Sheep Shite Article -Gathering of Mustangs an Legends (1 Viewer)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

drgondog

Major
9,421
5,855
Jun 28, 2006
Scurry, Texas
Stumbled on this yesterday while searching on Ben Kelsey. This article had to be written by the most gullible Kelsey fanboy (related to Bodie?) while recording the reminisces of Kelsey in advanced dementia.

Subtitle should have been "everyone loves a winner - and wants max credit for zero contribution'


 
Stumbled on this yesterday while searching on Ben Kelsey. This article had to be written by the most gullible Kelsey fanboy (related to Bodie?) while recording the reminisces of Kelsey in advanced dementia.

Subtitle should have been "everyone loves a winner - and wants max credit for zero contribution'



Sorry, I don't quite follow your banter...

Are you saying that Ben Kelsey, the head of Wright Field's fighter development program, had nothing to do with the introduction of the AAF's A-36/P-51?

Doesn't sound like the same Ben Kelsey that I knew...

Cheers,



Dana
 
It seems to be written by different people, the first page has a completely different tone to the last while the second seems to be a conspiracy theory.
 
Sorry, I don't quite follow your banter...

Are you saying that Ben Kelsey, the head of Wright Field's fighter development program, had nothing to do with the introduction of the AAF's A-36/P-51?

Doesn't sound like the same Ben Kelsey that I knew...

Cheers,



Dana
Simply stated - YES, that is what I am saying.
All the fighting and approvals and funding were way above his pay grade in 1940, and beyond his scope to approve a Defense Aid contract for RAF fo NA-91/P-51-NA in 1941. As to A-36, HQ-AAF drove first the A-36, then the P-51A down Materiel Command's throat in February-April 1942. I guarantee that Captain, then Major Ben Kelsey was NOT vocalizing support of NAA/Mustang to his boss in 1941 and early 1942 - when his boss was getting crap beat out of him by General Fairchild, Col. Schlatter and General Barney Giles. In addition to the 'will' issue, he was faced with a 'no longer here issue' as he was attached to 8th AF in April, 1942 to help with planning/logistics of moving P-38s to Great Britain while the fight over the A-36 was in full rage. He was not present and accounted for when the AAF snatched the P-51-1 from the NA-91 contract in May 1942. He was a 'no can do - not here' factor for the discussions and contracts for A-36, XP-78 (P-51B), P-51A, and P-51B and P-51C. However, to his credit he Did return in time to MC as Chief, Fighters in October 1942 - just in time for the XP-75 prototype development decision, but gone again to depart as CoS for 9th AF in Nov 1943.

EDIT - 8-17-2021
The two contracts that Fairchild drove - and ordered the acquisition of 500 A-36s.. Col Timberlake - Chief Production Engineering Div for MC protested on basis of inadequate Allisons and impact on B-25 production , but over ridden by M.Gen Harmon C/AS for HQ-AAF- and Echols complied. Elephants were in the room. IIRC Chief Fighter Branch reported to Chief Production Engineering. Fairchild also ordered that a follow on order for 1200 P-51 should be acquired - and converted to Merlin 'as soon as possible'

Notable events while Kelsey was in Great Britain as part of Spaatz party April 1940 - July 1940
NAA/AFPC LOI signed April 10
Material Command reviews (Echols/Brett) LOI and NAA Contract Vehicle - note that Allison V-1710 included. but finally approve Foreign Release Agreement, April 24 in return for 2 XP-51 from NA-73. UNTIL DELIVERED, AAC-MC knew zero about the details of P-509/NA73 including incorporation of Alison V-1710, Meredith Effect Cooling system, or proposed High Speed/Low Drag airfoil/wing.
Schmued begins detail design for NA73X
NA 1620 Specifications transforming P-509 to NA-73 delivered to RAF for joint review April 24
A-250 (Foreign Aid) contract executed May 1940
Preliminary Design of X73/NA73X released to Experimental Department for fabrication

Notable events while Kelsey was in Great Britain 4-42 through 9-42
April - A-36 Contract executed by Echols
May - Arnold has lunch with Hitchcock, Air Marshall Sholto and Amb Winant to receive first notice of R-R project to install Merlin 61 in Mustang
May - NA-91 - 58 P-51-NA extracted from RAF contract DA-140 delivery commitments of 150 for Mustang IA.
June -Two NA-91 of 58 P-51-NA allocated to XP-78 (P-51B), although NAA started Design in May 1942
June - Col, then General Chidlaw, AC/S Materiel Command became the primary point of contact for NAA
June - 1200 P-51A requested by HQ-AAF, Contract AC 30479, with provision to convert balance to P-51B-5
June - Gen. Saville Directorate Air Defense ordered e P-51-NA to be sent to Eglin for Operational Suitability Testing - instead of Wright Field, marking the end of Wright Field for that task.
August 1942
MC approved a.) Installation of Packard 1650-3 in XP-78, b.) the order for 400 P-51B-1, c.) A1 Priority for NAA for Tooling, parts and Packard Merlin 1650-3 associated with P-51B production.


Dana, help me out. Where is your evidence that Ben Kelsey was EVER and advocate for NAA/Mustang.

If you have studied Materiel Command track record of dismal operational testing (the reason the task went to Eglin), the dismal track record of RFP funded failures for Pursuit/Fighter aircraft, the Attack Turkey over which MC fought for (XA-32 and yes Ben was there for that one) versus the A-36, castigated by Combat officer review of the turkeys that MC sent to combat (A-24/25), the contract for the XP-75, THEN the additional purchase for 2500 more when it could not compete with any of the Big 3 already in serial production.

BTW Echols bought the XP-75 after he took an entourage to Rolls-Royce to look at the Merlin conversion just before first flight, see the performance projections and be subjected to gushing reviews of the Mustang from RAF. Kelsey was back as Chief, Fighter Branch when XP-75 contract approved - if you want to give him credit for that?

So where was the magic touch of Ben Kelsey in Fighter Development after 1940-41 or Echols at any point in time after 1940. Neither had anything to do with any feature of any Mustang at any time - and yet they claimed much support and influence in the development via articles, books and the referenced article. Pathetic.

Look to Echols career final resting place as a Military Governor of Occupied Germany before he saw the handwriting on the wall and went 'military-industrial complex' in 1946.

Summary
I'm saying that M.General Muir Fairchild rammed the A-36 up M.General Echols' rear end - and Maj. Ben Kelsey had zero to do with ether approval or funding. I'm saying that Ben Kelsey had zero to do with NAA/NACA collaboration on the 45-100 airfoil. I'm saying that Kelsey had nothing to do with DA-140 for the NA-91/RAF contract in July 1941. He was a mouse in room full of elephants during the A-36 fights. The A-36 was a major turf war between HQ CAS Directive and Planning & Requirements versus Materiel Command.

I am also saying that AAF-MC Col Mark Bradley intervened on behalf of the P-51B in July 1943 to persuade Echols to fund the 85 gal fuse tank in order to test Combat Radius extension mandated by Fairchild's FAREP.

More on NA-91. The article also touted Kelsey as the 'assigner of DA-140 for the NA-91, which at the time was a pure RAF requirement to finally install the 20mm guns they wanted on NA-73, but prevented by Materiel Command. Note: Kelsey could have issued the requirement to assign AAF serial numbers to all of NA-91 150 ships when AAF made the decision in April 1942 to snatch 58 of the 150 for TAC recon (Forced also by HQ), he might have still been at Wright just before heading to 8th AF.

I did a LOT of research on over 1000 NAA/HQ/MC telex, and written external/internal NAA docs of the December 1939 through December 1943 period as well as sourced most of the docs cited in USAF136 by Boylon to cross correlate the dialogue within HQ-AAF, MC and NAA.

Echols (and Kelsey, by extension) was NOT an 'advocate of the Mustang - until it was too big of a success to not jump on the bandwagon..

If you have source docs from 1941 through July 1942 showing otherwise, a.) I would be pleased to acknowledge a different fact base rending my opinion (and Paul Ludwig's) questionable, and b.) astonishment regarding the contradictions between Kelsey 'fanboy of P-38' and 'Kelsey - pioneer of passionate support for the Mustang'.

I first formed opinions regarding Kelsey when I became acquainted with several NAA luminaries of that period through my father and Al White. The Opinions regarding Kelsey support/non support were held by Horkey and Schmued. For the record, the primary communicators to NAA re: P-51 were Cols. Branshaw and Chidlaw and Bradley with respect to specs, funding, change orders. Those tasks were above Kelsey when he was at MC before 1943 and he never issued any correspondence or report other than his January 1942 Test report of his personal comparison of XP-51 versus P-40E - in which he described 'problems' with main gear doors opening and 'shuddering' in dives, he concluded that the Mustang was faster at all altitudes than the P-40E. Contrast that Mustang 'support' with his gushing reports of the P-38. There were zero examples of correspondence between Kelsey and Kindelberger, Atwood, Rice, Schmued - including the time when Gen Brett/Col Echols 'traded approval to proceed NA-73 for AFPC in return for two freebie XP-51s.

Dana - have deep respect for your research, but we definitely have a different view of General Kelsey and M.Gen Echols.

Regards,

Bill
 
Last edited:
It seems to be written by different people, the first page has a completely different tone to the last while the second seems to be a conspiracy theory.
There was so much wrong with both articles. The most glaring error was stating that Kelsey saw the promise of NA-73/XP51 as superior to the P-40 early - but AAF somehow failed to recognize his genius and a.) cause Mustang I to be delivered to US in return for new production P-40E/F, b.) execute NA-83 and 91 as US 'AC contracts' not Defense Aid (DA-140). An accompanying error is that if Kelsey/MC had any influence on development of NA-91, the 20mm cannon would NOT have been developed as armament. The AAF consistently rejected 20mm cannon for every Mustang variant in which they had design/GFE oversight- while the RAF wanted nothing but 20mm.

The next critical evidence was NA Specification 1620 for Mustang I/IA which was amended from NA-73 to NA-83 to NA-91 and beginning A-36, with ZERO signatures from any authority but RAF. Further although the funding of XP-78 was formally approved in late July 1942, all the development was initiated in May under DA-140 (RAF/NAA contract), accrued for two months to ELIMINATE Materiel command 'oversight'.

Kelsey had zero influence on NACA/NAA dialogue regarding the NACA 45-125 Laminar Flow airfoil discussions or future development work on the NAA/NACA 45-100 High Speed/Low Drag airfoil (never officially Laminar Flow). For that matter the alleged connection between his (Kelsey) oversight of the XP-46 wing or cooling system and NAA Mustang approach should have been hushed up if meant as compliment. Those were the two primary factors causing serious performance deficits of the XP-46 leading to its cancellation. Certainly NAA ignored both Curtiss features upon acquisition of the purchased data.

Kelsey had zero influence on the negotiations or actions by NAA to acquire Curtis P-40 ad XP-46 data That was solely the decision of Sir Harry Self to make sure that NAA had additional info which might be available to avoid common Meredith Effect design mistakes to date (Hurricane, Bf 109, Spitfire, XP-46).

Kelsey had zero influence on development of Merlin powered Mustangs, including XP-51F/G and P-51D. The approval for NA-105 (XP-51F/G) came directly from Arnold to whomever was tasked to secure funding and write up the contract. Branshaw/Chidlaw were MC 'go to' for production improvements to the P-51A (incl Water Injection version of -81), Bubble canopy, 85 gallon Fuse Tank Kits and production insertion, bubble canopy.. No Kelsey in sight -

Rant over - temporarily.

Did I mention the flaw in naming the A-36 the 'A' word
 
Almost everything I have read about Ben Kelsey has to do with the P-38. It's development was fraught with solving problems that were simple in the end but not easy to investigate in most cases. It's like finding a short circuit in your car. Fixing it is easy once you find the short; the problem is finding the short to begin with. And neither he nor anyone else ever "fixed" the low critical Mach number problem, though the dive brakes DID help a lot with making it much less dangerous, when they were fitted.

I would congratulate him is successfully putting down the XP-38 on a golf course, though. It was amazing he survived it, at least to me. Tony LeVier was quite angry at Kelsey for that, calling the accident totally unnecessary. He might have been right, but I wasn't there to know and have no opinion other than wanting to have had the opportunity to chip over a P-38 for par because I could then claim the feat going forward. Not many can make that claim ...

I have seen things that link Kelsey with the P-51 airfoil, and Wiki indicates he was instrumental in ordering 500 A36's (to keep production lines open) and in flying combat missions to get familiar with the A-36 / P-51. He seems to also be credited with expediting the opinions of front-line P-51 pilots back to North American to shorten the modification process, at least in Wiki. How true this might be is not something I can debate at this time. Anyone can write almost anything in Wiki, so seeing something in Wiki has a random relationship to facts. Wiki is the worst source in the world except for no source.

It's seems more like the guy writing the article didn't really know much about Kelsey's career, and is crediting Kelsey with more than he really did for the P-51 effort by reading between the lines, somewhat incorrectly. Perhaps I am missing something and there is a personal agenda in there?

I am pretty sure that had Ben Kelsey been assigned to the P-51 project in the same capacity he was for the P-38, he would have pursued it with the same dedication he used for the P-38. But, that's a "what if" since he didn't have the same assignment with the P-51 that he had for the P-38. I have also not seen anything that makes me think less of Kelsey as a pilot or person.
 
Perhaps notable, within Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker biographies - Echols is not even mentioned. That pretty well covers his contributions to global affairs. Kelsey does a little better - but zero mention of Kelsey combined with NAA or Mustang. MANY mentions of Kindelberger, NAA and Mustang from December 1941 through ETO air battles.

No mention of Echols/Kelsey in To Command the Sky'. Passing mention by Dewitt Copp volumes "A Few Great Captains" and "Forged in Fire", of Kelsey contribution of Observer with Spaatz and P-38/Ferry Tank contributions - no mention of Echols - and no mention of Mustangs in connection with either.

No mention of Echols and the sparse mention of Kelsey in all six of those books are:
a.) exclusively dedicated to his assignment as P-38 speed record pilot that crashed, b.) one of several officers dispatched to England with Spaatz as an observer of RAF operations in spring 1940, c.) as the P-38 Project Manager that led Lockheed's 'secret' work to provide External Pylons/Fuel tank kit for P-38E in fall 1941, d.) leading Wright Field investigation of P-38 Compressibility issues and solutions, and e.) the Wright Field Project leader for long Range Ferry tanks for P-38/P47 (Spring 1942), He passed through Wright Field just prior to departing for England the second time in April 1942.

USAF Study 136 mentions both Kelsey and Echols - but not with reference to P-51. 136 devotes much space to Mat.Cmd studying Ferry tankage in Spring 1941,with Lockheed and Kelsey (MC) developing the plumbing and load bearing pylon through the end of 1941. The testing continued through June 1942 at Wright - The primary focus from AAF Field Commanders to AAF Material Command were correspondence regarding the inadequate testing and corrections made to bugs found before introducing to combat ops, And the increasing decibel memos to Echols regarding supply of combat tanks to VIII FC. Combat Tanks were a Major priority following January 1942 Fighter Conference, which Eaker attended - and assigned to Wright Field to execute. No mention of Mat.Cmd contribution to delivery or support of Mustang. One Very Clear message in the documented sources provided by Study 136: The impetus to select the P-51B came from HQ after the review of 'best potential LR Escort Fighter' in June/July 1943 came from AAF-HQ study - not Materiel Command.

There is a real dearth of actual career moves for Kelsey from AAF records. What I have found to date after 1941 is devotion to solving the Ferry/Combat Tank projects at Wright, his one documented Flight Test Report on P-40E vs XP-51 41-1038, continued focus n Combat tanks, then his staff jobs with 9th, then 8th AF in VIII ATS technical leader.
 
Almost everything I have read about Ben Kelsey has to do with the P-38. It's development was fraught with solving problems that were simple in the end but not easy to investigate in most cases. It's like finding a short circuit in your car. Fixing it is easy once you find the short; the problem is finding the short to begin with. And neither he nor anyone else ever "fixed" the low critical Mach number problem, though the dive brakes DID help a lot with making it much less dangerous, when they were fitted.

I would congratulate him is successfully putting down the XP-38 on a golf course, though. It was amazing he survived it, at least to me. Tony LeVier was quite angry at Kelsey for that, calling the accident totally unnecessary. He might have been right, but I wasn't there to know and have no opinion other than wanting to have had the opportunity to chip over a P-38 for par because I could then claim the feat going forward. Not many can make that claim ...

I have seen things that link Kelsey with the P-51 airfoil, and Wiki indicates he was instrumental in ordering 500 A36's (to keep production lines open) and in flying combat missions to get familiar with the A-36 / P-51. He seems to also be credited with expediting the opinions of front-line P-51 pilots back to North American to shorten the modification process, at least in Wiki. How true this might be is not something I can debate at this time. Anyone can write almost anything in Wiki, so seeing something in Wiki has a random relationship to facts. Wiki is the worst source in the world except for no source.

It's seems more like the guy writing the article didn't really know much about Kelsey's career, and is crediting Kelsey with more than he really did for the P-51 effort by reading between the lines, somewhat incorrectly. Perhaps I am missing something and there is a personal agenda in there?

I am pretty sure that had Ben Kelsey been assigned to the P-51 project in the same capacity he was for the P-38, he would have pursued it with the same dedication he used for the P-38. But, that's a "what if" since he didn't have the same assignment with the P-51 that he had for the P-38. I have also not seen anything that makes me think less of Kelsey as a pilot or person.
Hi Greg - I am not attacking Kelsey and agree your points - especially about the knowledge of the guy writing the article.

That said, I have seen post war quotes attributed to both that claim much influence on the acquisition of the Mustang for AAF, none of which is supported y the NAA and AAF docs that I spent nearly 10 years diving through. Further said, it is impossible to totally downplay positive influence by a respected Captain to a Major General in control of great power - even if not documented well.
 
Kelsey had zero influence on the negotiations or actions by NAA to acquire Curtis P-40 ad XP-46 data That was solely the decision of Sir Harry Self to make sure that NAA had additional info which might be available to avoid common Meredith Effect design mistakes to date (Hurricane, Bf 109, Spitfire, XP-46).
You can add the Hawker Tornado to that list. You gotta feel for the people at Curtiss, in addition to handing over all the information on a design they didnt get to work, they were also forced to receive $56,000 from the people who were doing their R&D for them.

The whole thing seems like a Netflix docudrama, the people existed and things happened, it could have happened but actually didnt.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back