Some thoughts on "combat effectiveness/performance" factors that are often hidden.

[Engineman]

Hi,

Some misquotes about the Spitfire and Bf109 structures.
Both these types had a structurally similar carry-through Primary wing spar centre-section in the lower fuselage, that allowed attachment of the Left and Right wings. The Spitfire used multiple close-fit bolts into its multi-tube top and bottom spars, the Bf 109 used self-aligning spherical bushes with single shear pins in top and bottom position spars.
The Spitfire wing had a rear drag attachment point, the Bf 109 had a vernier front drag attachment point onto the front fuselage D brackets. The Bf 109 "D" brackets served for the drag mount, the engine lower mounting triangulation point and the undercarriage mounting points. On the Spitfire, the main undercarriage pintles bolted to the rear of the wing spars.
On the subject of engine life, apart from type tests and specifications, Rolls-Royce with the Wartime Merlin declared that if a third of the engines in a category were reaching TBO before failure or rejection, and the average achieved life was 60 per cent of the TBO, then it was possible to consider an increase in TBO!

Eng

 

[Shortround6]

TBO was not a guarantee. It was sort of a reverse guarantee.
IF the engine reached hour number XXX of running time and had not been pulled for any other reasons (ground strike, metal particles in the oil, low compression, con-rod coming through side). then the engine should be pulled/replaced as a precaution as the likelihood of it failing in the next few hours was going up faster than normal.

 

[GregP]

I do think it's simple today, due to the internet and all the books which have been compiled and published now. I don't need to share sources, I already have mentioned most of the books and authors doing this. More and more of them are being published every month or two, for multiple different Theaters. I have also shared (and pointed out) the locations and names of some of the primary sources they used already.

There is a limit to how fine of a point you can put on it. We may not be able to every be certain which exact unit or pilot got which actual victory.

However, we do in most cases know the number of claims, and we do know the losses in a given Theater for a given period of time.

So if for example in Nov-Dec 1942 in the Guadalcanal area in the South Pacific, US fighter pilots claimed 480 enemy aircraft, and the Japanese claimed 590 enemy aircraft, but actual Japanese losses were 86 aircraft and actual US losses were 108 aircraft, that indeed tells us a big part of what we actually need to know. It's really not that complicated.

We may not know precisely which of those 86 Japanese aircraft were shot down by Wildcats, but we can see that they made 70% of the claims (just making this number up off the top of my head, but it can be calculated). So that can give us at least a ballpark idea of what damage was actually done, and for what loss (since we know that 35 Wildcats were lost in the same period).

We also can't always tell for certain which were 'operational losses' and which were lost due to enemy activity, and which of those were lost to flak vs defensive fire from bombers vs combat with fighters. But we can get pretty close to which was which in this case too. There were many operational losses on days when the enemy wasn't even flying, for example. There were days in which aircraft were lost and only one particular unit on the other side made claims. Also very common.

Before we knew the enemy losses, then yes. It was VERY complicated, in fact there was really no way to know. But those days are over now.

Never mind ...

 

[GregP]

I don't think that's actually a coherent argument buddy, sorry.



Some of y'all just don't want to acknowledge that the myths you grew up with about this wonderful topic of military aviation were just that - myths.



I've seen your file, it's got errors which I think were pointed out to you. But it's overall good enough for counting claims. That's a completely different thing than actual losses by the other side.



The data is out there, it really only makes the whole thing more interesting. I recommend embracing it.

I don't think that's actually a coherent argument buddy, sorry.

Some of y'all just don't want to acknowledge that the myths you grew up with about this wonderful topic of military aviation were just that - myths.



I've seen your file, it's got errors which I think were pointed out to you. But it's overall good enough for counting claims. That's a completely different thing than actual losses by the other side.



The data is out there, it really only makes the whole thing more interesting. I recommend embracing it.

If acknowledging that there is massive disagreement in aerial victories amoung the interested public is not a coherent argument, then you may not recognize one when you hear it. That, in turn, means attempting discussion of the subject with you is less than a desirable undertaking.

Ergo, we must agree to disagree, as I stated earlier. No fun when just trying to talk about something turns out to be completely non productive.

No respect for sources and not thinking the fact that half of the potential audience disagrees with the other half, sometimes for seemingly decent reasons ... I suppose we're done discussing.

Have a good day, Steamer. Cheers.

 

[GregP]

TBO was not a guarantee. It was sort of a reverse guarantee.
IF the engine reached hour number XXX of running time and had not been pulled for any other reasons (ground strike, metal particles in the oil, low compression, con-rod coming through side). then the engine should be pulled/replaced as a precaution as the likelihood of it failing in the next few hours was going up faster than normal.

C'mon Shortround, that is not why the TBO time was established at all, and you know it.

It was established so the vast majority of all engines sent in for overhaul (more than 99%) were, in fact, overhaulable without requiring a new engine block, an item for which very few spares were ever made. Almost all went to new engine production.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I don't think that's actually a coherent argument buddy, sorry.

If acknowledging that there is massive disagreement in aerial victories amoung the interested public is not a coherent argument, then you may not recognize one when you hear it. That, in turn, means attempting discussion of the subject with you is less than a desirable undertaking.

Ergo, we must agree to disagree, as I stated earlier. No fun when just trying to talk about something turns out to be completely non productive.

No respect for sources and not thinking the fact that half of the potential audience disagrees with the other half, sometimes for seemingly decent reasons ... I suppose we're done discussing.

Have a good day, Steamer. Cheers.

Fair enough!

 

[MiTasol]

I got to thinking about some of the hidden (not often thought about ) things that affect both effectiveness and performance. This was in regards to the idea that the US could have used cheaper, lighter planes and gotten about the same effectiveness in combat. Maybe they could but I am not interested in going into the claims/losses rabbit hole. I am thinking about a quite different rabbit hole that has even less documentation.
I am going to use the US as the example as the US is rightly or wrongly considered to have the heaviest/most rugged aircraft and actual combat performance (climb and turn) suffered.
In the early part of the war with France vs Germany there was one sort of war going on. Apologies to the Poles but that part of the war was too short for engine life and airframe life or accident rate to have much effect. It did have an effect even during the Phony war over the winter of 1939/40.
Amount of spare parts for both engines (and accessories) and airframes became more important. For France and Germany the front lines were only a few hundred Kilometers from the factories except for the purchased American planes (Hawk 75s). In some cases there are reports of the French squadrons not being able to repair/maintain aircraft due to lack of spare parts because a high percentage of the parts were going to new construction. We don't (in English sources) have much good information about the reliability/durability of French engines, except it was not what was wanted once they got passed the Hispano-Suiza radials which seem to have been really horrible. Now against this is the fact that distances and flight times were short, often 2-3 hours? or less?
The Hawk 75s have had a little written about them about this. The US got two reports in 1939, one Oct 1939 and one id Dec about things like fuel tank protection, fuel management (tank switches), landing gear operation, ammo capacity and rear seat armor. One French commander reported that 3 of his Hawks had been damaged due to bullets penetrating the hydraulic system for the landing gear. Others had been damaged due the electric landing gear position indicator failing to function. His own mechanics came up with a visual indicator, white paint on part of the landing gear that was only visible when the landing gear was down, red paint on the part when it was not down. In Early Jan 1940 the head of the French Air Mission in the US was trying very hard to purchase 30 extra wing sets for the Hawk 75s already delivered. The French had ordered the equivalent of 25% spares in monetary value for the first 200 planes (equivalent to 50 airframes) but they were running out of spare wings a lot faster than expected. They had 30 Hawks grounded due to damaged wings in jam 1940. The US Army with a very vested interest in problems with the P-36 as the US P-36s were interspersed with the French Hawk 75s on production line and the US Army and over 500 P-40s with a very closely related airframe on order. The US Army had the Military Intelligence Division revue the French reports and give their assessment.
US Report was that the major causes as a high rate of landing accidents (but no cause/s?) and lack of sufficient spares.
The Hawks seem to have done quite well in combat in both the Phony war and after the actual invasion.
French fighter fields were often not very good. Many of them were old (WW I or just after) and not maintained well during the years of peace. Some were very good if they had been regular fields in the 1930s.
Many countries wound operating from poor airfields after the BoF. In the BoB both sides operated from a variety or airfields and both sides, while transport distances were short, often prioritized new construction over spare parts.
Both the Spitfire and 109 are often criticized for weak landing gear and/or landing/ground handling problems. What is rarely/never mentioned is what else gets damaged in landing/taxiing accident that caused by the landing gear? Can they just bolt a new landing gear leg onto the original mounts or does the wing (Spitfire) or fuselage (109) need parts or replacements. Sometimes on the Hawks the landing gear leg punched it's way up through the wing.
What is known on the Hawks is that the wings on the P-40s (the ones with four .303/.30 cal guns) gained about 150lbs over the P-36/Hawk 75 wings.
Some of the French Hawks had four 7.5mm mgs.
The P-40 was heavier and needed stronger wings handle the US required G loadings. Now despite the Hawk 75s being built to handle 11.5-12 Gs ultimate (breaking, bending could be at a lower G load) in flight they had a problem with landing. US P-36s also had problems with landing gear attachments and wing skin buckling around the landing gear.
How much of the weight increase was to handle the flight load/s and how much was to fix the landing gear problem/s I don't know. P-40E and up gained about another 100lbs in the wings, higher gross weight.
When the US went to war it did so in areas thousands of Kilometers from the factories. Spare aircraft or spare parts were going to take a lot longer to get to where they were needed and cost a lot more (fuel and manpower) to get them there.
The US had started testing their engines (commercial and military) to a 150 hr endurance test instead of the 100 hours most of the rest of world used in 1936 (?) which meant that US engines were a little heavier than other engines during the 1930s and early 40s.
Now once you get to a crappy airfield in the North African dessert or some of the Jungle airfields or coral Islands US endurance testing is sort of useless but only sort of. An engine that limped though a European test (there were different standards on how many full power hours and how many parts could be replace) trying to operate in the same environment as a US 150 hour engine (with a few allowances) might show a similar life span, roughly 2/3rds ???
British had problem. Flying out of England, close to the Factories, had the best conditions (on average) for engine life compared to flying out of North Africa or the Far East and with the Med shut down sending spare aircraft/parts/engines around Africa was real logistics problem.
Japan had a problem also but is about 2800-2900 miles from Japan to Rabaul and around 6000 miles from San Francisco to Henderson Field.
Not saying that either county designed aircraft with those specific transport distances in mind but the US was more mindful than most that logistics was going to be a major factor in any war the US got involved with.

Some things just sort of happened. The US was figuring out how to make protected tanks and fit armor/BP glass during much of 1940. Sometimes it didn't make it into some the planes until 1941 and while the US figured it would have to fight Japan at some point they didn't know when or what planes they would have and they didn't know that the Japanese would fail to follow the world trend and not fit protection to many of their aircraft for 2-3 years after most other nations did. US pilots sometimes took guns/ammo and fuel out to increase performance. I don't think they ever took out armor/BP glass.
Perhaps the US overbuilt considering the amount of time a fighter or it's engine or it's guns would last on average in combat. But if you go too light you are loosing more equipment to mechanical attrition than to combat and accidents.

Every air force and point to planes that were lost to a single 7.5-7.9mm bullet (the Golden BB) and to planes that came home with several hundred holes and/or major pieces missing. Both are the exceptions and trying to figure out 'average' damage that was survivable takes a lot more time, information and computer power than I have.

I will note the Odyssey of the US 1st Pursuit Group in Dec 1941 to June/July 1942.

Dec 7th the Group is at Selfridge Field Michigan and is ordered to San Diego to guard against the Japanese.
Dec 8th the first aircraft arrive in San Diego, about 2000 miles straight line. Entire group (including ground elements) arrives Dec 22nd.
At least one squadron had been in El Paso Texas.
The 2st stays at San Diego until April 15th when it is decided to send the 1st to England and for them to fly across the Atlantic. The 1st is to get brand new P-38Fs from the factory prepared for the trip. The Group heads east to New England. and then is told to fly west after Midway. They are stopped in North Carolina and then sent sent north to Bangor Maine. By June 18th the 1st Pursuit group has it's full compliment of P-38s at Bangor. June 23 sees the first P-38s fly out of Presque Isle Maine to Goose Bay Labrador.
The US was sort of used to deployments that covered several thousand miles.
By the late 30s they were operating trans-continental air services several departures per day. It took about 15-17 hours and took 3 refueling stops.
The US Airlines were demanding reliable, long lived engines.

An excellent thread concept and it will be very interesting to see where it goes.

About the only comment I will make before I go read the rest of the thread is that the English Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah engine was already approved for a 1,200 hour time between overhauls prior to ww2 and was the first engine in the world to be approved for that TBO. Even 30 years later the Pratt R-985 and 1340 were 800 hour engines in Canada. I cannot remember their US TBO so I expect it was the same.

 

[MiTasol]

The Spitfire and Bf109 undercarriage attached to the fuselage.

As always a great summary Geoffrey however there is one error. Unusual but we all make them unfortunately.

S Shortround6 -- No, the Spitfire did not have a stubwing that the gear attached to. That photo is of a Spitfire with the wings sawn off outboard of the gear. What some may call a stubwing was that the front spar, and only the front spar, sticks out the side of the fuselage a short distance.

The Spitfire landing gear is attached to the wing outboard of the fuselage virtually at the point where the wing spars are bent to provide dihedral. Like the 109 the gear is at an angle which means the track changes as the struts compress and extend which does not make handling easy, especially on rough runways.

 

[MiTasol]

Half of this forum says the losses admitted by the other side are the REAL losses and that the pilots massively overclaim. That is directly because they can't agree on the definition of a loss or a victory. Many are quite ready to be venomous about it.

GregP and S Steamed_Banana both have valid points but both ignore the fact that the definition of a loss CAN vary considerably.

If an aircraft returns to base but is beyond economic repair (BER) is that a loss or not?

If an aircraft returns to base but the ground crew decide to convert it to spares because they have a critical shortage of one or more parts that are damaged on that aircraft is that a loss or not?

If an aircraft returns to base but the ground crew decide to convert it to spares because they have a critical shortage of one or more parts that are broken on one or more other aircraft but are serviceable on this one and it is easier to fix the other aircraft is that a loss or not?

I would say yes to all three examples but what did the military of the day say - especially considering morale issues. I strongly suspect that so long as the aircraft landed and some of crew walked away it was not called a loss because that would lower morale. Given losses were reported by the press to say, as an example 90% of our aircraft returned does not reflect the reality that X% never flew again as that serial.

Look at Spitfire production numbers as a classic example. Almost every BER that contained useable parts was "re-manufactured" (often as a different Mk) and given a new serial. I would almost bet that the official aircraft losses never recorded those because officially the flew again.

 

[Shortround6]

S Shortround6 -- No, the Spitfire did not have a stubwing that the gear attached to. That photo is of a Spitfire with the wings sawn off outboard of the gear. What some may call a stubwing was that the front spar, and only the front spar, sticks out the side of the fuselage a short distance.

Thank you.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

GregP and S Steamed_Banana both have valid points but both ignore the fact that the definition of a loss CAN vary considerably.

If an aircraft returns to base but is beyond economic repair (BER) is that a loss or not?

If an aircraft returns to base but the ground crew decide to convert it to spares because they have a critical shortage of one or more parts that are damaged on that aircraft is that a loss or not?

If an aircraft returns to base but the ground crew decide to convert it to spares because they have a critical shortage of one or more parts that are broken on one or more other aircraft but are serviceable on this one and it is easier to fix the other aircraft is that a loss or not?

Again, I don't think it's really that complicated because you just need to pick a set of criteria and stick with it (and apply it equally).

When counting these things you will do so with different priorities. There is a certain value to simply knocking enemy aircraft out of the sky, and there is a certain value to causing attrition damage so that enemy aircraft and crew are diminished. These overlap pretty closely but they are measured differently and from different data. Which matters more can depend on the Theater.

For example in the midst of a specific battle - like the attempted troop ship landing during the Battle of the Bismark Sea, or a convoy fight, or any carrier battle, the first definition is what really matters. In the case of a long grinding attrition war, you might make a case for the second.

Different honest people could come up with slightly different numbers using different criteria but I don't think it will vary that much (again, if we are being honest).

I personally go by aircraft which were 1) shot down, 2) missing / failed to return from battle 3) force / crash landed not at a base, or 4) force landed at their own or a friendly base and were immediately written off.

Some damaged aircraft might not be repaired or might even, with minimal damage, end up captured or destroyed in a subsequent strafing or bombing attack etc., but that is not the same thing as being "shot down" IMO. Either way, anyone counting these kinds of losses just needs to be clear up front about what criteria they are using. And also just be clear how many of each category you are talking about. 4 Lost, 3 crash landed, 1 missing, 6 damaged etc.

I would say yes to all three examples but what did the military of the day say - especially considering morale issues. I strongly suspect that so long as the aircraft landed and some of crew walked away it was not called a loss because that would lower morale. Given losses were reported by the press to say, as an example 90% of our aircraft returned does not reflect the reality that X% never flew again as that serial.

Look at Spitfire production numbers as a classic example. Almost every BER that contained useable parts was "re-manufactured" (often as a different Mk) and given a new serial. I would almost bet that the official aircraft losses never recorded those because officially the flew again.

Per definition #1 above, if it landed and wasn't immediately written off, it wasn't "shot down", IMO. It was damaged, and that counts for something, but it's not the same thing.

 

[GregP]

GregP and S Steamed_Banana both have valid points but both ignore the fact that the definition of a loss CAN vary considerably.

If an aircraft returns to base but is beyond economic repair (BER) is that a loss or not?

If an aircraft returns to base but the ground crew decide to convert it to spares because they have a critical shortage of one or more parts that are damaged on that aircraft is that a loss or not?

If an aircraft returns to base but the ground crew decide to convert it to spares because they have a critical shortage of one or more parts that are broken on one or more other aircraft but are serviceable on this one and it is easier to fix the other aircraft is that a loss or not?

I would say yes to all three examples but what did the military of the day say - especially considering morale issues. I strongly suspect that so long as the aircraft landed and some of crew walked away it was not called a loss because that would lower morale. Given losses were reported by the press to say, as an example 90% of our aircraft returned does not reflect the reality that X% never flew again as that serial.

Look at Spitfire production numbers as a classic example. Almost every BER that contained useable parts was "re-manufactured" (often as a different Mk) and given a new serial. I would almost bet that the official aircraft losses never recorded those because officially the flew again.

I definitely haven't ignored that concept; have broughyt it up in at least 10 threads.

One man's loss is another man's operational mishap. Same for victories ... there are as many definitions as we have members.

It is exactly why complaining about overclaiming and exaggerated losses can be fraught with argument, precisely because the definitions of a victory and a loss are taken for granted by the poster in most cases to be what HE (or she) thinks they are, and are considered differently by the reader.

I've gone into this so many times, I won't in here; perhaps in a dedicated thread for it.

Suffice to say I am not one to jump on the overclaiming bandwagon and do not believe loss lists are the primary source for correct loss totals. They are, in fact, only what that particular country admits to losing. Many times there are reasons why they refuse to admit major losses.

Does anyone really believe there is an accurate loss list for the battle of Stalingrad? Who was keeping it and how did they communicate with all units when everyone on both sides reports being cut off and in confusion? Somehow, accurate reporting of lost aircraft seems like a low priority when you are running for your life. That is very far from the only example, as everyone in here, including people who tout loss lists as accurate sources, knows.

Will discuss it anytime. Will not argue about it and get unpleasant about something we likely can't pin down to anyone's satisfaction, ever. Books after about the late 1970s usually quote sources that themsleves quoted sources from earlier books that may or may NOT have quoted from primary sources. If they did, the primary sources are not compreshensive because, to date, there is no comprehensive source for losses or victories that has been identified.

Cheers.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I definitely haven't ignored that concept; have broughyt it up in at least 10 threads.

One man's loss is another man's operational mishap. Same for victories ... there are as many definitions as we have members.

Even if you assumed maximum divergence on interpretation, there is simply not that much wiggle room. When each side claims 10 enemy aircraft, and actually losses were one missing on one side and two damaged (but were flying the next day) on the other, it really tells a fairly clear story, at least in broad strokes.

It is exactly why complaining about overclaiming and exaggerated losses can be fraught with argument, precisely because the definitions of a victory and a loss are taken for granted by the poster in most cases to be what HE (or she) thinks they are, and are considered differently by the reader.

I certainly don't complain about it personally. Who would I complain too? But I know some have.

I've gone into this so many times, I won't in here; perhaps in a dedicated thread for it.

Suffice to say I am not one to jump on the overclaiming bandwagon and do not believe loss lists are the primary source for correct loss totals. They are, in fact, only what that particular country admits to losing. Many times there are reasons why they refuse to admit major losses.

Even bad people needed to know how many assets they still had in their own war machine.

Does anyone really believe there is an accurate loss list for the battle of Stalingrad? Who was keeping it and how did they communicate wityh all units when everyone on both side rports being cut off and in confusion? Somehow, accurate reporting of lost aircraft seems like a low priority when youa re running for you life. That is very far from the only example, as everyone in here, including people who tout loss lists as accurate sources, knows.

There were certainly points where "fog of war" is thicker than usual. But even in Stalingrad, they know how many aircraft they sent into combat and how many they had left each day.

Will discuss it anytime. Will not argue about it and get unpleasant about something we likely can't pin down to anyone's satisfaction, ever. Books after about the late 1970s usually quote sourcers that themsleves quoted sources from earlier books that may or may NOT have quoted from primary sources. If they did, the primary sources are not compreshensive because, to date, there is no comprehensive source for losses or victories that has been identified.

I think that's really the issue. Books in the last 15 years or so have been written based on new research and precisely going to the actual primary sources again, which is getting much easier than it was in the 70s, due to the internet and partly due to AI.

Cheers.

 

[GregP]

Even if you assumed maximum divergence on interpretation, there is simply not that much wiggle room. When each side claims 10 enemy aircraft, and actually losses were one missing on one side and two damaged (but were flying the next day) on the other, it really tells a fairly clear story, at least in broad strokes.



I certainly don't complain about it personally. Who would I complain too? But I know some have.



Even bad people needed to know how many assets they still had in their own war machine.



There were certainly points where "fog of war" is thicker than usual. But even in Stalingrad, they know how many aircraft they sent into combat and how many they had left each day.



I think that's really the issue. Books in the last 15 years or so have been written based on new research and precisely going to the actual primary sources again, which is getting much easier than it was in the 70s, due to the internet and partly due to AI.

OK.

Let's say that I say "if you shoot an enemy airplane out of a fight, and he does not retun to that fight, you get a victory."

You shoot 3 airplanes out of a fight. They went down below the cloud layer smoking, didn't crash, but left trailing smoke and flew back to their base without ever returning to the fight. One of them is written off for spares, but made it home, and so was never put on any loss list, but it doesn't reutrn to combat. The other two are repaired and return the next day to fight, but obviously are also not on any loss list from the day before, despite being shot out of the fight.

By my definition, the pilot had 3 victories, but the enemy admited no losses and, 70 years later, YOU are telling ME that there were no losses while I am happy to award 3 victories by my definition of a vcitory.

It happened almost exactly tghat way in many cases.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

OK.

Let's say that I say "if you shoot an enemy airplane out of a fight, and he does not retun to that fight, you get a victory."

IMO, if you were credited in wartime with the victory, you get the victory. The actual losses are a separate number, which can be calculated different ways (and this is definitely not how I would do that, but how to make that determination is up for debate). Just knowing the actual losses vs the credited claims, tells us as historians and amateur enthusiasts a lot about what really happened during the war. Because even if we used your criteria, the actual loss numbers are always far different from the claims.

But as long as you pick a criteria and stick with it, that part is simple.

Reconciling the two (credited victories vs actual losses by the other side) is going to be tricky, and I don't think fully resolvable.

In other words, if a P-38 squadron and two F4U squadrons and a P-39 squadron and two Wildcat squadrons and two different P-40 units engaged a large number of A6Ms and G4Ms over the same little island, and claimed 25 victories (confirmed / credited), but the actual losses were 7 A6M and 7 G4M for 14 total, as happened in one of the battles in the Pacific Adversaries book that Jobbin was talking about, then we know something new about what happened. And to me that is very interesting. Determining which of those units deserve the credit is a lot trickier in that kind of complex situation.

On the other hand, if a P-38 squadron engaged with an A6M squadron and claimed 10 but only 3 A6M were lost, we do know which unit got them, though we will still probably never know which pilot really deserves the credit. For this reason I think we should just maintain the two different numbers in the record. Currently we focus on the claims and mostly ignore the real losses which i think it incorrect, but increasingly I'm seeing some analysis (including in film and videos) where the actual losses are mentioned, so the reader or viewer can kind of mentally reconcile these in their own mind.

You shoot 3 airplanes out of a fight. They went down below the cloud layer smoking, didn't crash, but left trailing smoke and flew back top their base without ever returning to the fight. One of them is written off for spares, but made it home, and so was never put on anyloss list, but it doesn't reutrn to combat. The other two are repaired and return the next day to fight, but obviously are also not on any loss list fromn the day before, despite being shot out of the fight.

Those will be noted. What also happens is that a fighter pilot shot at an enemy plane, later saw it or quite possibly another plane smoking, and maybe later sees a mysterious circular splash shape in the sea. Claims it as a victory. So does another pilot from the same unit. And so does the AAA gunners on a ship down below. And so do the defensive gunners on a bomber that plane was attacking. In reality, that aircraft may have gone down in the battle area (and possibly due to gunfire from any combination of the four parties that made a claim on it), it may have returned to base damaged, it may have returned and then been written off right away, or it may have been smoking just because it the pilot was firewalling the throttle trying to escape. He may have left the fight because he was low on ammunition or because he was outnumbered and feared for his life. I don't think you can automatically assign a victory in that circumstance, though I also don't believe it changes the numbers as much as you may think it does which means it's not as significant as you may assume.

By my definition, the pilot had 3 victories, but the enemy admited no losses and, 70 years later, YOU are telling ME that there were no losses while I am happy to award 3 victories by my definition of a vcitory.

It happened almost exactly tghat way in many cases.

It happened that in many cases, the pilots on the other side returned to base with no or very minimal damage and their planes were flying again the next day. This, by the way, also works both ways. It's not just Allied pilots who overclaimed.

I would say if you want to keep damaged aircraft in mind, you can do that and keep it as part of the story: "25 were claimed, 14 were really lost, 3 damaged". You can also, if you really want to, trace the ultimate fate of these aircraft in many cases because they had serial numbers and these were traced. I think going that route gets a bit too complicated and introduces too many variables but if you wanted to you could do it, and nobody should try to force you not to.

Forgive me if I'm reading too much into your posts, but it seems like you are tying to find a way to dismiss this type of data, when I think you might find that embracing and exploring it will be very rewarding and interesting. The book has not in fact been closed on this war like some thought or claimed it has. The story is much more complex and interesting.

 

[GregP]

I think that you are not doing anything wrong or illogical.

My entire point has always been that the definitions of a victory and a loss need to very carefully worded because NOT thinking about it can easily result in victories awarded or not awarded or losses that were real or not.

I have no desire to award a victory that was not earned, but I also do not believe a pilot who very reasonably shoots an enemy from the sky should not be awarded credit for same. I do not have great faith in loss lists.

I was an electrial engineer working for Motorola in the 1980s and we produced the proximity fuze and Target Detecting Device (TDD) for Navy Standard Missile. We tracked each and every unit by serial number and country it went to. I programmed a tracking software on a computer to keep the status of each one by serial number.

We had a new commander at one of the West Coast Navy Depots who decided to beautify his post and he had people mow lawns and spruce up the base. In one area, there were two old, rusty railroad cars that were sitting on a siding just outside of the base fence. He called the military police and had them come over and cut the locks from the railroad cars and opened them.

There were 10 fully assembled Navy Standard Missiles in crates, five to a car inside. Naturally, EVERYONE was curious how they came to be there unguarded and unaccounted for. In due course, I got asked about the histories of the TDDs / prox fuzes. All 10 were listed as "expended in test" in my database. After an investigation, it turned out that, at one point, someone had requested an inventory of the weapons, and various people had responded to that request. When these 10 could not be located, they got classified as "expended in test."

That way, though they could not be physically located, they were accounted for in the inventory. It's not widespread, but sometimes these things happen. People tend to account for their tasks. As it turned out, we took those missiles and shot them in test! Nobody wanted to pay for refurbhishing them and reissuing them to some unit. They all worked!

Also back in the 1970s, I was in the USAF. After the first oil crisis, we had our hangars set to 78°F and, to make sure nobody fooled with the settings, they sent facilities around to put clear plastic boxes around the thremostats to make it impossible for us to fool with them.

They did NOT say we could not put a shelf under the thermostat, however. So, we simply mounted a shelf about 2 feet under the thermostat and put a candle on the shelf that made hot air rise into and through the thermostat box. Our office was cool. We removed the candle when someone was coming down the fairly remote hallway, and nobody ever caught on.

Moral of the stories above is: people find a workaround to account for their jobs and to make themselves comfortable, even in wartime. Reports are not necessarily always accurate, but they usually acount for the items supposed to be accounted for. I'm very skeptical of reports that cover the wartime loss of an airfield lost to the other side. It's a simple way to account for many accounting sins of the recent or not-so-recent past. Abandoning a base is fraught with, "I'm not really sure what we left behind, but here is an accurate list of it." The count can be short or too big, and nobody really questions it since there is no way to really check it during the war.

Add up the definitions of a victory and a loss and some percentage of inaccurate reports, and you get numbers that don't add up accurately and likely never will.

Cheers.

 

[beers]

Some of the 15th Air Force 1945 monthly reports have Engine Change Reports, graphs of average running time per aircraft engine changed. generally speaking the R-1830 radials in the B-24 and the R-1820 radials in the B-17 had at least an average of 300 hours running when changed, few had 400, with the R-1820 ahead, most having 350 or more hours. Overhauled engines usually had around half the average hours of new engines. The V-1650 Merlins and the V-1710 Allisons usually averaged over 200 hours, few made it to 300 until March/April. Overhauled Allisons were around half the new engine hours, overhauled Merlins more like a quarter. In civil service the radials lasted several times longer between overhauls.

Maybe a naive question in all this, but why ARE radials generally more reliable than inlines? You'd think efforts in the automotive segment would have translated pretty well into making more reliable aviation inlines, while radials didn't benefit from this at all (I don't think anyone was putting radials in cars) and they at least look much more complex with long, exposed pushrods, many cylinder heads, and the 'master rod' in the center of the crankcase negotiating all 7 or 9 cylinders attached to it.
But whether here with trustworthy data or in common anecdotes, it really seems that in wartime you'd want nothing but radials if you have models you can adapt to your needs - (apparently) they are easier to build, are lighter, and more resilient against battle damage than a comparable inline; all for a modest, but not impossible to overcome, increase in drag and frontal area (with the indirect benefit of forcing those pesky aircraft manufacturers to make cockpits for an entire person and not just 80% of one).

 

[GregP]

It was stated above thath the loss lists should be accurate becasue "even bad people need to know how many assets they still had in their own war machine.."

You don't really get that from loss lists, even if you are the bad guy in charge. You get that from inventory on hand by unit reports. The inventory on hand by unit reports take into account losses, aircraft struck off charge for various reasons, and other factors. Included among them are aircraft that are techically on hand, but unavailable due to being down and waiting for parts before they can fly. Losses are only one number for planes that are unavailable for missions.

 

[swampyankee]

Maybe a naive question in all this, but why ARE radials generally more reliable than inlines? You'd think efforts in the automotive segment would have translated pretty well into making more reliable aviation inlines, while radials didn't benefit from this at all (I don't think anyone was putting radials in cars) and they at least look much more complex with long, exposed pushrods, many cylinder heads, and the 'master rod' in the center of the crankcase negotiating all 7 or 9 cylinders attached to it.
But whether here with trustworthy data or in common anecdotes, it really seems that in wartime you'd want nothing but radials if you have models you can adapt to your needs - (apparently) they are easier to build, are lighter, and more resilient against battle damage than a comparable inline; all for a modest, but not impossible to overcome, increase in drag and frontal area (with the indirect benefit of forcing those pesky aircraft manufacturers to make cockpits for an entire person and not just 80% of one).

My suspicion is that US radials were derived from commercial aircraft designs, while most aviation V-12s were military in origin, and armed forces, in peacetime, use their aircraft much less than airlines. This is probably starker today, as, from the specs I've read, military aircraft operate only about four hundred hours per year, while commercial ones in airline service operate about ten times that.

I don't know how applicable the above is to non-US engines.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

It was stated above thath the loss lists should be accurate becasue "even bad people need to know how many assets they still had in their own war machine.."

You don't really get that from loss lists, even if you are the bad guy in charge. You get that from inventory on hand by unit reports. The inventory on hand by unit reports take into accounbt losses, aircrfaft struck off charge for varuious reasons, and other factors. Included among them are aircraft that are techically on hand, but unavailable due to being down and waiting for parts before they can fly. Losses are only one number for planes thath are unavailable for missions.

You wrote an interesting post along these lines related to your military experience, which I meant to reply to but lost in the shuffle between all these threads and couldn't find it. So here is that reply, hopefully you remember the post.

Let me say that i get your point. I was in the military too, and I have experienced first hand the type of 'creative bookeeping' and also just institutional blunders and dysfunction that you are alluding to. I've seen equipment move around miraculously, appear and disappear etc. We used to have a thing called the "E4 Mafia" and it gets more creative and daring as you go up the chain of command from there.

However, while these are all very real factors especially in wartime, I don't they can account for the scenarios under discussion.

When 16 A6Ms encounter 10 F4Us and each side claims 10 'confirmed victories', but then the next day ... 16 A6Ms and 10 F4Us still fly the next mission, all the pilots are still alive, the serial numbers on the tail are still the same, and we know no new ones were delivered yet, it stretches credulity that somehow 10 planes (or even 9, or 5, or 3) were put back together out of parts or a damaged / crippled plane was repaired etc. overnight. Or in a week.

You might have some stuff going on creatively around the margins. I have noted that there are some stretches of time and certain places for example where the Japanese didn't record lost aircraft, just lost pilots and aircrew. But the thing is here, lost aircraft and lost aircrew corresponded quite closely for the Japanese. Sometimes pretty closely for the Allies as well but not always. In several of the battles Claringbould describes in Pacific Profiles title covering the USMC F4U battles in 1943, and in most of his other ones, there is a major discrepancy between dead crews for the IJN and JAAF vs the US and Aussies etc. In one of the battles Claringbould highlights in that book, each side lost 9 aircraft, but all of the Allied pilots survived and were rescued, whereas all of the Japanese pilots died.

Bottom line, I just don't see enough wiggle room to make any major difference sufficient to give lie to the new figures.

There is clearly some room to interpret how to match up claims vs losses - I think Claringbould actually does lean far into an overcorrection in how he matches up the claims vs losses, but he gives us the actual losses and (usually) the actual claims. (And where he doesn't give us the precise claims we can find those easily enough from other sources). So we can decide how to interpret those ourselves. As I've said a few times, i think there are a few ways to try to do that, closing that loop is probably impossible in many cases. The best practice is surely to retain and report both numbers.

But I don't think you can make the claims 'real' by claiming losses were covered up or faked.

You might have a 5-10% margin difference in actual losses vs reported, due to repairs and hiding aircraft that are acquired by one means or another. But that gets a lot harder to do for pilots. Aircraft have serial numbers, pilots have names and faces and families. They have billets, they take rations every day. They have a big footprint. I know deaths can and were also covered up to varying degrees in wartime, but you can't have non existent pilots flying missions, and when they only had say 15 pilots to begin with, you aren't going to be grabbing a monkey from the trees and putting flight goggles on them and sending them out on a mission for you.