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It very well could be my mistake.SV Goodall, the RN's chief designer states that the 18in MkXII used a 440lb warhead:
well that is rather a no-brainer.and definitely a D3A over a Skua
I don't know whose mistake it is, and 388lb is oft stated, but by 1940 the FAA MkXII was fitted with a 440lb TNT warhead.It very well could be my mistake.
"Naval Weapons of World War II" by Campbell says explosive charge of 388lbs and I changed it warhead weight.
Now your says 440lbs explosive weight.
The later Mark XV torpedo started with 388lb of TNT and later 432.5lbs of Torpex for carrier aircraft and 545lbs of Torpex for land based planes. The Mark XV is supposed to have weighed 1801lbs but is was stronger and held more air.
The Mark XII gained weight also, like 2.5lbs more shale oil and another 10lbs of air (air pressure went from 1600psi to 1900psi). Not stated but certainly possible that the MK XII got a heavier war head between 1937 and 1941?
Or the 388lb charge was contained in a 440lb warhead (casing and firing pistol/s?) and that is a source of confusion.
Some versions of the Mk XII got the "air-tail" similar to the Mk XV but no weights given.
I would note that the Japanese must have been very clever indeed to fit 867lb charges into under 2000lb torpedoes.
4) - The aerial torpedo warhead was
440lbs of TNT, compared with
750 or even 1000 for a ship or
submarine launched torpedo. In 1940-
41 British aerial torpedoes failed to sink
the French battleships Dunkerque an
Strasbourg and the German Bismarck, in
each case inflicting severe (and tacti-
cally crippling) but not fatal damage
On the other hand, they did sink three
Italian battleships at Taranto in Novem-
ber 1940.
Again, we may be quoting different things. Or people of the time quoted different things.I don't know whose mistake it is, and 388lb is oft stated, but by 1940 the FAA MkXII was fitted with a 440lb TNT warhead.
In my notes I have the Mk XII weighing in at 1620 lbs (388 lbs TNT filler) and 1665 lbs (432.5 lbs Torpex filler), in both cases weight is with the MAT (Mk III?) tail attached.
Again, we may be quoting different things. Or people of the time quoted different things.
Explosive weight is not warhead weight anymore than a 500lb bomb contains 500lbs of explosives.
Or that the quoted 88lb warhead for a Sparrow missile actual contains 88lbs of explosives.
Unfortunately warhead weight and explosive weight are sometimes used interchangeably some people.
well that is rather a no-brainer.
When the IJN placed the order for the D3A1 Blackburn only had 4 planes left to complete on the order.
The Skua was sinking German ships before the D3A1 was undertaken carrier trials.
1-2 years can make a big difference. Especially for aircraft like the Skua where there were no improved versions ever built.
The really shocking thing about the US torpedo debacle isn't so much that they had the problems to begin with, but that even in the face of the loss of scores of ships and submarines and thousands of lives of US servicemen, they could not recognize let alone fix the problems. That is the part which deserves a second look with respect to modern times, because it's a theme with US procurement which haunts us periodically.
Bureaucrats -- a category which includes people in uniform -- and managers, which includes people with titles like "commandant," will frequently ignore data they don't like, up to and including attacks on the people reporting the data. The reaction of the USN, including more people than just those at Newport, to field reports of torpedo problems was an egregious example of a bureaucratic group ignoring data. It's not unique, and not even the worst incident of it in US historyThe really shocking thing about the US torpedo debacle isn't so much that they had the problems to begin with, but that even in the face of the loss of scores of ships and submarines and thousands of lives of US servicemen, they could not recognize let alone fix the problems. That is the part which deserves a second look with respect to modern times, because it's a theme with US procurement which haunts us periodically.
The root cause was that after the War to End All Wars the USN decided that private industry would not have a reason to continue producing torpedoes, since they had no commercial applications and since there was not going to be any wars any more, no one would build them. So they decided to take over all torpedo development and production themselves in order to ensure their supply. Given that there were no wars to force the unruly imposition of reality, the USN torpedo factory rapidly became a treasured self-licking ice cream cone. The Rhode Island Congressional delegation intervened in the event of any attempt to make improvements or weed out the deadwood, including preventing any other location being established to produce torpedoes, even as war threatened. Thus, the main priority became preserving government civilian jobs there and funds that should have been spent on proper testing were seen as a threat to paychecks. When the horrific results of this approach became apparent soon after 7 Dec 1941 the response from Goat Island was deny, deny, deny, and accuse others. Adm Lockwood had run the factory, was in charge of US subs based in Australia, and KNEW there was nothing wrong with his torps; it was the idiot sub skippers at fault. Finally, after one sub fired its entire complement of torpedoes at a very large Japanese whaling factory ship, without sinking it, the sub's captain walked into the Admiral's office at Pearl Harbor and literally screamed in outrage. After that even Lockwood had to admit that he'd had enough reports that maybe there was some kind of a problem with US torpedoes.I suspect the root cause was the USN's general deprecation of the value of the torpedo
How much enemy fighter operation did the Swordfish ever face? Not much. At Coral Sea, when they put a few F4F's down on the deck with the TBD's they not only got some hits but did not lose a single torpedo bomber.The TBD actually turns out to be worse than the Swordfish in most respects, if you really look at them.
The root cause was that after the War to End All Wars the USN decided that private industry would not have a reason to continue producing torpedoes, since they had no commercial applications and since there was not going to be any wars any more, no one would build them. So they decided to take over all torpedo development and production themselves in order to ensure their supply. Given that there were no wars to force the unruly imposition of reality, the USN torpedo factory rapidly became a treasured self-licking ice cream cone. The Rhode Island Congressional delegation intervened in the event of any attempt to make improvements or weed out the deadwood, including preventing any other location being established to produce torpedoes, even as war threatened. Thus, the main priority became preserving government civilian jobs there and funds that should have been spent on proper testing were seen as a threat to paychecks. When the horrific results of this approach became apparent soon after 7 Dec 1941 the response from Goat Island was deny, deny, deny, and accuse others. Adm Lockwood had run the factory, was in charge of US subs based in Australia, and KNEW there was nothing wrong with his torps; it was the idiot sub skippers at fault. Finally, after one sub fired its entire complement of torpedoes at a very large Japanese whaling factory ship, without sinking it, the sub's captain walked into the Admiral's office at Pearl Harbor and literally screamed in outrage. After that even Lockwood had to admit that he'd had enough reports that maybe there was some kind of a problem with US torpedoes.
And this whole shameful, treasonous, disgusting story apparently proved to be so attractive to some people that 30 years later it was repeated almost exactly in a program called The Space Shuttle, except that it went on for another 20 years after it was found to be a massive mistake.
How much enemy fighter operation did the Swordfish ever face? Not much.
At Coral Sea, when they put a few F4F's down on the deck with the TBD's they not only got some hits but did not lose a single torpedo bomber.
The RN carrier Glorious had Swordfish when its captain ordered a bombing attack on Norwegian shore installations occupied by the Germans. The squadron replied that was a suicde mission, such slow biplanes against the AAA. The carrier capatin was so infuriated that he requested that teh ship proceed back to Scapa Flow so a court martial board could be convened ASAP. The Glorious departed, with no air patrols and only a single destroyer for escort. Both RN ships were sunk by the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with heavy loss of life. If the Glorious had TBD's they could have done high altitude level bombing attacks with a pretty good chance of survival.
I lol'd at "Self Licking Icecream Cone"
I agree with most of the post though.
As far as the Space Shuttle, we may have blown two of them up but that's not unusual for 20th Century space launches. I don't really see how the shuttle program even comes close to comparison as a debacle. The torpedo thing could have cost us the war, it certainly led to at least hundreds if not thousands of our own people dying, aside from being a grift and a waste of money.
Lt Commander Heath, the flight ops officer, was to be court martialed for being reluctant to order a Swordfish DB attack against an airfield, and an ill defined road which didn't appear on Glorious' maps. He considered that the potential strike force, 5 Swordfish with 3 Gloster SGs as escort, was insufficient for the task at hand, especially given the vague intel. The Swordfish Sqn CO and flight crews were quite prepared to undertake the operation. Heath was quite prepared to order an attack on the airfield alone.How much enemy fighter operation did the Swordfish ever face? Not much. At Coral Sea, when they put a few F4F's down on the deck with the TBD's they not only got some hits but did not lose a single torpedo bomber.
The RN carrier Glorious had Swordfish when its captain ordered a bombing attack on Norwegian shore installations occupied by the Germans. The squadron replied that was a suicde mission, such slow biplanes against the AAA. The carrier capatin was so infuriated that he requested that teh ship proceed back to Scapa Flow so a court martial board could be convened ASAP. The Glorious departed, with no air patrols and only a single destroyer for escort. Both RN ships were sunk by the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with heavy loss of life. If the Glorious had TBD's they could have done high altitude level bombing attacks with a pretty good chance of survival.
Again, the same issues did not occur with naval shipyards or with places like Watervliet and Springfield arsenals and the Naval Gun Factory. I suspect that the exact same issues with the Mk14 would have happened regardless of whether they were produced by a USN facility or a private contractor. Sweetheart deals between military bureaucrats and private contractors have been known to exist.The root cause was that after the War to End All Wars the USN decided that private industry would not have a reason to continue producing torpedoes, since they had no commercial applications and since there was not going to be any wars any more, no one would build them. So they decided to take over all torpedo development and production themselves in order to ensure their supply. Given that there were no wars to force the unruly imposition of reality, the USN torpedo factory rapidly became a treasured self-licking ice cream cone. The Rhode Island Congressional delegation intervened in the event of any attempt to make improvements or weed out the deadwood, including preventing any other location being established to produce torpedoes, even as war threatened. Thus, the main priority became preserving government civilian jobs there and funds that should have been spent on proper testing were seen as a threat to paychecks. When the horrific results of this approach became apparent soon after 7 Dec 1941 the response from Goat Island was deny, deny, deny, and accuse others. Adm Lockwood had run the factory, was in charge of US subs based in Australia, and KNEW there was nothing wrong with his torps; it was the idiot sub skippers at fault. Finally, after one sub fired its entire complement of torpedoes at a very large Japanese whaling factory ship, without sinking it, the sub's captain walked into the Admiral's office at Pearl Harbor and literally screamed in outrage. After that even Lockwood had to admit that he'd had enough reports that maybe there was some kind of a problem with US torpedoes.
And this whole shameful, treasonous, disgusting story apparently proved to be so attractive to some people that 30 years later it was repeated almost exactly in a program called The Space Shuttle, except that it went on for another 20 years after it was found to be a massive mistake.
A lot of this true. However The Japanese carriers launched very few (any?) long range torpedo strikes, as in much over 200-240nm?I'd say that would be because they used them almost exclusively at night. Swordfish did operate in an environment where enemy fighters were around (i.e., the Mediterranean, and at least potentially, Indian Ocean or Pacific), and not being able to use them during the day was a severe limitation, as was the very short range. Add very limited and poor fighter protection options, and a small carrying capacity for aircraft by the RN carriers, and FAA has fairly weak capabilities. It's impressive that they did as much with it as they did.
We are not really comparing the Swordfish to the Avenger here. And even with radar the TBF didn't have a working torpedo until well into 1943.The ability to carry radar so early compared to other types was an advantage for the Swordfish, allowing them to conduct effective night attacks and maybe even more important, bad weather attacks. But TBF Avengers had this capability by late 1942.
Again lets compare the actual performance of the B5N2 to the Swordfish.I'd say the inability to survive encounters with enemy fighters, the slow speed increasing both vulnerability to interception by fighters and targeting by AAA, as well as increasing (doubling or tripling in some cases) the length of time to conduct a strike over a given distance, which was very limited anyway with this type, were all fairly telling disadvantages. Not so much in 1940, and maybe still competitive, all things considered, in early 1942, but by late 1942 this is not viable.
The B5N suffered rather similar losses at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. None the 1942 Japanese attack aircraft were very survivable in the face of decent (sufficient numbers) of fighters.In many subsequent engagements in the Pacific however there were much larger numbers of enemy fighters available to intercept strikes. And the TBD did not have a good record subsequent to Coral Sea. It is fortunate that it was quickly replaced by the TBF / TBM.
Thankfully so, as the Swordfish was shot down in droves when encountering enemy fighters.How much enemy fighter operation did the Swordfish ever face? Not much.