Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
The Japanese could not actually build what they wanted, they could not afford it.
They had gone to the 5.5 in guns because the lighter weight shells were easier to manhandle to the guns from the hoists.
Now please note that this was a limit to the British 5.25in AA guns which failed to reach the desired rate of fire.
For all of their emphasis on airpower Japanese Cruiser AA was pretty pathetic. It was also a bit wasteful as instead of accepting the loss of torpedo armament (or even the spare torpedoes) and just using the best AA guns they had they kept trying new guns but only mounting 4 on the Agano's didn't do much.
The Agano's were going in too many different directions at the same time.
All naval 6in guns had hand loaded or transferred shells, and naval 6in guns had a higher rate of fire than land based artillery. The USN 5in/25 had a fixed cartridge as did the RN 4.5in and they weighed 74lb and ~90lb, yet both were able to achieve a sustained 12RPM or better. The RN 5.25in shell was 80lb and it had a separate cartridge.Land-based artillery in the modern era has pretty much standardized on the 6" size, as that's about the largest shell that can be manhandled if necessary, and also that's about the maximum size of a gun that can be installed on a SP platform, provide some splinter protection for the crew, and still be road mobile.
For sea-based artillery conditions are more cramped, and the platform is moving and pitching, moving the maximum size that can be manhandled downwards. Consensus seems to be that somewhere around 5" is the maximum that can be manhandled in a somewhat sustained fashion without tiring the gun crews too fast.
Yes, the Brits waffled around with a number of different guns in this class until they developed and then standardized on the 4.5", which by all accounts was an excellent gun.
If you have perfect air superiority you don't need AA!
Was fire control the big thing that was missing for Japanese AA, or was it just they had relatively few guns compared to the USN? They had the 127mm Type 89 which perhaps wasn't up to par with the US 5"/38, but it seems to have been Ok. And later they introduced the 100mm AA gun, which seems to have been excellent, although it was so late it wasn't introduced in particularly large numbers before the US juggernaut steamrolled them.
For bigger ships, the insistence of a separate surface secondary battery and a separate heavy AA instead of DP mounts was arguably, in retrospect, a mistake.
Perhaps the larger gap was in light and medium AA. Some of their ships had pom-poms, which weren't as good as the 40mm Bofors, in newer designs being replaced with the POS 25mm AA gun.
're RN 4.5", it depends on which Mount/ turret you are referring to.All naval 6in guns had hand loaded or transferred shells, and naval 6in guns had a higher rate of fire than land based artillery. The USN 5in/25 had a fixed cartridge as did the RN 4.5in and they weighed 74lb and ~90lb, yet both were able to achieve a sustained 12RPM or better. The RN 5.25in shell was 80lb and it had a separate cartridge.
If you read Lundstrom's 3 volumes on the war in the Pacific (First Team 1 and 2 and Black Shoe carrier Admiral) you'll find that naval AA was ineffective on both sides (but the IJN was worse) and it wasn't till the introduction of massed 20 and 40mm guns in the USN at Santa Cruz that AA got really lethal.
The fire control was a different story. But the old light Cruisers and the destroyers early had no AA fire control or very rudimentary. larger/newer ships had better fire control.Was fire control the big thing that was missing for Japanese AA, or was it just they had relatively few guns compared to the USN? They had the 127mm Type 89 which perhaps wasn't up to par with the US 5"/38, but it seems to have been Ok.
It was technically excellent, but it came with problems. Guns of that veleocity level wore out their guns tubes quickly. The extra velocity/vertical range wasn't really that useful, nobody was level bombing from 30,000ft or above against ships. The long/ heavy barrels required a bigger/ more powerful mounting. The 100mm AA gun twin mount didn't turn or elevate much quicker than the twin 5"/38 and weighed almost the same and fired at about the same rate of fire. Trouble was it was firing 29lb shells and not 54-55lb shells.And later they introduced the 100mm AA gun, which seems to have been excellent,
Few, if any, of the 2pdr pom-pom guns served in WW I aboard ship.Perhaps the larger gap was in light and medium AA. Some of their ships had pom-poms, which weren't as good as the 40mm Bofors, in newer designs being replaced with the POS 25mm AA gun.
I meant the early war 4.5in UD and BD twin mount, using the fixed cartridge as they served a similar role as the 5.25in mounts on the Dido and KGV class ships.'re RN 4.5", it depends on which Mount/ turret you are referring to.
Single Mk V in destroyers (Savage and Z/C clases) used separate shell and cartridge cases, as did the guns in the twin Mk.IV turret in Savage & the Battle class. So did the post war turrets in the carriers Ark Royal IV & Eagle.
The earlier Mk.II BD (Between Deck) turret in battleships and carriers and the Mk.III UD (Upper Deck) mount in Ark Royal iii and depot ships used fixed rounds.
The IJN was still winning as late as July 1943. It wasn't until the Battle of Vella Gulf in August that the USN tactics finally started to work. Note that the use of cruisers was abandoned. The so called machine gun cruiser tactics were a flop. Helena was lost and St Louis and Honolulu were put out of action for several months. In mid 1943 the USN gave up on continuous fire and copied the RN method of salvo firing.Thanks, that is probably the one. It seems the IJN tactics held sway through most of 1942 and the USN
counter tactics proved to be superior from 1943 on.
IDK. Here's IJN losses up to June 1943. Just turn off your volume first - the music is ridiculous.The IJN was still winning as late as July 1943...
The IJN was still winning as late as July 1943. It wasn't until the Battle of Vella Gulf in August that the USN tactics finally started to work. Note that the use of cruisers was abandoned. The so called machine gun cruiser tactics were a flop. Helena was lost and St Louis and Honolulu were put out of action for several months. In mid 1943 the USN gave up on continuous fire and copied the RN method of salvo firing.
True. If the ETO and MTO were not so demanding of ships, the RN's submarines would be very useful against the IJN. Put a dozen RN boats between FIC and Malaya and another doze split between Sarawak and Penang, all with effective ROE, and the IJN's inept ASW should see much of their invasion fleet sunk.Unlike the USN, the RN was hopelessly outmatched by the IJN.
I was speaking specifically about surface actions at night. That was the subject which started with torpedoes. The majority of Japanese losses were to aircraft and submarines.I think that is a bit delusional and very much overstating the case. Japan was winning until Midway. From that point on it was roughly even for a few months, until the battles of Milne Bay (Aug-Sept 1942), the Naval battle of Guadalcanal (Nov 1942), and the completion of the Guadalcanal Campaign by February 1943. Cruisers were still being used until the end of the war.
And as we have discussed, at length, on this forum, but it clearly bears repeating, unlike the USN, the RN was hopelessly outmatched by the IJN.
I never said they were winning overall. They were winning most of the night fighting. The list of warships at the bottom of iron bottom sound is mostly American.IDK. Here's IJN losses up to June 1943. Just turn off your volume first - the music is ridiculous.
View: https://youtu.be/-pRun6GNlQM?si=Z7BysxZ6psJ1hF2J&t=76
In just eighteen months after Pearl Harbor, the IJN's losses include 3 battleships, 6 carriers, 4 CAs, 2 CLs, 36 destroyers and 29 submarines.
If this is still winning, what does losing look like?
Well, we are over 30 pages and 630 posts into this discussion.unlike the USN, the RN was hopelessly outmatched by the IJN.
Though with a lessor threat of Germany between the wars, what does the RN look like?
The B5N1 would not have been useful to the FAA as it was somewhat underpowered and was not stressed for divebombing, and I don't think the A5M was really up the task as a fighter in the ETO, as it was really under armed.https://www.armouredcarriers.com/
KEY POINTS TO CONSIDER
1) HMS Ark Royal (91) was designed to operate in the open waters of the Pacific, as Japan was seen as the greatest threat to the Empire in the early 1930s. Therefore it has more similarity in concept to the US carriers than the later Illustrious type carriers.
If the above is accurate, I must wonder if the Air Ministry took a look at what the IJNAS was flying between 1937-1938 when HMS Ark Royal was launched and commissioned. The Mitsubishi A5M introduced a year earlier in 1936 and the Nakajima B5N first flown in Jan 1937 were vastly superior to the fighters and torpedo-bombers being prepared for HMS Ark Royal's CAG. To be fair, the Skua was the better dive bomber until the Aichi D3A enters service in Jan 1940. I'd like to think that had the FAA regained control over its aircraft design and procurement five or more years before 1939 that the aircraft might have been better, but maybe not.
True. But if Ark Royal was designed to fight Japan in the IPTO, it would be good to consider the aircraft Japan was using and had in development. The only fighter envisioned for Ark Royal seems to be the Skua, which while having four .303 mgs vs. the A5M's two, does not seem like a competitive match. And the Skua is significantly slower than the B5N and the IJN's Bettys and Nells. Not a good fleet defence fighter, but there's no folding-wing fighter from the British that can fit down Ark's narrow lifts until the Fulmar and later Seafire. Fulmar vs. Zero, poor bastards in the FAA fighter.I don't think the A5M was really up the task as a fighter in the ETO, as it was really under armed.