Midway with expanded Kido Butai?

The USN had a sub screen laid out and because of Nagumo's fleet spacing, only a couple subs made contact.

If his fleet were larger, it would have quite possibly passed by more subs than was historically.

By the way, my Uncle's sub, USS Grayling (SS-209) was part of that screen but was attacked by a B-17!

tomo pauk said:

"Teamwork is essential - it gives them more targets to shoot, so I'm more likely to get unhurt", or something to that effect. American airmen will do their best to kill Japanese carriers - any carrier they can get - leaving the possibility to a few light carriers succumb to the overwhelming attacks, leaving the fleet carriers free to operate. Battle of Midway might leave USN loosing 2, if not all 3 carriers, with Japanese loosing 2 light and one or two fleet carriers instead of 4 fleet carriers as it was the case historically. Japanese also lose less aircraft and crewmen, especially since IJN can stay and save their men. Fielding more carriers at Midway also means more escort forces.
Mikuma lives, Mogami is not trashed.
Capture of Guadalcanal is less likely to happen. 1943 gets far more ... interesting to the WAllies in Pacific.

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Glad you wrote that. I was thinking the same thing but you phrased it better.

Jonathan Parshall was on Drachinifel's YouTube channel discussing Midway back at the start of June. Part of the conversation included alternative Midway scenarios, e.g. Hornet performs well, Yorktown is not available, Zuikaku is present, etc., and the likelihood of an American victory in such scenarios. It's an interesting one, and worth a watch.

The Battle of Midway - 80th Anniversary Stream ft. Jon Parshall

The alternative scenario discussion runs from 8m 20s to 31m 00s.

PAT303 said:

The CAP was a disorganised mess as well as also requiring the decks to be clear for refueling and rearming hampering the attacking force switching munitions below decks, if I had extra carriers I'd load them with zero's and use them as an autonomous force dedicated to fleet defence.

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You're still gonna have major problems with fighter control and direction.

A better idea over adding some questionable CV's to the mix, how about not frittering away your advantage in ships? Yamamoto was so "into" deception believing he had to lure the American CV's out of hiding that he spread his fleet all over the damn place. He (and the IJN GHQ) totally misread their opponents by figuring the USN was cowering in port and would have to be tricked into battle. He/they figured that if the Americans knew what all he had at sea they would stay in port, hence his ridiculous scheme of "distant cover" which was, in reality, no cover at all.

First, I'd put the big useless BB's out in front as a airpower sink to soak up attacks from the USN/USAAF and add the four cruisers and their escorts of the bombardment group to the AA screen of Kido Butai. KdB didn't need more CV's, they needed more support for the four they had present, the IJN had groups of ships all over the place doing nothing more than parading around the Pacific burning precious fuel. Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu were quite capable of getting the job done if given the right plan and support.

Second, nix the whole Aleutians debacle, total waste of ships, aircraft and manpower, any cruisers and destroyers there could be added to Kdb's AA screen.

Third, well, NOT underestimate a United States Navy that was totally NOT cowering in port and if I may coin a phrase, Effing SPOILING for a fight.

Deception wasn't what was needed at Midway by the IJN, overwhelming force was.

Also remember, if Yamamoto HAD concentrated his force like he should have, Nimitz might have let them just have Midway knowing he could retake it at any time after the fleet would be forced to retire. Fletcher and Spruance were under orders to give battle only if they had an advantage, if it looked to be going south on them, they were to pull out and preserve the CV's.

And speaking of Midway itself, Shattered Sword points out that it most definitely would NOT have been a given that the Japanese invasion would succeeded. Reading up on the preparations that were made, it's very probably that the landing troops would have been slaughtered as they tried to come ashore, leaving a bloody mess in the lagoon and a mighty fleet of surface units looking on, floundering around with nothing to support and open to aerial attack.

Peter Gunn said:

add the four cruisers and their escorts of the bombardment group to the AA screen of Kido Butai.

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Peter Gunn said:

nix the whole Aleutians debacle, total waste of ships, aircraft and manpower, any cruisers and destroyers there could be added to Kdb's AA screen.

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The AA screen is something of an illusion. Their primary function would be to soak up bombs and torpedoes from over anxious American pilots spoiling to get into the fight.

The Best Japanese heavy cruisers had eight heavy AA guns, the worst may have had 4 guns, The light cruiser with the support group destoyers and two 3 in (8cm) AA guns. Many of the destroyers had 12.7cm/50 guns which used bagged charges and had to loaded at 5-10 degrees which meant an rather low rate of fire. Some destroyers had 4-6 25mm AA guns, some had a few 13mm AA guns.

Granted the US cruisers of the time weren't much better but tremendous AA batteries of 1943 and on US Navy groups were noticeably lacking in the summer of 1942 on both sides.

Many of the fast Japanese battleships only had eight 5in/40 AA guns, and in June of 1942 not that many 25mm AA guns.

The US did have an advantage in that the modern destroyers had the 5in/38 guns which were a much superior AA gun to the Japanese 12.7cm/50.

Nobody had proximity fuses and the Americans may have had better gun directors.

Thumpalumpacus said:

You're still gonna have major problems with fighter control and direction.

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Given the lack of both discipline and radios, any instructions to improve CAP through additional carriers must be kept simple. Each squadron or flight is assigned an altitude spread and instructed not to leave it, but instead to pass off targets at different altitudes to other squadrons or flights. You only return to the "fighter replenishment" carriers for fuel and ammunition, and then immediately return to your assigned altitude. This may very well keep Zeros flying around doing nothing, but imagine if this simple SOP had been in place when the unescorted SBDs arrived at high altitude.

Mixing up the carriers for different duties isn't going to work well.

Fighters are going to want/need to land on their 'home' carriers for replenishment. Japanese carriers were a bit notorious is their differences. They didn't all have their islands on the same side and indeed, not all of them even had an island.

Different funnel arrangements made for different wind eddy currents for landing.
This also doesn't work well for "strike" carriers. You may be able to land and take-off your strike aircraft from a few carriers while other carriers become all fighter carriers. What you can't do on a whim is change the magazines and bomb hoists. Trying to double the amount of bomb stowage in magazines to accommodate having double the number of strike aircraft and no fighters isn't going to work well. Neither is trying to service twice the number of strike aircraft unless you take twice as long. You can reload fighter planes much faster than you can reload strike aircraft. Please remember that what contributed to the destruction of some of the Japanese carriers was the bombs/torpedoes in the hangers as they changed from one type of ordnance to the other and weren't taking the time to properly stow the dismounted ordnance. You have lifts (small elevators) to connect the hanger with the magazines lower in the hull.

Some of these ideas are not so much of change in deployment of ships/equipment but changes in procedure/training/doctrine and actual ship capabilities. Magazines were usually refrigerated, so you can't slap a sign on a compartment, clean it out, slap a lock on it and call it a magazine. Getting a torpedo from a lower deck to several decks above takes a bit of work too. Especially if you are trying to keep the elevator/lift shaft somewhat water tight and flash resistant.

Admiral Beez said:

Given the lack of both discipline and radios, any instructions to improve CAP through additional carriers must be kept simple. Each squadron or flight is assigned an altitude spread and instructed not to leave it, but instead to pass off targets at different altitudes to other squadrons or flights. You only return to the "fighter replenishment" carriers for fuel and ammunition, and then immediately return to your assigned altitude. This may very well keep Zeros flying around doing nothing, but imagine if this simple SOP had been in place when the unescorted SBDs arrived at high altitude.

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Depends on when the SBDs were seen and if the CAP was in position -- remember, the three dive bomber squadrons attacked from two different directions, arriving almost simultaneously. The torpedo bombers from both Midway and the CVs might actually have had an easier time of it too, with the fighters parceled out at altitudes. 55 dive bombers might have faced some heavier resistance and tougher drops, but I doubt the Zeroes would have kiboshed all of them, while the torpedo bombers would have had fewer fighters and maybe land a hit or three?

As matters stand, I think the massive disorganization on the American side was both a boon and a bane for us, once we consider the absence of air-search radar and director control aboard the Japanese ships.

Shortround6 said:

The AA screen is something of an illusion. Their primary function would be to soak up bombs and torpedoes from over anxious American pilots spoiling to get into the fight.

The Best Japanese heavy cruisers had eight heavy AA guns, the worst may have had 4 guns, The light cruiser with the support group destoyers and two 3 in (8cm) AA guns. Many of the destroyers had 12.7cm/50 guns which used bagged charges and had to loaded at 5-10 degrees which meant an rather low rate of fire. Some destroyers had 4-6 25mm AA guns, some had a few 13mm AA guns.

Granted the US cruisers of the time weren't much better but tremendous AA batteries of 1943 and on US Navy groups were noticeably lacking in the summer of 1942 on both sides.

Many of the fast Japanese battleships only had eight 5in/40 AA guns, and in June of 1942 not that many 25mm AA guns.

The US did have an advantage in that the modern destroyers had the 5in/38 guns which were a much superior AA gun to the Japanese 12.7cm/50.

Nobody had proximity fuses and the Americans may have had better gun directors.

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I'm not sure I see what you're getting at, I think we all know that fleet AA in both the USN and IJN was in it's fledgling months during 1942 and left something to be desired. Captain Sherman of Lexington and Admiral Halsey to name two, both lamented the poor AA shooting of Enterprise and Lexington, not to mention their escorts in the actions pre-Midway.

So are you saying because they didn't have very good AA (which the IJN certainly didn't) that the extra oh let's say, 32 heavy AA guns of Mogi and her three sisters weren't worth adding to the defensive ring around KdB? Maybe the AA suite of IJN cruisers and battleships was a shadow of 1944 but it makes a lot more sense to have them at the actual point of contact with the enemy rather than 200 miles away burning fuel. As it was, the screen around the four IJN CV's was rather pathetic, so I don't see a downside to adding more firepower to the defensive circle.

Shortround6 said:

Their primary function would be to soak up bombs and torpedoes from over anxious American pilots spoiling to get into the fight.

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Yes, I believe I said that...

Peter Gunn said:

First, I'd put the big useless BB's out in front as a airpower sink to soak up attacks from the USN/USAAF

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Peter Gunn said:

A better idea over adding some questionable CV's to the mix, how about not frittering away your advantage in ships?

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Sounds like a great topic for another thread. Do that.

Shortround6 said:

Mixing up the carriers for different duties isn't going to work well. Fighters are going to want/need to land on their 'home' carriers for replenishment. Japanese carriers were a bit notorious is their differences. They didn't all have their islands on the same side and indeed, not all of them even had an island.

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I hadn't realized that the differences in the carriers precluded any cross decking.

The Royal Navy's carriers were a complete hodgepodge, did the FAA have similar issues? In preparation for the Taranto raid in Nov 1941 HMS Eagle had to bow out due to mechanical issues, with her Swordfish flying over to operate from HMS Illustrious. Eagle was a slower and smaller ship, so perhaps Illustrious would in fact be easier.

Admiral Beez said:

I hadn't realized that the differences in the carriers precluded any cross decking.

The Royal Navy's carriers were a complete hodgepodge, did the FAA have similar issues? In preparation for the Taranto raid in Nov 1941 HMS Eagle had to bow out due to mechanical issues, with her Swordfish flying over to operate from HMS Illustrious. Eagle was a slower and smaller ship, so perhaps Illustrious would in fact be easier.

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You have two different things going on. The RN Was operating short of aircraft to begin with, so were the Japanese but not quite as bad.
The British were planning on limited strike. One or two (at the most) strikes, two waves were used but it was get in, hit get out and sail away.
The Japanese were planning for several days, Bomb Midway and deal with the American carriers if they showed up and flying a number of missions (2-4?) each day.
Bomb stowage for strike aircraft was a lot more important.
British carriers had Islands to starboard of various sizes. There were no islands to port, ever. Furious got a small Island in 1939. No flush deck carriers after that.

The Japanese should have planned for more flexibility for moving one squadron to a different carrier. But trying to use all one type of aircraft from a carrier that was not designed to do so and do it with just a few weeks notice is not going to go well. Fighters may be more flexible than strike aircraft.
Japanese were short of all types of carrier aircraft in May 1942. There were no extra A6Ms to load onto the carriers.

British had started planning the Toranto raid in 1938, and modified as time went on and tried exercises and modified again.

The original plan for Taranto included both Illustrious & Eagle, but Eagle needed repairs.

At the time of Taranto Illustrious shipped her entire designated air group of 33 (15 Fulmars of 806 squadron and 18 Swordfish of 815 & 819 squadrons). This was dictated by hangar capacity. She took 6 Swordfish and 2 Sea Gladiators from Eagle's air group and ran a deck park. Some losses while en route reduced the strike force to 21 Swordfish. The long round down aft limited the numbers that could be carried as a deck park.

The idea of striking a fleet in its harbour dates back to the early 1930s and exercises by a multi carrier force against the Med Fleet in Greek waters.

Admiral Beez said:

Sounds like a great topic for another thread. Do that.

threadjacking - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

en.wiktionary.org

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It's a what-if thread, no need to be precious about staying on-topic.

Admiral Beez said:

The Royal Navy's carriers were a complete hodgepodge, did the FAA have similar issues?

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Elevator designs, I'd think. Non-folding wings on the skinny lifts, etc.

One thing to keep in mind is that the air groups on Japanese carriers were very much a regular part of the crew, just like the gun crews on a battleship, so they were trained very specifically for operations from their home carrier and would not easily have been able to operate from a different carrier, and also would not have liked to do so. Only the Cranes were identical enough to easily cross-deck.

The mistake had been done before, at the Coral Sea operation (Operation "MO", if I remember correctly). Sending just two heavy carriers to the party was due to Japanese overconfidence. Had there been a bigger slice of KB present, no US carrier would have survived. I doubt that, even with their intelligence advantage, the US Navy would have opposed the full KB with just Enterprise and Hornet.

Even if Midway had been more or even completely successful for Japan the woeful production capability
had doomed the IJN from the start.

Taiho was the only purpose built carrier Japan produced from 1941 on and 32 months to complete.
By 1944 Taiho was ready but the USN already the Essex in the water and commissioned in December 1942.
This was followed by a further 16 purpose built fleet carriers during the rest of the war as opposed to one.

The game was over before it started either way. A better result for Japan at Midway would only have delayed the
inevitable.

The Japanese - Yamamoto in any case - knew that, too. Their hope from the beginning had been that the USA might tire of the effort of full war against Japan - a forlorn hope after Pearl Harbor.

Shortround6 said:

This assumes you have extra Zeros.
They apparently didn't enough to replenish the Zuikako,
Zuiho had 1/2 Claudes and 1/2 Zeros for her fighter group.
Ryūjō had 30 aircraft aboard instead of her 'nominal' 48 planes.

The Alaskan adventure had just 30 Zeros between the 2 carriers. Ryūjō had just completed a short refit after her Indian Ocean service.

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Well that's proof that the IJN were even worse than I thought, who'd mount a surprise attack when not enough aircraft or pilots were available?.