in home waters or at Truk even as they were literally getting ready to launch on Fletcher!

As to Nimitz, as he comitted 2 vs 5, likely he will probably go for 3 vs 7 too. And the calculated risk thing is all fine and dandy, BUT once comitted to battle, it was either win or lose for the USN, 30 kts ships can't run away from 200 kts planes! So if the initial US strike failed to hit enough carriers, or they were discovered early, they are in mortal danger.

As to the Aleutians, actually it doesn't even need to be cancelled, just postponed. Recall that after Midway between i believe June 28th and July 7 carriers Zuikaku, Junyo, Zuiho and Ryujo cruised in northern waters covering a convoy to Kiska. In this scenario that may well be the invasion convoy.

 

[Conslaw]

I think that overstates things a bit. However the loss of Midway would have greatly hampered USN sub operations against Japan. Of course by ~1944 the overwhelming USA and Allied industrial advantage would overwhelm IJ, but in the short term the loss of Midway would complicate the USN position in the PTO.

True to a point, but although the US Navy brass couldn't have known it at the time, US subs would not accomplish a lot until well into 1943, and by that time Midway could have been retaken. In fact, I think it is likely that the 1st Marine Division that took Guadalcanal would have been redirected to retake Midway, so that could have happened by the end of the summer 1942. I don't think the US would have assaulted Guadalcanal in 1942 in such a scenario, but I'm not even sure that under different circumstances Guadalcanal would have been the choice for a first offensive assault.

I think maybe the Gilberts would have been the target. That would have been interesting. - Imagine no Solomons campaign at all. There would be no Espirito Santo and New Caledonia to use as advanced bases, but if you are assaulting the Gilberts in early 1943, you would have Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet, Wasp, Saratoga and the 4 Sangamon-class large escort carriers, minus whatever ships are held back for maintenance or unavailable due to submarine attack or whatever. (It's also possible that without carriers lost in the Pacific, the Sangamon carriers would be held back in the Atlantic - which might have helped defeat the U-boats earlier.).

 

[Conslaw]

Ultimately IJ was playing a losing hand; we all know this but the loss of Midway and one or more USN fleet carriers in June 1942, but with the IJN loosing one or even two would have delayed the Allied counteroffensive in the SW Pacific until Midway was retaken.

If we concentrate all the IJN carriers at Midway and the IJN use the extra aircraft to improve their recon, then it's quite possible that Midway could have been a resounding defeat for the USN despite their sigint advantages, and even the actual historical encounter could have turned into a draw, if IJN recon had been a bit more successful.

The Allied strategic position on 1 June 1942 was quite precarious; Malta was just holding on, the Axis armies were pushing rapidly towards Stalingrad and the Baku oil fields, and IO was up for grabs so the RN had to gamble in the IO by pulling out their carriers to try and resupply Malta.

RCAFson, you are right that concentrating all the carriers at Midway could have ended up with a resounding defeat of the USN, but if the USN knew of the forces coming it gave the USN reason not to engage. The USN didn't just know what was coming. it knew what wasn't coming (within a margin for error).

The Japanese had some bad luck in the battle of Midway. Their scouts just missed finding American carriers. Hiryu's planes found Yorktown twice rather than two separate carriers. The Americans had some bad luck too. The complete uselessness of the Hornet's air group being the biggest negative. Better fighter direction, especially relating to Enterprise and Hornet fighters, might have saved the Yorktown.

 

[Conslaw]

But there's the rub. The Allies don't have infinite resources either at this critical juncture. Having an intact KB leaves the IJN with the option of interdicting Allies sea LOS in the IO, and then the potential for the Allied position in the IOTO and MTO to collapse and with it the potential for the USSR to make a separate peace.

The safe bet would be for the USN fleet carriers to be sent to the IO to protect it while the RN carriers cover the resupply of Malta and I sus[ect that the Allied high command would see it that way as well.

The US Navy, the US Government, showed no signs of giving a s--t about the Indian Ocean. Once the Burma Road was lost, the US seemed to have no significant strategic interest in the area.

By the middle of 1942, American losses to U-Boats in the Atlantic were, in the big picture, actually the most pressing problem for the US Navy. The Pacific Ocean was the historical wargame playing field for US admirals, so it was still going to get some attention anyway, but after the Atlantic and Pacific, there was no priority left for the Indian Ocean.

I also suspect that US naval strategists did not necessarily agree that a Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal posed an existential threat to US shipping to-from Australia. Occasional carrier raids and shore bombardment could suppress airpower to the point where it was certainly no worse than the German airpower that sometimes caused endurable losses in shipping routes in that other theater. King wanted a Pacific offensive, and the airfield at Guadalcanal was an opportunistic chance to field an achievable offensive and take advantage of the mistake the Japanese made by starting an airfield they weren't prepared to defend. If during the same period of time Midway was in Japanese hands, I think King would have wanted to take Midway instead.

 

[Conslaw]

Just add something should have done previously, the G4M does not have the range to attack PH, i've read somewhere once that the maximum radius of the G4M was 880nm, not sure if with a torpedo or reduced bombload.

So with Midway in japanese hands the danger would "only" be from H6K an H8K nuisance raids, and IJN subs staged through Midway. So imo it will be foolish NOT to withraw the carriers and battleships temporarily, risking a lucky bomb hit or sub attack hit while being at Pearl.

Btw the document posted by R Leonard, shows exactly what J Lundstrom pointed, Nimitz comitted to battle 2 vs 5 initially, and he was expecting much stronger escorts for Nagumo. Ironically if Nagumo had with him the other 2 Kongos and another cruiser division, with the extra search planes chances are high he would have spotted TF16 or 17 in time, about 06.30 or so.

Also note no mention of Yamamoto's 7 battleships! So the US intelligence was not all seeing. Actually after Midway due to the IJN code change already on May 27, they lost the ability to read their mail, hence being constantly one step behind the japanese for most of Guadalcanal battle - at Eastern Solomons intel said the IJN carriers were in home waters or at Truk even as they were literally getting ready to launch on Fletcher!

As to Nimitz, as he comitted 2 vs 5, likely he will probably go for 3 vs 7 too. And the calculated risk thing is all fine and dandy, BUT once comitted to battle, it was either win or lose for the USN, 30 kts ships can't run away from 200 kts planes! So if the initial US strike failed to hit enough carriers, or they were discovered early, they are in mortal danger.

As to the Aleutians, actually it doesn't even need to be cancelled, just postponed. Recall that after Midway between i believe June 28th and July 7 carriers Zuikaku, Junyo, Zuiho and Ryujo cruised in northern waters covering a convoy to Kiska. In this scenario that may well be the invasion convoy.

Zuikaku & company may have been fit to escort a convoy to Kiska while they were training an airgoup.

The IJN burnt a lot of oil in 1942/43. The USN's early carrier raids achieved almost nothing in strategic or tactical terms, except for training USN personnel and provoking the IJN with the Doolittle raid. A carrier/cruiser raid on Midway wouldn't do much either (as per the IJN raid on 4 June) unless the TF sticks around for a day or two and then a KB interception becomes more probable.

You keep saying that Midway is essentially worthless, yet the USN would run risks to neutralize it or retake it, and this seems a bit contradictory. I've explained in earlier posts why the USN wanted Midway and what they used it for and the IJN would do the same: Sub base, Recon, and ASW airbase.

The historical outcome at Midway turned on faulty IJN recon even with the USN having a very good idea when to expect the KB. With more IJN carriers there's a good chance that the USN TFs are spotted early and hit early. If the USN gets beaten at Midway, along with the drubbing that Allied shipping is taking from 'Drumbeat' then King is most probably toast along with his SW Pacific first strategy. If the USN doesn't contest the IJN landing at Midway we still end up with King's SW Pacific strategy stalled and the Allied position in the MTO and IOTO in a precarious position and King probably gets the boot unless he bows to the high command's 'Germany First' strategy. In which case taking back Midway has to wait until the Essex and CVL classes start to arrive and in the meantime some of the USN carriers are repositioned to protect the IO ( and the SLOC to India and Australia via the IO). The Marines and US Army units are sent to Australia and NG to fight the IJA.

The training of US carrier personnel in the early carrier raids was crucial, and it may have made the difference between Yorktown and Enterprise being effective at Midway and Hornet not being effective. US early raids, for better or worse, made Japan increase its garrisons in places like the Marshall and Gilbert Islands - garrisons that could not be directed toward the Solomons, etc.

Midway was worthless to Japan. It was not worthless to the Americans. It just wasn't worth risking the US carrier fleet if the odds were against a victory.

Yes historically Midway may have turned on faulty IJN recon - but IJN recon failures were partly because US carriers were positioned to make them most likely to avoid recon (due to the intelligence advantage.).

I agree with you that if Midway failed, Admiral King was likely to have been sacked; but I I'm not sure that would have made a material change in US strategy. I think King got right more than he got wrong, and other intelligent admirals may have followed the same logical paths. I know Roosevelt was fully down with a march across the Pacific as soon as it was feasible. A lot of the forces that would have been dedicated to retaking Midway would not have been usable in the Atlantic. The US didn't like to keep its front line carriers in the Atlantic to be U-Boat target practice. I think if the US lost Midway, I don't see Guadalcanal being invaded in 1942 though. I wonder what would have happened if Midway was lost and all the US carriers were spared. The Wasp probably would have stayed in the Atlantic. Yorktown would have gone into the yard, and the Enterprise, Saratoga and Hornet may have raided for a while - perhaps limited by a shortage of fast tankers. All three carriers would have given their air groups target practice on Midway whenever they passed by.

 

[EwenS]

The decision to move the Wasp to the Pacific was taken following the loss of the Lexington and the damage to Yorktown at Coral Sea. She was then hurried back to Norfolk following the completion of her second Malta run and given a quick refit. She left Norfolk on 6th June and transitted the Panama Canal on the 10th.

So Yorktown surviving Midway does not change that, especially when that ship required some serious yard time to properly fix the damage she suffered at Coral Sea (the work done on her at PH ahead of Midway was a 48 hour quick patch up job not a proper repair). She would probably have needed 3-6 months at the Puget Sound NY for full repairs plus modifications to incorporate the lessons already learned during the war to date.

U.S.S. Yorktown--Action Report of the Battle of the Coral Sea

www.ibiblio.org

 

[Barrett]

My Uncle's boat, the Grayling (SS-209) was attacked by one of Midway's B-17s, too.
A crash dive took her out of harm's way.

I think that was the episode when the AAF claimed sinking a Japanese cruiser in 30 seconds!

 

[GrauGeist]

I think that was the episode when the AAF claimed sinking a Japanese cruiser in 30 seconds!

Yes indeed.

I could see the Grayling being mistaken for a destroyer (Gato class boats were over 300 feet long), but a Cruiser?

 

[SaparotRob]

It was sunk. Who's gonna' check?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Yes indeed.

I could see the Grayling being mistaken for a destroyer (Gato class boats were over 300 feet long), but a Cruiser?

It was common for destroyers to become cruisers, cruisers to become battleships. Oddly enough the instances of under claiming are rare.

 

[Shortround6]

but a Cruiser?

Tenryū-class cruiser.

As has been said. No pilot, aircrew thought the target ship was smaller....................ever.

 

[EwenS]

As has been said. No pilot, aircrew thought the target ship was smaller....................ever.

In 1982 Argentinian Naval pilots mistook the frigate Avenger for the Invincible and claimed, wrongly, to have sunk her!!

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Frankly i think the USN will move the heavy units out of PH, temporarily at least. I don't think they will chance a lucky hit on a carrier from a seaplane raid.

There is no way that the USN is going to tuck its tail between its legs and run back to San Francisco. The loss of reputation would be enormous for the USN and for that matter the US itself. Morale within the Navy would plummet. The US would be announcing to the world that they are allowing Japan to run uncontested in the Pacific for the next full year (until the Essex and Lexington arrive). Japan would have won a tremendous strategic victory without firing a shot. All because the USN is terrified of a half dozen flying boats based 1500 miles away.

Meanwhile the world is watching the heroics of the Royal Navy fighting convoys through to Malta and Murmansk at great cost in men and ships while the USN is imitating the Regia Marina. USN will not be greeted warmly by the US civilian population. The British are battling terrible odds while USN hiding behind their skirts.

The USN has ambitions of displacing the RN as the worlds finest Navy. By retreating they would be condemning themselves to playing little brother to the RN and the US Army. The USN has established parity with the RN on paper through some clever treaties but real test is battle. Hiding in port is not the path to glory.

As Admiral Cunningham succinctly put it during the evacuation of Crete "It takes three years for the Navy to build a ship it will take 300 years to build a new tradition."

 

[GrauGeist]

The USN would not have backed down if Midway was a loss.

As it happened, Oahu's defenses were reorganized and upgraded after 7 December, so any attempt to mount anything more than a token raid against the island would be met with fierce opposition.

For an excellent overview and detail about how Oahu's (and the rest of the Hawaiian Islands) defenses transformed, read this article, as well as the following chapters:

Chapter VI: The Reinforcement of Oahu

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

In this vid, Jon Parshall say that a couple of mathematicians developed a model for various options to see if there was any posibility that IJN could win at Midway and not in one it was posible (been the options in the realm of the posible at that moment).

Don't remember the exact point were it starts.


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