Fine points there.
We might see that failure of the IV-1430 was never mentioned in the article, yet Arnold's condemning comments about US engines' manufacturers can be read easily:
In late 1942, both UK and Germany were trying to develop the engines that were neither small, nor light (Sabre, Griffon, Centaurus, DB-603, Jumo 213/222, BMW-802). The USAC/USAF never put much faith before 1942 in two-stage engines either - why all of the sudden accusing the manufacturers for not designing the stuff the main costumer isn't asking for? If there was no USN and P&W cooperation, the P&W 2-stage ('highly supercharged') engines would've likely never existed. Even Wright produced 2-stage variant of the R-2600, though just as prototype (prototypes?).
Contrary to that, USAC/USAF favored turbo, and that does not mean small, and by extension, does not mean light. Insistence for turbo meant that engine-stage compressors were of modest size, too.
That is dated as of "3 November 1941".
The R-2800 was at that time (and any other time) a far better engine than BMW-801. In late 1941, the lack of fuel injection was not a thing holding back the R-2600, but a better layout of exhaust, that was solved mid-war. The 801 was somewhat smaller, but R-2600 was far more reliable, despite some Curtiss muddling.
Here is the reply (dated 11 December 1942) from P&W to the Arnold's accusations of 14 October 1942, a footnote from same web site:
The BMW 801 enjoyed an inflated reputation early in the war due to the reputation of the FW 190. Certainly, the FW 190 engine installation was advanced in some respects and fuel injection did avoid problems being encountered with larger engines, such as mixture uniformity.
It may be that Arnold was well aware of the shortcomings of the US engines, both real and imagined, while being unaware of the growing difficulties the Germans were finding themselves in.