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The Japanese went from a V-12 to a radial in going from the Ki-61 to the Ki-100, and they didn't seem to have much trouble.
This is WAY OFF TOPIC and if it gets thrown off oh well. I am personally tired of hearing about covid. Please no serious talks about it. If I want that I can just turn on the talking heads.
It made the CG and spin characteristics different. Many pilots thought it was dangerous some used it to their advantage. The rear engine was vulnerable to a 6 o'clock attack but head to head the other guy was dead since the nose had two 50's and a 37mm made possible by a rear engine.Hey everyone,
I am doing a school project and
I chose the P-39 to be on of the planes in my book. But I have a question, did the engine behind the pilot cause any problems?
Thanks ahead of time.
Hey everyone,
I am doing a school project and
I chose the P-39 to be on of the planes in my book. But I have a question, did the engine behind the pilot cause any problems?
Thanks ahead of time.
I like the looks of the F myself, but the performance gain was very little, and wasn't worth the effort.
The UK made the last WWII debt payment to the U.S.A. and Canada in 2006.
The USSR never did repay the WWII lend-lease debt. They paid part of it and, since we never really expected any payment, maybe it was a win.
I'm sorry there was ever a reason for WWII debt in the first place. It would be interesting to go back to the 1880s and find a way to keep the Triple Alliance and other agreements alive. Maybe WWI would never have happened, thus maybe not generating a way or a need for Hitler to come into the limelight. von Metternich set up alliances that were allowed to expire and set up WWI. Funny how agreements penned in the mid-1800s managed to lead to WWI and WWII so many years later after they expired. I suppose that's off-topic, so I'll just let it die here.
Engine was put behind the pilot to make room for the 37mm cannon. It couldn't be synchronized.Firstly, why have the engine behind the pilot?
One in theory was that it would increase maneuverability by reducing the polar moment of inertia, ie the main masses would be close to the centre of gravity and so there would be less resistance to turning. I don't know whether that worked, but it certainly gave it a vicious fast spin when the cg got too far back after expending ammunition. This, along with the aircraft failing to meet its performance claims, meant that it had a very brief career with the RAF, who passed the whole lot onto the USSR.
Second, it would allow better streamlining by having the point of greatest width (the engine) in the middle of the fuselage rather than the nose. However, as stated, its performance, not only at altitude, was disappointing compared to what had been promised.
Third, it would allow heavy nose armament. Which in the true P39 it did, with a filthy great 30mm cannon that the Russians loved in ground attack roles. However, in the original export version, the P400, this was replaced by a 20mm cannon (why?) which had nowhere near the hitting power.
So the only justification that worked out was the heavy cannon armament, and the P400 didn't even have that.
Interestingly the Italians used the same three justifications for a prototype mid-engined fighter called the Piaggio P119.
More about the cg problem: on normal ww2 fighters ammo and fuel were kept around the cg, notably in the wings, so that as they were expended the cg stayed about the same. However, with the engine occupying all the fuselage space around the cg, they had to be moved and for goodness knows what reason Bell calculated the static margin (distance from cg to centre of aerodynamic pressure) with a full ammo load. The result is that once the ammo had run down the static margin was reduced and the aircraft was only marginally stable and a potential widow maker.
Part of the reason for the success the Russians had was that rather than giving up on the aircraft (they were desperate for any modern fighters) was that they extensively researched the cg problem and came up with precautions and work-arounds. (I see parallels with the Finns and the Buffalo, where for lack of alternatives they took an aircraft the Western allies loathed and steadily turned it into something decent).
Incidentally, I wonder how much the smaller caliber cannon in the P400 made the cg problem worse by reducing nose weight. I read once (can't confirm it) that the last straw for the RAF after only a handful of missions in their P400s was when they sent four out on one raid and on the way home, with ammo expended, two of the four (including pilots) were lost to flat spins!
Overall for me the most appropriate epitaph for the P39 is the British phrase "Too clever by half".
And why on earth did they use those car doors, making it very difficult to get out of an already dangerous aircraft in an emergency?
Best of luck with your project. BTW, one lesser-known user was the RAAF who refurbished twenty or so war weary and damaged P39s and P400s for interim home defence for a few months in 1942.
Firstly, why have the engine behind the pilot?
One in theory was that it would increase maneuverability by reducing the polar moment of inertia, ie the main masses would be close to the centre of gravity and so there would be less resistance to turning. I don't know whether that worked, but it certainly gave it a vicious fast spin when the cg got too far back after expending ammunition. This, along with the aircraft failing to meet its performance claims, meant that it had a very brief career with the RAF, who passed the whole lot onto the USSR.
Second, it would allow better streamlining by having the point of greatest width (the engine) in the middle of the fuselage rather than the nose. However, as stated, its performance, not only at altitude, was disappointing compared to what had been promised.
Third, it would allow heavy nose armament. Which in the true P39 it did, with a filthy great 30mm cannon that the Russians loved in ground attack roles. However, in the original export version, the P400, this was replaced by a 20mm cannon (why?) which had nowhere near the hitting power.
So the only justification that worked out was the heavy cannon armament, and the P400 didn't even have that.
Overall for me the most appropriate epitaph for the P39 is the British phrase "Too clever by half".
And why on earth did they use those car doors, making it very difficult to get out of an already dangerous aircraft in an emergency?
Best of luck with your project. You have certainly picked a topic that creates controversy. The subject of the P39 and its success with Soviet forces in WW2 and its lack of success with the US and British is a cause for constant debate on forums.
A few points about the British experience with the P-39 are directly related to the engine position. These points are almost never bought up in modern discussions of the type, being largely forgotten. So they might interest other readers of this forum as well as adding a unique slant to your project.
On 1st March 1940, an article appeared in the British weekly "Aeroplane" magazine. It was highly critical of the new Bell P-39 Airacobra and the performance claims made for it. One point the author kept repeating was that a mid-engined aircraft requires a long extension shaft to the prop. That adds extra weight to the aircraft, weight that is avoided in a traditional front-engined design. So, all things being equal, a properly designed front-engined fighter would always be superior to a mid-engined one because it would not carry the additional weight of the extension shaft. The added weight and complication of the big steerable nose-wheel would only compound the matter. The author also had a particular issue with the location of the carb air intake behind the cockpit, which he asserted would be highly inefficient. The position of the engine behind the pilot was also criticised as in a crash it could "run over" the pilot (this was a particularly British concern reflecting the experience with "pusher" aircraft such as the FE2B and Vickers Gunbus in the First World War). The tone of the whole article was downright nasty and it ended on a particularly sour note.
"As a serious fighter the Bell is all wrong. We trust the British Purchasing Commission in the USA will not be hood-winked into placing an order"
The article was anonymous, but no one had any doubts who had written it – the dreaded Charles G Grey.
It is hard now to realise just what influence this ridiculous old fool had in Britain at the time. The founder of the "Aeroplane" magazine he had used it as a mouthpiece for his own racist, xenophobic, world-view in both the weekly editorial and the comments he felt free to insert into other writer's articles. His own pet-theories and prejudices were given great coverage and he became a man of great influence. A sort of aeronautical Piers Morgan, one half of his readership agreed with him while the other half read his editorials to see what nonsense the old man was spouting this week. He was the man that had led the campaign to close down the Royal Aircraft Factory during World War One just as it was about to deliver some very advanced designs and an outstanding engine. The Air Ministry ran scared of him on a number of issues. His pro-German attitude eventually proved too much even for the publishers of "The Aeroplane" and he was "retired" as editor when war broke out in September 1939. However he continued to have his articles printed in the magazine (often anonymously) and he was snapped-up as air correspondent of various newspapers, so if anything his influence spread.
So you can imagine the trepidation of the Air Ministry and RAF when the British Purchasing Committee selected the P-39 for production for the RAF in its modified P-400 "Caribou" form with 20mm cannon instead of 37mm cannon. It would only need a letter from some pilot to his MP or to a newspaper complaining of even the slightest problem with the new aircraft to have CG Grey down on them complaining of incompetence in the Air Ministry. When the new aircraft were tested after arrival in the UK and found to have a performance well below that expected, just as CG Grey had prophesied 12 months earlier, you can imagine alarm bells started ringing in the Air Ministry! Is it any wonder they looked for ways of unloading this machine onto someone else, especially as, at the time, supplies of Hurricanes and Spitfires were on the up (How things would change at the end of 1941 with opening up of the war in the Far East!)
The other problem with the P-400 was the timing of its arrival in the UK. In early 1941 there was every expectation that the Luftwaffe would renew their daylight attacks on Britain. When the Battle of Britain had petered out in 1940 combats had been happening at increasing heights. The RAF expected that when the battle was re-joined it would start off where it had left off, with combat at increasing altitude and maybe with the Germans using new high-altitude pressurised bombers. This had led to the emergency development of the mark VII and VIII high-altitude versions of the Spitfire and the fitting of the Merlin XX in the Hurricane II to give a better high-altitude performance. Again, you can imagine the dismay when the new P-400 arrives on the scene and proves to have a particularly disappointing performance at altitude. Even when the Germans invaded Russia everyone assumed that the Soviets would be defeated in a matter of weeks and that the Germans would resume their attack on the UK in the autumn of 1941 or spring 1942.
The other issue that came to light during testing was the time it took to "turn around" the aircraft. During the Battle of Britain, when a Hurricane or Spitfire squadron returned to base after combat they would usually come back in "dribs and drabs", a few aircraft at a time. The armourers would work on the machine-guns in the wings, and even though they had 8 machine guns the way they were installed made them easy to reload without getting in anyone's way. While this was going on the fuel could be refilled and oil and coolant topped-up. So the turn-around time was remarkably quick and the aircraft was ready for the next "scramble" in a very short time. Largely because of its mid-engine layout P-39/ P-400 took much longer to turn-around. With the armament in the nose and awkward to get at the armourers were in the way of the fuel-replenishers. Time to turn-around is a powerful FORCE-MULTIPLIER and remained a central feature of RAF thinking into the cold-war (the cannon packs on the Hunter jets being a case in point).
The RAF defence structure, based on sector stations each controlling a limited number of squadrons had been a great success in 1940. – But it was also inflexible. All Day Fighter Squadrons were EQUAL. They all had to be capable of being sent against any incoming force and at whatever height, be they bombers or an enemy fighter sweep (one of the reasons for the withdrawal of the Defiant from the Day-fighter role in 1940). It simply would not have been possible to have some P-39 /P-400 squadrons limited to only low-altitude interceptions, and also taking twice the time to turn-around.
So you see, the P-39 was just not suitable for the battle RAF Fighter Command thought it was going to have to fight in 1941 or 1942 once the Germans were through with defeating the Russians. Of course, neither the altitude or turn-around time matters when you go into OFFENSIVE operations or if you provide air defence over your front line by flying standing patrols. Then, as the Russians did, you can dictate yourself what altitude you want to fight at and take your time re-arming and refuelling your aircraft ready for the next mission.
So when you add this evaluation to the possibilities of the "CG Grey" issue you can perhaps appreciate why the Air Marshals jumped at the chance to unload the P-400s onto the Soviets!
CG Grey was only months away from getting his own comeuppance. Firstly the German invasion of Russia made allies of a nation he had spent a lifetime denigrating. Then the US entry into the war made Allies of a nation he had often offended ( the American aeronautical press often featured letters from the British people apologising for Greys latest outbursts, the B-17 and US aero-engines were also regular targets for his ire). Then a piece he wrote just weeks before Pearl Harbour about the abilities of Japanese Aviators sealed his fate as an aviation pundit.
Heck, I've ended up writing an essay! - Best of luck with yours!
Give me a day to two to dig through old copies of "The Aeroplane" and other magazines and books of the time I'll put them up. Along with some of his more outrageous comments on other subjects. - But rather than do it on this thread I'll create a new one. Then anyone else who comes up with other quotations from him can add them for comment.Would be interested to hear his thoughts of the B-17.
I honestly don't know what to say.
Merlin in a P-39? I guess it's possible but hardly worth the effort. If you want two stage performance just use the -93 engine in production from April 1943.
Main problem with the P-39 and P-400 was weight. In 1941 a SpitfireV weighed 6600#. A P-400 weighed 7850# with a slightly less powerful engine. If they had simply deleted the wing guns and a little of the redundant armor plate performance was about the same as the SpitfireV. With 20% more fuel, tricycle landing gear and better visibility.Best of luck with your project. You have certainly picked a topic that creates controversy. The subject of the P39 and its success with Soviet forces in WW2 and its lack of success with the US and British is a cause for constant debate on forums.
A few points about the British experience with the P-39 are directly related to the engine position. These points are almost never bought up in modern discussions of the type, being largely forgotten. So they might interest other readers of this forum as well as adding a unique slant to your project.
On 1st March 1940, an article appeared in the British weekly "Aeroplane" magazine. It was highly critical of the new Bell P-39 Airacobra and the performance claims made for it. One point the author kept repeating was that a mid-engined aircraft requires a long extension shaft to the prop. That adds extra weight to the aircraft, weight that is avoided in a traditional front-engined design. So, all things being equal, a properly designed front-engined fighter would always be superior to a mid-engined one because it would not carry the additional weight of the extension shaft. The added weight and complication of the big steerable nose-wheel would only compound the matter. The author also had a particular issue with the location of the carb air intake behind the cockpit, which he asserted would be highly inefficient. The position of the engine behind the pilot was also criticised as in a crash it could "run over" the pilot (this was a particularly British concern reflecting the experience with "pusher" aircraft such as the FE2B and Vickers Gunbus in the First World War). The tone of the whole article was downright nasty and it ended on a particularly sour note.
"As a serious fighter the Bell is all wrong. We trust the British Purchasing Commission in the USA will not be hood-winked into placing an order"
The article was anonymous, but no one had any doubts who had written it – the dreaded Charles G Grey.
It is hard now to realise just what influence this ridiculous old fool had in Britain at the time. The founder of the "Aeroplane" magazine he had used it as a mouthpiece for his own racist, xenophobic, world-view in both the weekly editorial and the comments he felt free to insert into other writer's articles. His own pet-theories and prejudices were given great coverage and he became a man of great influence. A sort of aeronautical Piers Morgan, one half of his readership agreed with him while the other half read his editorials to see what nonsense the old man was spouting this week. He was the man that had led the campaign to close down the Royal Aircraft Factory during World War One just as it was about to deliver some very advanced designs and an outstanding engine. The Air Ministry ran scared of him on a number of issues. His pro-German attitude eventually proved too much even for the publishers of "The Aeroplane" and he was "retired" as editor when war broke out in September 1939. However he continued to have his articles printed in the magazine (often anonymously) and he was snapped-up as air correspondent of various newspapers, so if anything his influence spread.
So you can imagine the trepidation of the Air Ministry and RAF when the British Purchasing Committee selected the P-39 for production for the RAF in its modified P-400 "Caribou" form with 20mm cannon instead of 37mm cannon. It would only need a letter from some pilot to his MP or to a newspaper complaining of even the slightest problem with the new aircraft to have CG Grey down on them complaining of incompetence in the Air Ministry. When the new aircraft were tested after arrival in the UK and found to have a performance well below that expected, just as CG Grey had prophesied 12 months earlier, you can imagine alarm bells started ringing in the Air Ministry! Is it any wonder they looked for ways of unloading this machine onto someone else, especially as, at the time, supplies of Hurricanes and Spitfires were on the up (How things would change at the end of 1941 with opening up of the war in the Far East!)
The other problem with the P-400 was the timing of its arrival in the UK. In early 1941 there was every expectation that the Luftwaffe would renew their daylight attacks on Britain. When the Battle of Britain had petered out in 1940 combats had been happening at increasing heights. The RAF expected that when the battle was re-joined it would start off where it had left off, with combat at increasing altitude and maybe with the Germans using new high-altitude pressurised bombers. This had led to the emergency development of the mark VII and VIII high-altitude versions of the Spitfire and the fitting of the Merlin XX in the Hurricane II to give a better high-altitude performance. Again, you can imagine the dismay when the new P-400 arrives on the scene and proves to have a particularly disappointing performance at altitude. Even when the Germans invaded Russia everyone assumed that the Soviets would be defeated in a matter of weeks and that the Germans would resume their attack on the UK in the autumn of 1941 or spring 1942.
The other issue that came to light during testing was the time it took to "turn around" the aircraft. During the Battle of Britain, when a Hurricane or Spitfire squadron returned to base after combat they would usually come back in "dribs and drabs", a few aircraft at a time. The armourers would work on the machine-guns in the wings, and even though they had 8 machine guns the way they were installed made them easy to reload without getting in anyone's way. While this was going on the fuel could be refilled and oil and coolant topped-up. So the turn-around time was remarkably quick and the aircraft was ready for the next "scramble" in a very short time. Largely because of its mid-engine layout P-39/ P-400 took much longer to turn-around. With the armament in the nose and awkward to get at the armourers were in the way of the fuel-replenishers. Time to turn-around is a powerful FORCE-MULTIPLIER and remained a central feature of RAF thinking into the cold-war (the cannon packs on the Hunter jets being a case in point).
The RAF defence structure, based on sector stations each controlling a limited number of squadrons had been a great success in 1940. – But it was also inflexible. All Day Fighter Squadrons were EQUAL. They all had to be capable of being sent against any incoming force and at whatever height, be they bombers or an enemy fighter sweep (one of the reasons for the withdrawal of the Defiant from the Day-fighter role in 1940). It simply would not have been possible to have some P-39 /P-400 squadrons limited to only low-altitude interceptions, and also taking twice the time to turn-around.
So you see, the P-39 was just not suitable for the battle RAF Fighter Command thought it was going to have to fight in 1941 or 1942 once the Germans were through with defeating the Russians. Of course, neither the altitude or turn-around time matters when you go into OFFENSIVE operations or if you provide air defence over your front line by flying standing patrols. Then, as the Russians did, you can dictate yourself what altitude you want to fight at and take your time re-arming and refuelling your aircraft ready for the next mission.
So when you add this evaluation to the possibilities of the "CG Grey" issue you can perhaps appreciate why the Air Marshals jumped at the chance to unload the P-400s onto the Soviets!
CG Grey was only months away from getting his own comeuppance. Firstly the German invasion of Russia made allies of a nation he had spent a lifetime denigrating. Then the US entry into the war made Allies of a nation he had often offended ( the American aeronautical press often featured letters from the British people apologising for Greys latest outbursts, the B-17 and US aero-engines were also regular targets for his ire). Then a piece he wrote just weeks before Pearl Harbour about the abilities of Japanese Aviators sealed his fate as an aviation pundit.
Heck, I've ended up writing an essay! - Best of luck with yours!
Have started the new thread under "Stories" (only heading I could see that was anywhere near applicable). - Includes a quote of his on the B17.Would be interested to hear his thoughts of the B-17.