Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Thumpalumpacus]

True but as mentioned above the only existing airfield/s NW of Oahu was/were on Kauai which only gains about 100 miles. For the US this is huge as far as defense goes. For attacking Midway, not so much. Kauai gives the US about 30 minutes more notice of an incoming raid or forces a 100+ detour. This does not count ships acting as pickets. It also means that Kauai based fighters can pursue escaping enemy aircraft over 100 miles further than Oahu based fighters or the Oahu fighters can land on Kauai to refuel after pursuing the Japanese fighters.

I don't think much Japanese raiding will happen. Every drop of fuel, every bomb, every bullet, and every gram of food will be coming over more than 2,000 miles of ocean at the same time logistic needs are ramping up in New Guinea and the Solomons. Any raid will be unescorted and be going up against a couple of hundred American fighters.

I mentioned the nearer bases to point out that B-24s could hit MI without a problem. I know at least one was built by Jun 42 already, though it was not up to PH standards of quality.

As for "early warning", we already had radar at PH, and would put it on outliers as well, so it's a little more than 30 minutes' notice, I think. The SCR-270 on 7 Dec lit up almost an hour before the first wave hit. Even a P-39 could get to altitude with that sort of warning.

The problem for both the US and the Japanese in trying to extend the chain of air bases it there really wasn't much suitable in between Kauai and Midway and most of the Islands/atolls were very small, ringed with reefs, sometimes less than 10 ft high, had no water, etc. The US did it but it took months and considerable engineering effort.

Right. I'm pretty sure that had Midway fallen, that building would have been sped up. Don't you?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The USN was also short on cruisers which is why 2nd Guadalcanal was fought by 2 fast battleships and 4 destroyers.

The cruiser shortage only came about from combat in the Solomons. Had Midway fallen, Savo Island would not have happened, and those cruisers would not have been lost. Neither the cruisers lost on Friday the 13th, nor Tassafaronga.

When doing counterfactuals you need to remember the knock-ons. America loses at Midway, we don't attack the Solomons in August, and we don't have that cruiser shortage because there ain't that bloodletting. Guess where those cruisers get used?

 

[RCAFson]

The cruiser shortage only came about from combat in the Solomons. Had Midway fallen, Savo Island would not have happened, and those cruisers would not have been lost. Neither the cruisers lost on Friday the 13th, nor Tassafaronga.

When doing counterfactuals you need to remember the knock-ons. America loses at Midway, we don't attack the Solomons in August, and we don't have that cruiser shortage because there ain't that bloodletting. Guess where those cruisers get used?

Yes, that's true, but then the Allied offensive in the SWP doesn't happen.

Remember that in this scenario the IJN fleet carriers are largely intact. This means that any USN sweep around Midway will potentially run into the KB

 

[Shortround6]

As for "early warning", we already had radar at PH, and would put it on outliers as well, so it's a little more than 30 minutes' notice, I think. The SCR-270 on 7 Dec lit up almost an hour before the first wave hit. Even a P-39 could get to altitude with thaqt sort of warning.

I was saying that it would extend the warning time over Oaho based radars by 30 minutes (assuming cruise speed of 200mph) and I am sure that they mounted radar/s on Kauai as soon as possible for that reason.

Right. I'm pretty sure that had Midway fallen, that building would have been sped up. Don't you?

Yes but it would not have been quick. Cut construction time from 9 months to 5 - 6 months?

They put one sea plane tender into French Frigate Shoals after the March 1942 raid by the 2 Emily's and a minelayer.

They had to extend the original Island from a few hundred feet to 3100 x 275 ft using dredged coral.
It was never more than an emergency landing field and base for a few recon planes. the construction crew was housed on board the YHB-10 for a while.

Depending on how you read the history the YHB-10 may never have left French Frigate Shoals being expended as a torpedo target there on March 26th 1945.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes, that's true, but then the Allied offensive in the SWP doesn't happen.

Right, that's pretty much what I said. Now, it would have happened in 1943, I believe, because King was determined to secure sea lanes to Australia. But that still means cruisers sailing around Midway when they damned well please.

Remember that in this scenario the IJN fleet carriers are largely intact. This means that any USN sweep around Midway will potentially run into the KB

And those carriers will once more be open to ambush.

Further: how much fuel does it take to sortie that fleet, and how much does Japan have? Remember, in Oct 41 the IJN figured they had 18 months of fuel for combat ops. Now remember you've got to fuel the ships supplying New Guinea and Tulagi, Nauru, and related operations. Further: are you willing to risk your carriers tied to supporting a land base? That's not a good idea at all, because it negates their prime quality, mobility. Look at the American experience in the Solomons. Carriers nailed to defending Guadalcanal got torpedoed twice, with one lost, and then another lost and another damaged in battle. It's a waste of valuable assets, both ships, men, and oil.

I think Nimitz assayed it right: losing Midway was survivable, losing carriers, not so much.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes but it would not have been quick. Cut construction time from 9 months to 5 - 6 months?

That's still not enough time for the Japanese to mount a credible threat from Midway, imo. Remember too that if Midway is lost you're not deploying Seabees to the Solomons, and might have a battalion handy for this work as a result.

 

[Shortround6]

That's still not enough time for the Japanese to mount a credible threat from Midway, imo. Remember too that if Midway is lost you're not deploying Seabees to the Solomons, and might have a battalion handy for this work as a result.

The Japanese don't have the logistics to mount such an offensive. The closest base to Midway from Japanese territory is over twice as far as Midway to Pearl Harbor so the ability of the Japanese to sustain ships around Midway to counter US cruisers and Destroyers is not good.

The problem with trying to build the base at French Frigate Shoals is not the man power itself, it is housing, feeding (water) the men and the capacity to dredge the coral for fill.

The Japanese have a couple of Islands closer to Midway but they don't have the fuel, aircraft, construction equipment, and other "stuff" to start building forward bases.

I agree that the the loss of Midway from a military perspective was not really worth the price of more carriers. Propaganda value might be different.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Propaganda value might be different.

That same propaganda would see Midway retaken before 1942 was out, I believe.

 

[RCAFson]

Right, that's pretty much what I said. Now, it would have happened in 1943, I believe, because King was determined to secure sea lanes to Australia. But that still means cruisers sailing around Midway when they damned well please.



And those carriers will once more be open to ambush.

Further: how much fuel does it take to sortie that fleet, and how much does Japan have? Remember, in Oct 41 the IJN figured they had 18 months of fuel for combat ops. Now remember you've got to fuel the ships supplying New Guinea and Tulagi, Nauru, and related operations. Further: are you willing to risk your carriers tied to supporting a land base? That's not a good idea at all, because it negates their prime quality, mobility. Look at the American experience in the Solomons. Carriers nailed to defending Guadalcanal got torpedoed twice, with one lost, and then another lost and another damaged in battle. It's a waste of valuable assets, both ships, men, and oil.

I think Nimitz assayed it right: losing Midway was survivable, losing carriers, not so much.

But there's the rub. The Allies don't have infinite resources either at this critical juncture. Having an intact KB leaves the IJN with the option of interdicting Allies sea LOS in the IO, and then the potential for the Allied position in the IOTO and MTO to collapse and with it the potential for the USSR to make a separate peace.

The safe bet would be for the USN fleet carriers to be sent to the IO to protect it while the RN carriers cover the resupply of Malta and I sus[ect that the Allied high command would see it that way as well.

 

[EwenS]

Right, that's pretty much what I said. Now, it would have happened in 1943, I believe, because King was determined to secure sea lanes to Australia. But that still means cruisers sailing around Midway when they damned well please.



And those carriers will once more be open to ambush.

Further: how much fuel does it take to sortie that fleet, and how much does Japan have? Remember, in Oct 41 the IJN figured they had 18 months of fuel for combat ops. Now remember you've got to fuel the ships supplying New Guinea and Tulagi, Nauru, and related operations. Further: are you willing to risk your carriers tied to supporting a land base? That's not a good idea at all, because it negates their prime quality, mobility. Look at the American experience in the Solomons. Carriers nailed to defending Guadalcanal got torpedoed twice, with one lost, and then another lost and another damaged in battle. It's a waste of valuable assets, both ships, men, and oil.

I think Nimitz assayed it right: losing Midway was survivable, losing carriers, not so much.

Japan's oil position did not deteriorate nearly as much in 1942 as was predicted. That was largelt due to the stocks captured in the DEI and the way that the Japanese were able to bring the oilfields and, more importantly the refineries back on line. The Japanese problem was really one of moving it to where it was needed. That got immeasurably worse as 1943 went on.

I've posted this before but it is worth it again. It is the only serious study I've seen done on Japan's oil position in WW2. Note the table on p54 comparing the budgeted oil reserves at the end of 1942 v actual (20.3m barrels budgeted v 30m actual) barrels and that started from a lower actual than budgeted opening figure. Understanding the oil position is complicated by both the IJA & the IJN lying anbout what they held to begin with and the oil going staright from the DEI to the frontline without going to japan in the first place.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

But there's the rub. The Allies don't have infinite resources either at this critical juncture. Having an intact KB leaves the IJN with the option of interdicting Allies sea LOS in the IO, and then the potential for the Allied position in the IOTO and MTO to collapse and with it the potential for the USSR to make a separate peace.

So is Kido Butai in the Indian Ocean, or Central Pacific. You're arguing they can be a threat to both -- and that even as Japan is driving to sever communications with Australia.

The safe bet would be for the USN fleet carriers to be sent to the IO to protect it while the RN carriers cover the resupply of Malta and I sus[ect that the Allied high command would see it that way as well.

Lord, no. King would have cried bloody murder at this proposition. Further, it would allow the Japanese to consolidate a shaky spot at Midway even as the American people and press are demanding its recapture.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Japan's oil position did not deteriorate nearly as much in 1942 as was predicted. That was largelt due to the stocks captured in the DEI and the way that the Japanese were able to bring the oilfields and, more importantly the refineries back on line. The Japanese problem was really one of moving it to where it was needed. That got immeasurably worse as 1943 went on.

I've posted this before but it is worth it again. It is the only serious study I've seen done on Japan's oil position in WW2. Note the table on p54 comparing the budgeted oil reserves at the end of 1942 v actual (20.3m barrels budgeted v 30m actual) barrels and that started from a lower actual than budgeted opening figure. Understanding the oil position is complicated by both the IJA & the IJN lying anbout what they held to begin with and the oil going staright from the DEI to the frontline without going to japan in the first place.

Right, but RCAFSon is positing keeping KdB defending Midway (for how long?) and now, apparently, threatening another Operation C. That's a lot of oil being burned in his counterfactual.

 

[RCAFson]

So is Kido Butai in the Indian Ocean, or Central Pacific. You're arguing they can be a threat to both -- and that even as Japan is driving to sever communications with Australia.



Lord, no. King would have cried bloody murder at this proposition. Further, it would allow the Japanese to consolidate a shaky spot at Midway even as the American people and press are demanding its recapture.

The KB doesn't have to be anywhere in particular, it just has to threaten to be there. Even a fast carrier raid into the IO with IJN CVLs and maybe the two Junyos and would have put incredible strains on the situation in the MTO and IOTO.

King would probably have been relieved of command along with the idea of spending so many Allied resources in the SWP, whilst potentially losing the war.

 

[SaparotRob]

..As for "early warning", we already had radar at PH, and would put it on outliers as well,...

And this time they'd take it seriously.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The KB doesn't have to be anywhere in particular, it just has to threaten to be there. Even a fast carrier raid into the IO with IJN CVLs and maybe the two Junyos and would have put incredible strains on the situation in the MTO and IOTO.

King would probably have been relieved of command along with the idea of spending so many Allied resources in the SWP, whilst potentially losing the war.

Again, that's a lot of Japanese oil being burnt, and if KdB ain't in CenPac, that's a nice window to bombard the Japanese MI garrison. You'd posited that that wouldn't happen because the Japanese carriers would presumably be nearby, but now you're arguing that their simply existing would forestall any raiding. That didn't hold true in early 1942. Why should it hold true in the summer?

Remember too that we could track their movements by traffic analysis even though they'd updated JN-25b. We would likely know when the window of opportunity was present.

As for King being relieved, that depends on circumstances. But as with most counterfactuals, we now see alternatives piled atop alternatives, rendering the entire exercise rather pointless. Meanwhile, you still haven't explained why taking Midway would be a useful and affordable conquest -- when even the Japanese only wanted to use it as bait.

 

[SaparotRob]

Being rather provincial, I never thought about the effects of the Battle of Midway on the Indian Ocean in the big scheme of things. I remember losing Malta while trying to defend Wake, though. However, you guys brought up IJN logistics were stretched to begin with. Now stretch that further by protecting Midway. If the scenario leaves the USN with carriers, the IJN will be playing whack a mole across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Not much in the way of gas stations along the way. A carrier equipped navy (Now with battleships!) at either end of a long supply chain wouldn't be a good idea. Midway was too close to Pearl and the U.S. I know Admiral Yamamoto had troop ships. IIRC that was the group first spotted by the PBY. Admiral Yamamoto would have leveled the place. Landed troops. Raised the flag. Leave some forlorn troops to die for the Empire and split. IMHO.

 

[GrauGeist]

I see something that is largely overlooked when the intact Kido Butai and captured Midway Atoll is brought up: the USN's sub fleet.

The IJN's carrier groups might be a problem to U.S. and Allied surface elements, but the subs will be there everywhere the Japanese are and the IJN will most certainly know it.

 

[SaparotRob]

I see something that is largely overlooked when the intact Kido Butai and captured Midway Atoll is brought up: the USN's sub fleet.

The IJN's carrier groups might be a problem to U.S. and Allied surface elements, but the subs will be there everywhere the Japanese are and the IJN will most certainly know it.

I gave them a lot of thought but I didn't want to go down the torpedo rabbit hole.

 

[RCAFson]

Again, that's a lot of Japanese oil being burnt, and if KdB ain't in CenPac, that's a nice window to bombard the Japanese MI garrison. You'd posited that that wouldn't happen because the Japanese carriers would presumably be nearby, but now you're arguing that their simply existing would forestall any raiding. That didn't hold true in early 1942. Why should it hold true in the summer?

Remember too that we could track their movements by traffic analysis even though they'd updated JN-25b. We would likely know when the window of opportunity was present.

As for King being relieved, that depends on circumstances. But as with most counterfactuals, we now see alternatives piled atop alternatives, rendering the entire exercise rather pointless. Meanwhile, you still haven't explained why taking Midway would be a useful and affordable conquest -- when even the Japanese only wanted to use it as bait.

The IJN burnt a lot of oil in 1942/43. The USN's early carrier raids achieved almost nothing in strategic or tactical terms, except for training USN personnel and provoking the IJN with the Doolittle raid. A carrier/cruiser raid on Midway wouldn't do much either (as per the IJN raid on 4 June) unless the TF sticks around for a day or two and then a KB interception becomes more probable.

You keep saying that Midway is essentially worthless, yet the USN would run risks to neutralize it or retake it, and this seems a bit contradictory. I've explained in earlier posts why the USN wanted Midway and what they used it for and the IJN would do the same: Sub base, Recon, and ASW airbase.

The historical outcome at Midway turned on faulty IJN recon even with the USN having a very good idea when to expect the KB. With more IJN carriers there's a good chance that the USN TFs are spotted early and hit early. If the USN gets beaten at Midway, along with the drubbing that Allied shipping is taking from 'Drumbeat' then King is most probably toast along with his SW Pacific first strategy. If the USN doesn't contest the IJN landing at Midway we still end up with King's SW Pacific strategy stalled and the Allied position in the MTO and IOTO in a precarious position and King probably gets the boot unless he bows to the high command's 'Germany First' strategy. In which case taking back Midway has to wait until the Essex and CVL classes start to arrive and in the meantime some of the USN carriers are repositioned to protect the IO ( and the SLOC to India and Australia via the IO). The Marines and US Army units are sent to Australia and NG to fight the IJA.

 

[R Leonard]

Nimitz didn't regard it so valuable as to be indispensable. I'll see if I might find his orders to Fletcher and Spruance. He didn't deem it so important as you seem to.

CinCPac OpOrd for Midway