Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
I'm Johnny come lately to this party, but it strikes me that the title and the very premise of this thread radiates retrospectoscopism. Prior to Dec 7, I don't think the Empire had a true enough appreciation of the immediacy of the Japanese threat to pay outrageous prices for "substandard" fighters on the off chance they might be needed in the far east. After Dec 7, it was moot, as Uncle Sam wasn't letting anything go that he might need in the post-Pearl scramble.
Cheers,
Wes
I'm Johnny come lately to this party, but it strikes me that the title and the very premise of this thread radiates retrospectoscopism. Prior to Dec 7, I don't think the Empire had a true enough appreciation of the immediacy of the Japanese threat to pay outrageous prices for "substandard" fighters on the off chance they might be needed in the far east. After Dec 7, it was moot, as Uncle Sam wasn't letting anything go that he might need in the post-Pearl scramble.
Cheers,
Wes
Put yourself in Frankie boy's shoes. He was enough of a geostrategist to realize Japanese ambitions had to be reined in and conflict was inevitable, but how to convince a contentious, suspicious, isolationist nation of the reality of the danger? I'm sure he realized that sanctions would force the Japanese into a corner where they would have to take overt aggressive action that would awake and unify a reluctant America. (Sound familiar?) The gamble was, where would the blow fall? I bet the conventional wisdom suggested Manila, not Honolulu.Hi Wes,
This rang a bell about reading some online ''intelligence report'' sent by the Brits to FDR about the Japanese readying their fleet?
There is a theory floating around somewhere that says FDR knew about it and decided to let things happen (?)
(Apologies for straying off topic).
In regards to the Europe first policy, please keep in mind that fighting across the Atlantic was far more realistic than trying to move across the Pacific. The USN Fleet Train did not exist yet and there was no way that the Navy had enough assets in early 1942 to go fight, stick around, and take control of the sea, let alone the resources to resupply.
When the US came back to the Philippines in '44 the Fleet Train consisted of 34 AO (oilers), 11 CVE, 19 DD, 26 DE, and a bunch of ocean going tugs. That was just to keep the fleet fueled, that doesn't include the ammo ships and other misc. auxiliaries needed to actually feed the crews and guns. The Fleet Train finished the war at around 400 ships.
It was easier to fight the U-Boat logistically in 1942 than it was to cross the Pacific.
"Yup, nuthin' but a bunch o' mean, stupid monkeys. Gas 'em!!"I believe the plan was to poison gas the cities there.
I think you're right, except I think it was the total of seaplane AND submarine tenders that equaled the total (all classes) of carriers.Then there were the seaplane tenders. IIRC as many built as carriers.
After the Gottage patrol, any ideas of adhering to the Geneva Conventions pretty much went out the window with the rank and file Marine."Yup, nuthin' but a bunch o' mean, stupid monkeys. Gas 'em!!"
The Tender be it for Subs, Destroyers, or Seaplanes was essential for support. Something our current Navy apparently has forgot.I think you're right, except I think it was the total of seaplane AND submarine tenders that equaled the total (all classes) of carriers.
Cheers,
Wes
Hey fubar57,
In my mind I am running around like Minime in Austin Powers going "Eeeee! Eeeee!" at the thought that we even considered such gas attacks. Thanks for the info (I think) plus more fodder for nightmares.
Eeeee!......Eeeee!
Eeeee!
Well, the P-400s largely went to the Pacific, but the Lockheed 322 without combat ready fuel tanks or armor were deemed unsuitable for combat even by AAF and only the improved P-38E went to operational units before December 7, 1941. The only things that made the E more suitable were the counter rotating Allisons, the armor plate and self sealing internal fuel tanks. The first kits to install plumbing and external fuel tanks were also tested on, and available for the P-38E - and installed on the subsequent F-4. AAC doctrine in 1941/1942 prohibited ferry tanks from combat operations save the F-4.I started this thread because of the other thread suggesting us Brits should have taken the Lightning for use in Europe. IMO, the RAF had no practical use for them there. However, the Pacific is another story. It's virtually undefended. Both our cancelled Cobras and Lightning's could have been put to good use there from early 1942.
Just my opinion but I think the Brits could have put Lightnings to good use in Europe.I started this thread because of the other thread suggesting us Brits should have taken the Lightning for use in Europe. IMO, the RAF had no practical use for them there. However, the Pacific is another story. It's virtually undefended. Both our cancelled Cobras and Lightning's could have been put to good use there from early 1942.
Yes, the later Lightnings might have been useful to them, but the Lightnings they bought were a non starter for all the reasons pointed out earlier in this and other threads. And what mission would it have fulfilled? The 322 was no night fighter, so bomber escort was out. With no protection it wasn't really suited to low altitude rhubarbs over Europe or against the Afrika Korps. It might have made a good combat trainer if there were actual combat-worthy P38s to send pilots to. But no joy there either.Just my opinion but I think the Brits could have put Lightnings to good use in Europe.
A high performance fighter with good range was really the only hole in their arsenal. No?