Interesting discussion! I had a few thoughts nobody will probably care about but I will post them anyway....
On the point in the OP
- The OP has a good point. I think 'stretch' was a fairly common tactic both in substantial revisions of old designs and in new ones. Not universal but by no means unusual. Even the Spitfire was stretched.
- I think the main reason for the stretch however is for improved stability, which became needed with increased speed and power, such as during takeoff and also hard maneuvering.
- Fuel tanks seemed to do best when placed between engine and cockpit, in the central part of the wings, or beneath the cockpit in roughly that order. Fuel tanks behind the pilot seemed to frequently cause stability problems when full (though they could still be used anyway for long range flights).
Conversely I believe a lot of very short (and often overly fat) aircraft, particularly early war fighters, suffered some stability issues as a result. The I-15 / I-16 series are one good example. The Bloch 152 is I think another as is the Brewster F2A Buffalo. However the trend of some shorter and also smaller planes did also exist as previously mentioned (Bearcat etc.)
Since guns and fuel were best put between the engine and cockpit there was a limit to how far you could push the cockpit backward that limited how much 'stretch' could help. Some, when it came to adding a bigger supercharger or for ammunition storage for example. But not too much.
Limitations of Japanese fighters
I think the biggest problems with Japanese fighters and aircraft more generally was with engines. I believe like the Russians and Italians and all the lesser powers, they struggled with engine design most of all. At the end of the 30's nearly every advanced nation proved capable of making the modern standard of fighter planes: single-engined, closed cockpit, cantilever winged monoplanes with at least partly stressed metal skin*, closed cockpit, and retractable landing gear. Small countries like Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Romania made reasonably good planes - engines were the single most difficult stumbling block for most. When you read the design history of countless planes problems with the new or anticipated engines were so routine as to be almost inevitable - even in the UK, Germany or the US but especially in every other country.
The Soviets struggled with derivations of the Hispano Suiza 12Y or whatever and until nearly the end of the war their inline engines were rarely capable of more than 1,200 or 1,300 HP so to improve performance they had to keep their fighters very light and therefore small. Only their Shvestov M-82 radial enabled them to break out into heavy duty horsepower (which is perhaps why they loved the La 5 series so much). The Italians just had to adopt German DB 600 series engines.
In Japan they
did make much more powerful engines than the 800 or 900 hp motors they started the war with (up to 2,000 hp and more eventually), they just couldn't make more powerful engines
that could reliably work and be maintained onboard aircraft carriers or dusty, humid, squalid island revetments. So to speak only of fighters the Ki-44 (early 1942), J2M (Dec 1942), and Ki-61 (early 1943) did arrive in time to potentially make a difference in the war. They were not available in huge numbers but many of the key battles in the Pacific were fought with surprisingly few aircraft. The float plane version of the N1K1 also arrived in 1943, and there were some innovative and highly capable Japanese bomber types arriving around the same time as well. But problems with their engines, both on the production side and in terms of maintenance in the field were so crippling that these aircraft were produced at a slow rate and had a very low availability ratio. So if you have 100 new planes that are pretty good, but can only field 20 at a time and then half of them have to turn around en-route to the target, you really have no benefit.
Furthermore trying to fix teething problems with engines slowed down both engine and aircraft production & development and is a large part of the reason why so many more very promising Japanese aircraft which flew in say 1941 or 1942 didn't make into combat until late 1944 or 1945 (and then only in small numbers), when it was clearly too late.
Japanese aircraft and armor
My understanding is that the Japanese fighters and some of the bombers arriving mid-war did have armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. Can somebody clarify about the N1K1? I thought it had armor too. The problem was that the Japanese didn't have a robust system for pilot rescue and recovery. Armor in an aircraft served two purposes. One was Tactical - to enable the aircraft to survive being hit and keep fighting- maybe still win in spite of a few bullet holes. Japanese fighters such as the A6M5 had that. The other was Strategic / Attritional: for the aircraft though basically smashed up, to remain flyable long enough for the pilot to bail out, ditch or crash-land. Read the personal histories of German or Russian aces in WW2, or any Ace who fought for a very long period of time - you will find almost inevitably that they were shot down multiple times, but survived to return to base and fight again and again. On the Russian Front for both sides this was accomplished mainly by the air combat being right next to the front line and a relatively lucky pilot being able to make his way to friendly troops. In the West you had the Resistance plus air-sea rescue.
In the Pacific though due to the vast distances over water you needed a
very robust dedicated air-sea rescue system. Even a moderately damaged aircraft often faced a very long flight back to base, often through dangerous weather, in a challenging navigational environment and near the limits of their fuel / range. The Americans and ANZAC forces had life jackets, they had dinghy's in their combat planes, most importantly they had fleets of PBY, OS2U, Lockheed Hudsons, Sunderlands, later PB4Y as well as submarines and PT boats and the like assigned to rescue and recovery duties. The Japanese never really had this in place as a system (even though they had submarines and some great seaplanes and flying boats that could do the job), they famously had a hard time even getting pilots to wear parachutes. The notion of a pilot who was defeated still being worth keeping as a pilot was also slow to realization for the IJA and IJN.
So without a recovery system in other words most shot down Japanese pilots, even if they survived the destruction or crippling of their aircraft, ended up POW, MIA, or KIA, whereas a large number of Anglo-American / ANZAC pilots survived being shot down (sometimes two and three times) and were able to keep fighting. In part due to the armor and self-sealing fuel tanks on their aircraft, but in part due to that air-sea rescue system. Even when the Japanese caught up in this area, they still lacked the pilot recovery infrastructure or system to get the greatest benefit out of it in terms of attrition warfare.
* almost always some kind of duralumin or the equivalent in some kind of wartime-expedient advanced plywood