Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

[Thumpalumpacus]

If the IJN had brought 6 or 7 carriers to attack Midway, the odds are greater, under his principle of "calculated risk", that Nimitz would have avoided carrier combat entirely. Now, ignoring the issue of whether Japan would or would not have successfully taken Midway, this scenario creates another problem. More ships mean more oil consumption. Arguably Japan just lost the battle through the mere act of sorteeing the whole fleet, and using up a huge chunk of its strategic oil reserve - basically for nothing, no climactic battle and no defendable gain At best and an embarrassing defeat on the ground at worst.

Nimitz had already made his peace with losing Midway, had such been necessary. His orders were to save the carriers even at the cost of losing the island, because he knew that the Japanese would have a hard time holding, supplying, and defending it.

 

[GrauGeist]

Nimitz had already made his peace with losing Midway, had such been necessary. His orders were to save the carriers even at the cost of losing the island, because he knew that the Japanese would have a hard time holding, supplying, and defending it.

Agreed.

Let Midway go if need be and the USN will be back when conditions are right.

It's hard to imagine that just shy of three years later at the invasion of Okinawa, the U.S. naval assets included 11 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers, 22 escort carriers, 18 battleships, 31 cruisers (all types) and almost 180 destroyers...

 

[mack8]

No more capital ships. Everything in commission was committed to Midway/Aleutians. 7 with the Midway Forces & 4 with the Aleutian forces. Musashi was yet to complete.

Same story with heavy cruisers. Only ones not committed were 3 in refit and 2 based out of Rabaul.

That only leaves the old WW1 design light cruisers and the training cruisers. Of those 20, 9 were already allocated to those assaults.

I haven't looked in detail at the DD position, but the vast majority of the modern ones were already allocated to these forces.


Hosho speed 25 knots
Junyo speed 25.5 knots
Zuiho speed 28 knots
Ryujo speed 29 knots
Zuikaku speed 34.25 knots


But how are you intending to deploy them? The Kongo battlecruisers used as carrier escorts are only capable of 30 knots with all the other old battleships only good for 25 knots. Yamato was 27 knots. And anyway carriers don't go haring around the oceans for most of the time at those kinds of speeds.

Historically Junyo & Ryujo went to the Aleutians & Hosho covered the First Fleet Main Force & Zuiho covered the Second Fleet Main Body. So what are you sacrificing?

I assume that in this scenario AO is cancelled, at least that's what the OP seems to suggest? So the escorts historically earmarked for Aleutians could be reassigned.

The OP wants 7 (and even 8 in another post) carriers with Nagumo so this is what i tried to reasonably get to. Now how i want them organized and how the japanese would are two different things. I would bunch up together Kondo and Kurita's 2 BB and 8 CA with Nagumo, leaving Hosogayas 3 CAs to cover the Midway invasion force. I would also have Yamamoto's oil guzzling BBs stay home, but maybe the japanese won't do this.

Nagumo then would have 10 CA, 4 BBs and say 2 DD flotillas covering his 7 carriers, (and at the ready for any night surface action) plus more seaplanes for search/ ASW patrols etc., but again this is hindsight.

Now i don't know if the japanese would put all 7 carriers together in a single group, or perhaps have them in two task forces (which ironically, will be what the americans expected). At Pearl Harbour they had 6 in one group, and 5 in the Indian Ocean, so i guess 7 isn't much of a stretch. And i leave Junyo behind because it will slow Nagumo by 3 kts, when all his other ships can do 28 kts or better. I guess if Junyo still comes along it could cover the Midway invasion force.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I assume that in this scenario AO is cancelled, at least that's what the OP seems to suggest? So the escorts historically earmarked for Aleutians could be reassigned.

The OP wants 7 (and even 8 in another post) carriers with Nagumo so this is what i tried to reasonably get to. Now how i want them organized and how the japanese would are two different things. I would bunch up together Kondo and Kurita's 2 BB and 8 CA with Nagumo, leaving Hosogayas 3 CAs to cover the Midway invasion force. I would also have Yamamoto's oil guzzling BBs stay home, but maybe the japanese won't do this.

Nagumo then would have 10 CA, 4 BBs and say 2 DD flotillas covering his 7 carriers, (and at the ready for any night surface action) plus more seaplanes for search/ ASW patrols etc., but again this is hindsight.

Now i don't know if the japanese would put all 7 carriers together in a single group, or perhaps have them in two task forces (which ironically, will be what the americans expected). At Pearl Harbour they had 6 in one group, and 5 in the Indian Ocean, so i guess 7 isn't much of a stretch. And i leave Junyo behind because it will slow Nagumo by 3 kts, when all his other ships can do 28 kts or better. I guess if Junyo still comes along it could cover the Midway invasion force.

I posted something similar earlier in this thread.

Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

Look at USS Wasp. Torpedoes both released avgas and ruined the forward water mains, 5" shells exploding, so we have ordnance going off as well, but the aft mains were still working, the ship's command was intact, and DC parties sprang into action. Granted she's a smaller ship than Kaga, but...

ww2aircraft.net

All the junior carriers provide the strikes on Midway. The big carriers are saved for the real battle.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agreed.

Let Midway go if need be and the USN will be back when conditions are right.

The Japanese would be hard-pressed to keep any aviation units on the atoll supplied with fuel, spare parts, and replacement aircraft ... and without airplanes any occupation garrison will be a punching bag.

 

[EwenS]

The Japanese would be hard-pressed to keep any aviation units on the atoll supplied with fuel, spare parts, and replacement aircraft ... and without airplanes any occupation garrison will be a punching bag.

Just as Wake & Truk became from mid-1944 as a final work up for new / refitted carriers heading to join the fleet.

 

[SaparotRob]

If the IJN had brought 6 or 7 carriers to attack Midway, the odds are greater, under his principle of "calculated risk", that Nimitz would have avoided carrier combat entirely. Now, ignoring the issue of whether Japan would or would not have successfully taken Midway, this scenario creates another problem. More ships mean more oil consumption. Arguably Japan just lost the battle through the mere act of sorteeing the whole fleet, and using up a huge chunk of its strategic oil reserve - basically for nothing, no climactic battle and no defendable gain At best and an embarrassing defeat on the ground at worst.

Wish I remembered that myself. Great call.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The Japanese would be hard-pressed to keep any aviation units on the atoll supplied with fuel, spare parts, and replacement aircraft ... and without airplanes any occupation garrison will be a punching bag.

That is why the whole plan was idiotic. I don't think Yamato wasn't the genius many people think he was.

 

[SaparotRob]

In all fairness, Admiral Yamamoto thought going to war with the U.S. was idiotic.

 

[RCAFson]

Isn't dive-bombing per se>60?

From Lundstrom many of the Val DB attacks appeared to have been conducted at less than 60 degs. In any event the Fulmar was cleared to drop a 500lb bomb at 60degs and 310 knots.

 

[RCAFson]

The Japanese would be hard-pressed to keep any aviation units on the atoll supplied with fuel, spare parts, and replacement aircraft ... and without airplanes any occupation garrison will be a punching bag.

I think that overstates things a bit. However the loss of Midway would have greatly hampered USN sub operations against Japan. Of course by ~1944 the overwhelming USA and Allied industrial advantage would overwhelm IJ, but in the short term the loss of Midway would complicate the USN position in the PTO.

 

[RCAFson]

Define "quasi". What ships carried it, what information systems fed it, and so on.

see post 272.

Further info:

6 Dec 1941
Relative technology and training
__________________RN__USN__IJN
AW radar__________Y___Y____N
SW radar__________Y___N____N
SW 10cm radar_____Y___N____N
FC AA radar_______Y___N____N
FC surface radar__Y___N____N
carrier radar GCI_Y___L*___N
ASV radar_________Y___N____N


Intensive Night action training
___________________Y____N____Y
Flashless powder___Y____N____Y
Reliable Torpedo___Y____N____Y
VL range Torp._____N____N____Y
(from my own research from various sources)

*L = limited but expanding in capability.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Arguably Japan just lost the battle through the mere act of sorteeing the whole fleet, and using up a huge chunk of its strategic oil reserve - basically for nothing, no climactic battle and no defendable gain At best and an embarrassing defeat on the ground at worst.

It's a good point. Japan lands an occupation force at Midway and then sails the entire fleet home. The IJA garrison at Midway can be destroyed shortly thereafter.

What does the IJN do now? Sail for Java to replenish their fuel tanks? Meanwhile, by end of summer 1942 the USPACFLT will have Yorktown repaired, and now five CVs at PH.

 

[RCAFson]

It's a good point. Japan lands an occupation force at Midway and then sails the entire fleet home. The IJA garrison at Midway can be destroyed shortly thereafter.

What does the IJN do now? Sail for Java to replenish their fuel tanks? Meanwhile, by end of summer 1942 the USPACFLT will have Yorktown repaired, and now five CVs at PH.

The IJN would use no more fuel than historically, because all these ships were used historically at Midway and the Aleutians. Having the KB intact would have posed enormous tactical and strategic complications for the USN and RN, and might have led to the loss of Malta because RN fleet units especially carriers might have been forced to concentrate in the IO rather than relieving Malta. It would certainly delayed or halted the US offensive at Guadalcanal.

The best USN strategy when faced with the entire IJN carrier force at Midway would have been a one strike' hit and run' attack in hopes of knocking out several IJN carriers, and then a hasty withdrawal toward PH.

 

[EwenS]

see post 272.

Further info:

6 Dec 1941
Relative technology and training
__________________RN__USN__IJN
AW radar__________Y___Y____N
SW radar__________Y___N____N
SW 10cm radar_____Y___N____N
FC AA radar_______Y___N____N
FC surface radar__Y___N____N
carrier radar GCI_Y___L*___N
ASV radar_________Y___N____N


Intensive Night action training
___________________Y____N____Y
Flashless powder___Y____N____Y
Reliable Torpedo___Y____N____Y
VL range Torp._____N____N____Y
(from my own research from various sources)

*L = limited but expanding in capability.

For the USA , the CXAM / CXAM-1 air warning radars fitted from 1940 also had a surface warning capability. Battleship or cruiser at 16nm, destroyer at 12nm. The SC / SC-1 sets fitted from late 1941 were effectively the same radar with a smaller antennae. Range against battleship 10nm, 3nm on a destroyer.

The Mark 1 fire control radar went to sea in the cruiser Wichita in June 1941 but used more for surface search than gunnery (10 sets built). The Mark 3 main battery fire control radar was first fitted to the cruiser Philadelphia in Oct 1941. The Mark 4 associated with the Mk.37 dual purpose director was first fitted in Sept 1941 to the destroyer Roe. Also fitted to the earlier Mk.33 director.

The USN had a prototype SG 10cm surface warning set at sea in June 1941. Production sets fitted from April 1942.

From Friedman "Naval Radar"

 

[Conslaw]

The IJN would use no more fuel than historically, because all these ships were used historically at Midway and the Aleutians. Having the KB intact would have posed enormous tactical and strategic complications for the USN and RN, and might have led to the loss of Malta because RN fleet units especially carriers might have been forced to concentrate in the IO rather than relieving Malta. It would certainly delayed or halted the US offensive at Guadalcanal.

The best USN strategy when faced with the entire IJN carrier force at Midway would have been a one strike' hit and run' attack in hopes of knocking out several IJN carriers, and then a hasty withdrawal toward PH.

I was deliberately ambiguous when it came to the Aleutian campaign because it is not clear if it would go on without the small carriers. Assuming it did, then yes, the Japanese would use more fuel. If not, well, in this operation the Japanese would not use more fuel - but they would also not have taken the Aleutians, and they would be worried about that Northern Arrow pointing at the homeland.

Now lets say they didn't take the Aleutians, their fuel situation would still be worse, because they would have four more carriers and a cruiser (arguably 2 cruisers) that would either be rotting at anchor or sucking up precious fuel.

 

[RCAFson]

For the USA , the CXAM / CXAM-1 air warning radars fitted from 1940 also had a surface warning capability. Battleship or cruiser at 16nm, destroyer at 12nm. The SC / SC-1 sets fitted from late 1941 were effectively the same radar with a smaller antennae. Range against battleship 10nm, 3nm on a destroyer.

The Mark 1 fire control radar went to sea in the cruiser Wichita in June 1941 but used more for surface search than gunnery (10 sets built). The Mark 3 main battery fire control radar was first fitted to the cruiser Philadelphia in Oct 1941. The Mark 4 associated with the Mk.37 dual purpose director was first fitted in Sept 1941 to the destroyer Roe. Also fitted to the earlier Mk.33 director.

The USN had a prototype SG 10cm surface warning set at sea in June 1941. Production sets fitted from April 1942.

From Friedman "Naval Radar"

I excluded the dual use of AW radar unless two such sets were installed on the same ship, but the table was based upon widespread use of the different operational radar types, not prototype or failed designs such as the Mk1 FC radar.

Fleet Admiral King writing about Dec 1941: "Although antiaircraft fire-control radar was under development, no installations were operative in the fleet."

HyperWar: U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945 (Off. Reports to SecNav from CNO) [Third Report]

 

[EwenS]

I excluded the dual use of AW radar unless two such sets were installed on the same ship,

For me it is rather an odd distinction because very few RN ships were carrying separate surface and air warning sets in 1941. Prince of Wales was one of the lucky ones gaining a Type 273 centimetric surface search set in Aug 1941 when she already had Type 281 Air Warning and 282/284/285 gunnery sets.

Types 286/290/291 were considered dual role and were generally fitted to smaller ships like destroyers. Early Type 286 sets didn't even rotate. It was a Type 286P set however that was fitted to the Repulse when she was sunk along with some fire control radars. Due to a general shortage of radars in 1941 Type 286 was also fitted to a number of Med fleet cruisers. ("Naval Radar" by Derek Howse). Radar, any radar, was not a universal fitting in RN ships until later in the war.

In 1940/41 the priority for the RN was to get radar into ships. So larger ships, cruisers and above, used whatever they had in whatever role it was capable of, when they needed to do so. Suffolk for example used her Type 284 gunnery set to track Bismarck in the Denmark Strait.

Types 279/281 generally associated with air warning in larger ships were capable of being used for surface search and for gunnery ranging. In Oct 1940 Valiant used her Type 279 to lay an AA barrage against a formation of Italian torpedo bombers approaching at night at low level. The cruiser Nigeria was able to use her Type 279 in a suface action off Norway in Sept 1941. It was the end of 1942 before the Ranging Panels were deleted from new Type 279 sets, because by then Type 284 had reached a significantly greater number of ships.

Even centimetric sets like Type 271, nominally a surface warning set, could be used to detect low flying aircraft.

 

[RCAFson]

For me it is rather an odd distinction because very few RN ships were carrying separate surface and air warning sets in 1941. Prince of Wales was one of the lucky ones gaining a Type 273 centimetric surface search set in Aug 1941 when she already had Type 281 Air Warning and 282/284/285 gunnery sets.

Types 286/290/291 were considered dual role and were generally fitted to smaller ships like destroyers. Early Type 286 sets didn't even rotate. It was a Type 286P set however that was fitted to the Repulse when she was sunk along with some fire control radars. Due to a general shortage of radars in 1941 Type 286 was also fitted to a number of Med fleet cruisers. ("Naval Radar" by Derek Howse). Radar, any radar, was not a universal fitting in RN ships until later in the war.

In 1940/41 the priority for the RN was to get radar into ships. So larger ships, cruisers and above, used whatever they had in whatever role it was capable of, when they needed to do so. Suffolk for example used her Type 284 gunnery set to track Bismarck in the Denmark Strait.

Types 279/281 generally associated with air warning in larger ships were capable of being used for surface search and for gunnery ranging. In Oct 1940 Valiant used her Type 279 to lay an AA barrage against a formation of Italian torpedo bombers approaching at night at low level. The cruiser Nigeria was able to use her Type 279 in a suface action off Norway in Sept 1941. It was the end of 1942 before the Ranging Panels were deleted from new Type 279 sets, because by then Type 284 had reached a significantly greater number of ships.

Even centimetric sets like Type 271, nominally a surface warning set, could be used to detect low flying aircraft.

In May 1941 Suffolk had Type 279 and Type 284, as did KGV and Hood, for example. By 6 Dec almost all battleships and cruisers had at least 1 AW radar and many had AW radar and AA and/or surface FC radar. Type 285 was becoming common on fleet destroyers. I know that 273/279/280/281 SW/AW radar could be used for FC but it's use for FC meant forgoing the AW/SW function.

In any event the USN had few radars of any kind on 6 Dec 1941, whereas, as of 28 Sept 1941 (Howse, p.99-101) :

84 RN ships had at least one FC radar (284/285)
48 cruisers and larger ships has at least one type 79/279/280/281 AW radar
303 RN ships had AW/SW radar (Type 286/286P/290) and 40 had centimetric 27X series radars.

These numbers would have increased somewhat by 6 Dec 1941.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think that overstates things a bit. However the loss of Midway would have greatly hampered USN sub operations against Japan. Of course by ~1944 the overwhelming USA and Allied industrial advantage would overwhelm IJ, but in the short term the loss of Midway would complicate the USN position in the PTO.

Without fighters for defense, you're going to see regular -- and perhaps daily -- B-24 raids. And with fighters, you're going to have to keep them flying, and that entails a logistics chain that would have further taxed their merchant fleet. It will be sailing in dangerous waters, too.

All that for an atoll they couldn't even use to hit Pearl with air attack. Midway only makes sense as bait, and that's exactly what Yamamoto planned to use it for.