- Thread starter
- #241
Admiral Beez
Major
I have the sense the FAA's expansion and replacement pipeline for carrier aircraft and flight crews was not better than the IJNs.
Midway with expanded Kido Butai?
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Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,671
- Dec 6, 2006
The RN had to rely heavily on the USN for training as well as for aircraft.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,671
- Dec 6, 2006
Finding U boats by spotting torpedoes heading for your aircraft carrier is a fools game. There are two versions of how the Ark Royal survived, either by turning end on to the torpedos or by premature detonation of the magnetic explorers. If the latter it was extremely lucky. Trading aircraft carriers for submarines on a one for one basis is not a viable exchange.
It was nothing like the IJN's position. The IJN was in complete control of its own destiny throughout the 1930s the RN was not.
Just think about it for a moment. Inskip recommended in that control of the FAA be passed back to the RN in July 1937 (the formal announcement was made in Parliament on 30 July 1937). While handover arrangements began immediately, the detail took until the beginning of 1938 to sort out. One of the thorniest details was the question of training both pilots and maintenace personnel. The Prime Minister eventually had to make the decision in Jan 1938 giving responsibility for pilot & technical training to the RAF which already had the infrastructure in place (it was a sensible approach but one that left the RN feeling it did not entirely control its own fate). But the RN had to recruit and select the necessary bodies. At that point ALL the maintenance personnel and about 50% of the pilots were RAF personnel. The RN had to set up an entire personnel organisation to recruit and arrange the training of with the RAF. And this of course was at a time when the RAF had a high demand for suitable candidates for its own massive expansion. The first call for volunteers from within the RN was made in early 1938 as did a call for personnel to transfer from the RAF to the RN. The highest ranking RAF officers to volunteer for transfer were Flight Lieutenants.
How long to train a pilot? 18 months -2 years.
It also needed to look at the expansion plans. It would need aircrew & maintenance personnel for the new carriers coming through (only 6 in number planned in 1939 between May 1940 and mid-1942 = 242 aircraft slots) plus floatplanes and second line requirements. And the Admiralty plan was to form the squadrons for those carriers about 6 months before the carrier completed. So not all those personnel were needed at once.
The final handover was 24 May 1939. No one was expected war in Sept 1939.
Then we come to the problems. 25th May 1939 the Director of Air Personnel in the RN pointed out that back in 1938 the RAF had agreed to loan the RN 100 pilots until the RN could train up its own pilots. BUT the RAF only loaned 50 pilots. SO 45-50 RN pilots had to be sent to fill vacancies in the Observers and Air Gunners training squadrons. That is the explanation for Courageous having 2 of her squadrons converted to training units. At that point it was expected to be July 1940 before these squadrons could be reformed and Sept 1940 before the 50 remaining RAF pilots could begin to be released.
On 4 Sept 1939 the RN had 395 pilots incl the 50 RAF bods (but was still short of 100) and 190 observers (78 short). By 1 March 1940 it expected to have 570 pilots and 375 observers "allowing the expansion required and war wastage" and which would have allowed the RAF to begin getting their pilots back. So looking forward the aircrew position seems healthier than was thought just 4 months previously. As for maintenance personnel "Adequate numbers of on loan from RAF and training now going on will meet expansion". The stores position however was described as "unsatisfactory".
There were also disputes about shore bases that had to be resolved in 1938/39 both at home and abroad in Egypt and Singapore and about the level of aircraft reserves that were required. The RN finally got just 6 airfields from the RAF in May 1939.
Then shortly after the outbreak of war the RAF advised the Admiralty that they will have to provide their own air cover for bases like Scapa Flow. Another unexpected and unplanned for demand for pilots and other personnel. That saw the formation of 804 squadron at Hatston on 30 Nov with but 4 Sea Gladiators initially, taken from the second line deck landing training squadron at Donibristle. As time went on other requirements arose, like helping out RAF Coastal Command in 1940/41 and providing striking forces from Malta and Egypt.
Of course as WW2 went on the rate of expansion for the FAA increased far beyongd that envisaged in 1937-39. From 232 front line and 190 second line aircraft in Sept 1939 it grew to 1,336 front line and 2,790 second line aircraft in 1945. Viewed in those terms it is no wonder that the RN and the RAF needed to take every opportunity that they could to train aircrew. Even so, there were times around 1942 that pilots had to be found temporary billets to keep their skills alive as there were not the carriers and / or aircraft for them to fly from.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
A sad state of affairs. Very informative post.
- Thread starter
- #246
Admiral Beez
Major
Excellent info, thanks. What I meant was that both the IJN and FAA at times struggled to field or replace sufficient aircraft and flight crews.
Here's a question, one of the strikes observed a japanese ship sailing at speed in a different direction to where the IJN fleet apparently was, the flight leader deduced that the ship was trying to catch back up to the main fleet so took upon himself to follow it and sure enough his guess was correct, without that decision the flight would have not taken part in the battle, would a Japanese flight leader if put in that same position make the same call?.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Those IJN pilots weren't dummies. Their planes didn't have search radars. I say they would've come to the same conclusion and course of action as Wade McClusky. They were doing this stuff at least as long the USN.
Right from Pearl Harbor there is evidence of IJN flexibility of decision making on the hoof by flight commanders.
When the Japanese torpedo bombers made landfall in Hawaii, Fuchida changed the plan for the approach for his group to PH due to cloud over the mountains between the landfall point and PH itself.
Look at what happened with the sinking of the Hermes in April 1942.
IJN recce aircraft spots her, signals back to fleet but has to return to ship before the strike arrives. 0950 Strike arrives at the point where it was estimated Hermes would be, based on information provided. Hermes was not there. The strike commander then decided to take the force south. They flew south for 40 miles still found nothing. He then took them back north and finally found Hermes with Vampire as escort at 1030, some 40 mins after the initial expected interception time.
Once it was clear Hermes was doomed, the later pilots to bomb switched target to Vampire at 1055. By 1100 others were attacking the tanker British Sergeant.
So it seems very clear that IJN flight leaders were perfectly capable of thinking on their feet and varying their briefed orders as the tactical situation demanded to maximise the effect of their strikes.
The BCATP, based in Canada trained 5296 FAA personnel.:
which I suspect was a greater number than those trained in the USA.
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Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,671
- Dec 6, 2006
True. Poor word choice on my part. Supplement rather than rely heavily.
Contrast that with Ring's absymal performance, he wasn't even a bit curious what's to the south once he got to the designated target area on 265 and found nothing. Johnson was curious enough so he turned SE on a parallel track to the original KB course, though he missed Nagumo, probably because of him turning NE. Not to mention Waldron getting on his way early on. They all must have had the initial contact report details. If Johnson had more guts he should have joined Waldron early on. Not sure what happens with VF-8 in this scenario.
Also, at Coral Sea the stampede to bomb Shoho by the second group from Yorktown was ill-conceived to say the least. They could have gone for one or two of the cruisers.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Of course. Look at Coral Sea and the later carrier battles. Japanese flight leaders had quite a bit of leeway in target selection.
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- #255
Admiral Beez
Major
Perhaps that was part of the problem. Having all the A6M pilots abandon their high altitude patrols so that everyone could have a go at the low levels Devastators led to there being no A6Ms at high altitude to detect and engage the dozens of approaching Dauntless. Doctrine and discipline aren't there to stifle individual initiative, but to deal with the bigger picture.
But when the fighters didn't carry radios and the only means of fighter direction by the carriers was to fire their guns in the direction of the attackers, there wasn't a lot of choice other than to leave it to the flight leaders.
Imo there is a biased, skewed and incomplete image of the whole issue of Zeros, radios and fighter direction. I'm very interested in the subject but there's frustratingly little info on the subject in this part of the world. From the little i gathered over the years from snippets of info here and there, only (some?) land-based units took the radios off, the carrier based units kept them.
The carriers DID use radio to direct fighters, there's mention of it for Indian Ocean and Coral Sea and after Midway too. It may be than most (all?) Zero had receivers only though, so there wasn't the kind of chit-chat imagined in the western world when it comes to radio? Might have been morse only? Recall that the japanese searchers and strike leaders DID routinely messaged their ships, though it seems mostly by key.
So i find it hard to see the Zero not having the same radio capability as other carrier types? Maybe the specific radio model in the Zero might not have been good, but probably reliability issues would be exacerbated in the tropical climate, hence land based units taking them off. At least on a carrier you'd think the radio maintenance would be the best possible.
That being said, of course japanese radio use might not have been near as effective as western one, but they did had them and they were used in their own way. But even a worse problem was the lack of radar, in itself not a panacea, but it would have certainly helped.
Here's another angle to ponder though, even if there were Zeros at altitude, doubt they would have stopped the SBDs. Did Hiryu's CAP stop the 24 SBDs? No, though they took a toll. Thinking of the major carrier battles of 1942, it seems both sides couldn't stop a determined assault. The americans for example, with all their vaunted radar, radio and fighter direction, and despite having no less than 53 F4Fs on CAP at Eastern Solomons, failed to stop a mere 27 D3As, though they did took a deadly toll.
At Midway, by 10.20 AM due to the quite incredible fortunes of war of the day, almost 70 US planes were converging on KB in 3 different groups, from different directions. Failure to spot and intercept the SBDs was major, but even if they did, they couldn't have stopped them, though they could have taken a few down before their dives, and potentially reduce the number of hits. Also the japanese didn't knew how bad the TBDs and the Mk13 were, probably if VT-3 attacks entirely unmolested they probably still won't get any hits, but the japanese imagined they're as dangerous as their own kanko.
With the benefit of hindsight of course we think all 40 or so Zeros on CAP should have been high and gone after the SBDs, but like i said even if this happens i doubt they will stop them. Judging by the Hiryu attack ratio and assuming they are perfectly split, 25 vs VBS-6 and 15 vs VBS-5, at best they will probably kill 5-6 and 2-3 respectively before the dives, with probably at least as many damaged. But still enough SBDs would attack and hit Kaga and Soryu, though likely with fewer bombs, say 3 and 2. They have reduced casualties, but probably the armed and fuelled planes still explode and burn.
But imo, even if the SBDs are spotted earlier and some Zeros are higher or have time to climb, probably what will happen is only a part of the CAP will go after them, 20-25 max, leaving 15-20 still dealing with the TBDs and F4Fs
The major effect would be if even a shotai of Zeros intercepts Best's 3 SBDs and shoot down or at least damage and deflect them, thus preventing Akagi being hit, with major implication for the afternoon chain of events.
The carriers DID use radio to direct fighters, there's mention of it for Indian Ocean and Coral Sea and after Midway too. It may be than most (all?) Zero had receivers only though, so there wasn't the kind of chit-chat imagined in the western world when it comes to radio? Might have been morse only? Recall that the japanese searchers and strike leaders DID routinely messaged their ships, though it seems mostly by key.
So i find it hard to see the Zero not having the same radio capability as other carrier types? Maybe the specific radio model in the Zero might not have been good, but probably reliability issues would be exacerbated in the tropical climate, hence land based units taking them off. At least on a carrier you'd think the radio maintenance would be the best possible.
That being said, of course japanese radio use might not have been near as effective as western one, but they did had them and they were used in their own way. But even a worse problem was the lack of radar, in itself not a panacea, but it would have certainly helped.
Here's another angle to ponder though, even if there were Zeros at altitude, doubt they would have stopped the SBDs. Did Hiryu's CAP stop the 24 SBDs? No, though they took a toll. Thinking of the major carrier battles of 1942, it seems both sides couldn't stop a determined assault. The americans for example, with all their vaunted radar, radio and fighter direction, and despite having no less than 53 F4Fs on CAP at Eastern Solomons, failed to stop a mere 27 D3As, though they did took a deadly toll.
At Midway, by 10.20 AM due to the quite incredible fortunes of war of the day, almost 70 US planes were converging on KB in 3 different groups, from different directions. Failure to spot and intercept the SBDs was major, but even if they did, they couldn't have stopped them, though they could have taken a few down before their dives, and potentially reduce the number of hits. Also the japanese didn't knew how bad the TBDs and the Mk13 were, probably if VT-3 attacks entirely unmolested they probably still won't get any hits, but the japanese imagined they're as dangerous as their own kanko.
With the benefit of hindsight of course we think all 40 or so Zeros on CAP should have been high and gone after the SBDs, but like i said even if this happens i doubt they will stop them. Judging by the Hiryu attack ratio and assuming they are perfectly split, 25 vs VBS-6 and 15 vs VBS-5, at best they will probably kill 5-6 and 2-3 respectively before the dives, with probably at least as many damaged. But still enough SBDs would attack and hit Kaga and Soryu, though likely with fewer bombs, say 3 and 2. They have reduced casualties, but probably the armed and fuelled planes still explode and burn.
But imo, even if the SBDs are spotted earlier and some Zeros are higher or have time to climb, probably what will happen is only a part of the CAP will go after them, 20-25 max, leaving 15-20 still dealing with the TBDs and F4Fs
The major effect would be if even a shotai of Zeros intercepts Best's 3 SBDs and shoot down or at least damage and deflect them, thus preventing Akagi being hit, with major implication for the afternoon chain of events.
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Thumpalumpacus
Major
With CAP, sure. They had abysmal fighter direction for that task, which presents a bad defensive posture. Keep in mind too that no Japanese carrier at Midway had radar, and "fighter direction" consisted of cruisers and destroyers at a distance firing main-battery rounds in the direction of attackers, so it's not so much shotai leaders but rather doctrine and capability.
But when on offense, their small-unit leadership was, for instance, able to put in a partial-anvil against Lexington at Coral Sea even through a poor setup. And finding and hitting Hornet at Santa Cruz was also good airmanship.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
My understanding is that the radios were pretty bad for reliable and clear reception, but in 1942 the absence of fighter-control radar still meant that flight leaders were reliant on personal observation for countering enemy attacks. This was especially true in the Solomons, where the magnetic fields played havoc with Japanese radios (and American radios and magnetic torpedoes for that matter). But even elsewhere, the Zero's radio was not good. And without radar direction, radios just aren't very useful for CAP direction.
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- #260
Admiral Beez
Major
Orders should have been, no matter what you hold your HA station. Leave the torpedo bombers to the LA CAP.
The IJN had the identical mix of LA torpedo and HA dive bombers strike groups. Indeed, the fatal strike on USS Yorktown was the same, though in reverse with the HA Val DBs arriving before the LA Kate TBs, but nevertheless, coordinated attacks from both low and high altitude were the SOP on both sides. So, back to our A6M drivers, upon spotting the incoming low level Devastator strike the HA CAP should have been asking, hmmm…. now where are the USN dive bombers? We know they're coming. Let's wait for them.
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