RAF BoB Fighters OTL ATL v Me-109

Shortround6 said:

I will certainly take your word for it.

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I should stipulate that this was the case in 1940. You will see it described as a 'floodlight' system and that 'light' only shone in one direction.

At that time the area relevant to the BoB was covered by only eight Chain Home stations (and a number of Chain Home Low stations) between that at Bromley (Essex) to Ventnor (Isle of Wight). It is a reflection of the poor German intelligence that despite the supposed difficulty of eliminating these stations a concerted effort was never made.

Cheers

Steve

Shortround6 said:

There is also short term and long term. The Bombing of the BSA Factory did not destroy the Factory or stop production for years, bu the loss of 3 months of rifle production in 1940 may or may not have been important. Hitler turned East in 1941 and the loss of several months of rifle production to the British Army diminished in importance. IF the Germans had stayed in France and planned a Spring of 1941 invasion ( probably still doomed) then having lost several months of production may have been much more significant. BSA was the ONLY factory making rifles in 1940 in England. BTW a bomb raid in Aug 1940 burned out one building and the loss of 750 machine tools..

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On the 6th June 1940, after the loss of equipment in France the British army still had in stock 1,500,000 SMLE rifles, more than enough for all the regular divisions being re-equipped and raised in the UK at that time. A further 500,000 US surplus rifles were purchased at around this time, these were issued to the Home Guard in late summer 1940.

If the LW had destroyed the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield there would have been problems it was the only source of Bren Guns. Rifles werent the problem MGs were.

fastmongrel said:

If the LW had destroyed the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield there would have been problems it was the only source of Bren Guns. Rifles werent the problem MGs were.

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By the end of June 1940 the British army had 17,500 Bren guns in stock, half the number required for the 27 Infantry Divisions being raised and re-equipped in the UK at that time. However the British again also received surplus US Lewis MGs (1,157) and BARs (25,000) at around this time, these were used to help equip the regular divisions until towards the end of 1940, when enough Brens had been produced for the US equipment to be transfered to the Home Guard.

stona said:

Can the RAF afford to abandon it's sector airfields? Damage to these left Park on one occasion, and in his own words, flying little more than his desk. Can it afford to lose the south coast Chain Home stations? The temporary loss of two of these led to one of the Luftwaffe's most successful raids of the campaign.

What is too far forward? Just consider 11 Group's sector stations. Biggin Hill? Maybe. Tangmere? Possibly. Certainly Hawkinge which was also an important 'Y service' listening station. Do you fall back as far as London? Kenley, Northholt, North Weald? Do you leave London and it's docks and industry completely undefended? The whole idea is, frankly, ridiculous. The enemy would have to force such a withdrawal on the RAF

The UK air defence system was a co-ordinated system and dislocation (or abandonment) of any part of it would cause problems. There was a plan to withdraw north of the Thames, but only in the event of successful German landings. You can not operate from airfields occupied by the enemy.

The RAF existed as part of the UK's air defence system to defend the UK air space. The UK means from the English Channel (there's a reason it was called that) to the Scottish Isles and beyond. It would have been completely unacceptable to give up any part of this voluntarily. The Luftwaffe tried to force the issue, but it failed.

Cheers

Steve

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Steve

I meant the airfields right on the coast not the sector airfields. Some were so close to the sea they were very vulnerable, and if scrambled to intercept were too close, still climbing and a sitting duck to be bounced.

Hawkinge was a sector station a few miles inland from Folkestone. It's a very short drive to the rabbit ridden BoB memorial at Capel le Ferne, on the coast.

Lympne is arguably even closer to the coast though not a sector station it was one of the airfields seriously disrupted by the Luftwaffe and considered a serious loss at the time. It was just one of several advanced airfields.

Tangmere, another 11 Group sector station lies close to the coast near Chichester, a few miles inland from Bognor Regis.

The other 11 Group sector stations are around London but this was a coordinated system. The loss of any airfields interrupted the smooth operation of the system. Manston, another airfield virtually on the coast (not a sector station as some who have seen the BoB film seem to believe)) was badly hit leaving a hole in 11 Groups defences which there was a struggle to plug.

The BoB was fought largely over Kent and Sussex precisely because these airfields were able to get fighters airborne to intercept the German raids as they crossed the coast over those southern counties.

There was never any reason to abandon them. Why retreat in the face of an enemy who is unable to force such a decision upon you ? I haven't read one good reason for abandoning the south east of England, its infrastructure and people to the depredations of the Luftwaffe in 1940, but I've given several reasons why not.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Hawkinge was a sector station a few miles inland from Folkestone. It's a very short drive to the rabbit ridden BoB memorial at Capel le Ferne, on the coast.

Lympne is arguably even closer to the coast though not a sector station it was one of the airfields seriously disrupted by the Luftwaffe and considered a serious loss at the time. It was just one of several advanced airfields.

Tangmere, another 11 Group sector station lies close to the coast near Chichester, a few miles inland from Bognor Regis.

The other 11 Group sector stations are around London but this was a coordinated system. The loss of any airfields interrupted the smooth operation of the system. Manston, another airfield virtually on the coast (not a sector station as some who have seen the BoB film seem to believe)) was badly hit leaving a hole in 11 Groups defences which there was a struggle to plug.

The BoB was fought largely over Kent and Sussex precisely because these airfields were able to get fighters airborne to intercept the German raids as they crossed the coast over those southern counties.

There was never any reason to abandon them. Why retreat in the face of an enemy who is unable to force such a decision upon you ? I haven't read one good reason for abandoning the south east of England, its infrastructure and people to the depredations of the Luftwaffe in 1940, but I've given several reasons why not.

Cheers

Steve

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I wasnt talking about the south of England just the extreme south coast near the channel because they were simply too close. How long was Lympne used for, for example?

pbehn said:

How long was Lympne used for, for example?

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Until it was devastated by the Luftwaffe sometime in August 1940 (it was the same day that the Luftwaffe seriously disabled Chain Home IIRC). The decision to evacuate the airfield and its destroyed infrastructure was one forced on Fighter Command by the Luftwaffe. The airfield was declared 'unoperational' as a result of enemy action. Hawkinge was just as exposed and suffered significant damage though it (like Manston, similarly damaged) was never declared unoperational.

Despite its geographic proximity to Hawkinge, Lympne was actually a satellite field in the adjacent Biggin Hill sector which is why its loss was keenly felt. West Malling is the next airfield to the coast in this sector and it is much closer to Biggin Hill than the sea!

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Until it was devastated by the Luftwaffe sometime in August 1940 (it was the same day that the Luftwaffe seriously disabled Chain Home IIRC). The decision to evacuate the airfield and its destroyed infrastructure was one forced on Fighter Command by the Luftwaffe. The airfield was declared 'unoperational' as a result of enemy action. Hawkinge was just as exposed and suffered significant damage though it (like Manston, similarly damaged) was never declared unoperational.

Despite its geographic proximity to Hawkinge, Lympne was actually a satellite field in the adjacent Biggin Hill sector which is why its loss was keenly felt. West Malling is the next airfield to the coast in this sector and it is much closer to Biggin Hill than the sea!

Cheers

Steve

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Hi Steve

Its much a quetion of semantics I think. Many airfields were made unoperational, making them operational again depends on the will to do so. With some they did with others they didnt. From Wiki Lympne continued to be used but not by squadrons, for small flights and as an emergency landing strip. No point in re building hangars etc so close to the sea.

cheers peter

redcoat said:

By the end of June 1940 the British army had 17,500 Bren guns in stock, half the number required for the 27 Infantry Divisions being raised and re-equipped in the UK at that time. However the British again also received surplus US Lewis MGs (1,157) and BARs (25,000) at around this time, these were used to help equip the regular divisions until towards the end of 1940, when enough Brens had been produced for the US equipment to be transfered to the Home Guard.

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My grandfather's Home Guard platoon was being issued Vickers and .30 US rifles by August 1940. The Vickers to go in concrete bunkers that were being constructed the same month (they are still there).God Bless the BBC with 'Dad's Army' and kitchen knives on broomsticks but, if you were near the pointy end of an invasion, you got proper rifles and some machine guns fairly soon. Many in his platoon were ex soldiers so they knew what to do with their weapons.

pbehn said:

Hi Steve

Its much a quetion of semantics I think. Many airfields were made unoperational, making them operational again depends on the will to do so. With some they did with others they didnt. From Wiki Lympne continued to be used but not by squadrons, for small flights and as an emergency landing strip. No point in re building hangars etc so close to the sea.

cheers peter

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As I said Hawkinge and Manston are just as close to the sea but were never declared unoperational. The RAF obviously felt that it could afford to give up Lympne but not the other two. They were all satellite fields. The a decision to 'give up' Lympne was forced on Dowding by the Luftwaffe.

I'd have to check on Manston but Hawkinge was never forced out of operation, though it came close to it on 12th August. It is worth considering that, apart from squadrons based at Hawkinge, about 1 in 3 of ALL 11 Groups squadrons were based there for some period during the Battle. That makes it, a few miles from the coast behind Folkestone, at the heart of 'Hellfire Corner', one of the most important airfields of the entire battle. Had Hawkinge not been available Lympne would have been repaired.

The original premise of the discussion was that the RAF might voluntarily give up its southern airfields, withdrawing north of London. That was never going to happen and the Luftwaffe was unable to force that decision on the RAF. It's why we see the BoB as a victory.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: Manston was put out of action for 24 hours following those raids on 12th August. It too was a vital forward base and much of what I wrote about Hawkinge could be written of Manston.

The original premise of the discussion was that the RAF might voluntarily give up its southern airfields, withdrawing north of London. That was never going to happen and the Luftwaffe was unable to force that decision on the RAF. It's why we see the BoB as a victory.

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no, the original premise is what might the RAF do if the Spitfire, and/or the Hurricane was in short supply of not there at all. That never happened historically, so your whole position is based on faulty ground, because it simply keeps doubling back to the historical scenario...."they never abandoned those forward fields so they would never abandon those forward fields!". its a classic non-sequita wedge...it never happened so it never would....but fails to take into account the real starting premise.

So, what do you do if you go into the battle short of spitfires. Do you stay forward, and watch the entire FC be decimated because it is being forced into a one sided massacre. i think not. What options are there? One, as suggested is to stay put, fight the historical fight, and really lose. The forward airfields could be lost and Britiain could still survive. The RAF won on many fronts, one as you say was because the germans at no point could claim control of any part of British skies. That, however, was neither the greatest victory, or indeed the essential one. What was esential was that the RAF remain a viable force able to inflict losses on the LW at an unsustainable rate. Similar to the way Lee fought his seven days campaign, in this alternative, you would fight a battle and fall back to safety, fight a battle and fall back to safety. And those batles would be fought outside, or at the limit of the 109 range. Sure it would be preferable to fight a forward defence, and there would be pain because of the loss of airfields, and in 1940 the british could not be certain that Sealion might not be launched, but none of those things were likley to lead to the complete defeat of britain. but the question is, what do you doi if that strategty is simply not availbale. How can the RAF still fight and at least not lose.

Sometimes, if faced with a battle you cant win, you have to adapt to minimise your defeat

The southern half of Britain could have been left undefended if there was no means to defend it? Is that your suggestion? Of course it could have been. The Germans couldn't invade and in any case it would have been the Royal Navy's job to deal with an invasion (assuming in this rather silly what if the Germans have the means and the will to launch one).

Next we can assume that the Navy doesn't have any destroyers for some reason, maybe the same reason we don't have Spitfires and Hurricanes. Then we can have a German invasion faced by the Home Guard (the Army also being unavailable for some reason, maybe the same that we have no front line fighters or destroyers) and make ludicrous conjectures about how that might have gone.

If there had been no competitive front line fighters available to the RAF then it would have been forced, by the Luftwaffe, to move out of range of its front line fighters, leaving large swathes of Britain's infrastructure and citizenry undefended, thus failing in the primary reason for Fighter Command's (formerly Air Defence of Great Britain which is self explanatory) existence. The 'shape' of Fighter Command and its defensive posture owed much to the Steel-Bartholomew Committee's report which followed WW1.

I have never denied that the Luftwaffe could have forced any number of contingencies on the RAF but the fact is that it didn't.

Cheers

Steve

I agree its a bit of a silly scenario, poorly defined as well. Why are there no or few spitfires. What offsets would be given for example, if the Merlin did not eventuate. If the scenario was a shortage of fighters due to over-use, what impact would that over-engagement have on the Germans. How long would the RAF be forced to operate under conditions of having insufficient fighters. None of this was thought through when the original scenario was posed, and that leaves us all fighting about what it is we are up against. OTOH ive had to deal with worse over the years including some really dinky problems when I was at Tactical Wearfare School at HMAS Watson.

Thankfully, this scenario never happened. The RAF was abale to stand toe to toe with the LW and do enough to claim comprehensive victory at the end of it. none of the Germans objectives had been reached, all of the RAF and British objectives were in the bag. It had been costly, but it was successful.

One might want to move the fighters back from the foremost fields without actually abandoning them. If the fields are still able to service aircraft ( fuel, arm and minor repair) it extends the distance the British fighters can pursue damaged German aircraft or stragglers. It gives more options to lost pilots or pilots of damaged aircraft. Patch them up, refuel and send back to regular base. It allows more of a defense in depth rather than giving the Germans too much of a "safe" zone.

Shortround6 said:

One might want to move the fighters back from the foremost fields without actually abandoning them. If the fields are still able to service aircraft ( fuel, arm and minor repair) it extends the distance the British fighters can pursue damaged German aircraft or stragglers. It gives more options to lost pilots or pilots of damaged aircraft. Patch them up, refuel and send back to regular base. It allows more of a defense in depth rather than giving the Germans too much of a "safe" zone.

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Actually that was a routine practice - smaller "satellite" airfields, such as Rochford (Sector Station Hornchurch) were used as forward bases; fuel and ammunition was trucked in over night (the fuel, for example, was supplied by tanker, usually from a forward fuel depot), one or two squadrons would fly to the field early next morning, operate from the field during the day, then fly back to the sector station or a larger airfield late evening.

which i dont think would change, except that the point of engagement would be somewhat later than historical. historically the RAF was making interceptions well forward, even over the channel, or occasionally even over french terrotory. Certainly a lot of fighting occurred over the coastal areas of SE England. In thisscenario, the point of engagement would be moved back a a ways, so that initial or occasional interceptions (mostly of unescorted or lightly escorted strikes) occurred within effective range of the 109. Most of the escorted raids would need to be intercepted some time after that point. not easy, perhaps not even achievable, but if FC was in a weakened state, its really got no choice. It has to fight to its capability, not to some unachievable standard.

its in those situations, incidentally, that your second line fighters might be able to do some reall good. Endurance of a fulmar, for example, was about twice that of a spitfire, and it carried twice the ammunition loadout. it was, by all accounts, a good gun platform, so use it to spin out or stretch the limited capabilities of a reduced number of Spits/Hurris.

Endurance of a fulmar, for example, was about twice that of a spitfire, and it carried twice the ammunition loadout. it was, by all accounts, a good gun platform, so use it to spin out or stretch the limited capabilities of a reduced number of Spits/Hurris.

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...and in one sentence we've gone from constructive and informative discussion of actual historical events to pure fantasy and wishful thinking. The Fulmar entered FAA service in June 1940, yes, in time for the Battle of Britain, but if Fighter Command gets them, what does the FAA get? Also, why would Fighter Command get them when they were built for the FAA? Again, regardless of the desperation of FC's position, sending Fulmars over France would be suicidal - the Fulmar wasn't much faster than the Battle at height. Sorry Parsifal, whilst I find the scenario being proposed entirely plauseable, the introduction of the Fulmar just blew it. Like the initial discussion of this thread, the Brits would have come up with something else other than turning to the Fulmar; it just wasn't fast enough. It would not have met the requirements laid down for an RAF fighter at the time.

nuuumannn said:

...and in one sentence we've gone from constructive and informative discussion of actual historical events to pure fantasy and wishful thinking. The Fulmar entered FAA service in June 1940, yes, in time for the Battle of Britain, but if Fighter Command gets them, what does the FAA get? Also, why would Fighter Command get them when they were built for the FAA? Again, regardless of the desperation of FC's position, sending Fulmars over France would be suicidal - the Fulmar wasn't much faster than the Battle at height. Sorry Parsifal, whilst I find the scenario being proposed entirely plauseable, the introduction of the Fulmar just blew it. Like the initial discussion of this thread, the Brits would have come up with something else other than turning to the Fulmar; it just wasn't fast enough. It would not have met the requirements laid down for an RAF fighter at the time.

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This is one of the weaknesses of the starting scenario. all we are given is that the spifire and hurricane are either not available, or in short supply. We dont know if there is a long lead time to develop a replacement, we dont know if any ofsewts are given like more Fulmars, or a new replacement, or reduced 109 availablity. We dont know if the spitfire/hurricane famine is permanent thing, or just that losses had caused a temporary shaortage in the RAF inventory. We dont know if it was brought on by a shortage of airframes, or a shortage of pilots. We dont know if ther are any compensations or offsets, or what happens in other areas of development. one possibility (but a very remote one) is that greater resources before the war are put into the FAA and the has more Fulmars on strength by June. Say the RAF has 100 Spifires and Hurricanes, and 250 Fulmars on loan from an over resourced FAA as at June 1940, what should it do. Send in 100 fighters against 600+ enemies, send in 350 fighters, 250 of which will be hard pressed by the enemy fighters, in the historical forward defnces, or hang back, outside of the range of the bogey 109s in an effort to pick off some of the stragglers or unescorted bombers.
None of the options are good, but the last mentioned is by far the better option of the three to choose from. ther is only one other that I can think of and that is not rise up at all, which I think would be a disaster.

I never said that fulmars should proceed to fight over France with Fulmars. the opposite actually.

Im not suggesting that the Fulmar be pursued as the main fighter for the RAF, but I am suggesting it might be an expedient that could be used in an emergency. I am suggesting that if nothing else was available, it would need to be used, and if that need arose, it would need to be used in a very sparing and careful way. The alternative might be to allow just a few spitfires and hurricanes to be even more heavily outnumbered, or worse, have no fighters at all, giving the LW carte blanche to roam at will and destroy what they needed to do, at almost no cost. the latter is equivalent to total defeat, not just for FC, but for Britain as a whole. Using Fulmars would very much be qa stopgap, a partial solution to a very difficult problem.

parsifal said:

no, the original premise is what might the RAF do if the Spitfire, and/or the Hurricane was in short supply of not there at all. That never happened historically, so your whole position is based on faulty ground, because it simply keeps doubling back to the historical scenario...."they never abandoned those forward fields so they would never abandon those forward fields!". its a classic non-sequita wedge...it never happened so it never would....but fails to take into account the real starting premise.

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NO, that is not the original premise!

The question queried the performance of ATL aircraft against the Me-109! It didn't stipulate that there would be no Spitfires or Hurricanes - seems most unlikely, or even drastically less numbers, merely that there could have been other aircraft involved, rather than say the Defiant, Gladiator Blenheim - and hence posed the question how would these fare!?

We have had some interesting answers, and alternative suggestions, as well as being side tracked - which often happens!