Similar to the current & recent threads - what the Polish should've been doing wrt. outfitting of their armed forces in the years preceding the ww2? Also - what changes in positioning should've been implemented, like where to keep the divisions/armies once the German invasion becames imminent? Note that I have no illusions that Poles will simply trash the Nazi & Stalin butts in 1939, but still.
Polish outfitting & positioning of their armed forces, 1935-39(40?)
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
To start, the biggest lacks of Poland were in tanks and modern aircraft. My understanding is that for their size they were standing relatively well for artillery, AT and AA guns (not quite sure if they had a 20mm AA though). So there are the relatively low hanging fruits of "simply" accelerating the tank program, building several times as many 7TPs, as well as the 10TP, perhaps some 4TPs as well, as well as rearming with 20mm AT guns as many TKs as possible, and/or converting them to AT SPGs with the 37mm AT gun. This alone means many more german panzers would be destroyed/incapacitated, twice or even more which is a significant attrition rate. As the Panzerwaffe was one of the main spears of the german onslaught, blunt the spear and the german advance will at least be slowed down.
In the air, at the very least order as many of the the already produced PZL-24 and PZL-43 for the air force as possible, and get the PZL-50 and PZL-38 in production asap, all with GR14K, N or M engines as necessary. Perhaps would have been better to get the GR licence instead of Bristol in the first place. Again, this alone would greatly increase Luftwaffe losses considering the losses they suffered against the hopelessly obsolete (except the PZL_37) OTL polish planes (and of course AA), at least twice, maybe even significantly more, with consequences for the amount of air support given to german units. The polish aircraft industry was running well below capacity before the war, so several good hundreds of modern aircraft could have been built by 1939.
So while this might not have prevented an eventual german victory, it might have given them a significantly bloodier nose in doing so, with all kinds of butterflies later on.
In the air, at the very least order as many of the the already produced PZL-24 and PZL-43 for the air force as possible, and get the PZL-50 and PZL-38 in production asap, all with GR14K, N or M engines as necessary. Perhaps would have been better to get the GR licence instead of Bristol in the first place. Again, this alone would greatly increase Luftwaffe losses considering the losses they suffered against the hopelessly obsolete (except the PZL_37) OTL polish planes (and of course AA), at least twice, maybe even significantly more, with consequences for the amount of air support given to german units. The polish aircraft industry was running well below capacity before the war, so several good hundreds of modern aircraft could have been built by 1939.
So while this might not have prevented an eventual german victory, it might have given them a significantly bloodier nose in doing so, with all kinds of butterflies later on.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Low hanging fruit but shows how bare the trees really were.
More field phones and field phone wire.
More radios.
More artillery ammunition.
More transport (even horse) to get ammo to the guns.
If you can't tell some of your units where to go and when to retreat to avoid being cut off you are in trouble from the start.
If you can't direct the artillery you do have you have troubles.
If you don't have anywhere near the Ammo per artillery piece the Germans have in the divisions you are at significant disadvantage.
If you cannon resupply units in the field in a timely fashion things are going to go pear shaped really quickly.
Fancy guns and an extra 100-200 tanks are not going to turn things around.
Better coordination and better artillery support would go a long way to slowing the Germans down.
More field phones and field phone wire.
More radios.
More artillery ammunition.
More transport (even horse) to get ammo to the guns.
If you can't tell some of your units where to go and when to retreat to avoid being cut off you are in trouble from the start.
If you can't direct the artillery you do have you have troubles.
If you don't have anywhere near the Ammo per artillery piece the Germans have in the divisions you are at significant disadvantage.
If you cannon resupply units in the field in a timely fashion things are going to go pear shaped really quickly.
Fancy guns and an extra 100-200 tanks are not going to turn things around.
Better coordination and better artillery support would go a long way to slowing the Germans down.
- Thread starter
- #4
IMO, the airforce was the really sore point. Having a good and, at least, relatively modern fighter force not only defends one's assets and country, but it can allow the own bomber units to operate with reasonable casualties, instead of these being loopsided.
So despite the 1-engined bombers being popular in the interwar period, I'd rather spend the resources and time to make additional and better fighters, while keeping the 2-engined bombers at least as-is. Polish industry produced almost 300 or PZL 23 and 43, so just on that account they might've produced another 300+ fighters (some of them for export, but most of them for Poland itself). That is about the amount of the P.11 fighters produced - the 'swap' basically doubles the Polish fighters' strength.
Industry also manufactured 200+ P.24 fighters, that were exported.
Have half of the fighters outfitted to carry light bombs, so the Army generals are sattisfied, and these should prove as harder to kill than the PZL 23s for the Germans.
Some investment in the night operations by light aircraft and PZL 37s should've also been explored. A very cunning plan might've included having the agents close to the German air bases, that can lit the flares in the night to mark these bases, in coordination with the Polish AF commanders.
The P.11 and similar parasol aircraft with fixed U/C were rendered all but obsolete with the wide introduction of the I-16. Polish should've copied the I-16 idea blindly and ASAP, and can fit the Mercury engine in the nose. Against the 500-550 km/h fighters and 400-450 km/h bombers, the fighters doing 500 km/h are a far better asset than the fighters doing 400 km/h.
So despite the 1-engined bombers being popular in the interwar period, I'd rather spend the resources and time to make additional and better fighters, while keeping the 2-engined bombers at least as-is. Polish industry produced almost 300 or PZL 23 and 43, so just on that account they might've produced another 300+ fighters (some of them for export, but most of them for Poland itself). That is about the amount of the P.11 fighters produced - the 'swap' basically doubles the Polish fighters' strength.
Industry also manufactured 200+ P.24 fighters, that were exported.
Have half of the fighters outfitted to carry light bombs, so the Army generals are sattisfied, and these should prove as harder to kill than the PZL 23s for the Germans.
Some investment in the night operations by light aircraft and PZL 37s should've also been explored. A very cunning plan might've included having the agents close to the German air bases, that can lit the flares in the night to mark these bases, in coordination with the Polish AF commanders.
The P.11 and similar parasol aircraft with fixed U/C were rendered all but obsolete with the wide introduction of the I-16. Polish should've copied the I-16 idea blindly and ASAP, and can fit the Mercury engine in the nose. Against the 500-550 km/h fighters and 400-450 km/h bombers, the fighters doing 500 km/h are a far better asset than the fighters doing 400 km/h.
- Thread starter
- #5
Fighter designs that were actually produced in series, that were well within the scope of Polish industry in the second half of the 1930s, and equivalents of whom might've gave the Poles better chances:
- Ki 27 - on engines worse than Mercury VIII, were still good for 470 km/h
- A5M +the 'full' canopy on it
- Fokker D.XXI
Something like either of these is not a long shot to be made once I-16 is common knowledge, or indeed before the I-16. After a couple of years, make a version with retractable U/C (in Finland, the retractable U/C gained to their Fokkers an average of 26 km/h extra speed) - so we mimic the MC.200 performance here, and then some if the engine installation is kept clean and the canopy is fully closed.
A couple of light cannons will not look bad on either of these fighters.
Of course, Polish might've kept themselves in the V12 'business' for this time period, after all the innovative (for the time) P.1 was powered by the HS 12B (unsupercharged) engine.
- Ki 27 - on engines worse than Mercury VIII, were still good for 470 km/h
- A5M +the 'full' canopy on it
- Fokker D.XXI
Something like either of these is not a long shot to be made once I-16 is common knowledge, or indeed before the I-16. After a couple of years, make a version with retractable U/C (in Finland, the retractable U/C gained to their Fokkers an average of 26 km/h extra speed) - so we mimic the MC.200 performance here, and then some if the engine installation is kept clean and the canopy is fully closed.
A couple of light cannons will not look bad on either of these fighters.
Of course, Polish might've kept themselves in the V12 'business' for this time period, after all the innovative (for the time) P.1 was powered by the HS 12B (unsupercharged) engine.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Given the geography and the governmements* on either side, Poland would have had a better chance by developing nukes. In about a two year time frame. Without a butt ton of resources. I'm sure, however, they already had Russian spies at the ready.
*I accidentally typed governmements instead of governments, which spellcheck corrected. I think I prefer governmements.
*I accidentally typed governmements instead of governments, which spellcheck corrected. I think I prefer governmements.
Answer for late '30s is license built Curtiss Hawk-75. Poles just need to find the money, as Curtiss would be happy to sell. If China was able to build these, so could Poland
Faster than developing the Polish PZL.50 'Hawk', as could be in widespread squadron service by War start, since Curtiss was looking for international sales since 1936 for them
France 1940 showed they worked well against the Bf-109, and after that against the Soviets. It's a solid early war choice.
Just expensive.
Probably be fine using Bristol Mercury VIII over Wright or P&W power. G-R 14N or Bristol Hercules is also an option. The basic Hawk airframe was very adaptable forward of the firewall.
Armament, two Cowl MMG/HMG and two underslung Nkm wz. 38 FK 20mm in the Curtiss gunpod/gondola mount
For a bomber Interceptor, and six MMG for against Fighters.
For trainer or light ground attack, the CW-19
The 'Fun Sized' Curtiss that later was reworked into the CW-21 Demon. This Airframe used radials from the R-760 to the R-1820.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
A problem with the Mercury is that it peaks out at about 840hp at altitude. This is pretty good for a 24.9 liter engine but it is hard to improve very much.
Poland needs to but or build a factory for the American engines. It also has problem with Bristol 9 cylinder engines. They have a factory, but it is not a large one. Maybe they can go to 2/3 shifts ( I don't know if they were only running one shift). But they were only building a few dozen engines per month. The Poles were also trying to build Pegasus engines at the same factory at the same time in the same factory.
It Appears that Poland purchased the G-R 14 engines used in some of the other aircraft.
In 1939 the Hercules was almost vapor ware. Not very many were actually available and the ones that were had a lot of problems. A Very good engine in 1941 and later but not any sort of solution for the Poles in 1938-39.
They had their own indigenous equivalents in development, but as always there were critical delays. PZL-45 or RWD-45 seems to be in the same speed class, but also not any better than PZL-24, so to me it makes more sense to build as many PZL-24 as possible until PZL-50 and PZL-38 are ready. The poles might have suffered from the NIH sindrome so it's unlikely they will be keen to licence foreign aircraft (especially the very expensive and completely alien american options).
However if one is to consider a licence and a large foreign order i think Fokker D.XXI and especially the modern Fokker G1 fightercruiser are very attractive because of their mixed construction and Mercury engine (if they still stick to Bristol in this TL). Presumably their mixed construction might make them easier to build by secondary firms like RWD. Putting a large order with Fokker also supplements the numbers, though not sure what is their production capacity.
In the same vein putting large orders for Hurricanes, Battles and MS.406s as early as possible would be good too, at least they might get some before the war, where every modern airframe counts.
Same goes for tanks, order more Vickers, R-35s, H-35s etc just to hopefully get some delivered before the war.
TM06
Airman 1st Class
It might be worthwhile to invest further the 75 mm armata wz.36 cannon. The specs look impressive for its type and it would be available relatively early (designed in 1933, tested in 1935) - biggest sticking point was "minor defects in the carriage" which delayed production by 2.5~3 years.
Might be feasible to stick with the slightly flawed carriage and get the gun made in significant numbers as an interim solution until a better carriage is created?
Given its capabilities, I also think it could be used as a dual-purpose cannon that can take on anti-tank duties (towed or on a gun truck). It wouldn't really be needed considering the extremely light armour on both German and Russian tanks at the time, but it would be useful later on in the future against the next generation tanks assuming Poland does better here.
Might be feasible to stick with the slightly flawed carriage and get the gun made in significant numbers as an interim solution until a better carriage is created?
Given its capabilities, I also think it could be used as a dual-purpose cannon that can take on anti-tank duties (towed or on a gun truck). It wouldn't really be needed considering the extremely light armour on both German and Russian tanks at the time, but it would be useful later on in the future against the next generation tanks assuming Poland does better here.
This is fine, Son of the 1987.
just more of them, and decent prime movers for them.
Kegresse is one solution
TM06
Airman 1st Class
Oh definitely. I'm mainly arguing for a relatively future-proof option with the expectation of more heavily armoured tanks being on the horizon.
Besides, it's still a very capable AA gun even without the possibility of the AT role, and having more of those is never a bad thing.
- Thread starter
- #14
Usually, I will not utter a word against the Curtiss 75. However, there was no such thing as 'China was able to build Hawk 75s'.
Poles had no problems in making actual aircraft in the 1930s. Their problem was that, come ~1937, the only modern aircraft in production was PZL-37, a 2-engined bomber.
There is really no mayor obstacle for the Polish series production of an IAR.80 equivalent come 1938, alas than never happened.
IMO, Polish problem was that their fighters were of obsolete shape/layout.
We know that the Ki-27 with an engine that is of even lower power at altitude was faster by almost 80 km/h (50 mph) than the P.11g with the Mercury VIII. A 1000 HP engine on the P-24 (ie. 25% better power than what the best Ki-27 had) still produced a fighter that is slower than the best Ki-27, and by 40 km/h. In the same time, the similarly powered IAR.80 was 80-100 km/h faster than the P.24.
The MC.200 was even better performing than these fighters, even hough the engine on it was not better than the Mercury VIII.
If the light bombers are removed from the purchase plans, the factory should not have problems in making extra Mercury engines so more fighters can be made.
IIRC Poles considered the Bristol radials as much more reliable engines than the G&R 14K, but they had no problems if the foreign customer wanted these.
Agreed all the way.
Any Hurricane and MS.406 should've indeed be a boon to the Polish defenses.
Put the 'normal' turret on the early M2 and it should be very useful.
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Shortround6
Lieutenant General
This is quite true.
The famous "China Hawk 75s" were a result of China buying an assembly plant and a batch of parts kits to be assembled in China.
Due to bombings and evacuations only a small handful were assembled in China before the parts kits and salvaged tooling was loaded on a trains/s and would up in India. Origins of any India built Hawk stories. A handful may have been assembles in India. Completed aircraft are a small fraction of the number of parts kits sent to China.
But in no case were either the Chinese or India building Hawk 75s using locally manufactured parts to Curtiss drawing/prints using Chinese or Indian tooling.
Which is fine, comparing that China was hardly industrialized, and India no better.
Poland, OTOH, had been building all metal monococque aircraft since the PZL P.7 in Warsaw seven years before the War started, so could do more than just final assembly from knock down kits in 1938.
Curtiss kits done in late 1938 is better than hoping that the bugs of the PZL.50 would get worked out, or the panic orders for Hurricanes and MS 406 that never arrived before the start of the War.
Also dealing with Curtiss at this point, gives them access to these
So much better than the fixed pitch units their aircraft were using. Rotal couldn't provide any of their units, not even meeting RAF demands in 1939, and I don't know how many 2 speed units from DH were available, either, leaving many aircraft with fixed pitch props.
- Thread starter
- #17
If Poles want to do the buying of the MS 406 or Hurricane, they can start ordering these aircraft already in 1937.
I agree that the PZL.50 is too late, Polish need to up their indigenous fighters' game much earlier.
Hamilton Standard licences were all the rage already by 1935? In the UK, De Havilland was one of the licencees, Polish can emulate them.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Tomo is correct. Poland was already using H-S props on their twin engine bombers. I don't know where they got them or exactly which version (two pitch or variable pitch).
A lot of the smaller countries (and this includes Italy) could make small quantities of things. The problem is scaling up to match the big boys, like France or Germany.
It is not just factory space, you need to fill the factories with machine tools (or other tools) and skilled workers.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Given the industrial capacity of Poland, which was not small but not peer either, the strategy needs to tailored to suit and stripped down.
In the air concentrate on air superiority, or at least air effectiveness. Scrap the bombers but concentrate on fighters. Poland had a technical lead in the mid 1930s but recognise that the speed of technical advancement is such then that you need to be working on the next generation even as the current one is entering service. In Britain the 2,000bhp engine was the expected thing. The Merlin/Hercules were an interim holding pattern. Poland should have been making 1,000bhp+ fighters in service by 1938 not beginning to try out prototypes in 1939. One must note what the Japanese, Romanians and Italians managed with Mercury/ Pegasus power. Pilot training is always money well spent and cheaper than more machines.
On the ground horses must remain the principal power but select motorisation can occur for heavier artillery and tank transporters suited to the available roads. Having tanks in effective numbers to stop and throw back the Germans is not on. The industrial capacity is not there and could be put to better use. However anti tank guns, including anti tank rifles (and the Polish one was good for its brief window) are within the capacity of Poland. Also anti tank mines. Rqogther these kill more tanks than actual tanks do. Easily moved by horse. If you must have tanks then the PzIII is about the right mix to aim for and keep them for assault and exploitation under high level command. Never to shore up defence. That is for the anti tank guns and mines.
The navy acknowledges it can deter but not stop German naval attacks and IOTL sensibly sent it's best destroyers out of the Baltic to save them. Perhaps high speed minelayers could be more useful than gun vessels and block German Baltic parts and the use of Polish ones?
All of these will work immeasurably with real time command and control both in the army and air force. Radios at all levels are more important than bombs and bullets. The Polish army can then fight as one national army to an informed overall plan. Battlefield Intelligence is crucial to inform the Polish staff of what is going on and what can be expected to happen. This is an on the ground matter. Aerial reconnaissance gives only a momentary snapshot of one small part of the action and that predetermined by the mission. Stay-behind hides and light cavalry, properly trained and with radios can give a continuous picture of greater density. Improved formal Staff training and exercising builds and keeps confidence in the best use of the resources open to them.
Reversing a German attack and bringing it to a halt invites a war of attrition which Poland will lose. Driving them back and seizing Germany is not within Poland's powers. The army is not there to defend Warsaw but must seek to engage and destroy the German army in the field not by defending territory. It is only when the Germans are unable to further prosecute the war that they will sue for peace.
A two front war can only be won if the Soviets are hopelessly incompetent allowing the west to be won with only a holding action in the east before turning east. Plan to win in the west. That is the greater hazard and possibly greater risk.
So, for the machinery, we need a modern Mercury fighter in service. Polish industry is already building stressed skin aeroplanes.
We need a reliable simple tank with some HE capacity in its gun as well as AP. A four man crew with a three man turret. It must have useful radios. Capable of coping with a German 37mm AP hit on the front at least.
A light, reliable easily hidden and emplaced AT gun and a portable effective, in 1939, AT Rifle. For the latter the OTL one is sufficient but all troops should be trained and practiced to use it; mechanically and tactically. The AT gun for towed use by a horse/ horses and the AT Rifle on a pack animal and taken into position on foot.
Bad ground and mines can channel tanks into a killing field of AT guns set into a net of AT rifle positions to take the tank flanks as they turn to present their frontal armour to the guns.
In the air concentrate on air superiority, or at least air effectiveness. Scrap the bombers but concentrate on fighters. Poland had a technical lead in the mid 1930s but recognise that the speed of technical advancement is such then that you need to be working on the next generation even as the current one is entering service. In Britain the 2,000bhp engine was the expected thing. The Merlin/Hercules were an interim holding pattern. Poland should have been making 1,000bhp+ fighters in service by 1938 not beginning to try out prototypes in 1939. One must note what the Japanese, Romanians and Italians managed with Mercury/ Pegasus power. Pilot training is always money well spent and cheaper than more machines.
On the ground horses must remain the principal power but select motorisation can occur for heavier artillery and tank transporters suited to the available roads. Having tanks in effective numbers to stop and throw back the Germans is not on. The industrial capacity is not there and could be put to better use. However anti tank guns, including anti tank rifles (and the Polish one was good for its brief window) are within the capacity of Poland. Also anti tank mines. Rqogther these kill more tanks than actual tanks do. Easily moved by horse. If you must have tanks then the PzIII is about the right mix to aim for and keep them for assault and exploitation under high level command. Never to shore up defence. That is for the anti tank guns and mines.
The navy acknowledges it can deter but not stop German naval attacks and IOTL sensibly sent it's best destroyers out of the Baltic to save them. Perhaps high speed minelayers could be more useful than gun vessels and block German Baltic parts and the use of Polish ones?
All of these will work immeasurably with real time command and control both in the army and air force. Radios at all levels are more important than bombs and bullets. The Polish army can then fight as one national army to an informed overall plan. Battlefield Intelligence is crucial to inform the Polish staff of what is going on and what can be expected to happen. This is an on the ground matter. Aerial reconnaissance gives only a momentary snapshot of one small part of the action and that predetermined by the mission. Stay-behind hides and light cavalry, properly trained and with radios can give a continuous picture of greater density. Improved formal Staff training and exercising builds and keeps confidence in the best use of the resources open to them.
Reversing a German attack and bringing it to a halt invites a war of attrition which Poland will lose. Driving them back and seizing Germany is not within Poland's powers. The army is not there to defend Warsaw but must seek to engage and destroy the German army in the field not by defending territory. It is only when the Germans are unable to further prosecute the war that they will sue for peace.
A two front war can only be won if the Soviets are hopelessly incompetent allowing the west to be won with only a holding action in the east before turning east. Plan to win in the west. That is the greater hazard and possibly greater risk.
So, for the machinery, we need a modern Mercury fighter in service. Polish industry is already building stressed skin aeroplanes.
We need a reliable simple tank with some HE capacity in its gun as well as AP. A four man crew with a three man turret. It must have useful radios. Capable of coping with a German 37mm AP hit on the front at least.
A light, reliable easily hidden and emplaced AT gun and a portable effective, in 1939, AT Rifle. For the latter the OTL one is sufficient but all troops should be trained and practiced to use it; mechanically and tactically. The AT gun for towed use by a horse/ horses and the AT Rifle on a pack animal and taken into position on foot.
Bad ground and mines can channel tanks into a killing field of AT guns set into a net of AT rifle positions to take the tank flanks as they turn to present their frontal armour to the guns.
- Thread starter
- #20
E
Elan Vital - could you please post here about that book that deals with Polish (military?) aero industry up to 1939?
