Overwhelmed Flight Control System Contributes to F-35 Mishap

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MIflyer

1st Lieutenant
6,586
13,073
May 30, 2011
Cape Canaveral
Here is a new one, not just PIO but also CIO.

From Avweb

An unstable approach, a misaligned helmet and an "overwhelmed" flight control system led to the crash of an Air Force F-35 at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida last May. An Air Force accident report released a few weeks ago found plenty of fault with the pilot's actions but it was ultimately the airplane that wouldn't allow itself to be saved. The plane's overworked processor set the horizontal stabilizers to the "default" position of trailing edge down just as the pilot initiated a go-around to try his landing again. When the aircraft didn't respond to firewalled throttle and full back pressure on the stick, the pilot ejected and the plane rolled, caught fire and disintegrated. The pilot suffered minor injuries and the aircraft, worth $175,983,949, became a debris field.


The aircraft was on a night training flight and was landing at Eglin at 9:26 p.m. on May 19 when the accident occurred. The pilot was distracted by a misaligned helmet that was showing him erroneous head-up display information and didn't shut off a "speed hold" feature that maintained an airspeed of 202 knots. That's 50 knots faster than the 152-knot touchdown speed of the F-35. The aircraft was also on a 5.2 percent glideslope when the manual calls for 13.2 degrees. The result was a floating three-point landing followed by pilot-induced porpoising. As the pilot tried to salvage the landing with rapid control inputs, the flight control computer couldn't keep up and went to the default nose-down setting. "With the horizontal stabilizers set in this trailing edge down position, the [pilot] then input full aft stick for approximately three seconds and selected maximum afterburner (AB) in an unsuccessful attempt to set a go around attitude before successfully ejecting from the [aircraft]."
 
The JSF program is now in its 21st or 22nd year. Of the three flavors of F-35 delivered thus far, none are full-mission-capable, and Big AF gave up on the first batch apparently because L-M wanted to gouge We The Taxpayers for "improvements" that were supposed to be "factory standard." Those jets will be used for adversary training, if anything.

Somebody shoulda gone away long ago but JSF was born with a tattoo on its forehead: "TBTF." (Too Big To Fail.)
 
I realize that my following comments are the equivalent of backseat programming, but I would think that the problem described above (the software one, not the pilot one) should have been found and fixed long before now, particularly given the long gestation period of the airframe. I do realized (in general at least) the complexity of the programming and interaction of the different mechanical and human factors involved, including the many possible situations the pilot and aircraft may end up in, but did not this same problem occur during the development of the F-16, F-117, and Airbus, control system software?
 
The F-35 was the first new major USAF weapons system procured in the post Cold War era, after the service underwent a massive downsizing. The CSAF, Gen McPeak, decided that the downsizing should be accomplished by retaining as many "operators" as possible and getting rid of engineering and program management personnel instead. This was combined with an idea called "Support the Warfighter" which was intended to focus less on bureaucracy and more on actual useful capabilities; this was translated into "Do not question what the Operators want, no matter how dumb it sounds." Also, Darlyeen Druhand, Asst Secty of the Air Force for Acquisition, decreed that no program office should have more than 50 personnel. Ms Druhand ended up in jail for using back-door communications to negotiate a job with Boeing.

The F-35 was not the only system to have to suffer under these philosophies. Air Force Space Command asserted that the main problem with our space launch systems was that they were not being run by Operators with a proper emphasis on making the required schedule. The result was in 1998-99 the Air Force lost three out of four Titan IV missions from Cape Canaveral, and all three losses were preventable if only someone other than "operators" had been running things. There was a major turnover in personnel after that debacle and perhaps even a new appreciation that "kick the tires and light the fires" has some serious drawbacks as an approach.
 

Not completely true - as I've said countless times, many of these "improvements" and cost over-runs were induced AND approved by the government. BTW, depending on the day, it's has a better FMC rate than the F-22.

Over 500 built and 3 production lines in 3 different countries, yea, it's too big to fail.
 

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