Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

Thumpalumpacus said:

Shokaku took a beating not once, but twice in 1942. Mogami survived a collision and multiple bomb hits that same year. Japanese DC could be very good. The losses at Midway reflect the fact that the carriers were hit while fuel lines were filled and ammo was strewn everywhere. I can't see an American carrier in 1942 surviving under the same circumstances. Indeed, we lost Lexington due to avgas vapors turning it into a giant FAE.

Both Franklin and Bunker Hill survived similar conditions, but only because we had 2+ years of learning DC on the fly.

Moral of the story: some fires cain't be fought, and avgas is not your friend, especially with ammo laying around.

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The view of the USN vs IJN damage control is skewed by the success of the Yorktown. The reality is that the USN record in 1942 was not that good, particularly with regard to fire, and the USN was not happy about it. In the USN's own words:

"72. It is noted that the fire on PENSACOLA was of major proportions and easily could have jeopardized the survival of the vessel. Of U.S. cruisers which have suffered fires of similar proportions, incident to the present war, this was the first to be successfully controlled and extinguished. That this was done despite the inadequacy of fire fighting facilities is a tribute to the determination and skill of her personnel."

In fact the USN lost 5 vessels in a row with uncontrolled fires still raging as they sank. Lexington, Wasp, Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria.

"3. Structural damage to ASTORIA, although extensive, was not such that loss of the vessel was inevitable. The fires which resulted, however, effectively prevented control of damage. Fires could not be controlled because of the initial lack of certain facilities, the destruction of some facilities initially available, and the fact that certain others were inoperable because of the lack of power. Thus, damage and uncontrolled fires resulted in the loss of ASTORIA.
4. Damage to QUINCY and VINCENNES was so extensive that loss of the vessels was inevitable. It is not possible for any lightly protected vessel to absorb such punishment and survive. Fires in both cases, however, were also a major contributing factor."

Note that the fire on Pensacola was not controlled by the ship herself but only after she reached harbor and external fire fighting forces were brought into play. Even after reaching harbor it took 8 hours to get the fire under control. If Tulagi Harbor wasn't so close by it is doubtful the ship would have been saved.

"43. At 0355 on 1 December PENSACOLA reached Tulagi Harbor and anchored. A destroyer came alongside and passed over several hose lines to augment the 7 lines used on PENSACOLA. One of these lines was connected to the foam generator on the destroyer. Additional foam powder was obtained for use in the ship's generators. This additional source of foam and water was very effective and eventually brought the fire under control. It was approximately 12 hours from the time of the torpedo detonation until the fire was extinguished, and even then it continued to rekindle and break out in various spaces. It was necessary to continue cooling decks and bulkheads with fog applicators to prevent oil vapors from re-igniting. Throughout the whole period of the fire dense smoke, which resulted from the burning oil vapors, was a severe handicap in combating the fire. Rescue breathers were successfully used by the crew to enter smoke-filled spaces to quench smoldering embers."

The USN was particularly disappointed by the poor performance of the Wasp
"2. With the exception of the forward diesel generators and the No. 1 main generator in the forward engine room, the engineering plant was intact and engineering personnel remained at their stations until WASP was abandoned. These circumstances, plus the fact that it was necessary for U.S. forces to complete WASPs destruction, are clear indications
that structural damage and loss of buoyancy and stability were not fatal. The loss of the WASP thus must be attributed to the fires which resulted from the ignition of gasoline.
3. WASP was a new vessel, completed in 1940, and is considered to have been provided with an excellently arranged fire main system with ample pumping capacity. The inability to control the fire on the hangar deck is disappointing in view of the excellent facilities provided and the intact condition of the pumping plant. It was this fire which eventually forced WASP to be abandoned.
59. WASP, in spite of her small size, would have survived the damage to the hull had there been no fires. Watertight subdivision, stability characteristics and reserve buoyancy were all adequate to absorb the damage from two torpedoes, located as these were, without fatal consequences. It is noted that for some time after the attack WASP was still in a condition to proceed from the scene of action under her own power if the fires had been controlled. After she was abandoned she was struck by three additional torpedoes. Even after this, she did not sink immediately, although by then she was completely gutted by fire. Considering the durability of WASP, it was unfortunate that fire caused her loss."

This brings up another point. Older vessels did not perform as well as the newest designs. There was a lack of redundancy in the fire fighting systems provided. This had been discovered by the Royal Navy early in the war but the USN had not implemented the changes:

"71. As a result of the application of lessons from war experience prior to this action a greatly improved fire main and additional pumps had been authorized for PENSACOLA but had not been installed, because of lack of Navy Yard availability. While under repair at Pearl Harbor these alterations were accomplished. The fore and aft fire main was replaced with a loop system. This is composed of a horizontal loop running through the machinery spaces and 2 vertical loops, 1 forward of the machinery spaces and 1 aft. In addition to the 4 fire and bilge pumps and the 2 fire and flushing pumps in the engine rooms, one 1000 g.p.m. diesel pump was installed at frame 40 and two - 300 g.p.m. electric-driven pumps were installed, 1 forward and 1 aft. The 3 loops, with the various cross-connections, give a flexible layout and one which is capable of better subdivision than the previous system. This arrangement, therefore, in addition to almost doubling the pumping capacity, will increase the probability of retaining firefighting facilities in the event of severe battle damage."

As well as the fire systems themselves there was a lack of redundancy in the electrical systems that powered the fire pumps as well as the dewatering pumps. Again a lesson learned by the Royal Navy that had not been incorporated in the older ships of the USN.
A particular problem in older such as the battlecruiser and battleship conversions was the extensive use of cast iron which is very brittle and could not withstand the shock of a torpedo impact An example occurring early in the war was the loss of Southampton which was directly attributed to the loss of power when cast iron support feet fractured..

The one question that puzzles me the most is that they didn't pluck the low hanging fruit. I.e the removal of fire loads. A common theme is fires in the offices quarters.

Lexington
"(4) Fires were started in Admiral's and Chief of Staff's cabin which were soon reported under control. The upholstered furniture in these cabins was very difficult to extinguish after catching fire."

Quincy, Astoria and Vincennes
"5. The action sharply emphasized the necessity for providing equipment which is reliable and adequate for the control of the major conflagrations resulting from present day naval warfare. The necessity for a vigorous program for the removal of unessential material presenting fire hazards was also clearly presented.
6. With respect to improvement and augmentation of fire fighting facilities, the Bureau inaugurated and is executing an extensive program on both existing vessels and new construction. This program involves the installation of additional pumps with independent sources of power, separation of fire mains into loops to reduce probability of a few hits placing the entire system out of operation, installation of fog nozzles and other mechanical aids and rearrangement of inflammable stowage in which essential inflammable materials are to be carried below the waterline and at the extremities of the vessel.
7. In connection with elimination of existing fire hazards aboard ship, the Bureau is actively cooperating with the forces afloat to accomplish this. For example, reference (e) is a directive issued by Comcrupac for the removal of many items of an inflammable nature aboard cruisers as well as emphasizing the necessity for early accomplishment of alterations listed in paragraph 6. It is based on the lessons learned from this and other actions. The Bureau is assisting in the program by the development of new non-inflammable materials and authorizing the replacement of inflammable materials with new materials. In this category fall such items as fibrous glass for insulation and flame resistant compounds for treating fabrics.
82. Fires (particularly the one in the wardroom country) were the direct cause of the loss of ASTORIA. Excess equipment, paint on bulkheads, records, and so forth in officers' spaces and in ship's offices provided fuel for a fire which gradually worked downward exploding ammunition in the 5" hoists. From there the heat of the fire eventually reached and exploded the unflooded 5" magazine. This blew a hole in the ship's side below the waterline. The flooding which resulted caused the ship to capsize 45 minutes later.
83. This action emphasizes again the absolute necessity of permanently removing inflammables and leaving ashore clothes, records, paint, and other materials that are not essential for the war-time operation of the ship. Those inflammable materials which are classed essential should be stowed below in compartments well forward and below the waterline and which are provided with a CO smothering system."

Enterprise
"E5-2. Detonation and fragments from the first bomb started a serious Class A fire in bedding and personal effects in living compartments D-203-1LM, D-303-1L and D-305-L. Dense smoke completely filled these compartments. There was little paint on bulkheads and overheads to support the conflagration."

Hornet
"26. Bomb "A", which detonated in the crew's mess room, started a fire in the wardroom mess room, A-211-1L.This space contained a great deal of upholstered furniture. The dense smoke from this fire plus the steam from the ruptured steam line in the crew's mess room passed up into the hangar where conditions were made extremely difficult for the repair parties to bring other fires under control. There was little if any fire in the crew's mess room, A-310-1LM, where the bomb exploded as the space had no combustible material present. The damage to the intake to boilers 1, 2 and 3 on the third deck resulted in the drawing of smoke into these three firerooms, which seriously interfered with boiler operation. Central station was also filled with smoke through the ventilation system which was undoubtedly damaged on the third deck. The ventilation supply duct to the forward generator room at frame 76, which was destroyed on the third deck, carried the flash from the bomb detonation into the generator room where the distribution board was put out of commission. The after bulkhead of the plotting room, frame 76, was red-hot from the heat of this flash. Steam from the ruptured constant-service lines in the messing compartment and the generator room filled the damaged spaces on the second, third and fourth decks and the generator room. It appears that the steam assisted in the smothering of the fire on the second deck in the wardroom mess room. This fire, with others, was fought by bucket brigades and hoses passed over from the destroyers MORRIS, RUSSELL and MUSTIN."

In this case they certainly knew better as clearly stated in prewar instructions:

Strip Ship Bill

1. The Strip Ship Bill covers those items which are required to be done on mobilization, together with certain additional items which it may be necessary to do at regular intervals during war but which, by virtue of the time required to accomplish them, cannot be done when material condition "B" is ordered. The bill shall be prepared to accomplish the landing and stowage of material and alteration of certain peacetime conditions, in order to prepare the ship for wartime conditions. The bill should be as definite as planning will permit. Care must be taken to avoid premature decisions with regard to items of material and work which may be subject to modification depending on the type of campaign, climate, and probable area of operations. As a drill for strip ship cannot be held, no detailed compartment nor division check-off lists need be posted. Each department will list the various items by number, the location of the item by compartment, the division responsible for action, and the disposition. The following is a list of items by number, together with disposition, and represents the minimum which should be included in the Strip Ship Bill:-

The full list is here:
Operations Manual: Damage Control

USN Damage Control Reports which I have quoted from are here:
War Damage Reports

Having been aboard several WWII-era (and older) ships, the amount of linoleum on them is astounding. Between that and the upholstery of the furniture, it amazes me that more sailors didn't succumb to smoke inhalation. Those fumes are extremely toxic.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Having been aboard several WWII-era (and older) ships, the amount of linoleum on thiem is astounding. Between that and the upholstery of the furniture, i amazes me that more sailors didn't succumb to smoke inhalation. Those fumes are extremely toxic.

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The RN tried unsuccessfully to find a substitute but in the end just went to bare floors. The RN damage control measures are very well described in a chapter in

Thumpalumpacus said:

Having been aboard several WWII-era (and older) ships, the amount of linoleum on them is astounding. Between that and the upholstery of the furniture, it amazes me that more sailors didn't succumb to smoke inhalation. Those fumes are extremely toxic.

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Intuitively I'd think that apart from fuel and munitions, there's just not that much stuff that can provide fuel for a fire. But of course, the history of naval combat in the steel ship era invalidates that idea.

Seems that things like paint, furniture, cloth in various forms, etc are present in sufficient quantities to be problematic.

Speaking of upholstery specifically, any idea what materials were used for cushions in ships during the WWII era? Notably, the nowadays ubiquitous polyurethane foam was introduced only in the 1960'ies. Presumably they weren't using straw either?

Typical stuffing materials for cushions back in the day depended on the intended use and what was available to the maker. Seat cushions would typically be stuffed with horsehair (now often seen in vintage cars of that era). More decorative cushions, like pillows, with feathers. Other materials used included cotton batting, wool and even straw. Regular plumping up was required with many of theee materials to ensure they remained comfortable.

I recall reading that when the Captain class DE were returned to the USN in 1945/46, they were appalled at how the RN crews had introduced much flammable material into the ships as RN crews sought a few creature comforts from the rigours of Atlantic & Arctic convoy duty where most if thee ships operated 1943-45. The "heads" and bathroom facilities were another area that the RN modified to its own standards. With the USN having plenty DEs most of the ex RN ships went straight to the scrap yard.

One problem with the pre-war ships of all navies was the build up of paint as each minor refit saw another layer added to keep the ship looking in tip top condition.

Post war saw much use of new materials in warships. Greater use of Aluminium in place of steel and plastics for furnishings. The Falklands War in 1982 provided a wake up call for the RN (bad fires on Sheffield and Anteope for examle) while incidents like the USS Belknap collision with the carrier JFK in 1975 caused some rethink for the USN.

Even today we see the effects of fire with the loss of the Russian cruiser Moskva.

Carriers are particularly vulnerable to fire as evidenced by the loss of IJN ships at Midway and Philippine Sea and various USN ships already mentioned as well as those kamikazied in 1944/45. But even post war we have seen major fires on the USS Oriskany in 1966, Forrestal in 1967 while she was operating in the Tonkin Gulf and CVN-65 Enterprise in 1969, not to mention the total loss to fire of LHD-6 Bonhomme Richard in 2020.