Short Stirling, was it ever used by Coastal Command?

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pinehilljoe

Senior Airman
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May 1, 2016
Was the Sterling ever used by Coastal Command? Seems to have been a good candidate, long range, relatively low service ceiling would not have been a problem for maritime reconnaissance.
 
Was the Sterling ever used by Coastal Command? Seems to have been a good candidate, long range, relatively low service ceiling would not have been a problem for maritime reconnaissance.

The Stirling actually had a poor payload to range factor. While it could carry a heavy bomb load over short distances at long distances it's payload shrank to not a lot more than a Whitley or Wellington. Since very, very few aircraft ever made repeated attacks on subs in the same flight the Stirling needed twice the engines, about twice the fuel and a lot more maintenance to do a not much better job.
This may have been one of the things the RAF got right.
Besides which, after having both factories bombed the Stirling didn't enter service in large (more than a few squadrons) numbers until much later than first flights would indicate.
 
Besides which, after having both factories bombed the Stirling didn't enter service in large (more than a few squadrons) numbers until much later than first flights would indicate.

Belfast and Rochester, yes, and this undoubtedly had an adverse effect on production. Production was stopped by the 15th August 1940 raid and did not recommence at Rochester until March 1942.

However, Stirlings were also built near Swindon at South Marston (351). After the bombing of Rochester 27 aircraft were also completed at the Gloster Works at Hucclecote. The drawing office relocated to Kidderminster, which was sensible as substantial numbers were built by Austin Motors in Birmingham (620). Total production was only 2,383.

The Stirling staggered into operational service in February 1941, but in such low numbers, rarely more than a handful, they were hardly relevant.

In April two squadrons were operating Stirlings.

In August 1943 twelve squadrons were operating Stirlings, 146 serviceable and operational aircraft, 82 unserviceable.

The last operational use of Stirlings in Bomber Command was not until September 1944, though they hung on in a variety of support roles (at HCUs well into 1946) and in other non bomber roles.

As far as Coastal Command goes I can't even find a request for them to be operated there, which is odd, because the Command asked for just about everything else at some time!

Cheers

Steve
 
The Stirling staggered into operational service in February 1941, but in such low numbers, rarely more than a handful, they were hardly relevant.

In April two squadrons were operating Stirlings.

I believe it took until Oct or Nov of 1941 to get the 3rd squadron operational (or just equipped?)
At any rate the Stirling is a non-starter for coastal command in 1941 and a good part of 1942 due to low numbers. And they had plenty of time to figure out it's less than "Stirling" range capabilities. As in a Whitley could carry almost the same bomb load (well below max) just 300-400 miles less with full fuel tanks.
 
Maybe if the Stirling had used the same wing as the Sunderland as was originally planned before the Air Ministry had the wings shortened.
I think that was largely a myth, the Stirling was between the Lanc and Halifax in wing span, the Sirling basically carried 18ft too much fuselage.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/de/British_WW2_bombers_comparison.png

Not stated on the diagram but the fuselage was also deeper as can be seen, even though its bomb bay was actually less useful than the Lancaster.
 
The Stirling simply gained too much weight during design. The need for catapult launch was removed in 1938, which may have been too late.
The troop carrying capacity was not part of the Stirling requirement. This was included in the first draft of B.3/34 (Whitley) but was dropped from it and subsequent requirements when the impact on performance proved to be rather more significant than the Air Ministry had hoped. The DTD reported that it would result in a loss of at least 10 mph in speed.

B.12/36 did state:

"Consideration is to be given in design for fitting a light removable form of seating for the maximum number of personnel that can be accommodated within the fuselage when the aircraft is being used for reinforcing Overseas Commands."

Most important distinction. The seating was to be fitted in the fuselage, the fuselage was not to be designed around the seating.
Secondly, the personnel referred to are RAF ground crew who would need to travel with the aircraft if or when it went overseas. This is not a troop carrying role as usually understood.

After the 1936 specifications had been issued the Air Staff looked at how the resulting aircraft might be used as troop transports and proposed a new allocation of funds for a purpose built transport if this proved impossible. The funds were not forthcoming, but it wasn't until 1937 that the Air Staff decided that one of the aircraft to the 1936 specifications 'must' be used as a transport. On 3rd May 1939, a lecture on the role of bomber-transport aircraft noted that.

"By reason of the multitude of internal installations in the fuselage the troops may not enjoy the same degree of comfort available in present types".

There was so little room in the fuselage of the Supermarine mock up of their B.12/36 that when inspected by Bomber Command officers they feared that there was not enough room for the crew, never mind fully equipped troops.

Cheers

Steve
 

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