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I guess currently its more of a question of faith, than a matter of verifiable facts. Its certainly a dear enough subject for some to bother with creating new logins from time to time.
but it is considered roughly equivalent to the British fuel that topped out at +12lbs in a Merlin without intercooling
As for the use of 100 octane fuel in the BoB, Glider, lots of claims were made, little evidence has been seen what fuel Fighter Command was running on, and to what extent.
I guess currently its more of a question of faith, than a matter of verifiable facts.
Hop said:Spitfire Vs were run at up to 18 lbs without intercoolers.
Spitfire Mk II pilots notes, published July 1940 states that it uses 100 octane fuel, absolutely no mention of 87 octane.
We have the consumption figures from the national archives,
June - August 1940
10,000 tons 100 octane a month
26,000 tons other grades a month
September
14,000 tons 100 octane
23,000 tons other grades
October
17,000 tons 100 octane
18,000 tons other grades
We know that even 10,000 tons a month is far more than Fighter Command needs.
We know that we have combat reports from almost every Spitfire squadron mentioning the use of 100 octane.
Then we have a posting by an Australian called "Pips" who gave a précis of what he remembered seeing in the Australian archives
....that contradicts everything that's actually been published from the UK archives.
It certainly is a matter of faith. Documentary evidence against the opinion of an anonymous poster. What other reason is there to favour the opinion of the anonymous poster?
Kurfurst
Please don't quote just the one paper that was posted on the earlier thread without the rest. It is totally misleading and I formally object to you putting it in out of context.
I lost track of the times you have been asked to supply a copy of the paper.
You know that I approached the Australian archives where I was assured by you where it was held and I sent you their reply, they had never heard of it and could not find it.
The only thing that we agreed was that it up to the person making the claim to support their claims with evidence and you had not supplied this paper or anything else to support your comments.
This paper you keep on mentioning is to support your view, so supply a copy.
The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.
By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.
The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.
I came across it when I was in fact researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives.
It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance.
It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject.
It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.
The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF.
I believe that McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.