Midway with expanded Kido Butai? (1 Viewer)

[EwenS]

Also aiui Wasp had persistent problems with the turbines. Is it even phisically possible for Wasp to reach Midway in time? When did it arrived and left Hatston? I saw a picture saying Wasp arrived Norfolk May 26? If no or very short stop at Norfolk then abbout May 30 Canal, June 6-7 or so San Diego, then perhaps June 8-9 Pearl and June 11-12 Midway? With SB2Us and TBDs?

I have seen various scenarios in which Saratoga MIGHT make it to Midway with a very cobbled together airgroup, but there's a big if here as well whether VF-5 or 72 is ready to sail by the June 1st at the very latest. VT-8s TBFs are, and whatever SBDs and F4F plus pilots MIGHT already on the ship if it leaves San Diego straight away on May 25 or so, i think 23 SBD and 14 F4F, need to read again which squadrons.

But Zuikaku and Saratoga being at Midway really have no link to eachother, they're different scenarios, could be both, could be one or the other as once fancies.

Wasp arrived at Scapa Flow at the beginning of April 1942 along with an escorting Battleship, Cruisers and destroyers, with FDR having already agreed to Churchill's request for a loan for a Malta run at the end of March (at the time Eagle had had to be docked at Gibraltar unexpectedly due to rudder problems and Malta desperately needed Spitfires).

She undertook Operation Calendar, leaving the Clyde on 14 April and launching the Spitfires on 20 April. Because that delivery was largely destroyed on arrival, Churchill again requested help from FDR who rapidly agreed. So Operation Bowery was planned before Wasp arrived back in Britain on the 29th April. She was turned round and sailed 3 May on Op Bowery, launching those aircraft on the 9th May before returning to Britain.

Operation Calendar - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Operation Bowery - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

I'm not sure of her exact date of arrival at Norfolk but it was before the end of May as her new CO, Forrest P Sherman, took over Command on 31st May after Capt Reeves had been promoted.

 

[EwenS]

I don't think it's a stretch to have Saratoga complete her repairs/restock and arrive some days early in time to sail with TF17 on 31 May 1942.

From Shattered Sword.

9th May US intelligence begins to suspect a Japanese Operation in the Central Pacific. "Perhaps in the form of a raid against Hawaii". But there were differences of opinion in US command circles as to where the Japanese might strike next. Central or South Pacific?

19th May the clear signal about Midway's desalination plant being out of use.

20th May US codebreakers discover Midway will be the target.

And at that stage it was believed Japanese operations might begin as early as 2nd June, which meant US carriers needed to be in position by 1st June. On 30th May Nimitz ordered Saratoga to sail from San Diego on 1st June whether or not she had an escort.

Yorktown arrived at PH on 27th May and was docked the next day. She sailed again in the early morning of 30th May.

Nimitz clearly thought getting Saratoga to PH sooner was a stretch or he would have ordered it sooner.

 

[RCAFson]

From Shattered Sword.

9th May US intelligence begins to suspect a Japanese Operation in the Central Pacific. "Perhaps in the form of a raid against Hawaii". But there were differences of opinion in US command circles as to where the Japanese might strike next. Central or South Pacific?

19th May the clear signal about Midway's desalination plant being out of use.

20th May US codebreakers discover Midway will be the target.

And at that stage it was believed Japanese operations might begin as early as 2nd June, which meant US carriers needed to be in position by 1st June. On 30th May Nimitz ordered Saratoga to sail from San Diego on 1st June whether or not she had an escort.

Yorktown arrived at PH on 27th May and was docked the next day. She sailed again in the early morning of 30th May.

Nimitz clearly thought getting Saratoga to PH sooner was a stretch or he would have ordered it sooner.

IIRC, King had requested that the RN send a carrier to the Pacific prior to Midway (probably one from the IO).

 

[EwenS]

IIRC, King had requested that the RN send a carrier to the Pacific prior to Midway (probably one from the IO).

As far as I'm aware the US request for a British carrier for the Pacific did not come until the end of Oct 1942 immediately after the loss of Wasp on 15 Sept and Hornet on 27 Oct 1942 and when Enterprise had been damaged and needed extensive repairs, leaving only Saratoga operational in the Pacific. And the request was made by FDR to Churchill.

The Admiralty produced an appraisal of the possibilities for helping out with both carriers and Battleships on 5 Nov, assuming no losses during Torch and that Ranger would go to the Pacific after Torch. The conclusion was that Britain should do what it could to help the USN in the Pacific.

On 2 Dec 1942, with Torch successfully completed, Churchill responded officially to FDR offering Illustrious from the Eastern Fleet AND Victorious from the Home Fleet IF Ranger could be loaned to the Home Fleet. The IO would be covered by deploying Unicorn and an escort carrier.

On 5 Dec 1942 FDR responded that, after "serious consideration", the offer of Illustrious was accepted. If it was felt that a second carrier needed to be sent to the Pacific the US preference was to send Ranger, as no "special preparation" of that vessel would be required.

After further consideration the Admiralty decided to send Victorious, probably because she had the most up to date fighter direction facilities and had been more recently refitted. She sailed for Norfolk, Virginia on 20th Dec 1942.

Illustrious left the IO for home and a refit in early January 1943 arriving in Feb and completing in June. The IO was then without a carrier until the escort carrier Battler arrived in Oct 1943. Unicorn completed in March 1943 and worked up with the Home Fleet.

 

[RCAFson]

As far as I'm aware the US request for a British carrier for the Pacific did not come until the end of Oct 1942 immediately after the loss of Wasp on 15 Sept and Hornet on 27 Oct 1942 and when Enterprise had been damaged and needed extensive repairs, leaving only Saratoga operational in the Pacific. And the request was made by FDR to Churchill.

The Admiralty produced an appraisal of the possibilities for helping out with both carriers and Battleships on 5 Nov, assuming no losses during Torch and that Ranger would go to the Pacific after Torch. The conclusion was that Britain should do what it could to help the USN in the Pacific.

On 2 Dec 1942, with Torch successfully completed, Churchill responded officially to FDR offering Illustrious from the Eastern Fleet AND Victorious from the Home Fleet IF Ranger could be loaned to the Home Fleet. The IO would be covered by deploying Unicorn and an escort carrier.

On 5 Dec 1942 FDR responded that, after "serious consideration", the offer of Illustrious was accepted. If it was felt that a second carrier needed to be sent to the Pacific the US preference was to send Ranger, as no "special preparation" of that vessel would be required.

After further consideration the Admiralty decided to send Victorious, probably because she had the most up to date fighter direction facilities and had been more recently refitted. She sailed for Norfolk, Virginia on 20th Dec 1942.

Illustrious left the IO for home and a refit in early January 1943 arriving in Feb and completing in June. The IO was then without a carrier until the escort carrier Battler arrived in Oct 1943. Unicorn completed in March 1943 and worked up with the Home Fleet.

Thanks. However, I looked through the Nimitz Graybook V1 and found this:

181255 [18 May 1942]

COMINCH TO SPENAVO LONDON INFO COMSOWESPACFOR CINCPAC

Refer to this as Cominch 181255 action Spenavo London
info Comsowespacfor CinCPas xx Request you say to first
Sea Lord in person that indicated imminence of enemy
attacks on Midway and Alaska perhaps Hawaii has required
withdrawal of carrier-cruiser groups from South Pacific
parse Comsowespacfor has cruisers and destroyers but no
carrier wherewith to work against eneny activities in
Coral Sea para will Admiralty entertain request for
carrier from Eastern Fleet to join up with Leary temporarily
if so move had best be made at once para as
alternative was suggested consideration of coordinated eastern
fleet and British shore based air raids on Rangoon or
Andaman Islands and line of communication between Rangoon
and Singapore. (p.397)

The Admiralty reply was essentially that the RN carriers and destroyers were already fully committed to the relief of Malta.

Edit: COMINCH = USN Adm King.

 

[Admiral Beez]

IIRC, King had requested that the RN send a carrier to the Pacific prior to Midway (probably one from the IO).

If only the RN had better luck with its carriers between Sept 1939 and Nov 1941 where the service lost five! of its fast fleet carriers (HMS Courageous sunk Sept 39, Glorious sunk April 40, Illustrious crippled Jan 41, Formidable crippled May 1941, Ark Royal sunk Nov 41). Not until the IJN's loss at Coral Sea and Midway did a navy lose so many fleet carriers - though the Japanese lost their first five in rapid succession in 1942. Not that 1942 was a better year for Britain's surviving carriers, with HMS Hermes sunk in April, Eagle sunk and Indomitable crippled in August (returning in Feb 1943), and the CVE Avenger sunk in Nov 42. Britain's carrier losses would soon end, with its last carrier, the CVE being sunk in March 1943.

Thankfully, Illustrious and Formidable were repaired, with both returning to service in Feb 1942. Had the other three CVs survived into 1942 perhaps a fast CV or two could have been free for PacOps in time for Coral Sea and Midway.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Was Wasp delivering Spitfires to Malta at the time?

Late-spring of 42, yeah. Refit on the East coast before getting into Sopac in August.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As to Hornet, well Nimitz's master plan told them the japanese were in 2 groups one behind the other at 50-100 miles, Mitscher followed it hence sending Ring to the north on 265. So start with Nimitz, or replace Mitscher and/or the anyway incompetent/unliked Ring. Otherwise the only chance is Johnson's 17 SBDs flying a bit more SE in his run after breaking from Ring, MAYBE he could spot Nagumo.

The two-groups-of-Japanese-carriers thing was a suggestion based on incomplete intel. Nimitz didn't know that positively, and didn't order the contingency to be covered by any air group afloat in either Task Force.

Nimitz did not have a "master plan". He had a good idea of Japanese ops in general, and gave general orders, but he had no "master plan". That's bunkum.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Nimitz did not have a "master plan". He had a good idea of Japanese ops in general, and gave general orders, but he had no "master plan". That's bunkum.

Aren't the concept of the "master plan" one of the reasons Japan lost?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Aren't the concept of the "master plan" one of the reasons Japan lost?

About Midway specifically? Sure. They assumed us Americans would play along.

 

[SaparotRob]

... 18 of her 24 0.5in were replaced with 32 x 20mm to augment the 4 Quad 1.1in.

I'd have to agree with that.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Admiralty assumed Kido Butai was following western doctrine, where there would be two carriers to a task Force, this was why Hornet's air group "wandered off" - they were looking for the second task Force, which, unbeknownst to them, didn't exist.

The Japanese had four carriers to their task force.

 

[EwenS]

Thanks. However, I looked through the Nimitz Graybook V1 and found this:



The Admiralty reply was essentially that the RN carriers and destroyers were already fully committed to the relief of Malta.

Edit: COMINCH = USN Adm King.

Thank you for that additional piece of information. There was a lot going on at that point.

Furious had returned from her US refit in April and, as was common, had been taken in hand in a British yard for additional works to her radars. It would be July before she rejoined the Home Fleet.

It was high season for the Russian arctic convoys. April - May 1942 saw the Home Fleet at sea, with support from a US Battleship/cruiser/destroyer task force, to cover PQ15/QP11 and PQ16/QP12 which tied down Victorious.

In the Med planning was in hand for the Harpoon convoy from Gibraltar to Malta and the Vigorous convoy from Alexandria to Malta scheduled for June. The former would tie down Eagle. See below re the latter.

In the IO, there was an interesting exchange of signals between the Admiralty and Somerville. Having withdrawn the Eastern Fleet with Indomitable, Formidable and Illustrious to Mombasa / Kilindini and been forced to adopt a defensive strategy, he was on 30 April expecting the Japanese to take advantage and launch a repeat of their March / April foray to strike shipping in the Bay of Bengal / eastern Indian coast with "light forces" including some kind of carrier support, if not an outright amphibious assault. And there had been discussions about withdrawing one or more of the carriers along with Warspite to cover the Vigorous convoy in the eastern Med.

On 30 April Operation Ironclad (invasion of Madagascar) assault shipping and covering forces were being assembled, although the final 'go' had yet to be given IIRC. That was supported by the US in case Vichy might co-operate with the Axis to provide bases for action against the Allies, if not a Japanese amphibious assault. It kicked off on 5th May and tied up the carriers until around 20 May. Formidable was experiencing engine trouble limiting her speed to 24 knots, causing difficulties in aircraft operation in the light winds then prevailing. So she was operating separately from the other pair. The carriers were short of fighters (more were en route but Churchill appealed to FDR for still more Martlets on 12th May) and Somerville doubted their fighter direction capabilities, partly due to lack of practice, and was extremely pessimistic about the chances of Swordfish and Albacores in daylight against IJN fighters.

The FAA fighter situation was a major headache. The last deliveries of folding wing Martlet II (from a batch of 90) to the Eastern Fleet were only being made in April/May 1942. Then, due to understandable USN demand, the expected Lend Lease deliveries got delayed for several months. Sea Hurricane conversions were being run down as Seafire conversion work ramped up although the latter were still a few months from service.

And the US built escort carriers were only beginning to enter service. The first HMS Archer had completed in Nov 1941 but spent much of her first year plagued with machinery problems with several dockyard visits for repairs. Avenger escorted her first convoy on her delivery voyage from the US in mid-May, followed by Biter in June.

When Britain acceded to the US request at the end of 1942, things were really not that much better.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Yes, in history. But if the Japanese counterfactually have the Zuikaku, then the US can have Saratoga . . . and an improved HAG and M Browning actually performing as chief of staff.

I've always maintained that you don't even need an alternate time line, if Hornet had just performed half as well as Yorktown and Enterprise had, Hiryu would (IMO) have been put down along with Akagi, Kaga and Soryu all in one fell swoop. Yorktown would never have suffered any attacks and was then available after some yard work for the campaign in the Solomon Islands giving the USN Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown, Saratoga and Wasp all available at one time or another.

Even given Saratoga's penchant for being a torpedo magnet, how would Yorktown (possibly the best operating CV in the USN at the time) helped change the outcome at Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz? Add her air group to the strike package of Enterprise and Hornet and I'd say the IJN is in for another ass kicking carrier wise. The US might still lose a carrier (or two) but I'd bet dollars to donuts Shokaku and Zuikaku grace the bottom of the Pacific by the end of 1942.

Just my two cents. YMMV.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The FAA fighter situation was a major headache. The last deliveries of folding wing Martlet II (from a batch of 90) to the Eastern Fleet were only being made in April/May 1942. Then, due to understandable USN demand, the expected Lend Lease deliveries got delayed for several months.

Did Britain look at license production of the folding Martlet? The Empire/Commonwealth built several US types, including Curtiss Hawks in India, Curtiss SB2C and PBY Catalinas in Canada, P-51 Mustangs in Australia.

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of license production depends on timing, It an also take over a year to get a new factory up and running.

The USN designated Brewster as an associated contractor for the F4U in Nov 1941 and named Goodyear in Dec 1941. It took until April of 1943 for the two factories to deliver the first aircraft aircraft.

The Hawks in India story was rather convoluted. The Hawks had been ordered by China as knock down kits to be assembled in China. After the factory was bombed and the parts (and engines) and tooling/machinery relocated several times the train with railcars with parts/tools/machinery wound up in India. Given the need for aircraft to defend India at the time this gift basket was hard to overlook, however it still took months to get the first completed plane and by some accounts, only 5-6 planes were completed out of the 40+ kits available.
Best shot would have been Canada but only at the expense of something else not built. could the deal have been done in time to make any difference?

The British did get 220 Martlet IVs starting in July 1942 (Cyclone engines) and 311 Martlet Vs starting in Dec 1942 (Eastern FM-1s) so the gap in Wildcat deliveries was not long even if it was at a critical time.

To plug the gap the license agreement would have had to have happened in the winter of 1940/41 with suitable engine supply. The Wright engines in the Martlet IV was good for 1000hp at 13,500ft instead of the 1040hp at 18,400ft that the F4F-3 and F4F-4s had.

 

[MikeMeech]

If only the RN had better luck with its carriers between Sept 1939 and Nov 1941 where the service lost five! of its fast fleet carriers (HMS Courageous sunk Sept 39, Glorious sunk April 40, Illustrious crippled Jan 41, Formidable crippled May 1941, Ark Royal sunk Nov 41). Not until the IJN's loss at Coral Sea and Midway did a navy lose so many fleet carriers - though the Japanese lost their first five in rapid succession in 1942. Not that 1942 was a better year for Britain's surviving carriers, with HMS Hermes sunk in April, Eagle sunk and Indomitable crippled in August (returning in Feb 1943), and the CVE Avenger sunk in Nov 42. Britain's carrier losses would soon end, with its last carrier, the CVE being sunk in March 1943.

Thankfully, Illustrious and Formidable were repaired, with both returning to service in Feb 1942. Had the other three CVs survived into 1942 perhaps a fast CV or two could have been free for PacOps in time for Coral Sea and Midway.

Hi
Yes, and the USN lost four fleet carriers in 1942; Lexington in May, Yorktown in June, Wasp in September and Hornet in October. Langley was also lost in February 1942, although it was in use to carry US Army aircraft, I expect the Japanese classed it as a carrier. Presumably you would regard the USN as less "lucky" than the RN?
In war you lose ships.

Mike

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Hi
Yes, and the USN lost four fleet carriers in 1942; Lexington in May, Yorktown in June, Wasp in September and Hornet in October. Langley was also lost in February 1942, although it was in use to carry US Army aircraft, I expect the Japanese classed it as a carrier. Presumably you would regard the USN as less "lucky" than the RN?
In war you lose ships.

Mike

To be fair the RN lost Courageous and Glorious to stupidity not bad luck.

 

[EwenS]

A lot of license production depends on timing, It an also take over a year to get a new factory up and running.

The USN designated Brewster as an associated contractor for the F4U in Nov 1941 and named Goodyear in Dec 1941. It took until April of 1943 for the two factories to deliver the first aircraft aircraft.

The Hawks in India story was rather convoluted. The Hawks had been ordered by China as knock down kits to be assembled in China. After the factory was bombed and the parts (and engines) and tooling/machinery relocated several times the train with railcars with parts/tools/machinery wound up in India. Given the need for aircraft to defend India at the time this gift basket was hard to overlook, however it still took months to get the first completed plane and by some accounts, only 5-6 planes were completed out of the 40+ kits available.
Best shot would have been Canada but only at the expense of something else not built. could the deal have been done in time to make any difference?

The British did get 220 Martlet IVs starting in July 1942 (Cyclone engines) and 311 Martlet Vs starting in Dec 1942 (Eastern FM-1s) so the gap in Wildcat deliveries was not long even if it was at a critical time.

To plug the gap the license agreement would have had to have happened in the winter of 1940/41 with suitable engine supply. The Wright engines in the Martlet IV was good for 1000hp at 13,500ft instead of the 1040hp at 18,400ft that the F4F-3 and F4F-4s had.

The initial fixed wing Martlet I (71 delivered with 10 lost at sea) came from a French order taken over by Britain in June 1940. The Martlet II came, IIRC, from an option clause in that contract which Britain exercised around July 1940. The problem with the Martlets II was the very necessary decision to delay delivery of the 90 aircraft until Grumman developed the folding wing to enable it to fit British carrier lifts. According to a Minute from The First Lord of the Admiralty to Churchill in Dec 1941 deliveries of these should have started in Oct 1940. That delay was "over 9 months". In Oct 1941 delivery of the first 48 was to be expedited by deferring delivery of aircraft for the USN. Those didn't begin to arrive in FAA squadrons until the very end of 1941 and the last didn't arrive in the IO area until April 1942. These were never meant to be more than an emergency purchase to tide the FAA over until the Firefly & Firebrand (ordered early/mid 1940) arrived in service in 1942. And then those projects went pear shaped for various reasons.

Those 48 Martlets were to be followed by 95 for the USN and then the allocation was to be 2 USN to 1 RN until the rest of the British contract had been fulfilled. Reasons given for the delays related to the shortage of machine tools due to other priorities in defence procurement in the USA.

So a "stopgap" for the "emergency" purchase was required in the form of the Sea Hurricane & then the Seafire.

In Dec 1941 (before Pearl Harbor) it was noted that the USN was trying to get Grumman to increase F4F production from 60 to 75 aircraft per month of which 25 were supposed to be earmarked for Britain from April 1942. The first of the 220 Lend Lease Martlet IV only began to be shipped from the USA in mid-Aug 1942 and went straight to front line squadrons in Britain just in time to go aboard the carriers for Operation Torch. Even in late 1941 the Martlet was expected to be the main fighter into 1943.

On 30 Dec 1941 and 6 Jan 1942 the British Air Commission in Washington was talking to MAP about future US aircraft under the "Third Lend Lease Act". Those included the F4U-1 (deliveries expected to start with 80 in late 1942), the F6F (not expected before 1943) and the SB2C (small deliveries to be expected late 1942 for use in auxiliary carriers not the fleet carriers). The max number of expected Martlets for the year was then put at 300 with prospects for 80 F4U leaving a shortfall of 60.

It also noted that there was a project for producing fleet fighters in Canada, either F6F or faling that F4U, with production buiding to 40 per month but not before 1943. That however came to nothing although the Sb2C was built in canada.

It was about this time that the estimate of the number of carriers required was reassessed and was increased fourfold. That would then have a huge impact on the number of fighters required.

 

[EwenS]

Hi
Yes, and the USN lost four fleet carriers in 1942; Lexington in May, Yorktown in June, Wasp in September and Hornet in October. Langley was also lost in February 1942, although it was in use to carry US Army aircraft, I expect the Japanese classed it as a carrier. Presumably you would regard the USN as less "lucky" than the RN?
In war you lose ships.

Mike

Langley had been converted to a seaplane carrier in 1936/37 and redsignated AV-3. This was to free up the carrier tonnage for use in building the Wasp CV-7 and was necessary to comply with the terms of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. During this conversion she lost about one third of her flight deck. Here she is post 1937.

And as she was at Darwin on 11 Feb 1942